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This thesis starts from the consideration that law, mainly but not exclusively 
immigration law, can disproportionally and negatively affect immigrant 
women’s enjoyment of their rights in conditions of equality with both immigrant 
men and citizen women. These perverse effects are equally evident in the fields 
of family life and in that of employment. In the light of this observation, the aim 
of this thesis is twofold. On the one hand, it seek to verify the presence of such 
gendered shortcomings in apparently neutral norms applicable to immigrant 
women in the European legal space, both at European and domestic level. On 
the other hand, and most importantly, it aims to verify the transformative 
potential of human and fundamental rights law in this area, exploring the 
beneficial effects as well as the defects of this source per se and in its judicial 
application vis-à-vis biased norms applicable to immigrant women.  
In order to pursue this objective, this thesis explores three different levels of 
protection and enforcement of immigrant women’s human and fundamental 
rights in the European legal space. Chapter 1 is devoted to the human rights 
framework established by the Council of Europe, with a special focus on the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Chapter 2 discusses European 
fundamental rights law, with main reference to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms of the European Union. In Chapters 3 and 4 the national 
case studies of Italy and Spain will be analysed respectively, with reference to 
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At present, immigrant women account for a significant proportion of the migration fluxes 
towards Europe. According to the UN Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, in 2013 the highest proportion of female migrants in the world was to be found 
in Europe (51.9%)1. In addition to representing a significant part of the total number of third-
country nationals living in the Union territory, immigrant women2  experience specific 
difficulties and issues in many different aspects of their lives in their host countries, involving 
both the family and the employment realms.  
 
Despite the fact that immigrant women are increasingly migrating alone, this category still 
dominates family migration3 and is thus particularly affected by any provision n this field. 
While the percentage of immigrant women entering the European territory for work reasons 
has increased significantly since the late 1980s – from 18% to 32% according to Eurostat4, 
family reasons are still the main motivation for the immigration of third-country national 
women to Europe.  
The high concentration of immigrant women in family migration fluxes prompts the 
observation that the dependent status from sponsors that inevitably comes with this type of 
migration disproportionally impacts this category. At the time of their first entry in the host 
country, family migrants are likely to be reliant on their sponsoring family member in order to 
                                                           
1
 OECD-UNDESA, World Migration in Figures: A Joint Contribution by UN-DESA and the OECD to the United 
Nations High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, 3 -4 October 2013, p. 2, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/World-Migration-in-Figures.pdf [last accessed on 2 April 2014]. 
2
 For the purposes of this thesis, “immigrant women” and “migrant women” should be interpreted as referring 
to third-country national women, i.e. women who are not Union citizens, legally entering and residing in the 
European Union for purposes related to the family or employment.  
3
 Eurostat, First permits by reason, age, sex and citizenship (most recent data from 2012), available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/data/database [last accessed on 12 June 
2014]. In addition to family reunification – which consists of bringing to the host country immediate family 
members such as spouses or children – “family reasons” may also refer to other types of family migration 
(KOFMAN, E., MEETOO, V., ‘Family Migration’, in International Organization for Migration, World Migration 
Report, 2008, p. 155. See also PIPER, N., Gender and Migration, Paper Prepared for the Policy Analysis and 
Research Programme of the Global Commission on International Migration, 2005, p. 22). For instance, family 
migration can also occur through family formation or marriage migration, whereby second or subsequent 
generations of children of immigrant origin bring in a spouse from their parents’ or grandparents’ country of 
origin, or whereby a settled immigrant or citizen brings in a spouse from abroad. Other types of family 
migration consist in the migration of the entire family or sponsored family emigration of relatives outside the 
immediate family.  
4
 EUROSTAT, Migrants in Europe: A Statistical Portrait of the First and Second Generation, Eurostat Statistical 




navigate life in their new host country. This depend ce is caused by material factors such as 
language barriers, lack of knowledge of their new host country and its laws, lack of social and 
possibly family networks that the migrant could rely on in the country of origin, and so forth. 
In terms of family migration aimed at joining a spouse in the host country, this dependence 
may cause serious gender imbalances within spousal relationships at the disadvantage of the 
joining family member. Indeed, many immigrant women report negative effects of this 
enforced role of dependent family member, not only on their self-esteem but also for their 
opportunities of regaining autonomy, as well as their fr edom to reject certain roles within the 
family5. The factual dependence of immigrant women joining partners or husbands in the host 
country has indeed been identified as a significant push for these women to conform to the 
socio-economic and conjugal role their partners have designed for them6. 
Furthermore, dependence in the context of family migrat on can also undermine immigrant 
women’s possibilities of effectively reacting to domestic violence. The dependency of 
secondary migrants on others makes them vulnerable to exploitation within their families7; for 
women who suffer from domestic violence, that dependence may seriously undermine their 
possibility to leave violent husbands8. This perverse effect of family migration is particularly 
serious and constitutes one of the reasons immigrant women are considered to be at particular 
risk of domestic violence9.  
Immigrant women may also experience specific difficult es when sponsoring the migration 
of family members, i.e., when they are the ones residing in the host country and intend to 
sponsor reunification with a family member (e.g. husbands, partners, children, ascendants, 
etc.) left behind. In this case, the most common challenge is meeting the material 
                                                           
5
 STRASSER, E., KRALER, A., BONJOUR, S., BILGER, V., ‘Doing Family’, 14(2) The History of Family (2009) 165, p. 174.  
6
 ROCA I GIRONA, J., SORONELLAS MASDEU, M., BODOQUE PUERTA, Y., ‘Migraciones Por Amor: Diversidad y Complejidad 
de las Migraciones de Mujeres’, 97(3) Papers: Revista de Sociologia (2012) 285, pp. 703 - 704 [translation 
mine]. Despite the focus of this research on Slavic or Latin American women married to Spanish men, the 
relevance of the cited observations goes beyond the specific group analysed and can be applied to other 
groups of immigrant women entering Europe for the purpose of joining a partner or a spouse. 
7
 Strasser, E., Kraler, A., Bonjour, S., Bilger, V., ‘Doing Family’, cit., p. 174 - 175. 
8
 Ibid., p. 175. 
9
 In 2009, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe devoted a special Resolution to the issue of 
domestic violence against immigrant women (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 
1697(2009) on Migrant Women: at Particular Risk of Domestic Violence, adopted on 20 November 2009). 
Among the reasons this category was considered to have a disproportionate risk of domestic violence, the 
Council included the fact that “migrant women in Europe face twofold discrimination based both on their 
gender and their origin” (Ibid., § 1) and their eventual belonging to “communities marked by a strong 
patriarchal culture” (Id.), explaining their specific difficulties in reacting to such violence by observing how 
“confronted with the language barrier and family pressure, [immigrant women] often end up isolated and 
unable to express their views and have only limited access to any facilities that exist to protect the victims of 




requirements that are posed as preconditions for sponsoring family reunification. In terms of 
income this category fares comparatively worse thanboth female and male natives, on the one 
hand, and male migrants, on the other. Due to structural inequalities on intersectional grounds 
of gender and immigrant or ethnic origin, immigrant women experience the worst pay on their 
host country’s labour market10. As a result, immigrant women are disproportionally and 
negatively affected in their potential to sponsor family reunification with partners and 
children by comparison to their male counterparts. Indeed, their chances to successfully apply 
for family reunification may be lower due to their labour market position, and to their 
consequent difficulties in gathering the necessary financial resources11.  
Moving on to immigrant women’s employment, it must be noted first that their access to 
the host country’s labour market can occur either trough labour migration – i.e., through 
migration for the specific purpose of working in the ost country – or through access to 
employment of immigrant women residing in the host country on a different ground – for 
instance, on the grounds of a residence permit for family reasons. In both cases, however, 
immigrant women experience disproportionate difficult es in accessing national labour 
markets both in comparison to their male counterparts nd in comparison to native workers. 
In addition to possible family pressures, another and in my view more significant explanation 
of this phenomenon lies in employment discrimination on the grounds of several factors (such 
as nationality, gender, ethnicity, religion and migration status)that influence both access and 
integration in the host countries’ labour market and the sectors of the labour market where 
immigrant women concentrate12 . In this respect, in her explanatory memorandum 
                                                           
10
 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Migrants, Minorities and Employment: Exclusion and 
Discrimination in the 27 Member States of the European Union, Update 2003- 2008, Publication Office of the 
European Union, 2010, p. 74. On this matter, see also KOFMAN, E., ROOSBLAD, J., and KEUZENKAMP S., ‘Migrant and 
Minority Women, Inequalities and Discrimination in the Labour Market’, in Kraal, K., Roosblad, J., and Wrench, 
J., Equal Opportunities and Ethnic Inequalities in European Labour Markets: Discrimination, Gender and Politics 
of Diversity, IMISCOE Reports, Amsterdam University Press, 2009,  p. 56 ff. 
11
 KOFMAN, E., ‘Gendered Migrations, Livelihoods and Entitlements in European Welfare Regimes‘, in Piper, N. 
(ed.), New Perspectives on Gender and Migration: Livelihoods, Rights and Entitlements, Routledge, London, 
United Kingdom, 2008, p. 77. See also KRALER, A., Civic Stratification, Gender and Family Migration Policies in 
Europe: Final Report, International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Vienna, May 2010, who observes 
that “carrying the full (financial) responsibilities as a sponsor may be experienced as more difficult for women, 
in particular in the context of generally less favourable employment opportunities for women and if there are 
children and related child caring responsibilities” (ibid., p. 57). Furthermore, see Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe, Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population, Explanatory Memorandum 
Accompanying the Report on Protecting Migrant Women in the Labour Market, Doc. 12549, 24 March 2011, § 
22. 
12
 See MORENO-FONTES CHAMMARTIN, G., Female Migrant Workers’ Situation in the Labour Market, Thematic 
Review Seminar of the European Employment Strategy, ILO’s International Migration Programme, 2008, and 




accompanying the Council’s draft Resolution and Recommendation on protecting migrant 
women in the labour market, the Special Rapporteur for the Committee on Migration, 
Refugees and Population13  highlighted the higher prevalence of unemployment a d 
underemployment among migrant women in comparison to both native-born women and 
native men”14. While acknowledging that in some instances cultura  reasons may play a 
role15, the Rapporteur emphasised that the level of employment of immigrant women is much 
more strongly linked to the characteristics of the host society and its labour market16. 
Discrimination also affects immigrant women workers once they have entered the labour 
market, i.e., in their employment relationships. On a broad level, in its General 
Recommendation No. 26 of 200817 the CEDAW Committee highlighted several forms of de 
jure and de facto discrimination affecting this category, including a strong sectorialisation in 
sectors of the labour market considered appropriate for women, such as domestic work and 
entertainment, and characterised by lower wages and less job mobility, as well as a higher 
vulnerability to discriminatory dismissal for pregnancy reasons and to sexual abuse, 
harassment and physical violence18. The concentration of immigrant women in labour market 
sectors associated with traditional gender roles is str ctly connected with multiple sources of 
disadvantage and vulnerability of immigrant women workers, including de-skilling and over-
qualification19, low pay, bad working conditions20, and lower labour protections21.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Explanatory Memorandum Accompanying the Report on Protecting Migrant Women in the Labour Market, cit., 
§ 40 - 48. 
13
 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population, 
Explanatory Memorandum Accompanying the Report on Protecting Migrant Women in the Labour Market, cit. 
14
 Ibid., § 12. 
15
 Ibid., § 14. 
16
 Ibid., § 13. 
17
 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 26 on 
Women Migrant Workers, 5 December 2008, CEDAW/C/2009/WP.1/R. 
18
 Ibid., § 13 ff. See also Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Migration, Refugees 
and Population, Explanatory Memorandum Accompanying the Report on Protecting Migrant Women in the 
Labour Market, cit., § 10. 
19
 Immigrant women experience the highest degree of de-skilling by comparison to both native workers and to 
their male counterparts. This is not only observable at the European level, where in 2011 the over-qualification 
rate of non-EU born female workers amounted to 39% (in comparison to 35% for non-EU born male workers 
and 32% for workers born in the Union), but is also particularly marked in our national case studies’ labour 
markets. Indeed, in the same year the over-qualification rates for non-EU born women workers in Italy were as 
high as 67%, compared to 57% for non-EU born male workers and 20% for the total population. Similarly, the 
corresponding rates for Spain in 2011 amounted to 63% for non-EU born women workers, versus 50% for their 
male counterparts and 36% for the total population. On these matters, see Eurostat, Overqualification Rate by 
Groups of Country of Birth, Age groups and Sex, 2011, available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/employment_social_policy_equality/migrant_integration
/indicators [last accessed on 19 April 2013]. See also RUBIN, J., RENDALL, M. S., RABINOVICH, L., TSANG, F., 
VANORANJE-NASSAU, C., JANTA, B., Migrant Women in the European Labour Force: Current Situation and Future 




While these issues disproportionally affect immigrant women in general, those employed 
as domestic workers are particularly likely to experience them. Indeed, migrant domestic 
workers experience a stark contradiction between thir igh labour market demand and the 
difficult – and in some cases detrimental – working conditions that characterise the sector22. 
The high concentration of immigrant women in this field also means that, compared to their 
male counterparts and to native workers, they are disproportionally affected by the 
problematic aspects specific to this sector. Firstly, domestic work – and especially when it 
involves live-in situations – implies a blurring ofthe boundaries between being an employee 
and being “one of the family”. It has been shown that this situation, far from creating a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
immigrant women with a high degree of education are twice as likely than European citizen women to be 
employed in low-skill jobs, and in 2005 more than 25% of third-country national immigrant women with high 
levels of education were employed in low-skill jobs (ibid., p. 95). 
De-skilling, in addition to reinforcing a devaluation of immigrant women workers’ “capital (...) and social 
competence” (Kofman, E., Roosblad, J., and Keuzenkamp S., ‘Migrant and Minority Women‘, cit., p. 58) and 
limiting  “their mobility in the labour market, their opportunities for career progression, and their chances for 
human capital development” (Rubin, J., Rendall, M. S., Rabinovich, L., Tsang, F., Van Oranje-Nassau, C., Janta, 
B., Migrant Women in the European Labour Force, cit., p. 72), may take heavy psychological tolls on this 
category by disproportionately exposing them to “professional disillusions and loss of the constructive 
dynamics of their identity” (CHAIB, S., ‘Femmes Immigrées et Travail Salarié‘, 16 Les Cahiers du CEDREF 2008, 
209, § 30, translation mine). 
20
 The labour market segregation experienced by immigrant women workers in the European legal space must 
be read in combination with their disproportional concentration in the worst sectors of the labour market, i.e., 
in those sectors characterised by “low remuneration, heavy workloads comprised of long working hours, 
limited training facilities, poor career development”(Moreno-Fontes Chammartin, G., Female Migrant Workers’ 
Situation in the Labour Market, cit., p. 4). Indeed, the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population 
observed that most of the sectors where women workers concentrate “offer worse working conditions for 
migrant women than for local counterparts [such as] short-term contracts without opportunity of renewal, low 
wages, long working hours and physically demanding jobs” (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 
Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population, Explanatory Memorandum Accompanying the Report on 
Protecting Migrant Women in the Labour Market, cit., § 11.).  
21
 As a result of their concentration in sectors of the labour market that are highly unregulated and have low 
labour protection, immigrant women gain “less access to benefits such as training, health insurance, paid or 
unpaid sick leave, maternity leave, employment protection and other social rights” (Kofman, E., Roosblad, J., 
Keuzenkamp, S., ‘Migrant and Minority Women’, cit., p. 54). Therefore, this category appears to be 
disproportionately and negatively affected in their possibilities to benefit from a safety net or support system, 
constituted for instance by the chance of upward mobility on the occupational ladder through vocational 
training, or access to unemployment benefits in case of redundancy, or even the possibility to freely determine 
their reproductive life without fear of losing their employment.  
22
 Immigrant women are strongly present in this sector. In 2008, 18% of employed third-country national 
women between the age of 25 and 54 were employed as domestic workers (Eurostat, Migrants in Europe, cit., 
p. 95). In countries such as Spain and Italy, the number of immigrant women employed as domestic workers is 
even more significant. In fact, a recent study by the International Labour Organization (International Labour 
Organization, Domestic Workers Across the World: Global and Regional Statistics and the Extent of Legal 
Protection, International Labour Office, Geneva, Switzerland, 2013, see in particular p. 35 ff.) has highlighted 
that these two States, together with France, are the biggest employers of domestic workers in Europe. In 2010 
Spain had a total of 747,000 domestic workers
22
. Currently, 90% of domestic workers in Spain are female, and 
the vast majority of them are foreign-born – emigrated especially from Latin America (Ibid., p. 35). Similarly, in 
Italy 419,400 domestic workers were employed in 2008, with a minimum female share of 79% and with a 




welcoming and positive working environment, is often used by employers – consciously or 
not –as a way of demanding continuous availability, s retching working hours and multiplying 
demands23 . Secondly, the isolation caused by working in a private household can be 
emotionally and psychologically difficult24 . Thirdly, the correspondence between the 
workplace and the private household may also trigge, and at the same time hide, exploitation 
and abuse against domestic workers – for instance due to the difficulty for labour inspections 
in the private realm of the household, or because of the highly personalised character of their 
employment relationships25. 
 
As I have made clear in this brief overview, the specific problems and disadvantages 
experienced by immigrant women in the European legal space have been widely 
acknowledged by European institutions, either through the commissioning of dedicated 
reports and studies or through special recommendations or comments. However, what has 
been missing so far is a critical analysis of the rol of law in reinforcing the described factual 
barriers to immigrant women’s enjoyment of their rights in the fields of family life and 
employment. This thesis starts from the consideration that law – first and foremost 
immigration law – may generate perverse and gendered ffects that prevent immigrant 
                                                           
23
 See for instance KINDLER, M., ‘The relationship to the Employer in Migrant’s Eyes: the Domestic Work 
Ukrainian Migrant Women in Warsaw’, 12 Cahiers de l’URMIS (2009), §15 ff. See also LUTZ, H., ‘When Home 
Becomes a Workplace: Domestic Work as an Ordinary Job in Germany?’, in Lutz, H. (ed.), Migration and 
Domestic Work: a European Perspective on a Global Theme, Ashgate, Aldershot (UK) and Burlington (USA), 
2008, pp. 52-58 and Piper, N., Gender and Migration, cit., p. 8). As a result, domestic workers (especially live-
ins) often experience situations in which they are continuously on-call, do not enjoy proper rest periods and are 
requested to do additional work that is not however recognised as such. 
24
 It has been argued that the visibility of immigrant domestic workers in the household’s daily life contrasts 
with the denial of their presence and with a general attitude of rejection in the public sphere, and that such 
social alienation gives ground to “a subordinate position due to the socio-cultural extraneousness attributed to 
foreign women employed in the private sector” (MIRANDA, A., et al., ‘Les Mobilisations des Migrantes: un 
Processus d’Émancipation Invisible?’, 51 Cahiers du Genre 2011/2012, 5, p. 8 ff.). This creates an identification 
of immigrant status, female sex and in some cases a certain national or ethnic origin with the domestic sphere, 
which fosters the social disqualification and depersonalisation of immigrant women by equating them with 
certain stereotypically attributed characteristics (see MIRANDA, A., ‘Une Frontière Dans l’Intimité: la 
Confrontation Culturelle Entre Femmes Étrangères et Femmes Autochtones Dans l’Espace Domestique, 12 Les 
Cahiers du CEDREF 2004, 115, §27; see also MIRANDA, A., Migrare al Femminile: Appartenenza di Genere e 
Situazioni Migratorie in Movimento, McGraw-Hill, Milano, Italy, 2008, pp. 106 and 120). On how the confusion 
between employment and family-like obligations masks forms of “othering”, alienation and subordination of 
immigrant domestic workers on intersecting grounds of sex, immigrant status, ethnic and national origin, see 
also Miranda, Migrare al Femminile, cit., p. 120, as well as OZYEGIN, G., HONDAGNEU-SOTELO, P., ‘Conclusion: 
Domestic Work, Migration and the New Gender Order in Contemporary Europe’, in Lutz, H., (ed.), Migration 
and Domestic Work: A European Perspective on a Global Theme, cit., p. 199-200. 
25
 On these matters, see for example International Labour Conference, Report IV, Decent Work for Domestic 
Workers, 99
th
 Session, Geneva, 2010, § 248, and International Labour Conference, Report I(B), A Global Alliance 
Against Forced Labour, 93
rd





women’s enjoyment of their rights in conditions of equality with both immigrant men and 
citizen women. 
In the light of these observations, the aim of this t esis is to verify the existence of a 
gender bias in laws applicable to immigrant women in the European context (primarily but 
not exclusively immigration law), and to explore possible legal remedies to such a bias in 
areas where the latter will be identified. Among possible remedies, I will explore in particular 
the ameliorative and transformative potential of human and fundamental rights law in force in 
the European legal space. While doing so, I will consider the beneficial effects as well as the 
shortcomings of human and fundamental rights per se and in their application, and I will 
develop constructive proposals in order to enhance the former and correct the latter. 
In order to delimitate my field of analysis within the extremely vast subject of immigrants’ 
human and fundamental rights, I will focus in particular on third-country national women 
legally entering and residing within the territory of the European Union. In some instances, 
however, this category may inevitably overlap with that of third-country national women 
irregularly present on the Union territory – especially because the disparate impact of certain 
norms applicable to legally resident migrants may also undermine third-country national 
women’s access to or maintenance of residence permits. 
 
Throughout my analysis, I will refer to family life and employment as domains rather than as 
strictly rights. More specifically, I propose a notion of family life and employment as clusters 
of rights and entitlements. In this sense, family life should be understood as including crucial 
rights for immigrant women such as the right to spousal equality, the right to access family 
reunification and to enjoy family unity in conditions of equality, the right to live free of 
domestic violence, as well as the right to protection during pregnancy. Similarly, I have 
chosen to understand the employment domain as encompassing the right to access the host 
country’s labour market in conditions of equality and non-discrimination, the right to non-
discrimination in the workplace and in relation to dismissal, freedom from exploitation and 
abuse by employers, as well as access to justice in relation to employment matters.  
While I am aware that the rights to family life and to employment are not necessarily 
interpreted as including all of the mentioned aspects, I propose this different understanding of 
family life and employment for two main reasons. Firstly, this construction is in my view 
better able to reflect immigrant women’s complex experiences in their host countries as well 
as their specific difficulties. Thus, in the described clusters I have included areas where 




legal norms. Secondly, the described approach will allow me to better identify the eventual 
gender bias of norms applicable to this group, not only on the grounds of an isolated 
consideration of each legal source, but also through an analysis of their interconnections and 
interaction. By referring to family and employment as multi-dimensional clusters, I will be 
able to analyse how legal norms that are not normally connected to each other because they 
are assigned to different domains by disciplinary divides (e.g. immigration law, but also 
employment law, criminal law, family law, and so forth) may actually present a gender bias 
that results from the disparate impact that they jointly produce on immigrant women in one or 
multiple aspects of the said clusters.  
 
In areas where a gender bias is identified, I will assess the potential of human and 
fundamental rights law to remedy this bias as well as their limitations in this area. In order to 
answer this research question, my analysis will cover different dimensions at the same time. A 
first aspect that I will address concerns the impact that human and fundamental rights law 
have had so far on immigrant women’s family life and employment. In this context, I will 
discuss the relevant norms in this field, defining the content and scope of human and 
fundamental rights. Specific attention will also bepaid to their judicial application and 
interpretation by competent courts, in cases where the latter enjoyed a margin of discretion 
because of the general character of the norms at issue or due to a potential conflict between 
different norms. The judicial decisions analysed in this respect will relate to cases initiated by 
or in any case directly involving immigrant women, and will be chosen for their particular 
significance as examples of the role played by human and fundamental rights (whether 
positive or negative) in relation to immigrant women’s protection in the mentioned domains. 
In this sense, my analysis should not be understood as aspiring to be comprehensive or all 
encompassing, but rather as more focused on a qualitative assessment of the actual and 
potential impact of human and fundamental rights on immigrant women’s lives. Furthermore, 
a consideration – when relevant – of the regulatory impact of human and fundamental rights 
law will also be carried out, enquiring into their ventual role in inspiring or triggering more 
gender-sensitive norms of direct relevance for immigrant women.  
 A second aspect of my analysis will be more constructive, and will tackle the question of 
what role human and fundamental rights law could play in ensuring a stronger consideration 
of immigrant women’s needs and difficulties in the domains of family life and employment 
by legal norms applicable to them. I will draw insights from meaningful examples of judicial 




of ensuring this groups’ access to their rights ande titlements in conditions of equality and 
non-discrimination. While not assuming that human ad fundamental rights law are 
necessarily the solution in this field, and while conscious that these sources may in fact be 
affected by gendered shortcomings themselves, I will then offer my own perspective on the 
most fruitful approaches in this area. 
 
This thesis will analyse human and fundamental rights law as recognised and enforced in the 
European legal space at three different levels: international law, European Union law and 
domestic law. When examining these different legal orders, I will concentrate on different 
components of the family life and employment clusters, choosing those dimensions that have 
gained explicit recognition in each specific order and that have been judicially analysed and 
interpreted by competent courts in that context.  
The thesis is thus structured as follows. In chapter 1, I will discuss the human rights 
framework established by the Council of Europe, paying special attention to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. In particular, I will examine the interaction between this 
framework and specific provisions of national immigration law in the Strasbourg Court’s 
analysis, looking at their significance for immigrant women’s rights in the fields of family life 
and employment.  
In chapter 2, I will consider the fundamental rights framework emerging in the context of 
the European Union, with a special focus on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union as well as on the fundamental rights and freedoms established in the EU 
Treaties. This chapter will then mainly focus on the interaction between European 
fundamental rights law as interpreted by the European Court of Justice and problematic norms 
of European immigration law from a specifically gend red point of view.   
Chapters 3 and 4 will be devoted to the analysis of tw  national case studies – respectively 
Italy and Spain. After Germany, these two countries currently experience the highest 
proportion of resident third-country national women in Europe26, and thus constitute a 
particularly apt field of enquiry for my purposes. Both Italy and Spain have incorporated 
international human rights law and European fundamental rights law in their domestic orders 
through their national Constitutions, granting them with a special status. Furthermore, the 
Italian and the Spanish Constitutions enshrine their own system of fundamental rights. As a 
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result, both countries are characterised by a rich and heterogeneous systems of protection of 
human and fundamental rights. Therefore, in chapters 3 and 4 I will explore the potential of 
these fundamental rights law frameworks to correct biased provisions of domestic law 
applicable to immigrant women in the fields of family l fe and employment. Moreover, I will 
consider the eventual impact of supranational human and fundamental rights law in these 
domestic orders in an effort to understand whether and to what extent such an interaction has 
been fruitful for this category. 
 
While several crucial contributions have been offered with respect to specific issues or 
specific contexts27, the broader potential of human and fundamental rights law to constitute an 
effective tool to correct the gendered shortcomings of legal norms applicable to immigrant 
women in the European context has not been discussed in l gal academia. The significance of 
international human rights law for immigrants on the one hand, and for women on the other, 
has instead been at the heart of lively academic debates for decades.  
As to the first aspect, legal and socio-legal scholars have consistently investigated the 
meaning of international human rights law for immigrants’ rights. The view whereby modern 
international human rights law has caused the emergence of a post-national citizenship, thus 
grounding migrants’ access to rights in their host countries on a more universalistic basis 
identified with personhood and humanity28, has been particularly debated. Many have indeed 
highlighted that international human rights law, while certainly relevant, has not definitely 
broken the links between human rights and citizenship. In fact, it has been argued that 
international human rights law in Europe still reproduces internal borders (understood as the 
construction of rights on the grounds of migration status)29and that migrants are still excluded 
from socio-legal citizenship of their host countries in many crucial respects30. In relation to 
this, it has also been pointed out that human rights law has hardly trumped the 
citizenship/non-citizenship dichotomy and substituted it with the concept of humanity, 
                                                           
27
 For the purpose of my research, the importance of the academic work of scholars such as Sarah Van Walsum, 
Siobhán Mullally, and Ruth Mestre i Mestre, to name a few, is undeniable and will be appropriately highlighted 
throughout this thesis. 
28
 SOYSAL, Y. N., ‘Post-National Citizenship: Rights and Obligations of Individuality’, in Amenta, E., Nash, K., Scott, 
A., The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology, Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, Malden, 2012, p. 383 ff. 
29
 KESBY, A., The Right to Have Rights: Citizenship, Humanity, and International Law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2012, p. 92 ff. 
30





considering that human rights law itself rests on the assumption of a state-based world 
order31.  
As to the potential of international human rights law to offer effective recognition of 
women’s specific difficulties and needs, an ongoing critique in feminist legal scholarship is 
clearly identifiable. Criticism of the inadequacy of this source to protect women’s rights in 
conditions of equality with men has touched upon many different aspects. Traditionally, 
international human rights law has been criticised for its entrenchment with the public/private 
distinction typical of liberal theory, limiting its cope to the public realm and leaving out the 
private sphere – where crucial violations of women’s human rights occur32. Other important 
and more recent criticism has concerned the frequent marginalisation of women’s rights as 
sub-categories of human rights and the adoption of approaches excessively focused on 
victimisation discourses in international human rights law33. Lastly, a re-characterisation of 
this source has been deemed necessary in order to ensure its gender-sensitive 
implementation34. 
In sum, while the import of international human rights law for immigrants on the one hand 
and for women on the other has been widely discussed, th se two loose ends have yet to meet. 
This thesis aims to mark a step in this direction by exploring the actual and potential impact, 
as well as the shortcomings, of human and fundamental rights law vis-à-vis biased legal 
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European Human Rights Law:  
A Common Standard of Protection for Immigrant Women’s  





Since its inception, the Council of Europe has been committed to creating a solid human 
rights framework with the European Convention on Human Rights as its cornerstone35. The 
significance of this source for immigrants in the European legal space has been the subject of 
a lively academic debate. Some scholars have suggested that the Convention constitutes a 
great example of the positive impact that human rights law can produce on immigration law, 
and thus on immigrants’ lives36. Others hold less enthusiastic views, stressing the s ructural 
limitations of the human rights framework established by the European Convention as well as 
the shortcomings of the European Court of Human Rights’ judicial activity in the field of 
migration37. In the context of these critiques, however, the sp cific significance of the 
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European Convention on Human Rights for immigrant women has seldom been discussed38. 
A similar discourse can be extended to another key Council of Europe treaty for immigrant’s 
human rights, i.e., the European Social Charter39– although theoretical analyses on this 
source’s impact on migration issues have been sparser40.  
Against this background, in this chapter I aim to understand whether and to what extent 
European human rights law41has so far produced a positive impact on national immigration 
law from the specific point of view of immigrant women, and to enquire into its potential in 
this respect. In order to do so, this chapter will analyse the interaction between two main legal 
realms that play a crucial role in immigrant women’s enjoyment of their rights to family life 
and employment, i.e., national migration law in theEuropean context and European human 
rights law. In particular, the European human rights framework will be critically assessed 
with a dual aim. Firstly, I seek to identify the specific gendered shortcomings in national legal 
norms that produce a disparate impact on immigrant women’s access to their rights in the 
fields of family life and employment. Secondly, I aim to explore whether such a framework is 
actually capable of correcting the highlighted gender bias by trumping problematic domestic 
law provisions or by steering national authorities away from gender-insensitive enforcement 
practices, and to unveil its eventual failings in this respect.  
Thus, after providing a broad outline of the main elements of European human rights law 
relevant to immigrant women’s family life and employment in the European legal space, in 
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the first part of this chapter I will assess the interaction between problematic norms of 
national immigration law and this category’s human right to family life. Subsequently, I will 
move on to analyse the relationship between relevant rules of labour migration law and 
immigrant women’s human rights in the field of employment. 
 
1. European Human Rights Law: Relevant Provisions for Immigrant Women in the 
Fields of Family Life and Employment 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights establishes everal important rights in the fields 
of family and employment that have the potential for a fruitful application to specific 
difficulties experienced by immigrant women in the European legal space. In the field of 
family, the key provision in the Convention is constituted by article 8, which grants every 
individual the right to respect for his or her private and family life. Art. 8(2) prohibits every 
interference by a public authority with the exercise of such human right “except as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others”. The balance of interests enshri ed in article 8 of the Convention has 
grounded an extremely rich and abundant case law by the European Court of Human Rights 
on two main aspects of third-country national immigrants’ enjoyment of their right to family 
life. On the one hand, a consolidated case law has developed with respect to immigrants’ 
access to family reunification vis-à-vis restrictive national family migration policies42. On the 
other hand, the Strasbourg Court has established important principles concerning limitations 
to the expulsion of foreigners when their enjoyment of family life may be compromised, in an 
effort to balance immigrants’ interest to enjoy such family life in the host country and the 
state’s interest to control migration 43.
In addition to the right to family life, two key provisions specifically relate to marriage. 
Firstly, article 12 establishes a human right to marry, i.e., the right “of men and women of 
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marriageable age” to “marry and to found a family”. A wide margin of discretion is however 
left to States Parties of the Convention, since art. 12 also specifies that such a right may be 
enjoyed in accordance “to the national laws governing the exercise of this right”. Secondly, 
Protocol no. 7 to the Convention44 importantly includes a provision on spousal equality. Its 
article 5, indeed, establishes a principle of equality between spouses:“spouses shall enjoy 
equality of rights and responsibilities of a private law character between them, and in relations 
with their children, as to marriage, during marriage and in the event of its dissolution”.  
Arguably, the right to marry and to found a family may be read in conjunction with the 
right to family life and plays an important role in cases concerning prerequisites imposed by 
national legal regimes which limit foreigners’ possibility to marry on the host countries’ 
territory45. On the other hand, article 5 of Protocol no. 7 appears to be particularly important 
for immigrant women’s enjoyment of spousal equality and more broadly of equality within 
the family. In the light of the broader non-discrimination principles established by art.14 of 
the Convention and by art. 1 of Protocol No. 12, the provision enshrined in article 5 of Prot. 
No. 7 emerges as an important specification of equality and non-discrimination in the field of 
family relationships. 
In the field of family life, it is also extremely important to recall that the Strasbourg Court 
consistently interpreted several articles of the Convention as enshrining a right to live free of 
domestic violence. This case law concerned in particular the right to life enshrined in art. 246, 
the prohibition of torture established by art. 3, and the right to respect for private and family 
life ex art.8 of the Convention in applications brought by the victims themselves, both taken 
alone and in conjunction with the prohibition of sex discrimination under art. 1447.  
 
Moving on to employment, the Convention does not explicitly establish a human right to 
work, nor a right to fair working conditions. Noneth less, this source includes important 
provisions on employment matters that – despite not being all-encompassing – tackle both 
extreme phenomena of exploitation and abuse of workers and more ordinary issues in the 
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field of employment. On the one hand, indeed, article 4 establishes a prohibition of slavery, 
servitude and forced or compulsory labour – which bears the potential of constituting a 
powerful tool for immigrant women workers to contrast phenomena of exploitation and abuse 
in their employment relationships. On the other hand, article 5 grounds the general freedoms 
of assembly and of association, which also include “th right to form and to join trade unions 
for the protection of his interests”. Furthermore, art. 1 of Protocol no. 148 establishes a general 
right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possession which the Strasbourg Court has 
consistently relied on to assess cases concerning idividuals’ enjoyment of social security 
benefits49. Finally, it is important to stress that the non-discrimination and equality principles 
affirmed by art. 14 of the Convention and art. 1 of Protocol No. 12 also apply to the field of 
work. In this respect, it has been rightly noted that while the Convention does envisage these 
important rights for workers, it leaves most labour rights and social rights to the European 
Social Charter50. In fact, the European Social Charter envisages a range of human rights in the 
field of employment of key importance not simply for immigrant workers in general but for 
immigrant women workers specifically.  
On a broad level, in its article 1 the Charter recognises a general right to work and a 
corresponding state obligation to ensure the highest po sible level of employment as well as 
to protect workers’ right to earn their living through a freely entered into occupation. Articles 
2 and 3 respectively establish workers’ rights to just working conditions (mainly with 
reference to working hours and daily, weekly and yearly rest) and workers’ right to safe and 
healthy working conditions. Moreover, several provisions of the Charter grant key social 
rights to workers, such as the right to vocational guidance and vocational training (articles 9 
and 10 respectively), the right to social security as well as to social and medical assistance 
(articles 12 and 13 respectively), the right to health protection (article 11), the right to benefit 
from social welfare services (article 14), and the right to protection against unjustified 
dismissal (art. 24).  
With specific reference to immigrant women, several provisions are of particular interest. 
Firstly, some of such rights constitute significant ffirmations of the principle of sex equality 
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in the specific field of employment. For instance, article 4(3) establishes workers’ rights to a 
fair remuneration with specific reference to “the right of men and women workers to equal 
pay for work of equal value”. Similarly, article 20 recognises a “right to equal opportunities 
and equal treatment in matters of employment and occupation without discrimination on the 
grounds of sex”, which binds States Parties to takeappropriate measures to enforce such a 
right in the fields of access to employment, protection against dismissal, vocational guidance 
and training, terms of employment and working conditions (including remuneration) as well 
as career development. Furthermore, despite its gender-neutral language, article 27 may also 
be considered as a provision that is particularly protective of women workers’ right to 
equality and non-discrimination with respect to employment, since it envisages a “right to 
equality of opportunity and treatment for men and women workers with family 
responsibilities and between such workers and other workers”. It is clear that while this 
provision is directed at both men and women workers with family responsibilities, the 
“appropriate measures” outlined by art.27(1) – such as allowing workers to re-enter 
employment after an absence due to family responsibilities, the development of childcare 
facilities or access to parental leave – at present time disproportionally benefit women 
workers because of their disproportionate care burdens by comparison to their male 
counterparts.  
Secondly, certain rights recognised by the Charter apply specifically to women workers. 
Important provisions for women workers are for example established by article 8, which 
grants them with a right to protection of maternity, entailing States Parties’ obligation, among 
others, to grant paid maternity leave for at least fourteen weeks, to prohibit dismissal during 
pregnancy and maternity leave and to grant time off f r breastfeeding. Similarly, article 
26(1)– establishing a “right to dignity at work” – specifically tackles “sexual harassment in 
the workplace or in relation to work” by obliging States Parties to “take all appropriate 
measures to protect workers from such conduct”.  
It should also be noted, in relation to provisions of the Charter devoted to specific 
categories, that this source includes two articles focusing on migrant workers. In particular, 
article 18 grants workers “the right to engage in a gainful occupation in the territory of any 
other Party”, while article 19 recognises “the right of migrant workers and their families to 
protection and assistance”, which also encompasses States Parties’ obligation to guarantee 
their equal treatment with respect to their own nationals in the fields of “remuneration and 
other employment and working conditions” (let a.), “membership of trade unions and 





Against this background, it would appear that the European Social Charter constitutes an 
important complement to the European Convention on Human Rights, especially because of 
its specific provisions on women workers and migrant workers. However, the importance of 
the discussed rights enshrined in the European Social Charter for the specific situation of 
immigrant women workers in the European legal space may be significantly limited by its 
scope of application. The Appendix to the Charter, indeed, clarifies that all of its provisions 
apply to “foreigners only in so far as they are nationals of other Parties lawfully resident or 
working regularly within the territory of the Party concerned”. Thus, migrant workers may 
exclusively be covered by the Social Charter if they are citizens of a State Party. Arguably, 
this restriction excludes the vast majority of third-country national workers residing on the 
European territory from the Charter’s scope of application. Such a limitation arguably reduces 
the Charter’s potential to effectively impact national rules applicable to immigrant women, let 
alone to correct their perverse effects on this category. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the 
provisions of the Social Charter may produce positive effects by stimulating domestic law 
enforcing its rights without restrictions on the grounds of nationality, thus also indirectly 
benefiting immigrant women workers (and migrant workers in general). After all, the 
Appendix itself clarifies that the restriction of its personal scope does not prevent the 
extension of the Charter’s rights to other categories of persons.  
 
In sum, with respect to their potentially fruitful application to immigrant women in the field 
of employment, European human rights sources seem to offer mixed cues. On the one hand, 
an important aspect which is explicitly covered by the European Convention on Human 
Rights concerns immigrant women’s possibility to rely on the prohibition of slavery, 
servitude and forced labour under its article 4 to react to exploitative or abusive working 
conditions. Moreover, these articles may be fruitfully combined with the principles of non-
discrimination and equality between men and women established by art. 14 of the Convention 
and art. 1 of Protocol No. 12 to unveil an eventual disparate impact of certain labour 
migration regimes on immigrant women in this context. As for the European Social Charter, 
several rights relate to specific issues experienced by immigrant women workers in the 
European legal space. Among them, the right to work ex art. 1 arguably relates to access to 
employment, while article 24 explicitly and specifially tackles the issue of protection from 
unemployment and dismissal. Furthermore, article 2 concerns workers’ rights to non-




of rights concerning equality between women and men workers relates to the protection 
against employment discrimination. 
On the other hand, the limited personal scope of the European Social Charter for third-
country national workers puts the European Convention in the spotlight of our analysis, 
prompting the question of how the European Court of Human Rights has implemented the 
Convention’s provisions with specific reference to immigrant women in the European legal 
space. Therefore, while not completely overlooking the European Social Charter, in this 
chapter I will focus mainly on the European Convention of Human Rights and on its potential 
to support immigrant women’s access to their rights and entitlements in conditions of 
equality.  
 
An interaction between European human rights law and problematic norms of national 
immigration law from a gendered point of view has occurred on multiple occasions before the 
European Court of Human Rights. As a result, interesting perspectives have emerged with 
respect to immigrant women’s enjoyment of both family life and employment. In the next 
sections I will address relevant judgments by the Strasbourg Court concerning issues of 
specific importance for immigrant women in relation t  these fields. In particular, I will firstly 
examine selected judgments by the Strasbourg Court on two essential issues disproportionally 
affecting immigrant women and undermining their full and effective enjoyment of the right to 
family life as protected by the entire Convention, i.e., access to family reunification and 
freedom from domestic violence. Secondly, I will move on to examine relevant judgments of 
the Court on a matter of specific importance for immigrant women’s enjoyment of their rights 
in the field of employment as outlined by the Convention, i.e., freedom from labour 
exploitation. 
The aim of such an analysis is twofold. On the one hand, I plan to critically assess, through 
a human rights lens, the gender bias of the specific provisions of national immigration law 
called into question by the applicants in the examined cases before the Strasbourg Court. On 
the other hand, I aim to establish whether and to what extent the Court itself was able and 
willing to maximise the possible potential of European human rights law by performing an 
expansive reading of relevant provisions, in order to make up for the gendered shortcomings 
of the domestic legislation brought to its attentio as well as affirm immigrant women’s 






2. Immigrant Women and Family Life: Gendered Shortcomings of National 
Immigration Laws and Practices in the Light of the European Convention on Human 
Rights 
 
In the field of family life, the gendered shortcomings of immigration regimes can be 
manifold. This paragraph will mainly focus on two of these shortcomings, respectively 
concerning immigrant women as sponsors of family reunification and as family members in 
the context of family reunification schemes. These two aspects have been selected not only 
because they constitute significant examples of the disparate impact that immigration law may 
produce on immigrant women, but also because on several occasions the European Court of 
Human Rights has established meaningful principles for both matters.  
As for the first issue, it may be that certain lega prerequisites for the enjoyment of specific 
rights may disproportionally and negatively affect immigrant women due to their implicit 
focus on a male model of migrant or on gender stereo yp s. More specifically, family 
reunification regimes may be based on a male breadwinner model51, or on internalised 
stereotypical views concerning immigrant women, which actually do not fit this diverse 
group. This issue may concern legal provisions per se but may also emerge in the context of 
implementation. As a consequence, the possibilities of immigrant women to access family 
reunification in conditions of equality with male immigrants are severely hampered. In this 
context, I will examine the judgments of Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United 
Kingdom52 , Haydarie v. the Netherlands53  as well as the Court’s numerous decisions 
concerning transnational parents’ access to family reunification. 
The second matter that will be examined relates to the possibility that family migration 
regimes may fail to draw a connection between their provisions and issues that 
disproportionately affect immigrant women – thus failing to understand how such provisions 
may further aggravate them. In particular, it is crucial to consider that family migration 
regimes establishing a high degree of dependence of family members on sponsors may cause 
severe gender inequality within the family, with negative consequences for immigrant women 
specifically. A concrete example of such consequences, which I will discuss in order to 
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illustrate this shortcoming, concerns the increased risk of domestic violence 
disproportionately experienced by family members – especially female spouses – and the 
reduced possibilities to react to such violence withou  jeopardising their residence rights. A 
critical analysis of the Court’s case law on domestic violence will thus be carried out in order 
to explore the possible role and potential of human rights in this area. 
 
2.1. Immigrant Women’s Access to Family Reunification Before the European Court 
of  Human Rights  
 
The Strasbourg Court’s case law on third-country natio l’s access to family reunification is 
very rich and diverse. Among such case law, a specific group of judgments appears to be 
particularly important for our purposes due to its focus on immigrant women’s possibility to 
sponsor family reunification with their partners, spouses or children vis-à-vis restrictive norms 
of national immigration law. The importance of these judgments lies in the fact that the 
immigrant women involved were prevented from living with their family members in the host 
country because they had failed to comply with specific gendered notions of family roles and 
responsibilities underlying national provisions of family migration law. Thus, a key question 
that will be tackled when analysing these judgments will concern whether and to what extent 
the Strasbourg Court, through the lens of the human right to family life, was able to unveil the 
gendered effects of the immigration law norms brought to its attention. Even more 
importantly, I will enquire into whether the recalled human rights produced the effect of 
correcting the gendered shortcomings of such norms, and on their eventual limitations in this 
context. 
With that in mind, I will critically assess three main examples of problematic norms of 
national immigration law brought before the Court by immigrant women who had been 
denied the possibility to sponsor family reunificaton with their spouses, partners or children – 










a. Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom: An Example of the 
Positive Influence of Human Rights on Biased Norms of Family Migration Law 
 
The first example concerns the dated but landmark cse of Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali 
v. the United Kingdom54. Here, three immigrant women55 legally residing in the United 
Kingdom had requested a leave to remain on the British territory on behalf of their non-
citizen husbands for the purpose of family reunification. However, the British government 
rejected their requests on the basis of a law (the “Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules” 
of 20 February 1980) establishing specifically stricter conditions for the reunification of male 
immigrants with settled female spouses or fiancées. Similar strict conditions had not been 
introduced for the reunification of female immigrants with settled male spouses or fiancés.  
It is crucial to highlight that the reason for such a differentiation mainly concerned the 
objective to protect the national labour market anddiscourage primary immigration, i.e., the 
entry and stay of foreigners who would pursue “full-time work in order to support a family”56. 
In the British government’s view, men fit the latter category. Therefore, their entry and stay in 
the national territory had to be limited. Women, on the other hand, could still be freely 
admitted for the purpose of family reunification – provided that their marriage had not been 
contracted for the sole purpose of settlement – because of the Government’s “long-standing 
commitments (allegedly based on humanitarian, social and ethical reasons) to the 
reunification of the families of male immigrants”57.  
Arguably, such a legal system relied on a male breadwinner model. Indeed, the specific 
restriction against the entry of husbands or fiancés for the purpose of protecting the labour 
market explicitly targeted men rather than women because the British government expected 
immigrant men to be more likely than women to pursue an employed activity once admitted 
to the UK. On the other hand, such a policy implied that immigrant women were non-
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threatening for the national labour market because they would rely on the work of their 
resident husband rather than pursuing access to thelabour market once admitted.  
Against the outlined British family migration regime, the applicants complained of a 
violation of their right to family life ex art. 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
both taken alone and in conjunction with the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of 
sex and race established by article 14 of the Convention. Among these claims, the lamented 
violation of article 8 in conjunction with article 14 is particularly meaningful. Indeed, this 
claim concerned the existence of “unjustified differences of treatment in securing the right to 
respect for [the applicants’] family life, based onsex, race, and also – in the case of Mrs. 
Balkandali – birth”58. 
As far as discrimination on the grounds of sex was concerned, the Court interestingly 
analysed the gendered assumptions underlying the British ules on family reunification and 
concerning the hypothetically different impact of immigrant men and women on the national 
labour market. In this respect, it emerged very clearly that Ms. Abdulaziz, Ms. Cabales and 
Ms. Balkandali embodied the living contradiction of the gendered assumption enshrined in 
the British rules on family reunification. In fact, their situations showed the great variety of 
living and working arrangements chosen by immigrant couples in the UK. Ms. Abdulaziz was 
an unemployed stateless person married to a Portuguese man who worked as a chef59. Ms. 
Cabales, on the other hand, was a Philippine citizen who worked fulltime as a nurse and had 
an “established career”60; the judgment does not clarify whether her husband worked at all. 
Lastly, Ms. Balkandali was an Egyptian citizen “with a high level of university education”61 
who worked part time in a crèche while her Turkish husband worked fulltime and was 
pursuing a self-employed activity.  
It was precisely the variety of the applicants’ situations as to the gendered divisions of 
labour within their couples that constituted the very core of their claim of discrimination. 
Indeed, the applicants held that the justification advanced by the British Government for its 
different treatment of settled women in comparison t  settled migrant men “ignored the 
modern role of women”62. In its final assessment of the discriminatory character of the British 
rules on family reunification, the Court accepted the outdated and inexact nature of the 
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gendered assumptions underlying such rules, significa tly stating that “the impact on the 
domestic labour market of women immigrants as compared with men ought not to be 
underestimated”63 , and that even before the introduction of the rules enforced on the 
applicants many immigrant wives were “economically active”64 . Therefore, the Court 
established that the differential treatment of men and women established by the discussed 
rules on family reunification was not justified by a significant differential impact of 
immigrant men and women on the national labour market, and recognised a violation of the 
applicant women’s right to enjoy their family life in conditions of non-discrimination on the 
grounds of sex. 
The rejection by the Court of gendered and implicitly racialized assumptions concerning 
immigrant women is in my view a particularly importan  aspect of the Abdulaziz judgment. 
Indeed, the Court was not content with accepting the allegations of the Government 
concerning the hypothetical adherence of immigrant couples to the traditional distinction of 
productive work (assigned to men) and reproductive work (assigned to women). Instead, it 
observed that immigrant women also had a significant economic impact on the national 
labour market – despite mostly concentrating in part-time work. Especially in cases such as 
the one at issue, where alleged sex-based differencs between immigrant men and women 
lead to a significant reduction of the legal recognitio  of the latter’s rights, a judicial 
willingness to contrast gendered assumptions by immigration law is crucial65.  
In sum, by relying on their human right to enjoy family life in conditions of non-
discrimination on the grounds of sex, the applicant women were able to highlight and 
contradict the gendered assumptions made by the British Government concerning the roles, 
aspirations and expectations of men and women in immigrant communities in relation to 
work, family, and more generally the migration experience. As a result, the Strasbourg Court 
was prompted to acknowledge the gendered effects of such legal assumptions on immigrant 
women’s possibilities to enjoy family life with their husbands and partners in the United 
Kingdom, and to compensate for the national regime’s shortcomings by recognising a 
violation of articles 8 and 14 combined. 
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As far as the other discussed grounds of discriminatio  are concerned, the Court was less 
responsive. This is particularly regrettable considering that the Court was requested by the 
applicant women to recognise an instance of multiple discrimination (on the grounds of sex, 
race and birth) stemming from national immigration rules, which – while common in practice 
– has rarely been brought to the Court’s attention66. Firstly, the applicants complained that the 
British rules on family reunification, in addition to discriminating them on the grounds of sex, 
constituted an indirect and unjustified differential reatment on the grounds of race. Among 
other argumentations, the applicants claimed that te more favourable legal treatment 
reserved to settled immigrant wives born, or having a parent born, in the United Kingdom 
constituted a legal preferential treatment of “persons of a particular ethnic origin”67. The 
Court, however, quickly dismissed such a claim by maintaining that these legal 
differentiations constituted “exceptions designed for the benefit of persons having close links 
with the United Kingdom, which do not affect the general tenor of the rules”68. Moreover, 
Ms. Balkandali argued that the legal differentiation at issue constituted discrimination on the 
grounds of birth because it had neither objective nor reasonable justifications. Very 
interestingly, the Government replied to this claim by maintaining that “the difference in 
question was justified by the concern to avoid the hardship which women having close ties to 
the United Kingdom would encounter if, on marriage, they were obliged to move abroad in 
order to remain with their husbands”69. Thus, the Court rejected Ms. Balkandali’s claim of 
discrimination on the grounds of birth by referring to unspecified “persuasive social reasons” 
as a justification for the preferential treatment reserved to people linked by birth to the state70.  
Thus, the Court’s assessment of the applicants’ claims of multiple discrimination produced 
mixed results from the point of view of immigrant women. Indeed, on the one hand it is in my 
view extremely appreciable that the Court was not content with recognising a violation of 
article 14 and article 8 on the exclusive grounds of ex, dismissing the other alleged grounds 
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of discrimination as absorbed by the former. Instead, the Court chose to analyse the other 
possible grounds of discrimination lamented by the applicants, i.e., race and birth. However, 
the final assessment by the Court in relation to these grounds of discrimination revealed to be 
disappointing not so much because of its result but rather because of the depth of the Court’s 
analysis. Indeed, while in relation to the differential treatment on the basis of sex the Court 
looked at immigrant women’s participation and positi n in the national labour market to 
contrast the Government’s assumptions, the same cannot be said in relation to immigrant 
women’s differential treatment in relation to birth. In fact, the Court uncritically endorsed the 
Government’s view that simply by virtue of being born ut of the host country, or even of not 
having parents born in the country, immigrant women would be more likely to be able to 
establish their family lives elsewhere regardless of the emotional and socio-economic ties 
developed in the host country. It seems therefore that although the Court was theoretically 
willing to consider multiple axes of discrimination against immigrant women, it was not 
equally attentive to their cumulative role in the discriminatory effects of the British rules at 
issue. In fact, the Court ended up endorsing questionable legal assumptions that constituted an 
additional axis of exclusion for immigrant women, denying the links built by the applicants 
with their host country. 
 
b. Haydarie v. the Netherlands: When Human Rights Fail to Correct the Gender 
Bias of Family Migration Law 
 
A second important case where a third-country natiol immigrant woman opposed biased 
norms of family reunification law that prevented her from sponsoring family reunification is 
Haydarie v. the Netherlands71. This case concerns the rejection of a refugee woman’s72 
application for family reunification with her children on the grounds of her failure to comply 
with the financial requirements established by Dutch family reunification law. Moreover, 
while such systems envisaged the possibility of being xempted from income requirements if 
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aspiring sponsors could “demonstrate to have made, during a period of three years, serious but 
unsuccessful attempts to find gainful employment”, the applicant mother was not deemed to 
have done so. 
In particular, the Dutch authorities rejected her application on the grounds that, as noted by 
the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, “her sole income consisted of general welfare benefits 
whereas (...) benefits under the General Welfare Act are not accepted as constituting (part of 
the) means of subsistence within the meaning of the immigration rules”73 and that it found 
“no special circumstances on the grounds of which it should be held that the aim served by 
the income requirement (...) entailed disproportionate consequences for the first applicants”74. 
In fact, despite being authorised to work since twoyears after her first entry, the applicant 
mother had only attended sewing and language courses without actively seeking employment. 
Thus, in the Minister’s view the applicant mother had failed to make serious efforts to find 
employment, which would have required “an active attitude on her part, implying actively 
looking for and accepting work even where a job would not correspond to her education or 
professional experience, registering at an employment office (...) and interim employment 
agencies indicating to be willing to accept any kind of work, reacting to vacancy 
announcements, intensive writing of (un)solicited job applications, and undertaking labour-
market oriented studies”75.  
However, the applicant mother’s allegations at the domestic level reveal a heavy burden of 
care responsibilities which hampered her access to the labour market. In particular, the 
applicant submitted that “she had to care for her wheelchair bound sister who refused aid 
from strangers and that she did not wish to leave her sister alone in the house fearing that she 
might cause a fire”76. 
In this light, the concrete situation of the applicant mother showed not only the unrealistic 
character of the Minister’s expectations towards foreign women with severe care burdens, but 
also a questionable view based on the identification of productive work as active and unpaid 
care work within the family as passive and inactive, as well as a problematic characterisation 
of care work as a consistently free choice rather tan a responsibility. Such a regime was 
clearly based on a male breadwinner model, identifyi g the ideal and successful sponsor 
either with an immigrant worker earning enough to support himself and the family members 
by whom he wanted to be joined, or with an immigrant who had actively and consistently 
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pursued any kind of occupation in the labour market for at least three years. The Minister, 
indeed, significantly observed that “it was the [applicant mother’s] own choice to care for her 
sister”77, and that “she could appeal to aid providing bodies”78 to delegate her care work to 
others. Similar attitudes were also reproduced by the Regional Court of The Hague (to which 
the children of the applicant had turned), whose judgment concluded that Ms. Haydarie had 
“taken on the care for her disabled sister, which choice apparently entailed that she distanced 
herself from the labour market and thereby indirectly from her [three] children on account of 
failing to comply with the income requirement”79.  
Therefore, Ms. Haydarie and her children applied before the Strasbourg Court, lamenting a 
violation of their right to family life ex article 8 of the Convention. Interestingly, one of the 
argumentations set forth by the applicants under such a claim was that “the Netherlands 
authorities had given insufficient weight to her moral responsibility and unpaid care labour in 
respect of her sister”80. This submission raised the important point that te State’s depiction of 
the applicant as jobless and inactive on the sole grounds of her lack of salary was strongly 
inaccurate. In fact, the applicant’s job was to fulfil her care responsibilities towards her sister. 
 
Unfortunately, in the Haydarie case the Court was not as receptive to the deeply gendered 
discourse underlying the Dutch authorities’ decision as it was in the Abdulaziz et al. case with 
respect to the gendered assumptions of the British ules on family reunification. In the case at 
issue, the Court reproduced the exclusive focus of the national family reunification regime on 
productive work. In order to establish whether under such a system the applicant mother 
could have been exempted from complying with income requirements, the Court firstly 
affirmed that in principle it “[did] not consider unreasonable a requirement than an alien who 
seeks family reunion must demonstrate that he/she has a sufficient independent and lasting 
income, not being welfare benefits, to provide for the basic costs of subsistence of his or her 
family members with whom reunion is sought”81. Secondly, and even more interestingly, the 










 Id. This principle was subsequently reaffirmed by the Court in the case of Konstantinov v. the Netherlands, 
concerning the expulsion of a Serbian woman from the Netherlands on the grounds of her criminal record. 
While assessing the contextual refusal of the national authorities to grant her a residence permit on the basis 
of her marriage with a legally resident man because the latter did not satisfy the related income requirements, 
the Court reinstated that “[i]n principle, [it did] not consider unreasonable a requirement that an alien having 
achieved settled status in a Contracting State and who seeks family reunion there must demonstrate that 




Court moved on to consider whether in the specific case at issue such a requirement was 
reasonable. In this respect, I am of the view that in this case the Court had a chance to take 
into consideration the specific situation of the applicant. In particular, it could have 
established that as an immigrant woman living alone with a young child and a disabled sister 
in a foreign country, and burdened with intensive care labour, the applicant mother could not 
have been reasonably expected to take up an additional occupation in order to satisfy the 
discussed income requirements.  
However, the Court merely endorsed the Dutch Governm nt’s view whereby the applicant 
mother had simply chosen not to work and to take car of her sister instead – implying that 
her unpaid care labour was not actual work and she could have made efforts to find a “real” 
job. In particular, the Court stated that the applicant mother had not “actively sought gainful 
employment” and that “she preferred to care for her wheelchair bound sister at home”82. 
Moreover, the Court observed that it had not been dmonstrated “that it would have been 
impossible for the [applicant mother] to call in and entrust the care for her sister to an agency 
providing care for handicapped persons”83. On this basis, the Court concluded that the 
applicant mother’s interest could not trump the state’s interest in “controlling immigration and 
public expenditure”84 and declared the case inadmissible. 
While the Court’s failure to recognise and contrast the gender bias of the Dutch rules on 
family reunification and of the Dutch authorities’ decision is certainly disappointing, it is 
important to observe that no related claim was brought nder the right to non-discrimination 
established by art. 14. In particular, Ms. Haydarie could have relied on articles 8 and 14 
combined to highlight the gender bias of the Dutch norms at issue in order to prompt an 
assessment by the Strasbourg Court similar to that of Abdulaziz et al. It is reasonable to 
imagine that the applicant mother may have had a successful argumentation under these 
articles, shining a light on the disproportionate difficulties for a third-country national woman 
with no family network to rely on in the host country, as well as serious and burdensome care 
responsibilities, to take up employment in order to satisfy the income requirements 
established by the national family reunification regime. This could have encouraged the Court 
to recognise the indirectly discriminatory effects of the abstract model of “desirable sponsor” 
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underlying the discussed norms in relation to immigrant women’s enjoyment of their right to 
family life. 
This framing, in particular, could have prompted a different judicial assessment of the 
reasonableness of the prerequisites imposed by Dutch family reunification law and therefore 
of the fairness of the balance realised by the Dutch authorities between the state interest to 
ensure that immigrants entering the country for the purpose of family reunification would not 
rely on the national social assistance system, on the one hand, and immigrant women’s 
interest to enjoy family life in the host country in conditions of equality and non-
discrimination on the grounds of sex. Indeed, had the Court considered the gendered 
implications of the national authorities’ orientation, the substantial unreasonableness of 
imposing requisites exclusively based on productive work to an immigrant woman burdened 
by unpaid care labour and the objective impossibility for her to satisfy the income 
requirements at issue may have emerged in its assessment of whether such requirements were 
“reasonable in the instant case”85, revealing the disparate impact of this norm.  
 
c. Transnational Mothers’ Access to Family Reunification With Their Children: the 
Dangerous Endorsement by the Strasbourg Court of a Gendered “Good Mother” 
Narrative 
 
Contrary to the judicial examples discussed so far, which relate to gendered shortcomings 
underlying the very formulation of legal norms, the case law that will be examined in this 
section illustrates how a disparate impact on immigrant women’s rights in the field of family 
life may also be produced by the implementation of certain norms. This case law originated 
from the exclusion of certain immigrant parents from the possibility to sponsor family 
reunification with their children, on the grounds of the 1994 Dutch Aliens Act 
(Vreemdelingenwet 1994). Chapter B1 of the related Aliens Act Implementation Guidelines 
(Vreemdelingencirculaire 1994),only allowed entry for the purpose of family reunification to 
children “actually belonging to the family unit” (feitelijk behoren tot het gezin). Recalling this 
norm, the Dutch authorities had rejected the applicant parents’ requests for family 
reunification on the grounds that the family ties between them and their children had ceased 
to exist. 
 






The involved provisions of Dutch law did not appear to eveal any gendered shortcoming. In 
fact, these provisions appeared to negatively affect both men and women equally. It has been 
rightly noted that through the establishment of thecriterion of effective belonging to the 
family unity, Dutch immigration law required national authorities to “[police] the actual 
involvement of parents in the care of their children”86 and imposed an abstract model of an 
ideal parent. This corresponded to a broader evolution in Dutch society. Indeed, while the 
idea of a legal assessment of the actual care provided to children as a criterion for Dutch 
parents’ access to parental rights was firmly reject d, it was at the same time accepted and 
implemented in the national family reunification regime87.  
However, a parallel contradiction observable in Dutch society concerned immigrant women 
specifically: single motherhood was increasingly accepted as a sign of emancipation for 
Dutch women but was seen as an indication of immorality nd irresponsibility for migrant 
mothers88. These two tendencies suggested the risk of a severely biased implementation of the 
legislation at issue to the detriment of immigrant women. The assessment of the persistence of 
actual family ties – implying a close scrutiny of the actual involvement of transnational 
parents in their children’s care – could be heavily and negatively influenced by the gendered 
and racialized reproach of single immigrant mothers. A  a consequence, immigrant single 
mothers risked being disproportionately hampered in their prospects of enjoying family life 
with their children in their host country.  
Therefore, an important question concerns whether and to what extent the human rights 
framework of the Convention was capable of steering state practice towards a gender-
sensitive implementation of the norms at issue. A significant number of transnational parents 
turned to the Strasbourg Court after being denied family reunification with their children by 
the Dutch authorities on the grounds of allegedly broken family ties, lamenting violations of 
art. 8 of the Convention. The resulting case law offers interesting cues to answer this question. 
 
Thus, I will now turn to critically examine and compare two main groups of cases89. The first 
group concerns applications brought before the Court by single migrant mothers whose access 
to family reunification with their children had been denied by the Dutch authorities on the 
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grounds of an alleged severance of the family ties between them and their children left behind 
in their host country. Such a group includes the cases of Knel and Veira v. the Netherlands90, 
P.R. v. the Netherlands91, I.M. v. the Netherlands92, Chandra v. the Netherlands93, Ramos 
Andrade v. the Netherlands94, and Benamar v. the Netherlands95. The second group involves 
single migrant fathers in the same situation, and icludes the cases of Ahmut v. the 
Netherlands96, Mensah v. the Netherlands97, Lahnifi v. the Netherlands98, and Adnane v. the 
Netherlands99 
In a comparative perspective, it must be noted that while all of the cases on migrant single 
parents concerned men and women in very similar situations100, and all of the applications 
were deemed inadmissible by the Court regardless of the sex of the applicant parents, clearly 
gendered subtexts emerged from the Court’s judicial reasoning. Indeed, not only did the Court 
fail to consider the possibly biased implementation of the family reunification regime at issue 
by the national authorities, and the possibly gendered effects of state practice, but its own 
attitude towards the applicant single parents also varied significantly depending on the sex of 
the latter. Three main aspects of the Court’s decisions in this field strongly point towards this 
conclusion: the Court’s assessment of the single par nts’ decision to emigrate while leaving 
their children behind in their country of origin, the involved children’s need of care, and the 
parents’ realistic options of going back to their country of origin in order to enjoy family life 
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with their children there instead that in the host country. In each of these evaluations, the 
Court revealed a problematic, gendered view of parent l responsibilities.  
Firstly, while the Court’s assessment of migrant single fathers’ decision to leave their 
children behind consisted in quite neutral statements for men, immigrant single mothers’ 
decisions in this sense were much more detailed – specifically focusing on the presence of a 
new partner in the Netherlands as the reason for their emigration101, on the eventual 
unwillingness of a new partner to live with the applicants’ children as a reason for the 
postponement of reunification, and on the age of the c ildren at the moment of the mothers’ 
emigration. All of these factual aspects, despite also being present in the cases concerning 
single migrant fathers, were exclusively highlighted in relation to immigrant single 
mothers102. In this respect, it must also be noted that the eventual opposition of the migrant 
mothers’ new partners to the reunification with their children was the only reason on which 
the Court focused among the many other justifications raised by the applicant mothers – while 
for migrant fathers the Court appeared more willing to consider the whole set of justifications 
submitted by the applicants103. 
Secondly, the involved children’s need of care was as essed in very different terms by the 
Court depending on the sex of the applicant single parent. In particular, despite the fact that 
all of the applicants’ children were in the same ag range, the Court used this aspect as a 
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justification for the inadmissibility of their claims exclusively in relation to immigrant 
mothers – arguing that by the time the national authorities had taken a final decision on their 
application for family reunification, the children had reached an age where they were “not as 
much in need of care as younger children”104– while disregarding this issue entirely for 
immigrant fathers. 
Thirdly, the Court’s evaluation of the options left to the migrant single parents after the 
rejection of their applications for family reunification was also very different depending on 
the sex of the parents. On a broad level, despite the high degree of settlement of the involved 
parents in the case law at issue105, the Court consistently decided for the inadmissiblity of 
their plights on the grounds that no obstacles to developing their family life in their countries 
of origin had been shown106. Despite this homogeneous rejection of the parents’ applications, 
it must be noted that in at least two cases concerning migrant single fathers the Court accepted 
in principle that “in cases where a parent has achieved settled status in a country and wants to 
be reunited with her or his children who, for the time being, have been left behind in their 
country of origin, it may be unreasonable to give th parent the choice between giving up the 
position which she/he has acquired in the country of settlement or to renounce the mutual 
enjoyment by parent and child of each other’s company which constitutes a fundamental 
element of family life”107. However, despite the absolute similarity of the mothers’ and 
fathers’ situations in terms of settlement and integration in their host countries, none of the 
Court’s decisions on migrant mothers involved similar statements. Instead, the Court further 
reaffirmed such a principle in a subsequent decision concerning, once again, a migrant single 
father108.  
Against this background, a comparative analysis of the Court’s decisions on migrant single 
mothers and fathers reveals seriously gendered shortcomings of the Court’s own judicial 
reasoning, which undermined its possibilities of promoting a gender-sensitive implementation 
of the national immigration regime in question. Instead, the choices of the Courts in terms of 
an exclusive focus on certain aspects of the experience of immigrant mothers – while focusing 
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on others for immigrant fathers–suggests that the Court implicitly embraced and enforced an 
abstract and gendered model of ideal motherhood that had no equivalent for migrant fathers. 
In particular, the focus on the age of the children and on the “competing” presence of a new 
partner in the migrant mothers’ lives suggests that such a model relied on physical proximity 
and absolute emotional devotion to their children as indicators of a “real” family relationship 
between mother and child. The resulting “good mother” model was that of a mother 
physically close to her children throughout their entir  childhood (which denied the 
possibility of leaving young children behind in the country of origin) and exclusively devoted 
to them from an emotional point of view (with the consequent censure of eventual 
relationships with new partners in the host country). A similar model is also suggested by the 
exclusive mention in cases of migrant fathers of the possible unreasonableness of forcing a 
migrant parent to choose between giving up his or her settled position in the host country and 
relinquishing living with his or her children for good. In the spirit of utter self-abnegation, the 
“good mother” could instead be reasonably asked to leave the country where she had settled 
and sacrifice her position in order to return to her country of origin if she really wanted to 
enjoy family life with her children.  
 While the Court deemed inadmissible the claims of migrant fathers and mothers alike, the 
adoption of such an abstract model of “proper” mothering, but not of fathering, is significant 
in itself because it undermines the Court’s ability to offer key guidelines to state practice in 
order to avoid a biased implementation of family reunification regimes. Furthermore, the 
Court’s adoption of such a model in itself creates a double standard at the European level 
concerning migrant mothers’ and fathers’ access to family reunification with their children, at 
the disadvantage of the former. 
 
These observations on the Court’s insensitivity to the risk of deeply gendered effects of the 
norms in question do not appear applicable to its more recent judgment of Tuquabo-Tekle v. 
the Netherlands109. This case concerned the rejection of a single migrant mother’s application 
for family reunification with her child on the grounds that she had failed to maintain family 
ties with her daughter. In its judgment, the Court avoided replicating the observed features of 
its previous case law concerning single migrant mothers, and recognised – for the first time in 
this field – a violation of a single mother’s right to family life under article 8 of the 
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Convention. For the purpose of this section, the Court’s apparent departure from its usual 
attitude towards migrant single mothers is particularly interesting 
In the Tuquabo-Tekle case, several aspects suggest that the Court abandoned its usual focus 
on certain features of migrant mothers’ emigration – which were consistently overlooked for 
migrant fathers. For instance, in this case the Court made no mention whatsoever of the age of 
the involved child at the moment of her mother’s emigration, nor of the child’s need of care as 
a ground for the evaluation of the opportunity of family reunification. Similarly, the applicant 
mother’s relationship with another man in the host country was not penalised as in previous 
cases. Furthermore, in this judgment for the first time the Court not only explicitly 
acknowledged a single mother’s allegations of the reasons that caused her belated application 
for family reunification, but it even deemed them to be reasonably justified. Indeed, it 
concluded that the national authorities had “failed to strike a fair balance between the 
applicants’ interests on the one hand and [their] own interest in controlling immigration on the 
other”110, since the applicant mother’s efforts to reunite with her daughter had failed because 
of “circumstances beyond her control”111 and therefore the applicant mother had “always 
intended for her daughter to join her”112. 
However, a closer look at this judgment reveals that e Court’s deviation from its usual 
reasoning did not entail an overcoming of the abstrct and gendered notions of motherhood 
embraced in its previous case law. In fact, the different assessment of the applicant mother’s 
situation confirms the reproduction of such gendere narratives. It should be noted that the 
concrete situation of the applicant did not leave much room for any other framing. The 
circumstances of the mother’s emigration in this cae were substantially different from those 
of the other applicant mothers in the cases examined so far. In particular, Ms. Tuquabo-Tekle 
had escaped the civil war in Ethiopia following the d ath of her husband and her own 
harassment and detention due to her husband’s involvement in the Eritrean People’s 
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Liberation Front. Moreover, as soon as she had obtained a permit for humanitarian reasons 
she had applied for family reunification with her children. The difficulties in having her 
daughter join her were due to the fact that the latt r’s place of residence had become part of 
the new State of Eritrea, where contacts and the issuing of documentation were initially 
impossible to obtain. Lastly, she had met her new partner (her second husband) only after 
applying for family reunification with her children left behind. 
Against this background, it appears clearly that the applicant mother in this case complied 
with the abstract model of “good mother” which underlay the Court’s previous case law. 
Arguably, her lack of free choice as to the end of her marriage with the father of her children, 
her emigration and her consequent separation from her daughter allowed her to fit the 
gendered narrative of the Court, which identified motherhood with features such as a 
continuous physical proximity (or at least a continuous desire and effort in this respect) and 
total emotional devotion towards one’s children.  
 
Therefore, the Tuquabo-Tekle judgment does not actually suggest an evolution of the Court 
towards a more gender-sensitive assessment of migrant parents’ exclusion from the possibility 
to sponsor family reunification with their children. Rather, it confirms the existence of a 
double standard underlying the Strasbourg Court’s case law on this matter, in my view due to 
an unconscious internalisation and reproduction of gendered tropes concerning motherhood. 
The higher standards implicitly imposed on migrant mothers by the Court as to their 
possibilities to effectively enjoy family life with their children in their host countries, 
therefore, seriously undermined its capability to enforce a gender-sensitive implementation of 
the discussed norms on the grounds of the human rights enshrined in the Convention. 
In this respect, a reading of the right to family life ex art.8 in the light of the anti-
discrimination mandate of art. 14 appears utterly necessary to push the Court towards a 
reflection on the disparate impact that its own judgments may generate on immigrant women 
– in this case by imposing additional “good mother” prerequisites on them for the purpose of 
accessing family reunification which have no equivalent for fathers. These additional 
requirements, indeed, e facto undermine immigrant women’s access to their right to family 








d. Legal Enforcement of Gendered Models and its Disparte Impact on Immigrant 
Women 
 
The judgments examined in this section constitute significant examples of how the 
internalisation and enforcement of deeply gendered models on immigrant women may 
significantly hamper their access to rights which are in theory recognised to them on an equal 
footing with immigrant men. The matter of sponsoring family reunification is one of the areas 
in which this problem emerges, especially because sch models often rely on stereotypical 
assumptions concerning the role of women within the family. In the cases of Abdulaziz et 
al.113 and of Haydarie114, a disparate impact on the involved immigrant women’s family life 
was produced because of the adherence of national norms to a breadwinner model. In the 
Strasbourg Court’s case law on transnational mothers, a similar effect was generated due to 
the Court’s adherence to an abstract and unviable “good mother” model.  
Regrettably, the role played by human rights law in these instances was far from positive. 
With the important exception of Abdulaziz et al., the Court interpreted the right to family life 
ex art. 8 as a ground to endorse these models, reproducing their entrenched gender bias at the 
supranational level. The result, in my view, was one of indirect discrimination against the 
involved immigrant women in respect to their possibilities to access family reunification. This 
is also suggested by the outcome of the Abdulaziz et al. judgment. It is no coincidence that the 
only judgment where the Court recognised and corrected the perverse effects of a gendered 
model adopted by national norms was the one where a claim of sex discrimination under art. 
14 of the Convention was submitted. This claim, indee , encouraged the Court to delve into 
the justifications advanced by the British authorities for establishing rules whereby “it was 
easier for a man settled in the United Kingdom than for a woman so settled to obtain 
permission for his or her non-national spouse to enter or remain in the country for 
settlement”115. This focus, in turn, pushed the Court to pay attention to the breadwinner model 
that grounded these norms, and to compare their stereotypical normative view with the reality 
of immigrant women in the United Kingdom. Because it found a deep discrepancy between 
the two, the Court ultimately concluded that the bradwinner model enforced by British law 
did not constitute a reasonable and objective justifica on precisely because it relied on an 
outdated view of immigrant women’s role in the national society and labour market.  
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These observations suggest two main conclusions. Fir tly, that human rights norms per se 
are neither inherently harmful nor biased, nor automatically beneficial for immigrant women. 
As shown with particular clarity by the Court’s case law on transnational parents, and by the 
Court’s focus on different aspects depending on the sex of the parent, human rights norms 
may reproduce or correct the gender bias entrenched in national legal systems depending on 
how they are interpreted by competent courts. 
Secondly, a consideration of the right to family life in conjunction with the prohibition of 
discrimination on the grounds of sex appears essential to move towards a judicial recognition 
of the direct or indirect discrimination stemming from the adoption of gendered models by 
national legal regimes applicable to immigrant women. I am of the view that raising claims of 
violation of arts. 8 and 14 jointly can constitute an effective legal strategy to push the 
European Court of Human Rights to unveil and correct the disparate impact of these models 
on immigrant women’s access to family reunification, a d family life in general.  
In relation to this, it must be noted that the European Court of Human Rights has so far 
interpreted art. 14 as entailing a prohibition of bth direct and indirect discrimination116. 
Arguably, the latter appears particularly important for immigrant women. Domestic norms 
such as that chastised by the Court in Abdulaziz et al., which explicitly differentiate between 
men and women without a reasonable and objective justification, and thus produce direct 
discrimination, are indeed a rare occurrence. As suggested by the other judgments discussed 
in this section, the majority of norms undermining mmigrant women’s rights in the fields of 
family life and employment do so because, despite th ir apparent neutrality, they 
disproportionately and negatively affect this group – resulting in indirect discrimination. For 
this reason, the relatively recent attention of the Strasbourg Court towards indirect 
discrimination and substantial equality constitutes a particularly important development for 
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immigrant women, and should in my view be further encouraged through judicial claims in 
this sense.  
 
2.2. Freedom from Domestic Violence under the European Convention: Towards 
Common Standards for National Migration Regimes? 
 
Especially starting from the Kontrová case of 2007117, the European Court of Human Rights 
has established and consolidated important principles on human rights violations related to 
domestic violence and on state obligations in relation o this phenomenon. Because of the 
“particular risk from domestic violence” experienced by immigrant women118, the recent 
attention of the Court towards this phenomenon might constitute in itself a particularly 
positive development for this group. In this respect, it appears important to consider the 
effects of the principles established by the Court in this field on national migration regimes, 
and especially on the creation and implementation of domestic rules on family migration. In 
connection with this matter, the Council of Europe’s Committee on Equal Opportunities noted 
in 2009119 how the disproportionate risk of domestic violence run by immigrant women in the 
European legal space was not only imputable to factual triggers – such as their cultural 
background, the patriarchal mentality of their communities, language barriers, gender-based 
discrimination, stereotypes and so forth – but also by specific legal barriers imposed by 
national family reunification regimes. In particular, the Committee highlighted the 
problematic and perverse effects of family reunification schemes that impose the dependence 
of authorisations to stay and reside in the host country from the spouse’s permit. As a result of 
this dependence, “[making] a complaint and/or seeking divorce on the ground of violent acts 
signifies, in this case, a highly probable return to the country of origin and/or rejection by 
their own family”120. The Committee rightly observed how “[this] situation places many 
migrant women subjected to domestic violence at a dis dvantage, often deterring them from 
making a complaint against a violent partner or spou e”121.  
Arguably, the dependence of the family members’ residence permit on that of the spouse in 
the context of family reunification regimes disproportionately and negatively affects women’s 
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possibilities to react to phenomena of domestic violence. Not only do such phenomena 
disproportionately affect women more than men, but women are also mostly prevalent in 
family migration fluxes towards Europe. Thus, immigrant women victims of domestic 
violence holding a permit for the purpose of family reunification are forced by such a legally-
endorsed dependence to chose between jeopardising their possibility to stay in the host 
country and enduring domestic violence. With respect to the possible solutions to this issue, it 
is extremely significant that the Committee was notc ntent with recommending the state 
parties envisage an independent permit for migrant women victims of domestic violence. In 
fact, the Committee commented on the limited effectiv ness of such a legal solution, 
“considering the covert nature of domestic violence and the linguistic, financial and 
sometimes administrative difficulties, ignorance of these measures or family coercion if steps 
are taken”122, and concluded that “it seems indispensable for migrant women to be promptly 
granted an independent status in their own right”123. Accordingly, in the final text of its 
Resolution 1697(2009), the Council of Europe recommended that member States grant an 
“individual legal status to migrant women who have joined their spouse through family 
reunion, if possible within one year of the date of arrival”124. 
 
On a broader level, I would also argue that in addition to constituting a more effective 
measure against domestic violence, the granting of an independent status in the context of 
family reunification schemes beyond “extreme” situations such as spousal abuse, divorce, 
widowhood and so forth, would greatly benefit immigrant women by promoting spousal 
equality. At the very least, it would avoid pushing this category towards subordination and 
dependence on their spouses by aggravating and adding up to factual difficulties such as 
language barriers, lack of knowledge of the host society and its laws, and so forth. 
In the light of these observations, in this section I aim to critically assess the Strasbourg 
Court’s case law on domestic violence in order to understand whether and to what extent the 
principles established by the Court in this context may fruitfully apply to national family 
reunification regimes. In this respect, it must be first clarified that the Court’s judgments on 
the issue of domestic violence to date have never involved an immigrant woman. 
Consequently, the case law on the specific matter of domestic violence has never directly 
tackled national immigration regimes. Nevertheless, such a case law is still important for our 
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purposes. In its judgments on domestic violence, indeed, the Court has established key 
principles concerning positive and negative state obligations whose scope of application goes 
well beyond the specific domestic legislation examined in each case. In the next section, I will 
clarify this point and explain why, in my view, the principles established by the Strasbourg 
Court on this matter are in fact very relevant for immigrant women’s freedom from domestic 
violence. 
 
a. The European Court of Human Rights’ Case Law on Domestic Violence: 
Extracting Relevant Principles from Multiple Human Rights Under the Convention  
 
The Strasbourg Court’s case law on domestic violence can be divided into two groups. A first 
group of judgments concerns cases of domestic violence that eventually culminated in the 
victim’s murder at the hands of the violent partner. In such cases the Court was mainly 
submitted with claims of violations of the victim’s right to life established by article 2 of the 
Convention. In a second group of judgments, the Court analysed claims of human rights 
violations brought by victims of domestic violence themselves. In particular, in this second 
group, the applicant women mostly relied on the prohibition of torture ex article 3 of the 
Convention and on their right to respect for private nd family life under article 8, both taken 
alone or in conjunction with their right to non-discrimination on the grounds of sex pursuant 
article 14. 
As far as the first group of judgments is concerned, the cases of Kontrová v. Slovakia125, 
Branko Tomašic and Others v. Croatia126and Opuz v. Turkey127, all involved claims of 
violations of the right to life of persons killed in the context of abusive relationships or 
households. More specifically, in the case of K ntrová and Opuz the applicant women were 
both victims of severe psychological and physical abuse by their spouse, which had resulted 
in the murder of their children and mother respectiv ly. In the case of Branko Tomašic, the 
severe psychological abuse perpetrated by a male spouse had soon evolved in death threats 
and in the eventual murder of his former wife and their child. In all three judgments, the Court 
recognised a breach of the right to life of the victims by the respondent states on the basis of 
their failure to set up an effective system of protection. Moreover, in these judgments the 
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Court established a first important principle with respect to state obligations in relation to the 
right to life enshrined in article 2 of the Conventio . Indeed, the Court stated that article 2 
entails not only negative state obligations, i.e., an obligation to abstain from unlawfully taking 
the life of individuals, but also positive obligations of protection, consisting in “a primary 
duty on the State to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal-law 
provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person backed up by law-
enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such 
provisions [emphasis added]”128.  
 
In the second group of judgments, the Court looked more closely at the phenomenon of 
domestic violence as a form of violation of different articles of the Convention. In this second 
group of cases, the women victims of domestic violence directly applied before the Court in 
order to obtain recognition of breaches of their own human rights in direct connection with 
their experiences of abuse. The judgments of Bevacqua v. Bulgaria129, Opuz v. Turkey130, E. 
S. and Others v Slovakia131, A. v. Croatia132and Valiulienė v. Lithuania133can all be ascribed to 
such a group.  
In all of these cases, the applicant women complained before the Strasbourg Court that the 
national authorities of their states had breached several articles of the Convention by failing to 
effectively protect them against domestic violence. Depending on the seriousness and 
intensity of the violence suffered by the applicants, the Court analysed their claims in the 
context of the right not to be subjected to torture o  to inhuman or degrading treatment ex 
article 3 of the Convention or in the context of the right to respect of private and family life 
pursuant article 8. Moreover, in the case of Opuz, the Court also engaged in a compelling 
analysis of domestic violence as a form of discrimination on the grounds of sex and 
prohibited as such under article 14 of the Convention. Among the many important aspects 
touched upon by the Court in the judgments at issue, I will highlight two points that I find 
particularly relevant for the purpose of extracting useful principles for immigrant women 
specifically. 
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Firstly, in the case law at issue the Court established important principles concerning state 
obligations in preventing and suppressing domestic violence, under articles 3 and 8 of the 
Convention in particular. More specifically, in the B vacqua judgment the Court recalled that 
“the authorities’ positive obligations – in some cases under Articles 2 or 3 and in other 
instances under Article 8 taken alone or in combinatio  with Article 3 of the Convention – 
may include, in certain circumstances, a duty to maintain and apply in practice an adequate 
legal framework affording protection against acts of violence by private individuals”134, 
emphasising also “the particular vulnerability of the victims of domestic violence and the 
need for active State involvement in their protection”135. The existence of state obligations to 
take effective measures and adopt an adequate legal framework for protecting individuals 
against private acts of violence was consistently reaffirmed in the subsequent judgments by 
the Court on domestic violence. In Opuz v. Turkey, the Court established that the prohibition 
of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment under article 3 “requires States to take 
measures designed to ensure that individuals within t eir jurisdiction are not subjected to 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including such ill-treatment 
administered by private individuals”136, requiring “effective deterrence against such serious 
breaches of personal integrity”137. In A. v. Croatia, the Court affirmed that the right to respect 
for private life enshrined in article 8 also implies states’ “duty to protect the physical and 
moral integrity of an individual from other persons”138, and that “[to] that end they are to 
maintain and apply in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection against acts 
of violence by private individuals”139. 
In relation to states’ positive obligations to protect individuals against domestic violence, 
on the one hand the Court left the choice of the concrete measures to secure the rights 
enshrined in articles 3 and 8 to the states’ margin of appreciation140. On the other hand, 
however, the Court made very clear in such judgments that the choices adopted by states in 
their discretional power would be scrutinised in order to assess their appropriateness and 
effectiveness in ensuring respect of the rights establi hed by articles 3 and 8141.  
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A second important point touched upon by the Strasbourg Court concerns the relevance of 
domestic violence under the prohibition of discriminat on under article 14 of the Convention. 
This issue was discussed in particular in the cases of Opuz v. Turkey and of A. v. Croatia. In 
the Opuz case, the Court relied on several sources of interna ional human rights law in order 
to define domestic violence as a form of discrimination against women. More specifically, in 
Opuz the Court embraced the views expressed by the CEDAW Committee in its General 
Recommendation no. 19 of 1992142, which defines all gender-based violence as “a form f 
discrimination that seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis 
of equality with men”143, as well as Resolution 2003/45 of the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights144 and the so-called Belém do Pará Convention on Violence against Women145. 
Consequently, the Court determined that “the State’s failure to protect women against 
domestic violence breaches their right to equal protection of the law”146. In other words, 
because domestic violence is per se a form of discrimination on the grounds of sex and a 
breach of women’s right to equality and non-discrimination, states have an obligation under 
article 14 of the Convention to protect women against such a phenomenon.  
It is important to consider that in order to assess whether the respondent states had fulfilled 
such obligations, in the cases of Opuz and A. the Court undertook an analysis not only of the 
domestic legal framework in force, but also of its actual implementation and enforcement. It 
was precisely such attention that allowed the Court to conclude, in the Opuz case, that despite 
the apparent gender-neutrality of the Turkish laws in force, the general climate of “judicial 
passivity”147 in Turkey towards the issue of domestic violence (which disproportionately 
affected women) constituted per se a breach of article 14. The case of A. v. Croatia, despite 
ending with a rejection of the applicant’s claim of violation of article 14, confirmed the 
possibility to identify a breach of their human right to non-discrimination in the context of 
domestic violence not only on the basis of the legal framework set up by states but also in 
relation to the concrete possibilities left to women victims of violence to obtain protection in 
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such states148. The attention of the Court towards the actual imple entation of national laws 
on domestic violence in the cases of Opuz and A. is significant in that it called into question 
important aspects of “hidden” discrimination such as the disparate impact of inadequate 
national legal frameworks concerning domestic violence on women specifically, as well as 
the degree of actual enforcement of these legal provisions and the related attitude of national 
authorities in this regard. 
 
b. Potential Application of the Strasbourg Court’s Case Law on Domestic Violence 
to Immigrant Women in the Context of Family Reunification Regimes 
 
In order to understand whether and to what extent the examined principles may be fruitfully 
applied to immigrant women vis-à-vis family reunification regimes negatively affecting their 
freedom from domestic violence, it is crucial to observe that the case law examined in the 
previous section focused almost exclusively on enforcement rather than on the gendered 
shortcomings of discriminatory norms of national law. In other words, in the case law at issue 
the aim of the Court was mostly to establish whether t  national authorities had been 
sufficiently diligent in assessing the gravity and danger of the applicants’ situations and had 
taken appropriate measures to prevent further harm.  
 
However, this focus on implementation, and on the eff ctiveness of the legal protection 
offered to women against domestic violence, suggests that the Court’s case law may also be 
effectively applied to immigrant women. It is indee reasonable to argue that states’ 
obligations in relation to domestic violence as clarified by the Court do not solely involve the 
criminal system, but the entire domestic order – including family migration regimes and the 
general immigration law in force. This observation s supported by the subsequent Strasbourg 
Court judgment of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia149. This case did not concern domestic 
violence, but a different form of violence against women consisting in trafficking and forced 
prostitution. The Rantsev judgment, in particular, originated from an applicat on by the father 
of a young Russian woman who had travelled to Cyprus holding a so-called “artiste visa” and 
a work permit for the purpose of being employed in a cabaret, and who had died under 
unclear circumstances that suggested that she had been trafficked and sexually exploited. The 
father of the victim applied before the Court, against both Cyprus and Russia, in order to 
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obtain the recognition of a violation of his daughter’s right to life, to be free from torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment, to be free from slavery, servitude and forced labour, to 
liberty and security, and to respect for private and family life, as well as of his own right of 
access to courts. In relation to the father’s claims of violation of his daughter’s rights ex 
article 4 of the Convention, the Strasbourg Court established extremely significant principles 
for our purposes, examining the relevant provisions f Cypriot immigration law, their effects 
on immigrant women’s freedom from exploitation and abuse and, most importantly, the 
State’s responsibility for setting up such a legal system. 
The applicant’s claims under article 4 of the Convention did not merely relate to the 
Russian and the Cypriot authorities’ “failure to conduct an effective investigation into the 
circumstances of her arrival in Cyprus and the nature of her employment there”150 but also 
tackled their broader “failure to protect his daughter from being trafficked”151. On the grounds 
of these claims the Court, having established that trafficking falls within the scope of art. 4 of 
the Convention152, recalled its previously established general principles on the matter. Thus, 
the Court highlighted that for the purpose of complying with the prohibitions under art. 4, 
“the spectrum of safeguards set out in national legislation must be adequate to ensure the 
practical and effective protection of the rights ofvictims or potential victims of 
trafficking”153, importantly stressing that “a State’s immigration rules must address relevant 
concerns relating to encouragement, facilitation or tolerance of trafficking”154. With specific 
reference to positive state obligations under article 4, the Court recalled that in addition to 
“the duty to penalise and prosecute trafficking”155, members states are also required “in some 
circumstances (...) to take operational measures to protect victims, or potential victims, of 
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trafficking”156 as well as bearing “a procedural obligation to investigate situations of potential 
trafficking”157. 
In this case, the Court recognised a violation of the victim’s human right to protection from 
slavery not only on the grounds of the authorities’ failure to effectively investigate a possible 
case of trafficking, but also on the grounds of thefailure of the Cypriot labour migration 
regime to afford an effective protection against forms of violence against women such as 
trafficking and forced prostitution. In this respect, the Court found that the excessive control 
granted to employers over the “artistes” by the Cypriot visa regime suggested that the latter 
failed to provide a sufficient level of protection against trafficking, breaching art. 4 of the 
Convention. Thus, the Rantsev judgment suggests that national norms of immigration law 
may be subjected to judicial scrutiny with respect to their effectiveness in preventing cases of 
violence against women – including domestic violence. In this light, an eventual claim of 
human rights violations by victims of domestic violence in relation to a national family 
reunification scheme establishing an unreasonably prolonged dependence between migrant 
spouses’ residence permits may well be deemed admissible by the Strasbourg Court – 
especially in light of the discussed observations of the Council of Europe158. 
 
Furthermore, the Court’s sensitivity in the Opuz judgment towards the disparate impact of the 
national legal regime on women – for the purpose of identifying an indirect discrimination on 
the grounds of sex in relation to the applicants’ right to life and right to be free from torture 
and inhuman treatment – appears particularly important for a potential application of the 
principles established by the Court to immigrant women victims of domestic violence. The 
Court’s consideration of statistics to determine that the applicants pertained to a group 
particularly at risk of domestic violence (i.e., women living in a specific region of Turkey) as 
well as to identify a general context of “discriminatory judicial passivity (...) that was 
conducive to domestic violence” not only led to therecognition of indirect discrimination, but 
also suggested that such discrimination relied on multiple grounds – i.e., sex and geographical 
collocation. Twofold discrimination on the grounds of gender and national or ethnic origin 
                                                           
156
 Ibid., § 286. 
157
 Ibid., § 288. 
158
 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, 
Report on Migrant Women: at Particular Risk from Domestic Violence, cit.; Parliamentary Assembly of the 





has been identified by the Council of Europe as one of the main causes for the particular risk 
of domestic violence to which immigrant women are exposed159.  
Therefore, I believe that a similar argument may also be proposed in support of a 
recognition of the particular risk of domestic violence to immigrant women on the grounds of 
sex, nationality, ethnic origin and migrant status. This judicial strategy may unveil the 
indirectly discriminatory character of legal frameworks of protection established by domestic 
civil or criminal law which are rendered ineffective by structural limitations, judicial passivity 
but also, and most importantly for our purposes, by other legal norms undermining immigrant 
women’s access to such legal protections (such as family reunification norms that enforce a 
high level of dependence of family members on sponsors).  
 
In direct connection with the judicial framing of violence against immigrant women as a 
source and at the same time as an effect of multiple or intersectional discrimination, an 
important step forward was marked by the judgment of B.S. v. Spain160 by the Strasbourg 
Court. The case was initiated by a Nigerian woman working in Spain as a prostitute who has 
been subjected to physical and verbal abuse by police officers who had stopped and 
questioned her on multiple occasions. She also submitted that she had been discriminated 
against not only on the grounds of her skin colour – because other sex workers in the area 
“with a European phenotype”161 had not been stopped – but also because of her sex. Th  
applicant’s case was not simply one of racial profiling by police officers. She had also been 
insulted with sexist remarks in addition to being beaten by the officers. Furthermore, the 
applicant’s formal complaints before the competent national authorities had remained 
unaddressed. One specific judge had even observed that the evidence provided “merely 
[showed] that the applicant repeatedly [failed] to obey police orders given in the course of 
their duties, designed to prevent the shameful spectacle of prostitution on the public 
highway”162.  
On these grounds, the Court recognised the existence of a procedural violation of the 
applicant’s right to be free of inhuman and degrading treatment under art. 3 of the 
Convention, alone and most importantly in conjunction with the right to non-discrimination 
ex art. 14. With respect to the latter finding, the Court observed that the applicant’s claim that 
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she had been subjected to racist and sexist insults had not been examined by the national 
authorities. As a result, “the decisions made by the domestic courts [failed] to take account of 
the applicant’s particular vulnerability inherent i her position as an African woman working 
as a prostitute”163. The configuration of the violence suffered by theapplicant as the result of 
discrimination on the intersecting grounds of sex and race is an extremely important 
development in the Court’s case law. In the B.S. case, the Court not only consolidated the 
principle whereby judicial passivity on the national authorities’ side may generate state 
responsibility for the breach of the human rights of victims, but it also recognised for the first 
time that immigrant women may be disproportionately exposed to violence because they are 
placed at the intersection of different grounds of discrimination. In fact, the B.S. judgment 
suggests that different grounds of discrimination may combine in ways that make immigrant 
women’s experiences of violence unique. The applicant’s claim of violation of art.3 in 
conjunction with art. 14 constitutes a perfect illustration of this point. She indeed held that 
“her position as a black woman working as a prostitute made her particularly vulnerable to 
discriminatory attacks and that those factors could not be considered separately but should be 
taken into account in their entirety, their interaction being essential for an examination of the 
facts of the case”164. In this light, it appears clearly that state obligat ons under the human 
rights framework provided by the Convention vis-à-vis violence against women may be 
breached whenever national authorities – both legislative and judicial – fail to capture and 
effectively respond to immigrant women’s specific exp riences and difficulties in this matter.   
 
In sum, the Strasbourg Court’s case law on violence against women established important 
principles in terms of state obligations and due diligence standards in the field of violence 
against women. The most outstanding result of this jurisprudence was probably the 
overcoming of the public/private divide in this field, thanks to the Court’s attention to the 
effective implementation of national legal frameworks in the private sphere of the household. 
Equally important was the fact that this judicial interpretation also occurred in the context of 
claims of violations of art. 14 of the Convention, because this angle brought to the fore the 
disparate impact of norms failing to prevent and punish domestic violence against women 
specifically. In the Opuz judgment165 in particular, the applicant’s claim of violation of art. 8 
in conjunction with art. 14 gave rise to an interprtation of the right to family life as a right to 
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freedom from domestic violence and to sex equality w hin the family. In this sense, art. 14 
was understood by the Court not merely as demanding formal equality but as an anti-
subordination clause. 
This type of interpretation appears particularly promising beyond the issue of violence 
against women. In my introduction to this section I observed how the increased risk of 
domestic violence as a possible perverse effects of family migration norms constitutes an 
example of the broader problem of the enforced dependence often implied by such norms. 
While this enforced dependence may fuel domestic violence or hamper immigrant women’s 
possibilities to react to such violence, the most common effect that it may generate is a 
situation of inequality within the family, and spousal inequality in particular. However, much 
of the judicial and doctrinal attention in this are has been focussed on domestic violence – 
the most extreme effect of inequality within the family – while inequality per se has been 
extensively overlooked166. Thus I believe that the emergence of a right to equality within the 
family in the Opuz case – as the result of a joint interpretation of arts. 8 and 14–should be 
further developed in order to test its potential with respect to other norms applicable to 
immigrant women. I would argue that this type of judicial framing could reveal breaches of 
arts. 8 and 14 by norms that generate the perverse effect of forcing immigrant women into 
situations of prolonged dependence upon their husbands, highlighting their disparate impact 
and indirectly discriminatory effects on this group. 
 
The great relevance granted by the Court to the effective implementation of laws of national 
legal systems and to due diligence standards with respect to the prevention and suppression of 
violence against women therefore appears promising beyond the realm of domestic criminal 
law. Admittedly, the majority of the examined judgments concerned citizen women, and 
therefore the Court has had few occasions to discuss how state responsibility in this area may 
also arise from biased norms of immigration law. The Rantsev167 and B.S.168 judgments, 
however, constitute important exceptions –and not only because they concerned non-
nationals. The B.S. judgment, indeed, performed an interesting recognition of intersectional 
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discrimination169, as well as of its role in generating violence against women. Arguably, the 
B.S. case constitutes a fitting example of how an intersectional approach is in order to 
effectively capture phenomena of violence against immigrant women motivated by their 
being placed at the crossroads of multiple grounds of discrimination. 
The Rantsev case, on its part, importantly explored the role of a national immigration 
regime in increasing the risk of violence against immigrant women, recognising state 
responsibility in this area. The principles established in this case may in my view also be 
fruitfully applied to other areas of domestic immigration law, including family migration 
regimes. In particular, the idea whereby state respon ibility for human rights violations may 
arise from domestic norms which have the perverse eff ct of creating a situation of 
vulnerability for immigrant women – which emerges from Rantsev – enjoys a great value 
which goes beyond the specific circumstances of the case. This principle is indeed able to 
shine a light on how certain norms – including family migration rules –may give rise to state 
responsibility under the European Convention on Human Rights by creating and reinforcing 
situations of dependence that disproportionately and negatively affect immigrant women’s 
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3. Immigrant Women and Employment: Access to European Human Rights for 
Immigrant Women Workers  
 
Since its inception, the European Court of Human Rights has evolved from its initial 
reluctance towards the protection and affirmation of labour rights to a more inclusive attitude 
towards these rights. At the beginning of its activity, the Court was strongly affected by a 
legal and historical context characterised by the id a of a complete separation between 
socioeconomic rights on the one hand and civil and political rights on the other. As a result, 
until the end of the 1990s the Strasbourg Court consistently rejected claims of violation of 
workers’ rights based on the provisions of the Convention, refusing the idea that the latter also 
encompassed said rights170. Since the beginning of the 2000s, however, the Court became 
increasingly responsive to labour rights claims andstarted to issue judgments upholding these 
claims in the two main areas of collective labour rights and access to decent work171.   
In this section, I will focus on one specific aspect of the right to employment domain, i.e., 
the right to protection against labour exploitation. The reason for this focus stems from two 
main observations. Firstly, despite the significance of collective action for immigrant 
women’s enfranchisement, the utter centrality of this matter for this category is in my view 
undeniable. Immigrant women disproportionately concentrate in sectors of the labour market 
characterised by a high risk of exploitation and by very low legal protections. Among them, a 
particularly problematic sector is constituted by domestic work, where the highly personalised 
character of employed relationships and especially the isolation entailed by this profession 
may significantly increase this risk. Secondly, thefocus on the right to be free from labour 
exploitation is demanded by the fact that landmark judgments by the Strasbourg Court on this 
matter were initiated by applications advanced by imm grant women performing domestic 
work in private households, in relation to claims of violation of the prohibition of slavery, 
servitude and forced labour under art. 4 of the Convention. This feature also confirms the 
particular incidence of labour exploitation issues among immigrant women. 
In addition to analysing the Strasbourg Court’s case l w, this section will also include a 
critical discussion of the European Committee of Social Rights’ activity. While the 
Strasbourg Court has established key principles in relation to the human right to be free from 
slavery, forced labour and servitude, to date it has overlooked the specific issue of state 
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responsibility for breaches of this right stemming from national labour migration regimes. 
The Committee, on the other hand, has thoroughly examined this matter. For this reason, a 
specific paragraph will be devoted to the main principles established by this body with 
reference to the possible contribution of national immigration law to immigrant women’s 
vulnerability to labour exploitation. 
 
3.1. Immigrant Women’s Freedom from Labour Exploitation in the Light of the 
Prohibition of Slavery, Servitude and Forced Labour Under Article 4 ECHR 
 
Two main categories of immigrant workers can be identifi d as particularly at risk of labour 
exploitation and abuse from employers: immigrant women holding a temporary residence and 
work permit for the purpose of being employed in the entertainment industry and immigrant 
women employed as domestic workers. The reasons for this higher risk are strongly 
connected not only to factual aspects but also to na io al legal frameworks regulating their 
labour migration. In this section, I will analyse the specific legal reasons for the vulnerability 
of these categories of immigrant women workers. At the same time, I will critically assess 
relevant judgments by the Strasbourg Court on these matters, in an effort to understand 
whether the human rights enshrined in the Convention supported a stronger consciousness of 
the perverse effects produced by problematic labour mig ation schemes and provided possible 
remedies to their gendered shortcomings. 
 
a. “Artiste” Residence and Work Permits as a Trigger for Exploitation and 
Trafficking: the Cypriot Case Before the European Court of Human Rights  
 
The perverse effects of temporary work and residence permits in the field of entertainment 
have been commented on with respect to the high risk of trafficking inherent to such 
permits172. During the 1990s, the problematic character of allowing immigrant women to 
enter the national territory for the specific purpose of working as “artists” on the grounds of a 
special temporary work permit firstly became clear in the Belgian context, where it emerged 
that a similar system allowed for the trafficking of f reign women and their channelling into 
forced prostitution173. Interestingly, this issue was resolved by the Belgian authorities – and 
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subsequently by the Dutch and Swiss ones – not by completely eliminating the residence and 
work permit for artists, but rather by allowing immigrant women holding these permits to 
gain more control over their migration process. Forinstance, it was established that such 
permits would be directly released to immigrant women rather than to employers, that permit 
holders would have the right to decent housing separately from their workplace, to have their 
employment contracts respected without having to perform additional services, and to have 
access to information concerning their rights as well as NGOs they could address when in 
need of help174.  
Arguably, the described measures constituted an effective means of correcting the perverse 
effects of a national labour migration regime175. The Belgian case also confirms the powerful 
role that national immigration law can play in generating and reinforcing immigrant women 
workers’ vulnerability to exploitation and abuse. Thus, a key question remains, concerning 
what remedies are available against national labour mig ation regimes overlooking the issue 
of trafficking and exploitation – and whether European human rights law has so far 
constituted one of these remedies. 
 
A possible answer to these questions may be provided by the abovementioned Rantsev 
judgment176. As briefly observed above, the most interesting feature of the Rantsev judgment 
consists in the fact that for the purpose of applying these general principles to the Cypriot 
context, the Court did not merely analyse the presence of domestic law prohibiting trafficking 
and sexual exploitation but also looked specifically at the impact of the Cypriot labour 
migration regime on these phenomena. Arguably, the Cypriot law on “artiste” visas was 
highly questionable from the point of view of immigrant women’s freedom from exploitation, 
abuse and trafficking. Several of its provisions appeared to reinforce the dependence and 
isolation that immigrant women workers may already experience when entering a foreign 
country for the first time. Most of the problematic aspects of the law at issue derived from the 
high level of control granted to employers over the application procedure and the subsequent 
stay of artistes in Cyprus. Applications for “artiste” visas as well as residence and work 
permits had to be filed by prospective employers themselves, who were also requested to 
deposit a sum of money to cover eventual repatriation expenses. Moreover, artistes were 
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prevented from leaving the premises of the cabarets where they worked from 9 p.m. to 3 a.m., 
regardless of the duration of their performance. While this measure had apparently been 
adopted “to prevent artistes from being forced to leave the cabaret with clients”177, the 
inevitable consequence of this obligation was a strong limitation of their personal liberty and 
freedom of movement. Lastly, cabaret managers were under an obligation to alert the 
authorities if an artiste failed to come into work or if she had breached the terms of her 
contract. The penalty for the managers’ failure to comply with such obligations, however, also 
involved the artistes, who would face deportation – paid by their employer. 
Interestingly, the problematic aspects of the nation l immigration law in force were 
specifically analysed by the Court through the lens of the human right to be free from slavery, 
servitude and forced labour enshrined in article 4. In particular, the Court took into 
consideration several reports by NGOs and human rights bodies that pointed out how the 
“artiste” visa regime envisaged by national immigration law was in fact used to recruit 
prostitutes who would work in the numerous cabarets and nightclubs in Cyprus178. In the 
context of such reports, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights had 
highlighted the “risk that the young women who enter Cyprus on artiste visas may be victims 
of trafficking in human beings or later become victims of abuse or coercion”179 and observed 
that “[these] women are officially recruited as cabaret dancers but are nevertheless often 
expected also to work as prostitutes”180 . As to the specific contribution of national 
immigration law to this phenomenon, the Commissioner stressed that “[the] system itself, 
whereby the establishment owner applies for the permits on behalf of the woman, often 
renders the woman dependent on her employer or agent, and increases the risk of her falling 
into the hands of trafficking networks”181. This reinforced their vulnerable position with 
respect to their employers and their consequently disproportionate difficulties in refusing 
“demands from their employers or clients”182.  
In addition to this, the Court itself significantly observed that “while an obligation on 
employers to notify the authorities when an artiste leaves her employment is a legitimate 
measure to allow the authorities to monitor the compliance of immigrants with their 
immigration obligations, responsibility for ensuring compliance and for taking steps in cases 
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of non-compliance must remain with the authorities themselves”183, and it criticised the 
“measures which encourage cabaret owners and managers to track down missing artistes or in 
some other way to take personal responsibility for the conduct of artistes”184 as “unacceptable 
in the broader context of trafficking concerns regarding artistes in Cyprus”185. Similarly, the 
Court condemned the “practice of requiring cabaret owners and managers to lodge a bank 
guarantee to cover potential future costs associates with artistes which they have employed” 
as “particularly troubling”186. 
 
On these grounds, the Court concluded that “the regim  of artiste visas in Cyprus did not 
afford to [the applicant’s daughter] practical and effective protection against trafficking and 
exploitation”187, finding that Cyprus had infringed her right to be fr e from slavery, servitude 
and forced labour. The findings of the Court in Rantsev suggest that even in the absence of a 
legislative willingness to reform national immigration law so as to eliminate its negative and 
unforeseen consequences on immigrant women workers’ freedom from exploitation and 
abuse, the Court may be ready to intervene. This judgment offers an important example of the 
capability of the Court to detect and counter such consequences through a human rights lens, 
as well as to make up for the shortcomings of natiol immigration law in disproportionately 
important areas for immigrant women workers, and thus constitutes an extremely important 
precedent for future cases in this field. 
 
b. Exploitation of Immigrant Women in Domestic Work: Cues for Reflection from 
the Strasbourg Court’s Case Law 
 
Both European and national labour migration regimes respond to strongly gendered demands 
for immigrant labour. These demands heavily influence the availability of legal labour 
migration routes for women. In southern European countries, this situation is epitomised by 
the high demand for female migrant domestic workers, which is in turn conveyed by the 
establishment of annual quotas or regularisation schemes specifically for domestic workers by 
states such as Greece, Italy and Spain188. The Council of Europe Committee on Migration, 
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Refugees and Population has viewed such schemes as a positive development for 
acknowledging the high demand for domestic and careworkers, for creating access routes 
from which de facto immigrant women might disproportionately benefit and thus at least 
partially balancing the general difficulty of immigrant women to access legal channels of 
labour migration189.  
On the other hand, the Committee itself has also emphasised that “domestic workers are 
among the most exploited and abused workers in the world”190 and that “predominantly, but 
not exclusively, women and girls, they often experience working conditions that fall far short 
of international standards, including low and irregular pay, excessively long working hours, 
lack of rest periods (...) and exclusion from social protection such as social security and 
maternity benefits”191. Similarly, ALBIN  and MANTOUVALOU  have highlighted the “legislative 
precariousness” of domestic workers in general, discus ing “the special vulnerability faced by 
[this category] because of their exclusion from protective laws or the lower degrees of legal 
protection they receive in comparison to other workers”192. While the issue of legislative 
precariousness certainly affects all domestic workers (both nationals and immigrants), it is 
undeniable that immigrant domestic workers are disproportionately burdened by this 
precariousness due to the additional uncertainties deriving from their immigration status. For 
instance, ANDERSON has revealed through the example of the United Kingdom how domestic 
workers’ immigration status can grant significant power to employers and thus leave great 
space for exploitation and abuse193.  
In view of these problems, several scholars have turned to human rights law as a 
potentially effective tool of protection for immigrant domestic workers vis-à-vis these sources 
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of vulnerability. For instance, ALBIN  and MANTOUVALOU  have expressed their faith in the 
potential of the ILO Convention on Domestic Workers to establish a stronger worldwide 
respect of domestic workers’ rights194. Similarly, SATTERTHWAITE has repeatedly argued in 
favour of a human-rights based approach to the extension of labour protections with specific 
reference to immigrant women employed as domestic workers195.  
In the light of these considerations, I will now move on to consider the specific European 
context, examining whether the Strasbourg Court’s case law has offered promising results that 
may substantiate these author’s claims. In particular, I will discuss whether and to what extent 
the human rights enshrined in the Convention have so far been capable of supporting a 
stronger protection of immigrant women in the sector of domestic work, especially vis-à-vis 
national legal frameworks which may undermine their freedom from exploitation and abuse. 
For this purpose, I will discuss a specific matter analysed repeatedly by the Strasbourg Court, 
i.e., the exploitation and abuse suffered by migrant domestic workers in the light of their 
human right to be free from slavery, servitude and forced labour under art. 4 of the 
Convention. After this analysis, I will move on to c nsider relevant principles established by 
the European Committee of Social Rights with specific reference to domestic workers, 
discussing the reasons for its importance for immigrant women employed in the domestic and 
care sectors. 
 
Starting from the Siliadin v. France judgment of 2005196, the Strasbourg Court has been 
tackling the phenomenon of exploitation of domestic workers with increasing frequency. In 
the Siliadin judgment, for the first time the Court found a violation of article 4 of the 
Convention on the grounds of France’s failure to comply with its positive obligation to 
effectively protect the right to be free from servitude and forced labour of a Togolese 
underage girl who had been forced to perform unpaid domestic work after being trafficked to 
France. This finding stemmed from the observation of structural limitations of domestic 
criminal law, which did not envisage criminal offences for breaches of the rights protected by 
article 4197. 
Following Siliadin, third-country national immigrant women started to submit applications 
before the Court alleging situations of exploitation, abuse and trafficking in relation to 
                                                           
194
 Albin, E., Mantouvalou, V., ‘The ILO Convention on Domestic Workers‘, cit., p. 78. 
195
 SATTERTHWAITE, M., ‘Crossing Borders, Claiming Rights: Using Human Rights Law to Empower Women Migrant 
Workers’, 8 Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal (2005) 1, in particular p. 23 ff. 
196
 Siliadin v. France (Second Section), application no. 73316/01, judgment of 26 July 2005. 
197




domestic work. In 2012, two other judgments – C.N. v. the United Kingdom198 and C.N. et V. 
c. France199– were pronounced by the Court on the matter, both recognising violations of 
trafficked workers’ right to be free from servitude and forced labour under article 4 of the 
Convention on the grounds of the fact that the applicants had been forced to perform unpaid 
domestic work while held in deplorable living and working conditions. As in Siliadin, in these 
judgments this conclusion stemmed from a recognition of violations of positive state 
obligations to put in place an effective legal framework to prevent and contrast servitude and 
forced labour, due to structural limitations of national criminal law frameworks200 . 
Furthermore, two other cases concerning allegations of submission to domestic servitude, i.e., 
Kawogo v. the United Kingdom201 and O.G.O. v. the United Kingdom202, were initiated before 
the Court. 
 
The significance of these cases for immigrant women employed as domestic workers in the 
European legal space is undeniable. Thanks to the similarities in the situation of the applicant 
women in these cases, the principles established by the Court have also created an important 
framework for the protection of this category against serious phenomena such as trafficking, 
exploitation and abuse. All of the applicants in the cases at issue had emigrated from non-
European countries and were irregularly residing there at the time of the events examined by 
the Court. All of them were young women – in the cases of Siliadin, C.N. et V. and O.G.O., 
they were underage girls – at the time they had been subjected to domestic servitude. All of 
them had travelled to Europe with relatives or their previous employers under false pretences 
– that they would receive an education, or perform paid work – and were subsequently forced 
into domestic servitude and, due to the irregularity of their stay, were under the constant 
threat of being reported to the authorities or sent back to their country of origin. Against this 
background, the Court has established key principles as to positive state obligations to prevent 
and combat trafficking and labour exploitation.  
This development is in itself significant for migrant workers in general, but it also has a 
special relevance from the point of view of immigrant women workers. In this respect, it can 
be observed that the discussed case law constitutes a crucial example of the penetration of 
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human rights law in the private sphere of employment r lationships. By envisaging positive 
state obligations in this field, the Strasbourg Court has included such relationships within the 
scope of application of the Convention. The break of the public/private divide and the related 
establishment of positive state obligations in areas characterised by imbalances of power 
between private parties (also performed in the Opuz judgment203 in relation to the different 
matter of domestic violence) has been rightly welcomed as a step forward in increasing the 
applicability of the human rights enshrined in the Convention to the employment realm204. In 
this light, the principles established by the Strasbourg Court in the field of domestic work 
have specific importance for immigrant women in this sector. These principles suggest that 
the human rights established in the Convention can also provide solid ground to effectively 
contrast the legislative precariousness experienced by immigrant women employed as 
domestic workers and the resulting vulnerability disproportionately experienced by this 
category in their employment relationships. 
On the other hand, differently than what observed in the Rantsev judgment, such principles 
have so far exclusively concerned the obligation to set up an effective criminal law 
framework to prevent and punish phenomena of domestic servitude or forced labour. Other 
areas of law, such as immigration law– including visa and residence permits schemes for 
domestic workers and their possible contribution to these phenomena – currently remain 
unexplored205. In this respect, it must be noted that the Kawogo case constitutes a missed 
opportunity for the Court to consider immigration law (and more broadly domestic law 
provisions applicable to immigrant domestic workers) in the light of states’ obligations to 
protect domestic workers’ right to be free from slavery, servitude and forced labour.  
 
The Kawogo case originated from the application of a Tanzanian migrant woman, Ms. 
Kawogo, who had entered the United Kingdom with her employer, a Tanzanian woman, for 
whom she had performed paid domestic work for the previous three years. Her employer told 
Ms. Kawogo that she planned to undergo surgery in the United Kingdom, and that Ms. 
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Kawogo would be performing paid work for her during their stay and that they would return 
to Tanzania together after three months. Accordingly, Ms. Kawogo held a domestic work visa 
valid for three months, whereby any changes – such as a longer stay or a change of employer 
– had to be expressly authorised by the British authorities. Once they arrived in the UK, 
however, Ms. Kawogo’s employer confiscated her passort, returned to Tanzania alone after 
only two weeks (without undergoing any surgery) andleft Ms. Kawogo with her own parents 
(who were residing in the UK), telling her that she would have to work for them in order to 
repay the cost of her flight. At this point, Ms. Kawogo wanted to return to Tanzania but found 
herself not knowing the language of the country where she was staying, with no personal 
contacts except for her “employers”, irregularly working for an employer different than the 
one  specified in her visa and eventually in an irregular residence status due to the expiration 
of the three months validity of such a visa. With respect to the forced labour suffered by the 
applicant, the Kawogo application highlighted deplorable living and working conditions206 as 
well as serious limitations of her personal freedom and a lack of pay207. More importantly, 
among the specific sources of the applicant’s vulnerability, the Kawogo application included 
the fact that she “was not working in accordance with the terms of her visa and was therefore 
not authorised to work and was liable to be removed from the United Kingdom for breach of 
her terms of stay”208. Her irregular status, incidentally, was at the heart of her “employers’” 
threats against the applicant when she finally report d her situation to the Tanzanian High 
Commissioner209. 
In the light of these facts, the Kawogo case does not simply relate to the United Kingdom’s 
violation of its positive obligation to effectively investigate into the applicant’s allegations as 
well as enforcement issues210. It also suggests that the national visa scheme for domestic 
workers in itself could be identified as bearing some responsibility for the exploitation 
endured by the applicant, creating legislative preca iousness for immigrant domestic workers 
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specifically. Domestic work visas such as that granted to the applicant could only be issued to 
domestic workers who had previously been employed as such for the previous year. More 
specifically, immigrants seeking such visas had to sh w that they “[had] been employed as a 
domestic worker for one year or more immediately prior to the application for entry clearance 
under the same roof as the employer or in a household t at the employer uses for himself on a 
regular basis”211, and also had to produce “evidence (...) to demonstrate the connection 
between employer and employee”212. Normally, at the expiration of these visas domestic 
workers were expected to return to their countries of origin together with their original 
employer and they would not be entitled to work for other persons beyond their employer’s 
close family members who were also visiting the U.K.213.  
Arguably, similar provisions create a strong link between employers and employees that 
may significantly and negatively affect domestic workers’ freedom from exploitation and 
abuse. In particular, I would argue that the legal framework in force at the time of the Kawogo 
application essentially left the regular status of d mestic workers’ stays in the hands of their 
employers. The provisions at issue meant that if the employer left the United Kingdom 
leaving the domestic worker behind, this would leave the latter with very narrow choices 
besides working irregularly for a different employer. Indeed, while the possibility to change 
employer was theoretically envisaged by the legislation in force at the time214, it appears very 
unlikely that an immigrant domestic worker – having resided for a few months in the United 
Kingdom – would have a sufficient degree of integration to effectively find another employer. 
The example of Ms. Kawogo is very telling in this respect, because not only was she left 
behind by her employer in the United Kingdom against her will, but it would also have been 
de facto impossible for her to find a new employer due to her situation of isolation in the host 
country, her lack of kin network, the very short validity of her visa and her lack of knowledge 
of any language besides Swahili. Thus, the high likeliness of having to resort to informal 
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work as an irregularly staying migrant underlying the legal regime at issue constitutes a 
critical point, which the Court could examine in the light of article 4 of the Convention as a 
normative trigger for the labour exploitation of migrant domestic workers. The described 
difficulties also suggest that domestic workers could be exposed to threats from their 
employers in relation to being left behind in the host country. Thus, the domestic workers visa 
regime at issue could contribute to the vulnerability of this category by exposing them to 
abuse and exploitation not only in case of departure of their employer but also during their 
working relationship with him or her.  
 
Against this background, I would argue that the Kawogo case raised extremely important 
points as to the relevance of other areas beyond criminal law for the purpose of assessing 
states’ compliance with their obligations under art. 4 of the Convention. Although this aspect 
was not submitted by the applicant, it appears clearly that her situation of isolation epitomises 
that of many immigrant domestic workers in Europe. Language barriers, lack of knowledge of 
the host country’s laws, as well as a general physical and social isolation constitute important 
factors impeding immigrant domestic workers’ access to justice. This is in my view 
constitutes a crucial argumentation in support of the need to consider the domestic legal 
system applicable to this category as a whole for the purpose of assessing a state’s compliance 
of its art. 4 obligations. Indeed, a comprehensive set of criminal provisions concerning 
slavery, servitude and forced labour and an efficient nforcement system may not be 
sufficient when other legislation aggravates such specific difficulties and produces the 
perverse effect of triggering labour exploitation. In this respect, the brief filed by 
INTERIGHTS as a third party intervener215 in the Kawogo case is illuminating. The brief 
highlighted that “migrant domestic workers are even more vulnerable to abuse for a number 
of additional reasons associated with their non-natio l status”216, referring in particular to the 
high degree of dependence from employers which can be imposed to immigrant domestic 
workers by visa schemes217. In particular, INTERIGHTS pointed to the two-fold negative 
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effects of this factor, among others, on migrant domestic workers’ rights, consisting in the 
heightened risk of abuse and exploitation on the on hand and on the undermining of their 
ability to seek and obtain legal redress on the othr218. Therefore, the brief concluded that the 
mere availability of criminal legal frameworks might be utterly insufficient to ensure an 
effective protection of migrant domestic workers’ rights under article 4 of the Convention219.  
 
In this light, it is disappointing that the Strasbourg Court decided to strike the Kawogo 
application off its list of cases simply because thUnited Kingdom submitted that in the 
meantime criminal law reforms had made this field more comprehensive, by including slavery 
and servitude among criminal offences. In my view, the applicant had rightly responded to 
this statement by recalling that other legal issues required consideration. In the applicant’s 
view, these issues included “the steps that the respondent State could have taken to prevent 
her from being subjected to forced labour and servitude”220 in the first place – which could 
have well involved the domestic workers visa scheme – and “the extent of the obligation to 
provide in situ support”221. I would argue that a more in-depth analysis of the Court on the 
merits of the case may have offered important clarific t ons as to states’ obligations in 
relation to immigrant domestic workers beyond the realm of criminal law. Despite the fact 
that the applicant’s claims remained unanswered for this part, the INTERIGHTS report still 
suggests the great relevance of this matter in a human rights context. In this sense the Court’s 
narrow focus on criminal law in this case is disappointing, because clearly prevention 
measures should also have been incorporated in the British visa regime for domestic workers. 
These observations should not however prompt the conclusion that the judicial application 
art. 4 of the Convention exclusively involved criminal law. As the Rantsev case has shown, 
the right to be free from slavery, servitude and forced labour may also be successfully applied 
to other areas of law, including immigration law. In fact, in this case the Cypriot government 
was found in breach of art. 4 due to the insufficient protection against trafficking afforded by 
its system as a whole. The Rantsev judgment involved an in-depth scrutiny of the “general 
legal and administrative framework”222, and of the way in which such a framework rendered 
the protections afforded by the national anti-trafficking legislation moot for artistes in 
particular. In this respect, I would also argue that recalling the principle of non-discrimination 
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in conjunction with art. 4 may help to further dismantle abstract divisions between different 
areas of law that may prevent the Court’s full awareness of the perverse effects of labour 
migration regimes in areas where immigrant women prevail, such as domestic work for 
instance. In Kawogo, claiming a violation of art. 14 in conjunction with art. 4 could have 
constituted an effective judicial strategy to emphasise the disparate impact of the British visa 
regime on the applicant – an immigrant woman with no connections in the host country, no 
financial resources, no knowledge of the British language or of its legal system, and employed 
as a domestic servant in a private household. By doing so, it would have emerged more 
clearly that the United Kingdom had breached the applicant’s right to live free of labour 
exploitation notwithstanding the criminal law reforms, because the domestic legal system as a 
whole prevented her to access justice and obtain redress.  
 
3.2. Immigrant Women Workers’ Possibilities to Change Employers or Employment 
in the Light of Article 18 of the European Social Charter  
 
The examined cases before the European Court of Human Rights suggest the presence of a 
common thread running through the problematic norms of national immigration law brought 
to the Court’s attention, consisting in the great amount of power indirectly granted by such 
regimes to employers. In Rantsev, the strong control granted by the “artiste” visa regime to 
employers – both in relation to the application process and to their employees’ regular 
permanence in the host country – was acknowledged by the Court as a specific source of 
vulnerability of women holding such permits to trafficking, abuse and exploitation. In 
Kawogo, a similar assessment is suggested by the framing of the domestic workers’ visa 
regime merely as a tool for employers to bring along previously employed persons in order to 
be assisted during short visits in the United Kingdom, with de facto few possibilities for 
domestic workers to emancipate themselves from abusive employers.  
In this light, it appears that a crucial aspect for immigrant women workers’ freedom from 
exploitation and abuse concerns their full access to the possibility to change employer in the 
host country. The risk of exploitation inherent in narrowing workers’ possibility to change 
employers has been highlighted with reference to migrant workers in general223. Nevertheless, 
the discussed judicial examples suggest that this restriction can further aggravate the high risk 
of exploitation characterising sectors where immigrant women concentrate, such as those of 
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entertainment and domestic work. As I have shown, the Strasbourg Court has yet to analyse 
this issue. The European Committee of Social Rights, on the other hand, has established 
extremely interesting principles on the matter, which bear the potential of a fruitful 
application to immigrant women workers. The most relevant observations by the Committee 
in this area are to be found in conclusions adopted in the framework of the reporting 
procedure regulated by arts. 19 –21 of the Committee Rules224. Unfortunately, a similar 
diffusion is not observable in the decisions adopted by the Committee under the collective 
complaints procedure pursuant arts. 23 ff. of the Rules225. This is regrettable because while in 
the vast majority of cases States Parties do comply with the Committee’s conclusions, the 
latter do not rely on strong implementation mechanisms. In case of non-compliance with 
conclusions, the Committee of Ministers will merely issue a recommendation – which, as a 
political act, enjoys little binding force. The Committee’s decisions on collective complaints, 
on the other hand, may be properly qualified as case l w because they are increasingly 
acquiring a binding and more judicial character, with a growing attention to the legal situation 
of the involved countries as well as to the necessary normative steps to take in order to 
remedy the identified violations226.  
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Ever since its earlier activity, the Committee has interpreted the right to work established by 
article 18 of the European Social Charter as prohibiting excessively strict ties of migrant 
workers to a specific employment or employers. Before moving on to discussing the 
Committee’s position on the matter, it is important to stress that in this context the exclusive 
application of the Charter to migrant workers who are nationals of other State Parties does not 
undermine the relevance of such a case law for the purpose of this section’s analysis. Indeed, 
while it is certainly true that only a part of third-country national workers are theoretically 
affected by the Committee’s reasoning, the practical outcomes of the Committee’s 
conclusions are extremely likely to positively affect all third-country national workers 
residing in States Parties to the Charter. Indeed, in this context the Committee simply 
established general principles and obligations for the States Parties to follow when regulating 
the entry and stay of migrant workers regardless of their citizenship. While Union citizen 
migrants usually enjoy a more favourable legal treatm nt in EU Member States, it is much 
less common to observe a separate immigration regime for migrant citizens of States Parties 
of the Council of Europe. Generally, all non-EU immigrants are covered by the scope of one 
legal regime, unless their state of origin has concluded special agreements with the host 
country. Therefore, as far as third-country national workers from other States Parties are 
concerned, it would be logical to expect that States Parties would comply with the 
Committee’s conclusions by modifying their national immigration regimes, with positive 
effects not only for nationals of States Parties but for all third-country national immigrants 
covered by such regimes.  
 
Moving on to the Committee’s stance on the links betwe n validity of the residence permits 
and specific employers or employment, its main normative basis is constituted by article 18 of 
the Charter, establishing the right to engage in a gainful occupation in the territory of any 
other Party. Article 18 obliges States Parties to “apply existing regulations in a spirit of 
liberality” (§1), “to simplify existing formalities and to reduce or abolish (...) charges payable 
by foreign workers or their employers” (§2), “to liberalise (...) regulations governing the 
employment of foreign workers” (§3) and to recognise “the right of their national to leave the 




Already in 1971227, the Committee had interpreted the reference to the “spirit of liberality” 
in article 18(1) as specifically requiring a progressive but steady realisation of foreign 
workers’ right to access professions different than those for which they had been initially 
authorised to work. More specifically, the Committee noted that “[any] regulation which de 
jure or de facto restricts an authorisation to engage in a gainful occupation to a specific post 
for a specific employer cannot be regarded as satisfac ory”228. Even more importantly for our 
purposes, the Committee further established that “[to] tie an employed person to an enterprise 
by the threat of being obliged to leave the host country if he loses that job, in fact constitutes 
an infringement of the freedom of the individual such that cannot be regarded as evidence of a 
‘spirit of liberality’ or of liberal regulations”229. Finally, while admitting that tying foreign 
workers to a specific type of job “in certain occupational and geographical sectors”230 might 
be justified for economic or social reasons, the Committee explicitly condemned “the 
obligation to remain in the employment of a specific enterprise”231. Therefore, the Committee 
has consolidated the principle whereby national regim s tying foreign workers to specific 
employers for the purpose of the legitimacy of their residence and under the threat of 
expulsion breaches article 18(1) of the Charter. On the other hand, a similar condemnation 
was not expressed towards national regimes confining immigrant workers to specific types of 
jobs, which were considered by the Committee as compatible with the “spirit of liberality” ex 
art. 18(1) of the Charter. 
Subsequently, the Committee reiterated its criticism of national legal regimes linking the 
validity of residence permits on the one hand and employment for a specific employer on the 
other. In particular, several Conclusions by the Committee specifically analysed national 
immigration law regimes establishing severe limitations against the possibility for immigrant 
workers to change employers for considerable periods of their stay. One of the most relevant 
cases in this area concerned the German legal regime on foreign workers232. That regime 
established that once foreign workers were authorised by the federal employment agency to 
perform a specific job for a specific employer, they could not change either employment or 
employer for their first four years of residence and three years of compulsory social insurance. 
In this respect, the Committee emphasised that “making employees dependent on one 
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employer, with the threat if they lose their jobs of being obliged to leave the host country 
cannot be considered to reflect a spirit of liberality or flexible regulations”233 and that 
“regulations such as these that limit the right to enter gainful employment to a specified job 
and a specified employer cannot be deemed to be in conformity with Article 18 of the 
Charter”234. A similar condemnation of national immigration law regimes granting work 
permits exclusively linked to a specific employer was expressed by the Committee in relation 
to Turkey235, Slovenia236 and Sweden. As far as Sweden in particular is concerned, on 
multiple occasions237 the Committee examined the rule established by Swedish immigration 
law whereby temporary permits are exclusively granted for a specific job with a specific 
employer, and repeatedly pressured Sweden to legislative reform on the grounds of the 
incompatibility of such a legal regime with article 18(3) of the Charter. In its last Conclusions 
on Sweden, in particular, the Committee reinstated the importance of this aspect by once 
again finding Sweden in violation of article 18(3), notwithstanding the State’s efforts at 
reforming national immigration law, precisely because “the draft bill makes no change to the 
rule that temporary work permits may be issued only for a specific job, with a specific 
employer, in cases of shortages in the workforce”238. 
 
In the context of its analysis of violations of article 18 of the Charter, and of article 18(3) in 
particular, the Committee also established a broader principle that might serve as a useful 
basis to alleviate the unbalanced power relationships disproportionately experienced by 
immigrant women in the context of their work. Indee, beyond the specific issue of linking 
the validity of residence permits with the maintenance of a specific employer, the Committee 
also repeatedly criticised national legal regimes establishing an automatic expiration of 
residence permits in case of job loss. In particular, the Committee stated on several occasions 
that “in the event of loss of employment Article 18of the Charter requires extension of the 
validity of the residence permit to provide sufficient time for a job to be found”239. Thus, in 
the Committee’s view, national immigration law regimes establishing a strict link between the 
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validity of residence permits and the constant employment of the holders are contrary to 
article 18 of the Charter. Accordingly, in the case of Sweden and Germany, the affirmation of 
this principle led the Committee to find a violation f article 18(3) precisely on the basis of 
their immigration regimes. In particular, the Committee chastised the Swedish system for not 
allowing immigrant workers who had lost their jobs to extend their residence permits in order 
to find new employment240, while the German regime was deemed by the Committee as in 
breach of article 18(3) of the Charter because it provided for the possibility that the validity of 
residence permits could be retroactively reduced in case of job loss241.  
It appears quite clearly in my view that a positive effect of the principle at issue is to 
support immigrant workers’ access to employment in their host states, but also to ensure the 
protection of their freedom from labour exploitation and abuse by de-linking dismissal and 
unemployment on the one hand and immediate loss of residence rights on the other. Such an 
interpretation is also suggested by the fact that on at least two occasions, in the context of 
analyses concerning the extension of residence permits for the purpose of finding a new job, 
the Committee specifically enquired into whether extensions of residence permits were also 
possible “pending a court ruling on an appeal made by a foreign worker against his/her 
dismissal”242.  
 
The discussed conclusions of the Committee never specifically mentioned immigrant women 
workers, nor did they explicitly consider the gendered implications of national immigration 
law regimes imposing immigrants to work for a specific employer, or exposing them to the 
threat of expulsion in case of job loss. However, the Committee’s condemnation of legal 
regimes imposing a dependence of immigrant workers on one specific employer, or 
establishing an automatic loss of residence permits in case of redundancy, appears to be 
particularly important for this category. It provides a human rights basis to remedy 
employment relationships excessively unbalanced in favour of the employer and the 
consequent higher risk of labour exploitation that may derive from it. Because these issues 
primarily and disproportionately affect immigrant women, the very focus of the Committee 
on these problems is a specifically important development for this group. The insistence of 
the Committee on these issues and its efforts to push States Parties to modify their 
immigration law regimes in conformity with article 18 of the Charter appear even more 
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important if one considers the absence of similar principles in the European Court of Human 
Rights’ case law. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
The analysed case law of the European Court of Human Rights as well as of the European 
Committee of Social Rights prompts interesting observations, both with respect to the most 
common gendered shortcomings observable in national mmigration law, and to the effects of 
European human rights law on such a bias. The gender d shortcomings of domestic rules on 
immigration on which I have focused in this chapter are essentially ascribable to two features: 
the overlooking of specific difficulties experienced by immigrant women and the adoption of 
inadequate abstract models of the members of this group.  
Regarding the first problem, I investigated the role eventually played by the Court in 
unveiling and correcting the disparate impact on imm grant women generated by norms 
affected by a lack of awareness of this group’s specific issues, in respect to domestic violence 
and labour exploitation. My analysis of these contexts revealed that the Court’s case law so 
far has mainly focused on domestic criminal law, thus preventing a general assessment of the 
impact of European human rights law on this matter. However, I also noted how a significant 
and positive example of judicial influence of the human right to be free from slavery, 
servitude and forced labour on the disparate impact generated by a national labour migration 
regime was offered by the Rantsev judgment – and that the Kawogo case constituted a missed 
opportunity for further development in this regard. In relation to this, I also observed how the 
European Committee of Social Rights consistently establi hed key principles with respect to 
states’ obligations to ensure that their immigration regimes do not negatively influence 
immigrant workers’ right to be free from labour exploitation. 
Secondly, in relation to the indirectly discriminatory effects of national rules on 
immigration embracing an abstract and essentialising model of “immigrant woman”, I 
observed how the human rights lens did not prevent the Court’s embracing of these gendered 
narratives and their reproduction and enforcement at the supranational level. This precluded 
the recognition of the disparate impact of national immigration rules, per se or as enforced by 
the national authorities, on the involved immigrant women. An illustration of this 
phenomenon was provided by the Haydarie judgment and by the numerous decisions 
concerning transnational mothers. As a consequence, the human rights framework of the 




provisions, but rather perpetuated their indirectly discriminatory effects. Interestingly, the 
only exception to this phenomenon was provided by the case of Abdulaziz, Cabales and 
Balkandali, where the Court was able to detect that the British family reunification regime 
constituted a form of discrimination against immigrant women because it was based on 
gendered and inexact assumptions as to the distribution of productive and reproductive work 
within immigrant families. In relation to this, I observed that the prohibition of direct and 
indirect discrimination enshrined in article 14 of the Convention, in combination with the 
right to family life ex article 8, constituted a decisive reference in Abdulaziz, and that its 
potential to turn the Court’s attention to the disparate impact of legally-enforced gendered 
models should be further pursued through legal claims in this sense. 
 
In sum, it appears clearly that European human rights law has not so far been consistently 
capable of exposing and correcting the gendered shortcomings of specific national 
immigration law provisions, or of their implementation and interpretation by the national 
authorities. On the one hand, successful cases have been identified in this chapter, both in the 
field of family life and in that of employment. On the other hand, the Court has also made 
some mistakes, the most visible of which concerns the consistent reproduction of deeply 
gendered and stereotypical normative views based on an essentialised notion of immigrant 
women.  
In conclusion, I would argue that the analysis conducted in this chapter ultimately suggests 
that the European system of human rights can constitute a powerful tool for immigrant 
women aiming to expose the perverse effects of natio l rules applicable to them, but that a 
gender-sensitive interpretation of this system itself i  essential to fully realise this potential. 
Not only is the emergence of consolidated principles in this field naturally exposed to the 
possibility of continued setbacks, but the Strasbourg Court itself may also internalise 
gendered notions concerning immigrant women’s role, aspirations and needs. After all, it 
would be naive and far-fetched to identify supranational courts as infallible champions of sex 
equality, as opposed to national legislators and judges unaware of the specificities and 
extreme diversity of immigrant women in the European legal space. In fact, precisely because 
the normative embracing of gendered notions is often an unconscious occurrence, and the 
disproportionate and negative effects of certain norms on immigrant women often constitute 
unpredicted, perverse effects, it appears even more likely that human rights courts too may 
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In the previous chapter, I examined the capability of European human rights law to unveil and 
correct the gender bias – or gender biased interpretations – of national rules of migration law. 
It must be noted, however, that national immigration law is not the only problematic legal 
source for immigrant women. European Union law may indeed equally present gendered 
shortcomings in the fields of family life and employment. This is a problem of considerable 
importance, because since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 the European Union has 
significantly expanded its competences in the field of immigration. The power to control the 
entry and stay of foreigners on the national territory is one of the most important components 
of state sovereignty. The fact that Member States ar  increasingly bound to respect a common 
European framework of rules and policies on the matter is therefore extremely significant, 
although the resistance of Member States to cede sov reignty in this area is still very 
strong243.  
 
In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty244 introduced the matters of asylum and immigration within the 
competences of the Union under Title VI, dedicated to Provisions on Cooperation in the Field 
of Justice and Home Affairs. However, its article K.1 merely established an obligation for 
Member States to regard these areas “as a matter of common interest”245. It did not grant the 
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Union with the power to establish binding common rules in the area of immigration and 
asylum, but merely allowed the adoption of non-binding intergovernmental measures246. 
In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam247 introduced for the first time a Union competence to 
adopt binding rules on migration matters in its Title IV, entitled Visa Asylum Immigration and 
Other Policies Related to Free Movement of Persons. Article 61 established the competence 
of the Union to adopt measures in the matters of external border controls, asylum and 
immigration as well as measures “safeguarding the rights of nationals of third countries”248. 
More specific provisions were provided by article 62, which granted the European Council 
the power to adopt measures concerning “the crossing of the external borders of the Member 
States”249, which included standards on the checks carried out by Member States on persons 
at external borders and rules on short stay visas (no more than three months), as well as 
measures establishing the conditions under which third-country nationals could travel within 
the territory of the Union. Moreover, art. 63 of the Treaty established the power of the 
European Council to adopt measures on asylum, refuge  protection, the rights and conditions 
of residence in other Member States for legally resident third-country nationals and measures 
on immigration policy within the areas of illegal migration and of “conditions of entry and 
residence” of third-country nationals, as well as on “standards on procedures for the issue by 
Member States of long-term visas and residence permits, including those for the purpose of 
family reunion”250. This bundle of provisions established the first competence of the 
European Union to adopt binding rules in the field of immigration, and most importantly in 
the field of immigrants’ fundamental rights. 
While the Treaty of Nice of 2001251 did not modify the competence of the Union in the 
field of immigration, the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 has brought important changes, starting 
from the inclusion of immigration in Title V, devoted to the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice. Moreover, while article 61 of the Amsterdam Treaty simply referred to a competence 
of the Union to adopt measures in the field of migration, the Lisbon Treaty has introduced a 
new objective for the Union, i.e., “framing a common policy on asylum, immigration and 
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external border control (...) which is fair towards third country nationals”252. Consequently, 
the Lisbon Treaty has also modified articles 62 and 63 of the Amsterdam Treaty by clarifying 
specific aspects of this more comprehensive competenc  of the Union. While article 77 has 
substituted article 62 in establishing the competence of the Union to adopt a common visa 
policy and other measures mostly concerning external borders management, article 79 focuses 
almost exclusively on legal migration and on common standards in the treatment of 
immigrants from outside the EU. More specifically, article 79 established the competence of 
the Union to develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring not only an efficient 
management of migration flows but also the “fair trea ment of third-country nationals residing 
legally in Member States”253. Furthermore, paragraph 2 of article 79 has not only confirmed 
the power of the Union to adopt measures concerning conditions of entry and residence as 
well as standards on the procedures applied by Member States to grant long-term visas and 
residence permits – as already established by article 63, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Amsterdam 
Treaty – but it has also introduced a new area of competence, i.e., “the definition of the rights 
of third-country nationals residing legally in a Member State”254. The new emphasis on the 
need to develop common standards in the definition of the rights of immigrants in the EU is 
complemented by paragraph 4 of article 79, which also llows the European Parliament and 
the Council to adopt measures with the view of promoting the integration of legally resident 
immigrants.  
 
Concurrently with the evolution of the Union’s competences in the field of migration, soft-
law sources started to develop. For our purposes, it i  interesting to observe that European 
immigration policy documents have steadily transitioned from a phase of utter gender-
insensitivity to one of awareness of the need to effectively tackle immigrant women’s 
integration. Initially, important policy documents such as the Tampere Conclusions of 
1999255, the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration of 2004256 and The Hague 
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Programme of 2005257 consistently failed to consider gender-specific issues in the field of 
migration258. Around 2005, on the other hand, soft-law sources started mentioning the need to 
adopt a gender perspective in immigration policies, mostly with the view of promoting the 
integration of immigrant women in their host society through their stronger inclusion in the 
labour market259.  
However, such an evolution was mostly characterised by the introduction of exhortative 
statements towards Member States or EU institutions c cerning the importance of adopting 
gender sensitive policies and legislation, rather tan by an actual adoption of said policies or 
legislation for immigrant women. This further development, arguably much needed for 
effectively pursuing immigrant women’s integration, has yet to arrive. From this point of 
view, it appears quite significant that the first acknowledgments of the need for a stronger 
gender-sensitivity in EU immigration policy date back to 2005 and yet no document has 
actually adopted a gender-sensitive policy in the field of immigrants’ integration. Even more 
importantly, the rhetorical choice of calling for a stronger gender sensitivity of European legal 
sources in the field of migration has not been accompanied by an in-depth assessment of what 
changes in policy and legislation are actually needed to reach this goal.  
 
Beyond soft-law sources, the emergence and expansion of the competence of the Union on 
migration matters prompted the progressive creation of a corpus of hard-law sources at EU 
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level, and thus of a binding European immigration regime260. A first group of legal sources 
was adopted with respect to the fields of family migration and long-term residence. Thus, in 
2003, Directive 2003/86/EC261, regulating the exercise of the right to family reunification of 
third-country nationals and Directive 2003/109/EC262 on long-term residency status were 
adopted. The following year, Directive 2004/38/EC263, established relevant rules for third-
country national family members of Union citizens by including them in the enjoyment of 
freedom of movement and residence within the territory of the Union. 
A more recent group of sources, on the other hand, concerned labour migration. Until 
2011, this system clearly reflected a clear intention to attract “desirable” categories of 
immigrant workers, identifiable in two main categories: highly-skilled workers and temporary 
or circular workers. While the first category is regulated by Directive 2009/50/EC – the so-
called Blue Card Directive264, a legal framework on the second category is currently under 
construction. In addition to the already in force Directive 2005/71/EC on third-country 
national researchers265, two directive proposals on seasonal workers266 and intra-corporate 
transferees267 are currently under discussion. After 2011, however, this normative landscape 
changed thanks to the adoption of Directive 2011/98/EU, i.e., the Single Permit Directive268. 
This Directive is the first source in the field of labour migration to have a general character 
and not to focus on a specific profession, rather it establishes a common procedure for the 
entry and stay of all third-country national workers. 
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With respect to the field of employment, another relevant regime consists in the anti-
discrimination EU legal framework. The European lega  framework on non-discrimination 
has been defined as a “fragmented body of law” both ecause it mirrors different conceptual 
approaches to non-discrimination and equality – especially in relation to positive action – and 
because of its diverse responses to different grounds of discrimination269. The main legal 
sources in this area are indeed quite diverse in scope and content. While Directive 
2000/43270focuses exclusively on race discrimination but includes a variety of realms within 
its scope of application, Directive 2000/78271 aims instead at prohibiting discrimination on 
several grounds but exclusively in the field of employment. As to discrimination on the 
grounds of sex, the most important legal sources in force at the present time are constituted by 
Directive 2004/113272, prohibiting sex discrimination with respect to access to and supply of 
goods and services in fields beyond employment273, and by Directive 2006/54274, focusing on 
equal opportunities and equal treatment between men and women in the field of employment. 
 
The described normative system suggests that European Union law is comparable to Member 
States, in the sense that this entity establishes its own legislation with the aim to regulate 
immigration on its territory, and therefore its norms may have a disparate impact on 
immigrant women. At the same time, EU law has also e tablished its own system of 
fundamental rights protection, acting as an external source of control vis-à-vis Member 
States’ domestic orders. In this sense, European Union law constitutes both a system of 
guarantee of immigrant women’s fundamental rights and  possible source of biased norms 
which, just like national norms, are subject to fundamental rights review.  
European Union law may produce a disparate impact on immigrant women either as a 
direct result of discriminatory or biased norms, or because it fails to dictate appropriate 
                                                           
269
 SCHIEK, D., ‘From European Union Non-Discrimination Law Towards Multidimensional Equality Law for 
Europe’, in Schiek, D., Chege, V., European Union Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives on 
Multidimensional Equality Law, Routledge-Cavendish, London, 2009, p. 5. 
270
 Council Directive 2000/43 of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, O. J. L 180/22 of 19 July 2000. 
271
 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, O. J. L 303/16 of 2 December 2000. 
272
 Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, O. J. L 373/37 of 21 December 
2004. 
273
Article 3(4) of Directive 2004/113 explicitly provides that this source “shall not apply to matters of 
employment and occupation”. 
274
 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation 
of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and 




standards in relation to crucial aspects of immigrant women’s family or working life in the 
European legal space. In the latter case, a key question concerns the possibility to conclude 
that certain norms of EU law breach immigrant women’s fundamental rights because they 
leave Member States with a margin of discretion that m y be exercised in a way that 
undermines said rights. This question has divided European institutions, as shown by the 2006 
judgment of Parliament v. Council by the Court of Justice275. In this case, the European 
Parliament required the annulment of certain provisi ns of Directive 2003/86/EC276 which 
precisely relied on the observation that this source allows Member States to adopt domestic 
legislation that breaches fundamental rights and most importantly that “inasmuch as the 
Directive authorises such national legislation, it is the Directive itself which infringes 
fundamental rights”277. The European Council, on the other hand, argued that the provisions 
adopted and applied by Member States in breach of fundamental rights could not be 
considered as an action of European institutions, ad that the Court of Justice could not 
possibly review the compatibility of the norms of the Directive “in purely abstract terms” 
since those norms refer to “national law whose content, and the manner in which it will be 
applied, are unknown”278. Ultimately, the Court of Justice endorsed the European Council’s 
stance by observing that “while the Directive leaves the Member States a margin of 
appreciation, it is sufficiently wide to enable them to apply the Directive’s rules in a manner 
consistent with the requirements flowing from the protection of fundamental rights”279 and 
that in any case when implementing EU law Member States “are bound, as far as possible, to 
apply the rules in accordance with those requirements”280. 
However, in his Opinion on the case Advocate General Kokott expressed a partially 
dissenting stance on the matter281. In support of the view expressed by the European 
Parliament and the European Commission, AG Kokott observed that “endorsement by 
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Community law of specific options for maintaining in force or introducing provisions of 
national law constitutes a measure which may itself, in certain circumstances, infringe 
Community law”282. AG Kokott’s motivations were very fitting. In my view, the main 
problem with the Court’s argumentation was the inevitable consequence to admit the 
possibility for Member States to maintain or adopt legal provisions for the purpose of 
complying with EU law which breach fundamental rights. AG Kokott effectively pinpointed 
this problem by observing that similar options for Member States “formally establish” that 
these national provisions “are compatible with Community law”, and that if said provisions 
“are not challenged in time by means of an action fr annulment, the Community will be 
precluded from taking action itself against national measures which simply take advantage of 
the various options contemplated”283. In partial dissonance with the Parliament’s arguments, 
AG Kokott also raised the crucial point of interpretation. I very much share her view whereby 
“Community provisions are compatible with fundamental rights if they are capable of being 
interpreted in a way which produces the outcome which those rights require”284, and that 
therefore “what matters is not what rules Member States might be minded to adopt (...), but 
rather what rules Member States may lawfully adopt if the Community provisions in question 
are interpreted in conformity with fundamental rights” 285. In case EU norms were not 
sufficiently clear, and this ambiguity would give rise to a breach of human or fundamental 
rights, “responsibility would lie not only with the national legislature (...), but also with the 
Community legislature”286.  
This illustration of the Parliament v. Council case serves to clarify the point of view that 
have chosen to adopt in this chapter’s analysis of the gendered shortcomings of European 
Union law. While I am aware of the European Court of Justice’s position on the matter, I 
argue that delegating to Member States the entire responsibility of an implementation of EU 
law respectful of immigrant women’s fundamental rights is an unsatisfactory solution. 
Because the specific difficulties of this group alre dy tend to be overlooked by domestic 
legislation – as the previous chapter has shown in several instances – immigrant women are 
particularly in need of clear standards of protection of their rights at the supranational level. In 
this sense, the ambiguous and generic character of certain norms of EU law in critical areas 
for immigrant women’s right to family life and employment is problematic in itself and must 
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be addressed. For these reasons, in this chapter I will adopt the same partially dissenting 
stance expressed by AG Kokott in Parliament v. Council and I will focus on two main 
aspects. On the one hand, I will discuss specific provisions of EU law as in breach of 
immigrant women’s fundamental rights even when their g ndered shortcomings are mainly 
identifiable in their excessively generic character in areas of particular importance to 
immigrant women. On the other hand, I will reason on the potential for future development of 
judicial interpretations by the European Court of Justice of biased norms of law on the 
grounds of fundamental rights, so as to correct said bias.  
 
The aim of this chapter is thus to explore the interaction between European fundamental 
rights law and secondary norms of EU law applicable to this category. Firstly, I will delineate 
the right to family life and the right to employment as established and protected under 
European primary law, with a special focus on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union287. Then, I will move on to examine the main sources of European migration 
law (and other relevant sources of EU law) in order to assess whether the rights granted by 
such sources – in the fields of family and employment r spectively – have so far lived up to 
the standards established by European fundamental rights law. In the field of family life, I 
will focus on the European family migration regime. In the field of employment, on the other 
hand, I will discuss the European labour migration regime as well as the anti-discrimination 
framework provided by EU secondary law. For each of the two domains of family life and 
employment, such analyses will consistently include an assessment of selected judgments by 
the European Court of Justice and of the eventual role played by European fundamental rights 
law in unveiling and correcting gendered shortcomings of norms of secondary EU law. 
Undoubtedly, the relatively recent role of the Court of Justice as a fundamental rights 
adjudicator constitutes an important development in this respect and has been widely 
commented on288. In addition to this, it is important to consider that the awaiting accession of 
the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, as envisaged by art. 1 of 
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the Lisbon Treaty and art. 59 of the European Convention itself (as amended by Protocol No. 
14 of 2004)289, will further strengthen human rights protection in the European Union. On my 
part, in this chapter I aim to provide a fresh point of view on the Court’s judicial activity in 
the field of fundamental rights, examining its gendred implications in cases concerning 
immigrants. 
 
1. European Fundamental Rights in the Field of Work and Family: Significance for 
Immigrant Women in the European Legal Space 
 
As is known, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was solemnly 
proclaimed at the Nice European Council of 2000290, but only acquired a binding legal force 
in 2009 with its incorporation in the Treaty of Lisbon291, whose art. 6(1) granted this source 
with the same legal value as the Treaties. Thus, the C arter has become the most important 
binding legal source of European law in the field of fundamental rights, although many of the 
rights recognised by the Charter have been actually de-fundamentalised because their 
specification and guarantee is delegated to national laws.  
In any case, several of its provisions appear of interest for immigrant women’s family life 
and employment. The Charter does not simply establih a right to family life and a right to 
work. Rather, the profiles of these two fundamental rights emerge from a systematic 
consideration of several other rights established by the Charter which can be gathered around 
two main “clusters” related to the realm of family and employment respectively. In particular, 
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for the family domain I will focus on two main aspects: access to family reunification and 
enjoyment of spousal equality. These aspects have been chosen because they have been 
involved in an extremely significant case law by the European Court of Justice concerning 
third-country national carers and their possibility to enjoy family life with their children in the 
Union territory.  
As for the employment domain, two main areas appear articularly interesting: access to 
employment and the enjoyment of equality and non-discrimination at work. These two areas 
have not been involved by the European Court of Justice’  jurisprudence. In fact, the Court 
has yet to examine immigrant women workers’ position in a fundamental rights perspective. 
However, I have chosen to analyse these interrelated spects of the employment cluster 
because of the existence of interesting judicial examples of application of the EU anti-
discrimination framework to immigrant women pursuing access to employment. These 
examples do not provide any cues as to the way in which the EU fundamental rights 
framework may play out in relation to immigrant women workers’ situation. However, they 
provide important evidence as to the capability (or lack thereof) of EU anti-discrimination law 
to respond to immigrant women workers’ complex experiences of discrimination, which often 
involve multiple or intersecting grounds.  
 
a. Right to Family Life 
 
In relation to immigrant women’s family life, several fundamental rights established by the 
Charter appear to complete and specify the right to respect for family life established by 
article 7. Firstly, some of such rights aim at granting freedoms in relation to family life. Thus, 
article 9 establishes the fundamental rights to marry nd to found a family, both of which 
“shall be guaranteed in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of these 
rights”. Secondly, several rights established by the Charter relate to the fundamental right to 
enjoy family life in conditions of equality and non-discrimination. Such provisions, while 
broad in character, also apply to the field of family and can be of particular importance for 
immigrant women. They include the right to equality before the law, established by art. 20, 
the principle of equality between men and women grated by art. 23, as well as the provision 
by art. 21 of a right to non-discrimination on a non-exhaustive lists of grounds – including 
sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, religion and language. In this respect, it is important 
to stress that art. 21(3) separately tackles discrimination on the grounds of nationality, 




any of their specific provisions”. Furthermore, art. 33(2) of the Charter recognises a 
fundamental right pertaining to both the family and the employment domains, i.e., the right to 
reconcile family and professional life. This right is specified in the “right to protection from 
dismissal for a reason connected with maternity” and in the “right to paid maternity leave and 
to parental leave following the birth or adoption of a child”. 
A third bundle of provisions established by the Charter in relation to family life concerns 
access to fundamental rights that are functional to the enjoyment of the right to family life. 
For instance, article 33(1) establishes the right of the family “to enjoy legal, economic and 
social protection”, while article 33(2) grants every individual with the fundamental rights to 
“protection from dismissal for a reason connected with maternity” as well as to “paid 
maternity leave and to parental leave following the birth or adoption of a child”. Moreover, a 
particularly important provision for immigrant women is constituted by art. 24, which entitles 
children with a right “to such protection and care s is necessary for their well being” – art. 
24(1) –, establishes an obligation to consider their b st interest in all public or private actions 
relating to them – art. 24(2) - and, even more importantly for our purposes, establishes their 
right to “maintain on a regular basis a personal rel tionship and direct contact with both his or 
her parents, unless that is contrary to his or her int ests” – art. 24(3). 
 
b. Right to Work 
 
The Charter establishes several rights in the field of employment in both its individual and 
collective dimensions. Firstly, in relation to the aim of protecting freedom in relation to 
employment, the Charter establishes two key fundamental rights, i.e., the prohibition of 
slavery, servitude, forced or compulsory labour andtrafficking established by article 5 and the 
right “to engage in work and to pursue a freely chosen or accepted occupation” under art. 15. 
With respect to the right to work, article 15 also distinguishes between Union citizens and 
regularly residing third-country national workers. While indeed, the former are also granted 
by art. 15(2) with “the freedom to seek employment, to work, to exercise the right of 
establishment and to provide services in any Member State”, the latter are simply recognised 
with an entitlement “to working conditions equivalent to those of citizens of the Union” by 
art. 15(3). Art. 15 may therefore prove to be of little use for the protection of immigrant 
women workers against discrimination, at least with respect to citizen workers. The Charter, 
indeed, safeguards differential treatment on the grounds of nationality in the field of 




every individual unconditionally by article 15(1), the right to equal treatment with Union 
citizens in this field is only granted to third-country nationals that have been authorised to 
work in the Union and only as to working conditions ( ot access to employment). Similarly, 
article 21(2) of the Charter exclusively prohibits di crimination on the grounds of nationality 
“without prejudice to the special provisions of those Treaties”. 
Secondly, the Charter establishes several fundamental rights related to workers’ protection 
in their employment relationships and their working conditions. Such a bundle of rights 
includes the fundamental right to vocational and continuing training under article 14, the right 
to access free placement services pursuant art. 29, he right to protection against unjustified 
dismissal “in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices” ex art. 30, as well 
as the entitlement to social security benefits and social services “providing protection in cases 
such as maternity, illness, industrial accidents, dependency or old age and in the case of loss 
of employment” in accordance with national and European law – pursuant art. 34(1). 
Arguably, such rights constitute an important safety net against dismissal, unemployment and 
redundancy because they foster requalification, re-entry into the labour market or simply 
because they ensure cumulative or alternative means of support to workers. As to working 
conditions, this very same bundle of rights also includes article 31, entitled “fair and just 
working conditions”, granting every worker with “the right to working conditions which 
respect his or her health, safety and dignity” and “the right to limitation of maximum working 
hours, to daily and weekly rest periods and to annul period of paid leave”. 
Thirdly, several fundamental rights related to equality nd non-discrimination established 
by the Charter also cover the field of employment. Among those, the mentioned rights to 
equality before the law ex art. 20 and to non-discrimination ex art. 21 adopt a broad language 
without specifying any particular field of application. On the other hand, in establishing the 
principle of equality between men and women, article 23 explicitly mentions “employment, 
work and pay” as included in its scope of application – as if to stress the particular importance 
of implementing sex equality in the field of employment. 
Lastly, a bundle of rights established by the Charter involve the collective dimension of 
employment. Thus, article 27 establishes workers’ rights to information and consultation, 
while article 28 grants workers and employers with a “right to negotiate and conclude 
collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases of conflicts of interest, to take 
collective action to defend their interests, including strike action”. Also in connection to such 
rights to information, consultation, collective barg ining and action, the Charter also protects 




union and civic matters, which implies the right of everyone to form and join trade unions for 
the protection of his or her interests”. 
 
Having highlighted the most relevant aspects of European fundamental rights law in relation 
to immigrant women’s family life and employment, I will now turn to analyse European 
immigration law, evaluating whether and to what extent the contemporary sources of 
European immigration law have thus far lived up to immigrant women’s fundamental rights 
to family life and to employment as collectively constructed by several provisions of the 
Charter. While these sources grant important rights to third-country nationals residing and 
working in the European legal space, they may nonethel ss present serious gendered 
shortcomings with respect to the specific issues that I have identified as disproportionately 
affecting immigrant women.  
The next two sections of this chapter will be devotd o a critical assessment of relevant 
provisions of European immigration law in the fields of family life and employment 
respectively. In relation to the domain of family life, I will also analyse key judgments by the 
European Court of Justice interpreting and implementing these provisions, in an effort to 
answer the key question of whether EU fundamental rights law itself has so far been capable 
of exposing and correcting observable gendered shortcomings of European immigration law. 
In relation to the employment domain, on the other hand, I will focus more on the meaning of 
the selected judicial examples with respect to the responsiveness of secondary EU legislation 
on the right to non-discrimination to the specific issues experienced by immigrant women 
workers in the European Union. 
 
2. European Family Migration Law in the Light of Immig rant Women’s 
Fundamental Right to Family Life  
 
In this section, I will examine the relevant provisions of European immigration law that bear 
the potential to produce a disparate impact on immigrant women’s enjoyment of their right to 
family life as enshrined in several articles of the European Charter. The gendered 
shortcomings of these norms do not derive from their regulation in itself, but rather from the 
vast discretional power left to Member States in crucial areas of immigrant women’s family 
life. By doing so, such norms fail to establish mini um standards that would secure this 
category’s equal enjoyment of their fundamental right to family life in the European legal 




immigration law fall short of the protection guaranteed by the Charter. In this section, I will 
discuss this issue in more depth with reference to the economic prerequisites to sponsor 
family reunification and to the dependence of residnce permits for family reunification on 
that of the sponsor. This analysis will also include an enquiry into the capability of the 
fundamental rights framework provided by the European Charter to restrict Member States’ 
vast discretional power in these sensitive areas. In particular, I will turn to examine relevant 
judgments by the European Court of Justice in order to understand whether and to what extent 
said fundamental rights have been enforced in relation to these matters – and if so whether 
they have been used by the Court to address state impl mentation of EU immigration law in a 
more gender-sensitive direction. 
 
a. Access to Family Reunification 
 
Depending on the nationality of their spouses, partners and children as well as on the 
residence status of the involved persons, immigrant women’s access to family reunification, 
i.e., their enjoyment of family life with their family members in the host country, is regulated 
by different provisions of European immigration law. In this paragraph I am going to focus on 
immigrant women’s access to family reunification as sponsors, while the following one will 
be devoted to immigrant women as sponsored family members.  
When applying to sponsor family reunification, one of the most problematic legal 
provisions for third-country national immigrant women residing in the Union concerns the 
imposition of economic requirements as a precondition for enjoying family life with spouses, 
partners or children in the host country. On the one hand, such requirements pursue a 
fundamental interest of the host state, i.e., the necessity to ensure that incoming family 
migrants will not burden the national social assistance system, with the view to preserve and 
administer limited national resources. The legitimae character of Member States’ pursuit of 
these interests is unquestionable. On the other hand, however, an exclusive focus on 
productive work and economic thresholds as the only wa  to satisfy preconditions for the 
enjoyment of family life in the host country bears di proportionate and negative effects on 
immigrant women’s possibilities to access family reunification as sponsors. 
 
The majority of the relevant norms of European immigration law in this area appear to 
reproduce the criticised focus. Immigrant women aiming to sponsor family reunification will 




Directive 2009/50 depending on the type of permit they hold and on the exercise of their 
eventual freedom of movement within the Union. 
Directive 2003/86 – whose article 4 exclusively grants a right to reunification with “the 
sponsor’s spouse”292 as well as several categories of minor children293– at article 7 allows 
Member States to require that the sponsor provides evidence of having an accommodation 
“regarded as normal for a comparable family in the same region”294, sickness insurance for 
himself or herself and his family members, as well as “stable and regular resources which are 
sufficient to maintain himself/herself and the membrs of his/her family, without recourse to 
the social assistance system of the Member State concerned”295. In this respect, article 
16(1)(a) establishes that a renewal of the residence permit for the purpose of family 
reunification may be rejected by the Member States if the sponsor no longer has sufficient 
resources without recourse to the social assistance system of the host Member State, as 
referred to by article 7. 
Directive 2003/86 also applies to long-term residents’ family members entering the 
Member State where their sponsor resides. However, art. 16 of Directive 2003/109 also grants 
long-term residents with a right to be accompanied by their family members – already 
residing in the Member State in accordance with Direct ve 2003/86 – when exercising their 
right to reside in a second Member State296. For this different type of family migration, article 
16 requires family members to apply for another residence permit in the second Member 
State. Interestingly, while also establishing income requirements as a precondition for 
obtaining such permits, art. 16 refers them alternatively to the family member and to the 
sponsor rather than just the latter as is the case of Directive 2003/86. More specifically, article 
16(4)(c) of Directive 2003/109 allows the second Memb r State to require, among other 
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conditions, family members to provide “evidence that they have stable and regular resources 
to maintain themselves without recourse to the social assistance of the Member State 
concerned or that the long-term resident has such resou ces and insurance for them”.  
Lastly, article 15 of the Blue Card Directive grants third-country nationals holding this 
permit with the right to family reunification as envisaged by Directive 2003/86 with several 
more favourable derogations that do not touch upon income requirements. In addition to this, 
it must be noted that the very scope of application of the Blue Card Directive is dependent on 
stringent income requirements. Pursuant article 5(3) of the Directive, indeed, the Blue Card 
will only be released provided that “the gross annual salary resulting from the monthly or 
annual salary specified in the work contract or binding job offer shall not be inferior to a 
relevant salary threshold (...) which shall be at le st 1,5 times the average gross annual salary 
in the Member State concerned”297.  
 
The European normative framework on sponsorship of family reunification suggests that 
Directive 2003/109 may be the only legal source actually envisaging the possibility that 
family members may be able to maintain themselves from the very beginning of their 
movement rather than relying on their sponsor for subsistence – although exclusively in the 
case of movement of the long-term resident sponsor in another Member State. On the other 
hand, Directive 2003/86 – which still constitutes the general legal framework on third-country 
national’s enjoyment of family unity – appears to be heavily based on the possibility for 
Member States to impose preconditions related to inc me and productive work. It appears 
disappointing that Directive 2003/86 fails to refer at least to an obligation for Member States 
to consider the personal circumstances of the sponsor i  their evaluation of his or her 
application for family reunification. Far from being merely hypothetical, this observation 
stems from a comparison with Directive 2004/38. The latter resource, indeed, establishes by 
its article 8(4) a prohibition for Member States to set fixed amounts for the purpose of 
determining “sufficient resources”, as well as an obligation to take into account “the personal 
situation of the person concerned”. Clearly, there would be no guarantee that these “personal 
circumstances” would be interpreted in favour of immigrant women aspiring to sponsor 
family reunification – e.g., by setting lower income standards for immigrant women in 
consideration of the disproportionate impact of thegender pay gap on this category in 
comparison to national women workers. However, a similar provision bears at least the 
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potential to produce positive effects for immigrant women’s equal access to sponsorship of 
family reunification. 
The vast discretion left to Member States by Directv  2003/86 as to the possibility of 
imposing strictly economic requirements to third-country nationals pursuing to sponsor family 
reunification regardless of their personal situation and of the eventual income of other family 
members is likely to produce a disparate impact on immigrant women in the enjoyment of 
their right to family life. In particular, I would argue that this feature may be at odds with an 
organic reading of the Charter whereby the right to protection of family life ex art. 7 shall be 
guaranteed in conjunction with the principles of equality and non-discrimination affirmed by 
the Charter at arts. 20, 21 and 23 – particularly with respect to the prohibited ground of sex, 
provided that the latter group of articles may be interpreted as also encompassing a 
prohibition of indirect discrimination. The possibil ty for such an interpretation is suggested 
by the Explanations to the Charter drafted by the Presidium of the Convention which drafted 
this source298, whereby art. 21(1) draws on article 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union and article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. As I have 
previously stressed, the latter has been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights as 
also including a prohibition of indirect discrimination within its scope. On this ground, and 
even more so in consideration of the imminent accession of the European Union to the 
European Convention on Human Rights, it appears realistic to pursue and support an 
interpretation at least of art. 21 of the Charter as covering both direct and indirect 
discrimination. 
In consideration of immigrant women’s disproportionate difficulties in complying with 
income requirements, a reading of the legal framework at issue in the light of these 
fundamental rights may prompt the recognition of the indirectly discriminatory character of 
provisions allowing Member States to impose purely economic requisites for the purpose of 
enjoying family life on their territory. This framing of the current European family 
reunification regime may prompt the adoption of more gender-sensitive standards in this 
context. These may include Member States’ possibility – or even obligation – to consider 
whole families’ income rather than requiring a single sponsor to support herself and the 
family member for which reunification is sought. This solution would prompt a legal 
recognition of the value of reproductive and care work within the household in the context of 
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sponsorship for family reunification which would arguably constitute a key development for 
immigrant women’s equal enjoyment of their right to family life. 
 
While the negative outcome of the Haydarie judgment299 before the Strasbourg Court 
suggests cautiousness in considering human and fundamental rights as a cure-all in this area, 
the isolated nature of this case as well as the fact th t the Court of Justice has yet to analyse 
this specific matter300 leave grounds for possibly positive developments i the near future. An 
important encouragement in this respect comes from a group of judgments by the European 
Court of Justice whereby third-country national women were recognised with a right to enjoy 
family life with their Union citizen spouses or children in their host countries, although 
beyond the framework of Directive 2003/86. In these cases, the fundamental right to family 
life of the involved immigrant women was not the focus of the Court’s judicial reasoning. 
Rather, its protection constituted an indirect effect of the primary aim of ensuring the effective 
enjoyment by Union citizen spouses and children of their own fundamental rights and 
freedoms. The most interesting aspect of such a case law for the purpose of this section 
consists in the fact that this indirect effect was mainly grounded on the reproductive work and 
unpaid care labour of the involved third-country national women, which was considered by 
the Court as an indispensable support for the full enjoyment of their husbands’ and children’s 
fundamental rights as citizens of the Union. Thus, the judicial valorisation of unpaid care and 
reproductive work as a ground to access the fundamental right to family life may suggest a 
stronger sensitivity of the ECJ (in comparison to that shown by the Strasbourg Court in 
Haydarie) on these matters, which may ground a favourable assessment of the right to 
sponsor family reunification also beyond a mere breadwinner logic. 
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A closer look at the specific judgments at issue is however required before reaching such 
conclusions. In the case of Carpenter301, concerning a Philippines national illegally residing 
in the United Kingdom and married to a British national, the Court of Justice interpreted 
Directive 73/148/EEC302 (at the time regulating the exercise by Union citizens of their 
freedom of movement, and subsequently repealed by Directive 2004/38) in the light of Union 
citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms. In particular, the Court referred to freedom to 
provide services within the Union under article 49 of the EC Treaty303 and of Union citizens’ 
right to respect for family life x article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
aim of this judicial interpretation was to answer the question of whether a right of residence 
for a third-country national spouse could be recognised “if the non-national spouse indirectly 
assists the national of a Member State in carrying o  the provision of services in other 
Member States by carrying out childcare”304. Thus, the Court interestingly held that “the 
separation of Mr and Mrs Carpenter would be detrimental to their family life, and, therefore, 
to the conditions under which Mr Carpenter [exercised] a fundamental freedom”, because 
“[that] freedom could not be fully effective if Mr Carpenter were to be deterred from 
exercising it by obstacles (...) to the entry and residence of his spouse”305. As to the Union 
citizen husband’s right to respect for family life, the Court observed that “[the] decision to 
deport Mrs Carpenter [constituted] an interference with the exercise by Mr. Carpenter 
[emphasis added] of his right to respect for his family life within the meaning of Article 8 of 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”306. As a 
result, the Court exclusively referred to the husband’s human rights and fundamental 
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freedoms when it concluded that “Article 49 EC, read in the light of the fundamental right to 
respect for family life, is to be interpreted as precluding, in circumstances such as those in the 
main proceedings, a refusal by the Member State of origin of a provider of services (...) of the 
right to reside in its territory to that provider’s spouse, who is a national of a third country”307. 
Similarly, in the Baumbast and R.308  judgment the Court of Justice recognised a 
Colombian woman’s right to reside in the United Kingdom on the grounds of an interpretation 
of Regulation 1612/68309 in light of her children’s right to pursue education in their host state, 
which in turn was extracted by the Court from their Union citizen father’s fundamental 
freedom to circulate within the Union as a worker under article 39 EC310. The Court reached 
this conclusion even if the Union citizen father no longer exercised freedom of movement as a 
worker. The Court in particular observed that “where the children enjoy (...) the right to 
continue their education in the host Member State although the parents who are their carers 
are at risk of losing their right of residence as a result (...) of the fact that the parent who 
pursued the activity of an employed person in the host Member State (...) has ceased to work 
there, it is clear that if those parents were refused the right to remain in the host Member State 
during the period of their children’s education that might deprive those children of a right 
which is granted to them by the Community legislature”311. In this case therefore, not only 
was a third-country national woman once again granted with the possibility to enjoy family 
life in her host country with her spouse and children solely on the grounds of the “usefulness” 
of her care work for Union citizen children, but the framing of her fundamental right to family 
life as purely functional to the enjoyment of other individuals’ rights was also aggravated by 
the third-hand character of such a right, which hadbeen “passed on” from her husband to her 
children, and from her children to her. 
Interestingly, in the subsequent case of Zhu and Chen312 the Court interpreted Directive 
73/148/EEC as demanding the recognition of the right of a third-country national immigrant 
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woman to reside in the United Kingdom together with her baby daughter in the light of the 
latter’s right to reside on the territory of Member States as a Union citizen xart. 18 of the EC 
Treaty – not only on the grounds of the mother’s unpaid reproductive work, but also on the 
grounds of her productive and paid work. The order for eference in the case at issue, indeed, 
highlighted that the applicant mother – a Chinese woman working in China with her husband 
who had taken up residence in Ireland and had given birth there – was the primary carer of her 
daughter not only by virtue of her reproductive work but also on the grounds of her 
productive work, since her daughter was “dependent both emotionally and financially on her 
mother [emphasis added]”313 and she received “private medical services and child- are 
services in return for payment in the United Kingdom [emphasis added]”314. 
The fundamentally functional character of the rights recognised to third-country nationals 
related to Union citizens was not eliminated by the subsequent de-linking of said rights from 
Union citizens’ exercise of the freedoms attached to Union citizenship. Such a de-linking 
occurred for the first time in the landmark Zambrano judgment315, concerning a married 
couple of Colombian nationals irregularly residing  Belgium and pursuing residence permits 
in their host country on the grounds of the Union citizenship of their children. Nonetheless, as 
in the previous case law of the Court, the parents’ right to reside and work in Belgium in this 
case was also strictly functional; ensuring the possibility of their children to exercise their 
rights and freedoms as Union citizens. The persistently strict functionality of the fundamental 
rights granted to third-country nationals “attached” to Union citizens for the latter’s exercise 
of their own rights has been subsequently confirmed by the Court in the judgments of 
McCarthy316, Dereci317,O. and S.318 and Alokpa and Moudoulou319. 
 
The examined case law constitutes an important example of judicial interpretation by the ECJ 
of EU family migration norms in the light of fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in 
primary and secondary EU law. In this respect, it is also noteworthy that in the cases of 
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Carpenter and Baumbast the Court explicitly recalled the right to respect for family life ex 
article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights as a parameter for assessing relevant 
norms of migration law – opening up important perspctives for a joint interpretation of 
European fundamental rights and the human rights establi hed by the European Convention. 
The growing tendency to link access to EU fundamental rights and Union citizenship is not 
exclusive to the family migration realm. Such a tend cy has been commented on, on a 
broader level, by scholars who have emphasised that although the Strasbourg Court has 
exclusively focused on human rights in relation to cases brought by immigrants, the European 
Court of Justice “has so far adopted the nationality/citizenship lens to deal with rights of non-
EU citizens”320. As a result, a “stratification of rights”321 has been created, whereby “[there] is 
a hierarchy of legal residents within the EU, with the Union citizens at the apex and the TCNs 
with no connection with EU citizens at the bottom of the ladder”322.  
Such effects of stratification of rights have not discouraged proponents of an even tighter 
link between Union citizenship and European fundamental rights. In fact, in the light of the 
observation of the weak role played so far by the European Union in relation to fundamental 
rights violations within Member States323, it has been proposed that a possible solution may 
lie in the identification of the fundamental rights recalled by art. 2 TEU324 with the substance 
of Union citizenship. More specifically, it has been suggested that the substance of the rights 
conferred by virtue of the Union citizen status should be understood as corresponding to “the 
essence of fundamental rights enshrined in Article 2 TEU”325. In the proponents’ view, this 
would support individual legal action before the European Court of Justice for the protection 
of human rights on the grounds of Union citizenship, intensifying the judicial activity of the 
Court in this field. In response to the objection that this construction would exclude third-
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country nationals – especially considering that most provisions of the European Charter grant 
fundamental rights regardless of Union citizenship – it has been argued that in situations 
falling within the scope of EU law, this category may always rely on the Charter’s rights, and 
that in any case third-country nationals would indirectly benefit from a stronger protection of 
EU citizens’ rights326. 
However, restricting the possibility to introduce individual legal action to Union citizens 
only, in an effort to increase the ECJ’s judicial activity in the field of human and fundamental 
rights, constitutes a questionable approach in my view. It would be far-fetched to maintain 
that either Member States individually or the European Union as a whole are under an 
obligation to grant equal rights to Union citizens and to third-country nationals in all respects. 
The choice to grant a privileged status to Union citizens – and its collateral effect of granting 
such a status only to third-country nationals somehow linked to them – pertains to the 
legislative powers of the Union. Nonetheless, it must also be acknowledged that both 
doctrinal and normative approaches linking Union citizenship and the possibility to obtain 
judicial protection of one’s fundamental rights creates perverse effects for third-country 
nationals in general and for immigrant women in particular. It is in my view crucial to 
highlight such issues not because of moral reasons, but because these perverse effects may not 
correspond to the aim pursued by the legislation generating them. From a theoretical point of 
view, I would argue that it is precisely by overlooking this aspect that one may affirm that 
exclusively allowing Union citizens to pursue indivi ual legal action to obtain protection of 
their human and fundamental rights would not negatively affect third-country nationals327. 
 
Therefore, it is extremely important to consider that such legislative choices, while legitimate, 
create unforeseen effects on third-country national immigrant women. While some of these 
effects may be seen as a positive development for this category, a look at the broader picture 
reveals serious and perverse effects which may promt a re-thinking of European legislative 
and policy choices in the field of family migration.  
On the one hand, one may argue that the inclusion under the EU fundamental rights regime 
of third-country national women on the grounds of their care and reproductive work 
constitutes progress. The analysed case law may even be considered as a good example of 
how third-country nationals may benefit from a better protection of Union citizens’ 
fundamental rights and freedoms. In this light, it may be concluded that the ECJ is capable of 
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supporting a stronger and more gender-sensitive consideration of this type of labour in EU 
migration regimes – including their specific provisions on requisites for sponsoring family 
reunification. From a gendered point of view, in fact, judgments such as Chen and Baumbast 
have been welcomed as recognising “the role of women as prime carers”, and as enriching 
“European social citizenship by performing a sort of judicial gender mainstreaming”328. 
On the other hand, it is important to observe that e Court’s case law on the matter also 
presents gendered shortcomings. Firstly, this judicial approach constitutes a testimony of the 
increasingly narrow routes available to third-country national immigrant women to access 
fundamental rights in the field of family migration. Secondly, linking access to fundamental 
rights for third-country national women to their “usefulness” for the exercise of their spouses 
and children’s exercise of their own fundamental rights and freedoms has problematic 
gendered undertones. If an element of valorisation of unpaid care work is certainly observable 
in the examined case law, such care is not valued per se, as a sufficient ground to access 
fundamental rights vis-à-vis restrictive norms of immigration law. Rather, unpaid care work 
has been valued by the Court only in so far as it serves the purpose of allowing others to 
exercise their rights and freedoms as Union citizens. Far from enjoying a mere symbolic 
value, this judicial framing of care poses the crucial question of the fate of the residence rights 
granted to the third-country national women involved once their care work is no longer 
considered useful or vital for their spouses’ and children’s fundamental rights. In particular, 
an important question concerns whether these women will still enjoy residence rights strictly 
connected to their fundamental right to family life once their children reach adulthood and no 
longer need their care, or in case their marriage with citizen husbands comes to an end or 
when the latter no longer need to rely on their spou e’s care work in order to efficiently 
perform productive work.  
Lastly, an important consequence of the link between third-country national women’s 
rights and Union citizenship lies in the fact that a similar protection is not granted to those 
married to third-country nationals. In this respect, it has been rightly noted that linking 
immigrant women’s access to fundamental rights to their attachment to Union citizens creates 
“differentiated legal subject[s]”329 by privileging this category at the expenses of thse who 
cannot rely on similar links. In particular, it has been highlighted that “migrant women who 
are mothers of EU citizens enjoy more social citizenship rights than migrant women who are 
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not mothers of EU citizens”330. As it emerged from the examined case law, the same 
differentiation occurs with respect to immigrant women married with children to Union 
citizens vis-à-vis those married to third-country nationals.  
 
Against this background, while the extension to third-country national immigrant women of 
fundamental rights and freedoms of Union citizens vis-à-vis restrictive norms of European 
immigration law on the grounds of their unpaid care labour prompted positive judicial 
outcomes for the migrant mothers and wives involved in the examined case law, the gendered 
shortcomings of this form of protection of immigrant women’s right to family life are evident. 
Arguably, the highlighted limitations also pose theproblem of immigrant women’s enjoyment 
of equality within the family. In particular, the judicial recognition of immigrant women’s 
residence rights as strictly related to the usefulnss of their reproductive and care work for 
Union citizen men and their children raises doubts as to the ECJ’s capability to move beyond 
a gendered view of the distribution between productive and reproductive work within the 
family. This observation prompts the question of what perspectives are currently opened by 
European family migration law for immigrant women’s enjoyment of sex equality within the 
family, and what influence the Charter may have on this matter. With that in mind, I will now 
turn to examine relevant norms of European immigration law from the point of view of 
spousal equality as a specific facet of the fundamental right to family life enshrined in the 
Charter. 
 
b. Enjoyment of Spousal Equality and Equality Within the Family 
 
One of the most important aspects for the enjoyment of equality within the family in the 
context of family migration legal regimes consists in the degree of independence granted to 
family members entering for the purpose of family reunification. The relation between the 
validity of the family member’s residence permit and the persistence of the relationship on 
which family reunification is grounded, or the presence of legal requirements of cohabitation 
as proof of a genuine family relationship for the purpose of maintaining residence permits are 
among the indicators of the degree of independence established by family reunification 
regimes. 
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The importance of these features from a gendered point of view relates to their 
disproportionate impact on immigrant women as a category still predominantly entering 
Europe for family reasons. Restrictive norms establishing a strong link between family 
members’ and sponsors’ residence permits may further aggravate the factual dependence 
implied in entering a foreign country where the sponsor constitutes the only reference. In this 
respect, in 2007 the European Women’s Lobby (EWL) identified the dependent legal status of 
immigrant women from their husbands in case of family reunification among the obstacles to 
their empowerment331. 
 
A gendered analysis of the European immigration law in this area, in the light of immigrant 
women’s fundamental right to family life under the Charter as also encompassing spousal 
equality, offers mixed results. For the purpose of this section, I will look at relevant EU 
immigration law provisions applicable to third-country national immigrant women entering 
the European territory to join a previously resident family member (with a special focus on 
reunification with spouses).Third-country national women holding a residence permit for the 
purpose of family reunification with Union citizen family members enjoy quite secure, and to 
a certain extent independent, residence rights under Dir ctive 2004/38. In particular, article 
12(2) of the Directive establishes that “(...) the Union citizen’s death shall not entail loss of 
the right of residence of his/her family members who are not nationals of a Member State” 
provided that they have resided in the host Member State for at least one year before the 
citizen’s death. Even more importantly, the same provision is repeated by article 13 with 
respect to cases of “divorce, annulment of marriage or termination of the registered 
partnership”, provided that the marriage or registered partnership has lasted at least three 
years, including one year in the host Member State, or that the third-country national spouse 
has custody of the Union citizen’s children or enjoys a right to access to a minor child in the 
host Member State, or that “this is warranted by particularly difficult circumstances, such as 
having been a victim of domestic violence while themarriage or registered partnership was 
subsisting”. In both cases (death of the Union citizen ex art. 12 or divorce, separation or 
termination of partnership ex art. 13), third-country national spouses or partners may even 
acquire permanent residence in the host Member State provided that they satisfy the same 
                                                           
331
 European Women’s Lobby, Equal Rights, Equal Voices: Migrant Women in the European Union, 19-21 




requirements imposed by article 7(2) to Union citizens to acquire a right of residence in 
another Member State for more than three months332. 
It appears to be particularly noteworthy that the requirement of a minimum duration of the 
marriage by article 13(2)(a) refers to the initiation of divorce proceedings as the reference 
moment for determining the termination of said marriage – rather than, for instance, an 
eventual interruption of cohabitation or other circumstances. An even more visible protective 
scope characterises article 13(2)(b) and (c) – which establish that regardless of the duration of 
the marriage and partnership, third-country national spouses or partners cannot be expelled 
from the host Member State when they have parental responsibilities or when they are victims 
of domestic violence.  
Moving on to third-country national immigrant women holding residence permits on the 
grounds of family reunification with third-country national family members, Directive 
2003/86 establishes an extremely problematic interdependence between the family member’s 
permit and the sponsor’s permit. Indeed, if article 13(3) provides that “[the] duration of the 
residence permits granted to the family member(s) shall in principle not go beyond the date of 
expiry of the residence permit held by the sponsor”, a ticles 15(1) and 15(4) grant a wide 
discretional power to Member States concerning spoues’ entitlement to an independent 
residence permit. They indeed allow Member States to withhold the granting of independent 
permits for up to five years of residence, and leaving the determination of the conditions for 
the granting and duration of said independent permit entirely to Member States. Moreover, 
the second indent of article 15(1) also provides that “Member States may limit the granting of 
the [independent] residence permit (...) to the spou e or unmarried partner in cases of 
breakdowns of the family relationship”. With respect to the spouse’s possibility to obtain an 
independent permit before the five year-period allowed for by article 15(1), article 15(3) 
envisages a simple faculty for Member States to grant said permit “in the event of 
widowhood, divorce, [or] separation”. Although no clear mention of cases of domestic 
violence is present in the provisions of the Directive, article 15(3) also establishes an 
obligation for Member States to “lay down provisions ensuring the granting of an autonomous 
residence permit in the event of particularly difficult circumstances”. 
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In connection with the heavy dependence between permits allowed for by Directive 
2003/86, it is also important to stress that its article 16 establishes three very problematic 
hypotheses where Member States are allowed to withdraw or refuse to renew spouses’ 
residence permits. The first case is envisaged by article 16(1)(b) and concerns a situation 
“where the sponsor and his/her family member(s) do not or no longer live in a real marital (...) 
relationship”. The second case is described by article 16(1)(c) and occurs when “it is found 
that the sponsor or the unmarried partner is married or is in stable long-term relationship with 
another person”. The third hypothesis subsists, pursuant to article 16(3) “where the sponsor’s 
residence comes to an end and the family member does n t yet enjoy an autonomous right of 
residence under Article 15”. 
 
The mentioned provisions of Directives 2004/38 and 2003/86 have the potential to strongly 
influence immigrant women’s equality within the family. It appears clearly that all of the 
Directives’ provisions concerning the dependence of family members’ permits on conditions 
that the sponsor can satisfy, and in some cases from the unilateral behaviour of the sponsor, 
have a strong link with the possibility for immigrant women to establish equal relationships 
with their spouses or partners. Interestingly, after the adoption of Directive 2003/86 the 
Parliamentary Assembly stressed in Recommendation 1732(2006)333  the importance of 
granting independent permits in the context of family reunification with specific reference to 
the aim of “strengthening protection of the fundamental rights of immigrant women”334. In 
particular, the Assembly encouraged the “granting of an independent legal status to immigrant 
women having joined a principal right-holder, if possible within no more than one year from 
the date of their arrival”335.  
In fact, third-country national spouses seem to be granted with much weaker protections 
against expulsion by Directive 2003/86 than by Direct ve 2004/38. While the latter grants a 
certain level of legal certainty to this category after a determined period of residence and 
relationship with a Union citizen, the same cannot be said for the former source. Directive 
2003/86 indeed leaves a vast discretional power to Member States concerning whether or not 
to grant an independent permit to spouses in events such as widowhood, divorce, or 
separation.  
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Even more problematically from this point of view, third-country national spouses under 
the scope of Directive 2003/86 do not appear to be granted with any kind of right of residence 
in their host State in case of interruption of cohabitation. This type of provision deprives 
spouses of the possibility of leaving the conjugal home – for instance in order to withdraw 
themselves from domestic violence without pressing official charges, but also simply to 
experience a period of separation or to access employ ent elsewhere  – without the fear of 
losing their residence permit and thus risk expulsion. Moreover, it leaves spouses without any 
kind of legal protection in case of abandonment by heir sponsor partner. Lastly, such a lack 
of recognition of an independent right of residence also deprives immigrant women of any 
leverage concerning an eventual decision of their spon or partner to leave the host Member 
State to emigrate elsewhere. If such a decision occurs before the five-year period allowed for 
by Directive 2003/86, immigrant women holding a permit for family reunification will be 
presented with the choice to follow their partners o  lose their residence permit in the host 
Member State. It should be noted that the possibility to impose similar requirements of 
cohabitation is not recognised by Directive 2004/38336.  
The possibility left to Member States to impose prolonged periods of cohabitation allows 
the enforcement of an increasingly dated understanding of spousal relationships and 
household structures337. From such legal requirements a perverse normative effect emerges 
whereby immigrants joining resident spouses in the European space become mere 
commodities of the latter, and are denied with the possibility of developing life plans beyond 
those strictly related to the family realm. Just by way of example, it should be noted that an 
immigrant woman working as a domestic live-in worker, or simply working in a different city 
than her sponsor husband may risk losing her residence permit for her failure to satisfy that 
cohabitation requirement.  
In sum, immigrant women within the scope of Directive 2003/86 appear to be 
disproportionately and negatively affected in their possibility to enjoy equal spousal 
relationship and equality within the family. Under this regime, the possibility for spouses to 
make independent choices concerning their place of work, their housing situation and their 
marital or relationship situation is severely curbed by the negative influence that such 
decisions may have on their residence permit and legal status in the host Member State. 
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Against this background, a key question concerns whether the fundamental right to family life 
established by article 7 of the Charter, read in cojunction with the principles of equality and 
non-discrimination regardless of sex affirmed by this primary source, may prompt a judicial 
correction of the observed gendered shortcomings of European family migration law. At 
present time, the European Court of Justice has yet to tackle the issue of the compatibility of 
the described legally-enforced dependence with the fundamental right to family life 
established by the Charter. While the Court has previously analysed the imposition of 
cohabitation requirements in EU immigration law, it has done so merely through a literal 
interpretation of Regulation 1612/68 and subsequently of Directive 2004/38, without touching 
upon either Union citizens’ or third-country nationals’ fundamental rights and freedoms under 
EU law338. 
However, cues for reflection are offered by the discussed case law of the Court on the 
functional extension to third-country national women of the fundamental rights and freedoms 
recognised to Union citizen children and spouses. The Court’s characterisation of immigrant 
women’s residence rights as merely functional to Union citizens’ exercise of their own rights 
and freedoms, in particular, appears to further reinforce gender inequality within the family. 
In the case law at issue the Court embraced a rhetoric of spousal interdependence which casts 
serious doubts over the possibility of future interpr tations of the fundamental rights 
framework of the Charter in the sense of correcting he gendered shortcomings of legally-
enforced cohabitation allowed for by the discussed norms of EU law. 
Although the dependence reinforced by the Court works both ways, the disparate impact of 
its case law on immigrant women specifically is apprent. On the one hand, by granting 
residence rights to third-country national women only in case their care work was 
indispensable for their Union citizen husbands’ enjoyment of their own fundamental rights, 
the Court implicitly required a certain level of dependence of the former from the latter. This 
was particularly evident in the Dereci judgment. Here, the Court assessed that the involved 
Union citizens were not dependent on their third-country national spouses to such a degree 
that would have forced the former to leave the Union in case of denial of residence rights to 
their latter. Therefore, it concluded that the third-country nationals involved could not enjoy 
family life with their Union citizen spouses in the European territory. The inappropriateness 
of applying the same judicial standards used for the assessment of the degree of dependence 
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between parents and children to spousal relationship i  quite evident. On the other hand, the 
dependence of the spouse performing unpaid care work on that performing productive work 
affirmed in the analysed case law appears much more serious. The dependence of the Union 
citizen spouse on the third-country national one constituted an implicit prerequisite used by 
the Court to assess the indispensable character of he unpaid care work performed by the latter 
for the former’s enjoyment of his fundamental rights and freedoms. This second type of 
dependence, instead, constitutes an effect of the Court’s judicial reasoning and of its granting 
residence rights to third-country national spouses exclusively to the extent that they perform 
unpaid work within the household and that such work allows others to access fundamental 
rights. By establishing childcare and housework as the gateway through which third-country 
national spouses may enjoy family life in the host country, the Court indirectly generates a 
dependence of carers upon the persons they care for. As a result, a reinforcement of the 
traditional gendered division of productive and reproductive work is created, whereby those 
performing unpaid care work (usually women) are encouraged to continue to do so in order to 
keep enjoying residence rights.  
Therefore, it appears clearly that the real dependent subjects emerging from the Court’s 
case law are once again third-country national immigrant women. In relation to cases such as 
Baumbast and Zhu and Chen, it has been rightly noted that “[while] an unpaid carer woman 
may be able to claim EU rights on the basis of her partner’s status as an economic actor, the 
‘parasitic’ nature of these family rights induces dependency within families and places carers 
in a vulnerable position”339.  
 
In this light, the Court’s capability to ensure immigrant women’s enjoyment of equality 
within the family vis-à-vis the legally-enforced dependence envisaged by the current 
European family migration regime appears flimsy at the present time. The negative 
implications for immigrant women’s equality within the family of the principles established 
by this case law were likely to have been unforeseen by the European Court of Justice. 
However, this unawareness is problematic in itself. The purely instrumental way of accessing 
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fundamental rights for third-country national women established by the Court may constitute 
a further source of dependence on Union citizen husbands, because maintaining said rights 
will depend on their persistent adherence to gendered roles and on their “usefulness” or 
“desirability” within the household. Moreover, if being “useful” to someone else’s exercise of 
fundamental freedoms becomes the only or one of the few ways to access fundamental rights 
in Europe for third-country national immigrant women, the disparate impact on immigrant 
women of such a development appears to be self-evident ue to the resulting increased 
commodification of family members in family reunification legal regimes. 
 
3. European Law and Immigrant Women Workers’ Fundamental Rights  
 
In this section, I will focus on a crucial aspect for immigrant women workers, i.e., access to 
employment in conditions of equality and non-discrimination. From the outset, it must be 
noted that the relevant sources of European law in this field form a complex legal framework. 
In addition to European migration law, the European anti-discrimination framework also 
plays an important role in determining the degree to which immigrant women are able to 
enjoy their fundamental rights as workers.  
Thus, in this paragraph I will highlight the most relevant sources of European immigration 
law and European anti-discrimination law for immigrant women’s access to employment in 
conditions of equality and non-discrimination. By doing so, I aim to provide a normative 
background for the gendered analysis that will be carried out in sub-sections a) and b). In 
particular, in subsection a) I will discuss the main shortcomings of these sources from the 
specific point of view of immigrant women workers. In subsection b), given the discussed 
limitations of the fundamental right to engage in work recognised by art. 15 of the Charter, I 
will explore the extent to which the EU anti-discrimination framework has so far responded to 
the complex experiences of disadvantage of immigrant women workers in the European legal 
space, drawing future perspectives for further advancement in this area. In my analysis, I will 
touch upon two main issues, i.e., the interaction between the right to non-discrimination and 
biased immigration policies at the national level, and the application of said right in private 
employment relationships. 
 
From the outset, it must be noted that immigrant women’s access to employment is regulated 
by both EU family migration law and by EU labour migration law. Both of these regimes 




to family members entering the Union for family reunification purposes and to third-country 
nationals migrating to Europe for work reasons. In addition to these two regimes, this section 
will also critically analyse key provisions for immigrant women workers established by the 
EU anti-discrimination regime. 
As to European family migration law, while Directive 2004/38 does not envisage any 
limitation to the spouse’s right to work after being admitted to the Union territory for the 
purpose of family reunification, Directive 2003/86 appears much more restrictive. On the one 
hand, article 23 of Directive 2004/38 grants an unconditional right to work to family members 
of Union citizens within its scope, establishing that “[irrespective] of nationality, the family 
members of a Union citizen who have the right of resid nce or the right of permanent 
residence in a Member State shall be entitled to take up employment or self-employment 
there”. Therefore, regardless of the length covered by their right of residence and of their 
nationality, third-country national immigrant women married or in a registered partnership 
with a Union citizen are granted by the Directive with the right to access employment or self-
employment. Article 14(2) of Directive 2003/86, on the other hand, leaves Member States 
free to determine the conditions under which family members can exercise employed or self-
employed activities. Furthermore, this provision also allows Member States to prevent family 
members (and thus spouses) from performing said actvities for the first year of their stay 
according to “the situation of their labour market”.  
 
Moving on to the European labour migration regime, art. 12 of Directive 2009/50 grants Blue 
Card holders with a right to access Member States’ labour markets. Several limitations are 
however established with respect to this right to wrk. Indeed, for the first two years of 
residence, access to the labour market is exclusively recognised in relation to highly-skilled 
employment, and Blue Card holders are prevented by article 12(2) from changing employers 
without “the prior authorisation in writing of the competent authorities of the Member State of 
residence”. Moreover, after two years of legal employment, article 12(1) leaves the right to 
access the national labour market in conditions of equality with nationals to the host Member 
State’s discretional power. In case the host Member State denies such a right, article 12(2) 
also establishes an obligation for Blue Card holders to communicate any changes affecting the 
initial conditions of their admission to the national authorities. Other allowed restrictions 
concern access to employment entailing the exercise of public authority – ex article 12(3) – as 




Directive 2011/98, on its part, applies to third-country nationals seeking to reside and work 
in a Member State, to those already admitted to a Member State for purposes other than work 
but who are authorised to work and hold a residence permit, and those who have been 
admitted to a Member State for the purpose of work (art. 3). Its art. 11(c) specifies that 
holders of the single residence and work permit must be authorised to “exercise the specific 
employment activity authorised under the (...) permit in accordance with national law”. The 
adopted formulation suggests that Member States shall grant single work and residence 
permits tied to a specific type of employment, and that in order to change employment third-
country nationals may be required to ask for an amend ent of such permits before the 
national authorities.   
In addition to these sources of family and labour migration law, article 14 of Directive 
2003/109 grants third-country nationals holding a long-term residence permit with a right to 
move and reside in other Member States in order to xercise an employed or self-employed 
activity. Art. 14(3), however, establishes the possibility for Member States to limit this right 
by examining “the situation of their labour market and [applying] their national procedures 
regarding the requirement for (...) filling a vacany, or for exercising [self-employed] 
activities”, and also by giving preference to Union citizens or to already resident and 
unemployed third-country nationals “for reasons of labour market policy”. Moreover, art. 
14(4) appears to allow Member States to maintain natio l quotas for the entry of third-
country national workers, by establishing that “Member States may limit the total number of 
persons entitled to be granted right of residence, provided that such limitations are already set 
out for the admission of third-country nationals in the existing legislation at the time of the 
adoption of this Directive”. 
 
One common thread in the examined legal sources of European labour migration law is 
constituted by their recognition to third-country national workers of a right to equal treatment 
with citizen workers. In fact, the vast majority of the rights granted by these sources are not 
established in absolute terms, but rather as a right to equal treatment with the host Member 
State’s nationals in a variety of domains. For insta ce, the Blue Card Directive at art. 14 
provides third-country national workers admitted under its regime with a right to equal 
treatment in the field of employment340. A similar right is also recognised by art. 12 of the 
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Single Permit Directive341, although exclusively to third-country nationals alre dy admitted in 
a Member State, leaving out those applying to reside in a Member State for the purpose of 
work. Interestingly, a right to equal treatment with Member States’ citizens in the field of 
employment is also established beyond EU labour migration law by art. 11 of Directive 
2003/109 (also with specific reference to access to employment) for long-term residents342, 
and implicitly for third-country national family members of Union citizens exercising 
freedom of movement within the Union by article 24 of Directive 2004/38343. 
 
Beyond European immigration law, the principle of equality and non-discrimination in the 
field of employment has been affirmed on a broader level by the European anti-discrimination 
legal framework – including Directive 2000/43 (the so-called Race Discrimination Directive), 
Directive 2000/78 (or Employment Equality Framework Directive) and Directive 2006/54 
(the so-called Recast Directive or Sex Equality Directive). The European anti-discrimination 
regime covers both direct and indirect discrimination. Direct discrimination occurs when one 
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person is treated less favourably than another is, ha  been, or would be treated in a 
comparable situation344. Indirect discrimination, on the other hand, takes place where an 
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a certain group at a 
particular disadvantage compared with other persons, u less the differential treatment is 
objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the mans of achieving that aim are appropriate 
and necessary345. Harassment is also prohibited by this legal framework as a form of 
discrimination when an unwanted conduct related to certain characteristics such as race, 
ethnic origin, sex, and so forth takes place “with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity 
of a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive 
environment”346.  
In relation to access to employment, these legal sources prohibit discrimination on several 
grounds. Article 3(1)(a) of the Directive 2000/43 prohibits race or ethnic discrimination in 
relation to access to employment “including selection criteria and recruitment conditions, 
whatever the branch of activity and at all levels of the professional hierarchy, including 
promotion”. An identical provision is enshrined in article 3(1) of Directive 2000/78 in relation 
to discrimination on the grounds covered by the Direct ve, i.e., religion or belief, disability, 
age or sexual orientation. Even more importantly, Recital 5 of the Preamble of Directive 
2006/54 explicitly recalls articles 21 and 23 of the European Charter, respectively prohibiting 
discrimination on several grounds – including sex – and establishing a fundamental right to 
equality regardless of sex “in all areas, including employment, work and pay”. Furthermore, 
article 14(1)(a) of the Directive prohibits “direct or indirect discrimination on grounds of sex 
in the public or private sectors, including public bodies, in relation to (...) conditions for 
access to employment, to self-employment or to occupation, including selection criteria and 
recruitment conditions, whatever the branch of activity and at all levels of the professional 
hierarchy, including promotion”. 
Interestingly, the anti-discrimination legal framework also includes specific provisions 
designed to support access to justice and redress for victims of discrimination. For instance, 
all of the mentioned sources envisage an obligation for Member States to set up judicial or 
administrative procedures for the enforcement of the Directive. These procedures must be 
available to all individuals claiming to be victims of race discrimination347. Another key 
obligation for Member States relates to ensuring the participation of interested associations or 
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organisations in said procedures, provided that they have a legitimate interest in enforcing the 
Directive and that the complainant approves348. Lastly, this framework importantly establishes 
a reversal of the burden of proof, which will weigh on the respondent in case the alleged 
victims of race discrimination are able to submit “facts from which it may be presumed that 
there has been direct or indirect discrimination”349. 
 
a.  A Gendered Assessment of Key European Union Law Provisions in the Light of 
Immigrant Women’s Fundamental Right to Engage in Work  
 
Assessing the capability of the described legal framework to effectively support immigrant 
women’s access to employment in conditions of equality nd non-discrimination appears 
particularly important in relation to immigrant women’s equality within the family. Indeed, 
being able to contribute to the household income through productive work, and most 
importantly the enjoyment of a certain level of economic independence, can foster more equal 
relationships between immigrant women and their husbands or partners. With that in mind, I 
will now examine more closely the specific shortcomings of this system from the perspective 
of immigrant women’s right to engage in work as also envisaged by article 15 of the Charter. 
 
As I have shown, the European family migration regime reveals a strongly differentiated 
protection of immigrant women’s right to engage in work depending on the nationality of 
their sponsoring family members – with Directive 2004/38 establishing much stronger 
guarantees in comparison to Directive 2003/86. In this light, the limitations to access the 
labour market allowed for by Directive 2003/86 are t high risk of generating perverse effects 
on third-country national family migrants, forcing them into the role of mere commodities of 
the sponsor, rather than recognising their quality of individuals with their own life plans and 
aspirations beyond the family realm350. The disparate impact on immigrant women of these 
limitations, therefore, further reinforces the effects of both Directives’ imposition of income 
requirements for the purpose of family reunification exclusively to the sponsor351, discussed 
in relation to immigrant women’s right to family life. Arguably, the exclusive focus on the 
capability of the sponsor to support the entire family and the discussed limitations to family 
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members’ access to the host country’s labour market rev al the adoption of a one breadwinner 
model which further reinforces the commodification of reunited family members – and thus at 
present time of third-country national immigrant women. Indeed, a lack of consideration of 
family members’ (and spouses’ in particular) capabilities to contribute to their own support 
makes them passive followers of the sponsor, confined to the private realm of reproductive 
work and not primarily interested in productive work. As a consequence of these legislative 
choices, “the right to family (re)unification is primarily construed as a right to 
reproduction”352.  
The only positive legal provisions in this respect seem to be provided by Directive 
2003/109 and Directive 2003/86. The first source envisages the possibility for the Member 
State in which the long-term residents exercise their fr edom of movement to consider not 
only their own resources for the purpose of authorising family members to accompany or join 
them in their territory, but also the family members’ own possibilities of supporting 
themselves. Article 16(1)(a) of Directive 2003/86establishes that if at time of renewal of the 
residence permit for family reunification the sponsr no longer satisfies the income 
requirements ex art. 7(1)(c), “the Member State shall take into account the contributions of 
the family members to the household income”. By doing so, these provisions implicitly 
recognise that spouses too can contribute to their own maintenance and to the support of their 
families through productive, not only reproductive, work – a contribution that, in the case of 
art. 16 of Directive 2003/86, Member States are obliged to consider where the sponsor no 
longer satisfies income requirements by himself or herself.  
Another crucial aspect to consider in this context concerns the possibility to sponsor family 
reunification of ascendants which – considering immgrant women’s disproportionate 
difficulties in reconciling work and family life due to the absence of kin networks353– is an 
important factor in enabling them to access the host c untry’s labour market. In this area, 
article 4(2)(a) of Directive 2003/86 merely allows Member States to authorise reunification of 
“first-degree relatives in the direct ascending line of the sponsor or his or her spouse”, without 
establishing any obligation in this sense, and only “where they are dependent on [the sponsor 
or his or her spouse] and do not enjoy proper family support in the country of origin”. As a 
result, Directive 2003/86 appears somewhat limited in that it only allows for the reunification 
of ascendants when they would constitute an additional care burden rather than an active 
contribution to the family management.  









Moving on to European labour migration law, it must be noted that the most obvious 
gendered shortcoming of this legal framework with respect to immigrant women’s 
fundamental right to work (and thus to access employment) has been eliminated by Directive 
2011/98. Before its adoption, the European legal frmework on labour migration mostly 
appeared to be designed to accommodate labour market demands, attracting “desirable” third-
country nationals by regulating access to the European Union for the purpose of pursuing 
specific professions. Legal scholars thus pointed out how the “economic attractiveness” of 
third-country national migrants was among the actors shaping “a hierarchy of legal residents 
within the EU”354.  
While legitimate, this type of approach was quite problematic from a gendered point of 
view. Due to the abovementioned disproportionate difficulties experienced by immigrant 
women to enter the Union for labour purposes under highly skilled or temporary work 
schemes, it appeared that the “economically attractive” hird-country national worker was 
clearly male. As a result, immigrant women experienced disproportionate difficulties in 
obtaining work permits and thus legal access to the European labour market355. What is more, 
the fact that basically all legal sources on labour migration linked access to the fundamental 
right to work with minimum income requirements constituted a further source of indirect 
discrimination for immigrant women. On a broader level, it has rightly been observed that 
such an emphasis on income requirements generated a process whereby, while Union 
citizenship is increasingly becoming a source of fundamental rights and is moving away from 
a market citizenship model, this model is being brought back for third-country nationals356. 
Arguably, immigrant women are particularly disadvantaged by this phenomenon, considering 
their lower rates of participation in the host country’s labour market as well as the stark pay 
gap experienced by this category357. As a result, “[the] same factors that make TCN migrant 
women the obvious ‘solution’ to the care crisis now – they are cheap and flexible, prepared to 
work irregular hours with low pay, especially if they are in a precarious legal situation – make 
it unlikely that they would get Council sanctions as ‘TCN market citizens’”358.  
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The adoption of Directive 2011/98 clearly changed the described focus on specific, male-
dominated professions that characterised the European legal framework on labour migration 
up to that point. The possibility for third-country nationals to emigrate to the Union territory 
for the purpose of performing any type of employment – at least from a legal point of view – 
is certainly a significant development for immigrant women workers. Notwithstanding this 
important development, specific problems persist for immigrant women’s access to 
employment. For instance, the adherence by the BlueCard Directive to purely economic 
thresholds, used to qualify a worker as highly skilled, still specifically curbs women’s 
possibilities to access the European labour market under this label359. In this respect, it had 
been rightly observed that a stronger gender sensitivity of the Directive’s provisions may have 
been reached through the inclusion of human capital elements such as education among the 
factors of assessment of the highly skilled quality of workers360. This normative choice would 
permit the inclusion of severely undervalued professions where immigrant women 
disproportionately concentrate under the definition of highly skilled employment on which 
the Directive rests. For instance, by considering the high social and economic value of 
professional childcare or elderly care, it would have been possible to include immigrant 
domestic workers within its scope. By doing so, not only might domestic workers have been 
able to access key rights in the field of employment, but the more favourable norms of the 
Directive would have been applicable to a sector of the labour market characterised by 
particularly low legal protections. 
 
Moving on to the European anti-discrimination regime, it must be noted that access to 
employment in conditions of non-discrimination is disproportionately important for 
immigrant women due to the numerous grounds of discrimination on which such access may 
be prevented. Just like national women workers, immigrant women may suffer from sex 
discrimination in their efforts to access the host country’s labour market. But as immigrant 
workers, immigrant women are also exposed to discriminatory treatment in the field of 
employment on the grounds of ethnic origin, race, natio ality, migrant status, and so on. 
These grounds, moreover, may also combine and generat  multiple or intersectional 
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discrimination against immigrant women workers361. In the light of immigrant women’s 
fundamental right to engage in work as enshrined uner article 15(1) of the Charter in 
conjunction with the principles of equality and non-discrimination established therein, the EU 
anti-discrimination regime presents crucial shortcomings.  
Firstly, this regime focuses on single-ground discrimination rather than tackling multiple 
discriminations. While both Directive 2000/43 and Directive 2000/78 show awareness of the 
problem362, it has been rightly noted that “the term ‘multiple discrimination’ does not appear 
anywhere else in either of these Directives and no efinition is given nor any indication as to 
how to deal with cases of multiple discrimination”363. Moreover, the obligation of Member 
States’ to report on the gendered impact of the Directives’ provisions has not been fully 
implemented364. 
Secondly, while Directive 2006/54 importantly covers equal treatment between men and 
women in the field of employment, Directive 2000/78 tackles discrimination grounds which 
are not – with the important exception of religion r belief – among those most commonly 
experienced by immigrant women workers. A recent survey conducted in Europe among 
ethnic minorities and immigrant groups has indeed shown that the most common grounds of 
discrimination reported by immigrant women are immigrant origin, religion or belief and 
gender365. On the other hand, discrimination on grounds of disability, age and sexual 
orientation – while extremely serious and deserving of legislative attention – are statistically 
far less relevant for immigrant women. Thus, the most important aspect covered by the 
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Directive for our purposes is constituted by discrimination at the workplace on the grounds of 
religion or belief. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, the European anti-discrimination regime does not cover 
nationality discrimination. Article 3(2) of the Race Discrimination Directive and article 3(2) 
of the Employment Equality Framework Directive explicitly exclude differential treatment on 
the grounds of nationality from their scope of application. In particular, these Directives are 
without prejudice of all provisions “relating to the entry into and residence of third-country 
nationals” in Member States as well as “any treatment which arises from the legal status of 
the third-country nationals (...) concerned”. It is worth recalling that while discrimination on 
grounds of nationality is, as interestingly noted elsewhere, “the most important prohibited 
discrimination ground in EU law generally”366, such a ground has been consistently excluded 
from relevant sources of EU discrimination law applicable to third-country nationals367. For 
immigrant women specifically, nationality is one of the grounds of discrimination that–either 
alone or combined with sex, race, and migrant statu – significantly contributes to the 
difficulties experienced by this category in accessing their host countries’ labour market. In 
this matter, however, article 15 of the Charter may not constitute an effective ground to 
correct the observed shortcoming. As stressed above, article 15 merely establishes third-
country nationals’ right to equivalent working conditions with those of Union citizens, 
implicitly admitting the possibility of differential treatment on the grounds of nationality as to 
the right to engage in work established by its paragraph 1. 
 
In this paragraph, I have highlighted the main gendere  shortcomings of two main legal 
frameworks applicable to immigrant women workers, i.e., EU immigration law (including EU 
labour migration law as well as specific norms of EU family migration law concerning access 
to employment) and the EU anti-discrimination regime. At this point, considering the lack of 
availability of judgments by the European Court of Justice discussing the observed 
shortcomings in the light of the fundamental right to engage in work enshrined by the Charter, 
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I will now proceed to enquire into the Court’s interpretation of the European anti-
discrimination framework to cases of specific relevance for immigrant women workers’ 
access to employment in conditions of equality and non-discrimination. 
 
b. Access to Employment in Conditions of Non-Discrimination Before the European 
Court of Justice: Some Reflections on Selected Judgments 
 
As a preliminary observation, it must be noted thate European Court of Justice’s case law 
on the specific issue of employment discrimination as a breach of the right to work enshrined 
in article 15(1) of the Charter is still under construction368. What is more, the Court’s 
judgments so far have focused on a marginal ground f discrimination for immigrant women 
workers in the European legal space, i.e., age discrimination. It is certainly noteworthy that in 
these judgments the Court specifically established t at the prohibition of discrimination (in 
the contingent case on the grounds of age) envisaged by Directive 2000/78 “must be read in 
the light of the right to engage in work recognised in Article 15(1) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union”369.  
With that in mind, I will now turn to discuss judicial examples provided by the European 
Court of Justice that in my view offer interesting i sights about the capability of the EU anti-
discrimination framework to effectively capture and correct the complex experiences of 
discrimination of immigrant women workers, and its shortcomings in this area. The Jany 
case370offers a telling illustration of how examining national immigration policies through the 
lens of the right to equal treatment may expose their gender bias. The judgments of Firma 
Feryn and Meister constitute interesting judicial examples of the horiz ntal effects of the 
fundamental right to equality and non-discrimination (the latter with specific reference to 
immigrant women workers). Thus, in this section I will critically analyse these judgments, 
highlighting their specific significance for immigrant women workers. 
 
The Jany judgment concerned Polish and Czech women (still third-country nationals at the 
time) who had been denied by the Dutch authorities residence permits for the purpose of 
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working as self-employed sex workers in the Netherlands. The applicants were covered by 
Association Agreements between their states of origin and the European Community, which 
extended the fundamental freedom of establishment for the purpose of pursuing a self-
employed activity enjoyed by citizens of Member States to Polish and Czech nationals 
respectively371. However, the national authorities rejected their application on the grounds 
that “prostitution [was] a prohibited activity or at least not a socially acceptable form of work 
and [could not] be regarded as being either a regular job or a profession”372. Consequently, 
the European Court of Justice was asked by the national court to determine – among other 
questions – whether prostitution could be excluded from self-employed activities covered by 
the scope of the Association Agreements. In this context, the referring court submitted the 
illegal nature of prostitution and referred to “reasons of public morality” as well as to the fact 
that it would have been “difficult to control whethr persons pursuing that activity are able to 
act freely and are therefore not, in reality, parties to disguised employment relationships”373. 
Among the various aspects touched upon by the Court, two points are particularly 
significant. Both concern the justifications submitted by the national authorities in support of 
their interpretation of association agreements, which resulted in a limitation of the applicant 
women’s freedom of establishment and thus of their access to the national labour market. This 
analysis, in my view, offers an important example of fruitful interaction between fundamental 
rights and freedoms on the one hand and restrictive interpretations of legal norms on the 
other. Indeed it was precisely this interaction that indirectly exposed and trumped a 
discriminatory treatment in the field of access to employment. As for the justification based 
on the alleged immorality of the activity pursued by the immigrant women involved, the 
Court rightly observed that Member States could legitimately limit freedom of establishment 
for reasons of public policy and it was not for Community law to impose moral standards and 
common values as to what infringes public policy. However, the Court also established that 
the national authorities could not restrict foreigners’ right to enter, reside and work on their 
territory on grounds of public policy where they “[do] not adopt, with respect to the same 
conduct on the part of its own nationals, repressive measures or other genuine and effective 
measures intended to combat such conduct”374 . Consequently, since prostitution was 
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considered a legal activity in the Netherlands for citizens, the immigrant women involved had 
to be admitted to the national territory in order to pursue the same activity. Moreover, the 
Court also discussed the referring court’s argumentation whereby a risk of abuse of freedom 
of establishment by Polish and Czech nationals subsi ted because of the difficulty in 
ascertaining that foreign prostitutes were actually pursuing a self-employed activity rather 
than dependent employment from a pimp. Interestingly, the Court contrasted similar 
stereotypical assumptions by observing, among other facts, that the Dutch authorities “had not 
(...) provided support for the presumption that a person engaged in prostitution whose 
personal and working freedom is restricted by her pimp – a situation which is covered, where 
appropriate, by the criminal law of the host Member State – is to be treated as a person in an 
employment relationship”375. In any case, the difficulty to carry out checks in this area could 
not justify the assumption whereby “all activity of that kind implies that the person concerned 
is in a disguised employment relationship and consequently to reject an application for 
establishment solely on the ground that the planned activity is generally exercised in an 
employed capacity”376. Such an approach, in the Court’s view, “would put an economic 
activity entirely beyond the freedom of establishment arrangements introduced by the 
Association Agreements”377 at issue. 
In sum, the described analysis of the Court of natio l immigration policies in the light of 
the fundamental freedom to establishment for the purpose of work supported the involved 
immigrant women’s access to self-employed activities in conditions of equality and non-
discrimination with Dutch workers. From a gendered point of view, two main points can be 
raised. Firstly, I would argue that while this was not the focus of the Court in the Jany case, 
the analysis of the national authorities’ decision in the light of the fundamental right to equal 
treatment regardless of nationality revealed the gender bias implied in the refusal of a 
residence permit to the involved third-country national women. Even more notably, the 
heavily gendered subtexts underlying the national authorities’ justification for such a rejection 
were effectively trumped by the Court of Justice. Scondly, the Jany judgment suggests the 
difficulty of isolating one ground of discrimination from others, especially when immigrant 
women are involved. In this case, indeed, it appears that while the most visible issue 
concerned nationality-based discrimination, the grounds of sex were also very much present 
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in the national authorities’ justifications for their restrictive attitudes. This is especially 
noticeable in the referring court’s references to public morality as a possible reason to deny 
prostitution the status of self-employed activity. Furthermore, the fact that prostitution was 
indeed a legal activity in the Netherlands suggests the presence of migrant status as an 
implied component of the nationality discrimination identified by the Court of Justice.  
 
Moving on to the Firma Feryn378 and Meister379 judgments, in these cases the Court of Justice 
analysed the horizontal effects of the European anti-discrimination regime, providing 
important clarifications in this field. For our purposes, the application of the fundamental 
right to equal treatment and non-discrimination in employment relationships between private 
individuals is a particularly interesting matter. On a broader level, it must be stressed that 
many of the observed difficulties disproportionately affecting immigrant women workers in 
the European legal space generate vulnerability and power imbalances in their relationships 
with employers380. Therefore, the enforcement of their rights in horiz ntal relationships and 
not merely in immigrant workers’ relations with the ost State is in general particularly 
important for immigrant women. With specific respect to the right to non-discrimination, it 
can be observed that the labour market segregation experienced by immigrant women in 
Europe demands a special attention to their effectiv  enjoyment of said right. Their 
disproportionate concentration in certain sectors of the European labour market, indeed, often 
fosters a depersonalization of immigrant women workers caused by the identification of this 
group with their profession on the grounds of sex, migrant status, ethnicity, and nationality381. 
Arguably, such an identification is extremely problematic in that it may constitute both the 
source and the consequence of multiple and intersectional discrimination. In the light of these 
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observations, I will now turn to the Firma Feryn and Meister judgments in order to examine 
critically the principles established by the Court of Justice on the important matter of 
discrimination in relation to access to employment of immigrants in general and immigrant 
women in particular.  
 
In the case of Firma Feryn, the Belgian Centre for Equal Opportunities and Combating 
Racism argued that one of the directors of a company selling and installing doors had applied 
a discriminatory recruitment policy. In particular, the Centre highlighted that the director had 
publicly declared that he would not employ “immigrants” in his company “because its 
customers were reluctant to give them access to their private residences for the period of the 
works”382. The Labour Court of Brussels – to which the Centre had appealed after its 
application had been dismissed on the grounds that there was no proof that an actual person 
had applied and been rejected for a job due to ethnic origin – referred the issue to the ECJ. In 
relation to the scope of Directive 2000/43, the Court of Justice held that “the fact that an 
employer declares publicly that it will not recruit employees of a certain ethnic or racial 
origin, something which is clearly likely to strongly dissuade certain candidates from 
submitting their candidature and, accordingly, to hinder their access to the labour market, 
constitutes direct discrimination in respect of recruitment within the meaning of Directive 
2000/43”383– regardless of the presence of a specific complainant claiming to be the victim of 
a similar discrimination.  
The most interesting point of this case concerns the fact that, as emerged from the Opinion 
of Advocate General Maduro, the director of the company had originally declared that he 
would not employ “Moroccans” rather than immigrants384. The lack of clarity as to whether 
the employer was actually against the employment of persons of immigrant origin, of a 
certain ethnic group or of a certain nationality did not however prevent the Court from 
identifying a form of discrimination prohibited by the Race Discrimination Directive. In this 
respect, it has been importantly argued that in the Firma Feryn case the European Court of 
Justice established the presence of direct race disrimination thanks to its implicit recognition 
of the links between national origin and ethnic origin385. In fact, similarly to what I observed 
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with respect to the Jany judgment, it appears that this case presented a more complex situation 
of discrimination than that simply based on ethnic origin. Indeed, the employer’s 
discriminatory attitude was implicitly based not simply on ethnic origin but also on migrant 
status and possibly on sex386.Against this background, I would argue that the Court’s 
qualification of the employer’s declarations against “immigrants” and “Moroccans” as a form 
of race discrimination is particularly significant. In this case, discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality was also quite evident. The Court, however, chose to overlook the problem of the 
distinction between these two grounds and identified the presence of discrimination on the 
grounds of race and ethnic origin. In my view, by doing so the Court offered an important 
ground to counter the problematic effects of the commented exclusion of nationality from the 
EU anti-discrimination regime and from the scope of the right to engage in work pursuant art. 
15(1) of the Charter. By unveiling that a differential treatment on the grounds of nationality 
may be strictly linked to a prohibited discrimination on the grounds of race or ethnic origin, 
the principles established in the judgment at issue may support a broadening of the scope of 
the right to employment to include situations of “hidden” nationality discrimination387.  
 
In the Meister judgment issues of multiple discrimination were also raised by the applicant – a 
third-country national woman pursuing employment in Germany. In this case, the Court was 
presented with the case of a Russian national (Ms Meister) holding a degree in systems 
engineering who had repeatedly applied for a post advertised by the company Speech Design 
and had always been rejected without explanation. Ms Meister held before the German 
Labour Court that her level of expertise matched that referred to by the job advertisement, and 
“considered that she suffered less favourable treatm n  than another person in a comparable 
situation, on the grounds of her sex, age and ethnic origin”388. Before the same Court, she also 
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sought “the production of the file for the person who was engaged, which would enable her to 
prove that she [was] more qualified than that person”389.  
The main shortcoming of the applicant’s argumentation, however, was that different to the 
case of Firma Feryn the prospective employer had not enounced the reasons for Ms. 
Meister’s rejected application and refused to do so. Therefore, Ms. Meister could only 
speculate about the discriminatory nature of the rejection. As a result, the Court of Justice was 
prevented from examining the applicant’s claim of multiple discrimination on merit. On the 
one hand, the Court established that it is for the all ged victims of discrimination to submit 
facts from which such discrimination may be presumed in order to obtain a reversal of the 
burden of proof – pursuant art. 8(1) of Directive 2000/43, art.10(1) of Directive 2000/78 and 
art.19(1) of Directive 2006/54390. On the other hand, the Court showed awareness of the fact 
that Ms. Meister was prevented from acquiring the necessary proof due to the company’s 
refusal to disclose the reason for its rejection. Therefore, it conceded that “in the context of 
establishing the facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect 
discrimination, it must be ensured that a refusal of disclosure by the defendant is not liable to 
compromise the achievement of the objectives pursued by Directives 2000/43, 2000/78 and 
2000/54”391.  
Consequently, the Court concluded that the Directivs at issue do not entitle workers “who 
[claim] plausibly that [they] meet the requirements listed in a job advertisement and whose 
application was rejected to have access to information indicating whether the employer 
engaged another applicant at the end of the recruitment process”392. Nevertheless, the Court 
also left to the discretion of the referring court to determine whether the company’s refusal to 
grant access to information should be “one of the factors to take into account in the context of 
establishing facts from which it may be presumed that t ere has been direct or indirect 
discrimination”393. In sum, I would argue that the Meister judgment stemmed from an 
appropriate balancing between the necessity to respect EU non-discrimination law as well as 
its rules concerning the reversal of the burden of pr of, and the need to ensure that potentially 
discriminating employers do not take advantage of such rules by de facto preventing 
individuals from collecting the necessary proof.  
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The examined judgments prompt three general observations on the Court’s attitude towards 
the issue of discrimination in relation to access to employment. Firstly, in the Jany case I 
highlighted how the right to equal treatment with national workers sheds light on the severely 
discriminatory subtexts of the national authorities’ justifications in denying them with a 
residence permit. Interestingly, the moral nature of such justifications revealed not only sexist 
attitudes towards foreign prostitutes but also discriminatory stances towards the applicants on 
the grounds of their being foreigners and immigrants.  
This point recalls a second key observation that can be drawn from the examined 
judgments. In all three, multiple or intersectional discrimination could be observed. In the 
cases of Jany and Meister, in particular, the applicants were third-country national women 
who had been subjected to differential treatment on the grounds of sex, immigrant status, age, 
ethnic origin and nationality. The Court of Justice, however, did not delve into the merit of 
this specific issue. For this reason, the case of Janyhas been criticised by scholars who have 
noted how, in addition to considering the nationality angle, the Court may have missed an 
opportunity to analyse the intersecting discrimination ground of sex394. Similarly, the lost 
multiple discrimination dimension in the case of Firma Feryn has been pointed out by those 
who have observed how a gendered dimension may havebeen observable in the race 
discrimination performed by the prospective employer “[if] the assumption was that those at 
home during the daytime would be largely ethnic majority females and that they would be 
frightened by having an ethnic minority male around”395. A close observation of the future 
developments of the European Court of Justice’s case l w on this matter is nonetheless 
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demanded. In particular, the open and non-exhaustive list of grounds of discrimination 
included in article 21 of the Charter may foster an organic and intersectional reading of the 
different sources available under EU secondary law so as to cover multiple discrimination 
more effectively, expanding the protections available to immigrant women workers under 
European law. 
Lastly, the clarifications offered by the Court of Justice in the Firma Feryn and Meister 
judgments concerning the horizontal effects of the right to non-discrimination as specified in 
the EU anti-discrimination legal framework appear specifically significant for immigrant 
women. I have indeed stressed the importance of enfrci g fundamental rights of workers and 
particularly the fundamental right to access employment in conditions of non-discrimination 
for immigrant women, due to the fact that this category disproportionately encounters sources 
of vulnerability and subordination in their employment relationships. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
The norms of European law examined in this chapter have revealed several gendered 
shortcomings with respect to immigrant women’s family life and employment. The two 
realms, however, revealed to be affected by different types of issues. Regarding family life, 
many of the highlighted limitations of European immigration law are not imputable to directly 
problematic norms established by these sources. Rather, they stem from what I would qualify 
as an excessive discretional power left to Member States in crucial aspects of immigrant 
women’s lives in the European legal space. I have str s ed, for instance, how allowing 
Member States to impose purely economic prerequisites as a gateway to sponsor family 
reunification – on the grounds of an unviable breadwinner model –produced a disparate 
impact on immigrant women’s access to their right to family life. 
In relation to the field of employment, on the other hand, I have shown how the most 
problematic aspect of EU law applicable to immigrant women workers relates to the difficulty 
of this legal framework to effectively capture the complex experiences of discrimination 
affecting this category. This relates not only to the lack of a thorough normative consideration 
of multiple or intersectional discrimination in the stablishment of Member States’ 
obligations in this field, but also to a partial coverage by the relevant legal sources of 





Against this background, the aim of this chapter was to explore the possible role of EU 
fundamental rights law in correcting the observed gndered shortcomings. In order to do so, I 
turned to the European Court of Justice’s case law,focusing on specific judgments that I 
believe to offer important clues in this respect. A first general observation that can be made 
concerns the fact that only some of the problematic aspects of EU law were actually addressed 
by the Court, especially from the specific point of view of European fundamental rights law. 
However, it must be noted that the Court’s judicial experience with respect to the enforcement 
of fundamental rights is much more recent than thatof the Strasbourg Court. Therefore, the 
fact that judicial examples of interpretations of European immigration law (and of national 
provisions implementing it) are still quite sparse cannot be imputed to a supposed weakness 
of EU fundamental rights in comparison to European human rights law, but rather to the 
relatively recent adoption of the European Charter and to its even more recent acquisition of 
binding force. Increasingly, the European Court of Justice is incorporating fundamental rights 
in its judicial interpretation and there are many reasons to believe that this system’s influence 
will grow in the near future. 
As to the specific influence of EU fundamental rights law on gendered shortcomings of 
secondary norms of EU law applicable to immigrant women, my analysis of selected 
judgments by the Court of Justice produced mixed results. In the field of family life, the 
breadwinner model embraced by the discussed norms on family reunification was actually 
reinforced by the Court on the grounds of fundamental rights and freedoms recognised by EU 
primary law. The case law on carers’ enjoyment of family life on the territory of the Union 
might appear a positive development in this sense, because of its recognition of residence 
rights to third-country nationals on the grounds of unpaid care work, rather than on purely 
financial grounds. In other words, these judgments appeared to develop an alternative route of 
access to the enjoyment of family life that was not linked to purely financial requirements. 
 However, a closer look has revealed how the Court f Justice ultimately reinforced a rigid 
distinction between productive and reproductive work by granting carers with residence rights 
that were strictly functional to the exercise of Union citizen’s fundamental rights and 
freedoms, rather than justified by carers’ own fundamental rights. The breadwinner model 
currently inherent in EU family migration norms was thus not undermined but actually 
reinforced by the Court of Justice. In this sense, th  question of the potential of fundamental 
rights to expose and reverse the disparate impact of the discussed norms remains unanswered. 
As I have stressed above, the route currently followed by the Court of Justice not only 




immigrant women, but also leaves out third-country national women whose spouses or 
children are not Union citizens. The submission of judicial claims of violation of the 
fundamental right to family life in conjunction with the right to non-discrimination pursuant 
arts. 7 and 21 of the Charter may constitute an effective alternative strategy for exposing the 
disparate impact of the breadwinner model underlying the discussed norms. Admittedly, in 
Parliament v. Council396 the Court of Justice has not appeared responsive to the claim that 
European Union law may violate fundamental rights by leaving Member States with the 
possibility to implement its norms in ways that are contrary to the Charter. Nonetheless, I 
argue that efforts to overturn this position should be made in order to bring the Court’s 
attention to the negative effects on immigrant women of EU family migration norms that do 
overlook their specific difficulties. By doing so, it will be possible to highlight how the very 
level of discretion left to Member States in crucial areas for this category translates into 
severe barriers to the possibility to enjoy the rights recognised in these sources at all. As AG 
Kokott observed in her Opinion on Parliament v. Council, the “ambiguity on account of the 
failure to take account of hardship situations increases the risk that human rights will be 
infringed”397. 
 
Moving to the employment domain, I have observed how art. 15 of the Charter may be of 
limited help for immigrant women workers, in particular with reference to their possibility to 
access employment in conditions of equality and non-discrimination with Union citizens. The 
Court of Justice, on its part, did not offer any judicial examples of application of this article to 
immigrant women workers’ access to employment or enjoyment of non-discrimination in the 
workplace. I therefore turned my attention to the existing protections against discrimination as 
envisaged by secondary EU law. The judicial examples of interpretation of relevant sources in 
this area offered by the Court of Justice revealed both strengths and weaknesses of this 
system. On the one hand, the Jany case398 provided a good illustration of how the principle of 
non-discrimination can be interpreted to reveal gendered subtexts underlying national 
immigration policies. On the other hand, the examined judicial examples on the horizontal 
effects of the EU anti-discrimination regime confirm the importance of considering multiple 
and intersectional discrimination in this realm. At least with respect to working conditions, 
arts. 15 and 21 of the Charter may have a role to play in this, provided that the latter may be 
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reasonably interpreted as also prohibiting indirect discrimination and effectively used as a 
ground to tackle multiple and intersectional discrimination in the workplace. In this respect, 
although it did not concern employment discrimination, the B.S. v. Spain399 judgment by the 
European Court of Human Rights may constitute a useful r ference for the Court of Justice, 
since here the right to non-discrimination enshrined in art. 14 of the European Convention on 
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The Italian Case:  
Immigrant Women in Italy  





The Italian case study reproduces the situation of immigrant women in the European legal 
space in multiple respects. While the female component of immigration fluxes to Italy is very 
varied in terms of national, religious, social and cultural background, immigrant women in 
Italy as a group reflect many of the problems I have outlined in the general introduction as 
common issues that disproportionately affect third-country national migrant women in 
comparison to male migrants on the one hand and female and male Italian citizens on the 
other. 
Until 1991, foreigners residing in Italy never amounted to more than 1% of the total 
population. Italy was mainly a country of emigration f r the century following the Unification 
of Italy in 1861 – with more than 30 million Italians emigrating abroad400. Since the 1990s, 
however, Italy has increasingly become a country of immigration, with almost two million 
third-country nationals residing on the national terri ory in 2011 – among which Moroccans 
are the most present community, followed by Albanians, Chinese, Ukrainians, Filipinos, 
Moldavians, Peruvians and Tunisians401. The female component of such migration fluxes is 
very significant. In 2010, over half of the foreigners residing in Italy were women (51.8%)402. 
 
Italian law touches upon relevant aspects of immigrant women’s family life and employment 
not only in its immigration regime but also in its anti-discrimination legislation. The relevant 
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aspects of these different regimes are not scattered in different sources, but for the most part 
they are gathered in the so-called Testo Unico Immigrazione (from now on, T.U.)403. This law 
does not simply constitute the main text of reference of Italian immigration law but it also 
encompasses relevant norms in the field of employment, family life and non-discrimination. 
In addition to the T.U., several legislative or regulatory sources contribu e to forming the 
relevant regime for immigrant women.  
From the outset, it is important to highlight that the T.U. touches upon third-country 
nationals’ fundamental rights in its article 2, entitled “rights and obligations of foreigners”. 
On the one hand, article 2(1) establishes that “foreigners at any title present on Italian 
frontiers or territory are recognised with the fundamental rights of the human person 
envisaged by domestic law, international conventions in force and general principles of law 
recognised by civilised nations”. Art. 2(2), on the other hand, establishes that regularly 
staying foreigners “enjoy civil rights recognised to I alian citizens, except when international 
conventions enforced by Italy and this Testo Unico state otherwise”. Moreover, in relation to 
workers, art. 2(3) recalls the ILO Convention n. 143 of 1975404 and guarantees to all foreign 
workers regularly residing on the national territory and to their families “equal treatment and 
full equality of rights with respect to Italian workers”. 
Title II of the T.U. establishes norms on the entry, residence and expulsion of 
“foreigners”405 from the national territory. The Italian immigration regime is based on a wide 
range of residence permit types depending on the reason of entry and residence on the 
national territory (family reasons, employment, self-employment, seasonal work, study, 
asylum or subsidiary protection, medical reasons, ad so forth). In addition to the norms of 
the T.U., the conditions for renewing and converting residence permits (including the 
possibility of third-country national workers to change employer or type of employment) are 
regulated by Presidential Decrees n. 394 of 1999406 and n. 334 of 2004407. 
                                                           
403
 Decreto Legislativo no. 286 of 25 July 1998, or Testo Unico delle Disposizioni Concernenti la Disciplina 
dell’Immigrazione e Norme sulla Condizione dello Straniero, G.U. no. 191 of 18 August 1998, S.O. 
404
 Convention Concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and 
Treatment of Migrant Workers, adopted on 24 June 1975 and entered into force on 9 December 1978. Italy 
ratified this Convention with Law n. 158 of 10 April 1981 (G.U. no. 116 of 29 April 1981). 
405
 To clarify, the expression “foreigners” used by the T.U. refers to third-country national or stateless migrants. 
Pursuant art. 1(2), the T.U. does not apply to Union citizens in Italy unless it establishes more favourable norms 
than those of the legislation normally applicable to them. For the purpose of this chapter, I will use the terms 
“foreigners” or “immigrants” to refer to third-country nationals entering and residing in Italy.  
All quotations from the Testo Unico and other Italian provisions of law in this chapter, except when stated 
otherwise, are my own translations from the Italian. 
406
 Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica no. 394 of 31 August 1999, G.U. no. 258 of 3 November 1999, S.O. 
407




In the field of family migration, Title IV of the T.U. is devoted to “the right to family unity 
and the protection of minors”. Its main focus is onproviding rules on the issuing, 
maintenance and loss of residence permits for family reasons. For immigrant women entering 
Italy through family migration, the key legislation is provided by article 30 of the T.U., which 
grants residence permits “for family reasons” to foreigners pursuing family reunification, or 
accompanying family members who enter the national territory (let. a), as well as on grounds 
of marriage with an Italian or Union citizen or with a regularly staying foreigner (let. b), and 
to regularly staying family members of Italian or Union citizens or of regularly staying 
foreigners when they satisfy the requisites for family reunification (let. c).  
Beyond the T.U., immigrant women pursuing family reunification with Italian or European 
family members benefit from a more favourable regulation under d.lgs. 30/2007408 enforcing 
Directive 2004/38 in the Italian order. Interestingly, art. 23 of d.lgs. 30/2007 extended the 
more favourable provisions of Directive 2004/38 to purely internal situations concerning non-
Italian family members of Italian citizens. Therefore, while the Directive only includes within 
its scope Union citizens moving and residing on the territory of a Member State different than 
their own, d.lgs. 30/2007 also applies to Italian citizens living in Italy and sponsoring 
reunification with a non-Italian family member (including third-country nationals). 
In the field of employment, under the T.U. residence permits may be released for the 
purpose of employment, self-employment, seasonal work, and “pending employment”. The 
latter type of permit is granted in case of redundancy or unemployment provided that 
immigrant workers enrol in jobseekers’ lists pursuant rt. 22(11). Other permits envisaged by 
the T.U. have been introduced to receive Directive 2003/109 and Directive 2009/50 in the 
Italian order. In particular, art. 9 of the T.U. provides foreigners with the possibility of 
obtaining long-term residence permits of unlimited duration under the conditions of having 
held a residence permit for at least five years as well as of satisfying income and housing 
requirements. Art. 27-quater, on its part, regulates foreigners’ access to the EU Blue Card for 
highly qualified workers. Against this background, art. 2 and art. 29 of the T.U. provide that 
every year the Italian Prime Minister releases a programme establishing a maximum number 
of quotas of foreigners to admit for the following year for the purpose of employment or self-
employment. Visas and residence permits issued for that year must respect this threshold, 
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although further decrees on quotas may be issued during the year. These quotas do not apply 
to highly qualified workers pursuing Blue Cards. 
Italian law appears to pay a special attention to third-country national domestic workers. 
For instance, this category is included – together with other professions of particular interest 
from a gendered point of view such as entertainers and professional nurses – by art. 27 of the 
T.U. among those workers who can enter Italy beyond the annual quotas established by the 
Government. In other words, these categories of workers may enter Italy in an indeterminate 
number, also beyond the thresholds established for other third-country national workers409. 
Furthermore, in order to encourage third-country natio l domestic workers to move away 
from informal work, law n. 102 of 1999410 established a special regularisation procedure 
which both Italian and foreign employers residing in Italy can follow. Considering that 
irregularly employing third-country nationals in any sector is a crime punished by art. 22(12) 
of the T.U. with detention from six months to three years and with fines of 5,000 Euros per 
employee, this regime offers a more favourable treatm nt for employers who report 
themselves to the authorities by only imposing a lump-sum payment of 500 Euros. 
Incidentally, it must be noted that in connection with the protection of all third-country 
national workers from exploitation (which is arguably more likely to occur in informal 
employment), art. 22(12-bis) and art. 22(12-quater) of the T.U. also envisage more severe 
penalties for the irregular employment of third-country national workers if the latter are 
subjected to exploitation while granting them with a special residence permit valid for up to 
one year or for the entire duration of criminal proceedings against their employers.  
 
Moving on to the Italian anti-discrimination regime r levant for third-country national 
women, sex discrimination and limitations to equality are tackled by several sources of law. 
The Testo Unico dictated by legislative decree 151/2001411, for instance, establishes a wide 
range of rights for pregnant workers with the aim of sustaining maternity and paternity. Sex 
equality is also at the core of the so-called “Equal Opportunities Code” (Codice delle Pari 
Opportunità)412, which tackles direct and indirect sex discrimination413 as well as harassment 
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as a form of discrimination. The Code was amended in 2010 by legislative decree n. 5, which 
transposed in the Italian order Directive 2006/54 on equal opportunities in the field of 
employment414. 
Both sources, however, appear to set aside (for better or worse) domestic workers as a 
specific category. On the one hand, the T sto Unico on maternity and paternity includes 
domestic workers in a separate section dedicated to specific professions, recognising them in 
this context with a right to maternity and paternity leave under article 63. Moreover, it is 
extremely significant that article 74 on the right to maternity cheques expressly excludes from 
its scope of applications third-country nationals who do not hold a long-term resident permit. 
On the other hand, article 35 of the Equal Opportunities Code – establishing a prohibition of 
dismissal for reasons connected to marriage –explicitly excludes domestic workers from its 
scope of application415. 
As for race discrimination, legislative decree n. 216 of 2003416 received Directive 2000/43 
in the Italian order, reproducing the norms and definitions of the Directive. Interestingly, the 
T.U. also contains anti-discrimination provisions with reference to race and ethnic origin. In 
particular, article 43 prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnic origin, national 
origin or religion, specifying this principle in several areas such as employment, exercise of 
economic activities and interaction with public authorities. In addition to this, article 44 
envisages a specific civil action to counter discrimination on the mentioned grounds.  
 
Despite the fact that immigrant women constitute a significant portion of the total number of 
foreigners residing in Italy – the Testo Unico Immigrazione xplicitly mentions them only in 
two instances, and exclusively in relation to pregnancy and early maternity. In particular, art. 
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19(1)(d) of the T.U. establishes a prohibition to expel immigrant women during pregnancy 
and the first six months after giving birth, while art. 35(3)(a) grants irregularly staying women 
with a right to receive social protection during pregnancy and maternity in conditions of 
equality with Italian citizens. In addition to this, it appears that the recent introduction of a 
special permit for victims of domestic violence in art. 18-bis also implicitly aims at protecting 
immigrant women’s rights to physical and psychological ntegrity.  
Beyond this normative focus on the protection of immigrant women during critical 
situations, the Italian T.U. is characterised by a lack of provisions taking into account 
immigrant women’s specific needs in the fields of family life and employment. Nevertheless, 
immigrant women in Italy have been identified as a category at higher risk of social 
exclusion417. Multiple discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, culture, religion, or 
age has been pointed out as one of the main causes of this phenomenon418. Research 
conducted in the highly industrialised region of Lombardy, for instance, has unveiled how 
third-country national women workers experience strong precariousness and lack of upwards 
mobility due to some employers’ discriminatory attitudes419. Such discrimination on the 
intersecting grounds of sexism and racism can severely affect immigrant women’s freedom in 
determining their reproductive choices due to the fear of jeopardising their employment 
relationships420. On a broader level, immigrant women have been idetifi d by the CEDAW 
Shadow Report on Italy as suffering from multiple discrimination on grounds of gender, 
ethnic origin and age which affect their family relationships as well as the relations with their 
communities of origin421. Immigrant women in domestic work, in particular, e affected by 
specific kinds of discrimination that foster their vulnerability and deeply affect their access to 
employment as well as their employment conditions422. As a result of their disproportionate 
vulnerability to multiple discrimination, immigrant women are affected by “ethnic penalties” 
and a consequently heavier social disqualification than their male counterparts423 . 
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Interestingly, it has been highlighted that even those groups of immigrant women 
characterised by high employment rates in the Italian abour market, such as Asian women, 
are at high risk of achieving lower social positions due to such ethnic penalties424. Even 
achieving higher education does not support immigrant women’s access to higher social 
positions in the Italian context, but rather furthe ighlights their penalisation425. This is for 
instance the case of Filipino women, who despite their igh education rates disproportionately 
concentrate in the domestic work sector. 
More strictly in relation with the field of employment, immigrant women’s situation on the 
Italian labour market mirrors the broader European co text as to the over-qualification, de-
skilling, and high concentration in low paid, unregulated and unprotected sectors 
disproportionately affecting this category of workers 426 . The general participation of 
immigrant women in the Italian labour market is lower than that of Italian women as well as 
their male counterparts. Some exceptions are represnt d by specific national groups such as 
those from China or the Philippines who have higher activity rates than Italian women, while 
immigrant women from Northern Africa and Central Southern Asia experience more 
difficulties in this respect427. Employment rates of immigrant women and their gap in 
comparison to female citizens’ employment also vary depending on regional areas, since in 
Northern Italian regions employment rates of immigrant women are substantially lower than 
those of Italian women, while in the South of Italy (characterised by high female 
unemployment) immigrant women are actually employed more than their Italian 
counterparts428. The distribution of immigrant women in the Italian labour market is also very 
much linked to ethnic origin and gender. Immigrant workers in general concentrate in the 
tertiary sector and in agricultural activities; and within national groups mainly employed in 
domestic services, immigrant women constitute around 70% of the total429.  
In the field of family, it has been shown that having children and being in a couple 
constitutes the main obstacle for immigrant women’s participation in the Italian labour 
market. This confirms the presence of “a breadwinner model assigning the production of 
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secondary income to women, as a integration to the primary income produced by men”430. 
Immigrant women experience severe difficulties in reconciling work and family life due to 
the absence of kin networks in their host country and to the low accessibility or actual lack of 
childcare services in Italy431. Moreover, it has been noted that migrant women ru a 
disproportionate risk of suffering from violence and harassment in both the family and the 
employment realm, due to their economic dependence from spouses in the context of family 
reunification and from employers in the context of d mestic work in particular432. Immigrant 
women experience inequality within the family very commonly in Italy, both because they 
carry disproportionate care burdens and because of cultural reasons433. 
 
The Italian context does not simply epitomise the gneral factual difficulties 
disproportionately experienced by immigrant women in the broader European legal space. 
More importantly, indeed, Italian law also presents several critical features that can 
significantly aggravate these factual disadvantages. S veral norms of the T.U. – despite their 
apparent gender-neutral character – are likely in my view to negatively and disproportionately 
affect immigrant women’s enjoyment of their rights in relation to family life and employment. 
This disparate impact can either stem from structural limitations of national norms 
themselves, which may fail to consider these specific needs, or by biased interpretations of 
such norms by the authorities in charge of their imple entation. Notably, these problems 
affect not only general legislation (such as the Italian family reunification regime or the legal 
framework on labour migration), but also specific norms that are supposedly established for 
immigrant women’s protection (such as for instance th rules on special permits for 
pregnancy and early maternity). On the other hand,  multi-level system of fundamental rights 
protection resulting from both supranational and natio l sources is currently in force in the 
Italian order. Some of the fundamental rights established by this system appear to bear a 
particular potential to produce a significant impact on immigrant women’s lives in Italy. 
 
In the light of these observations, in this chapter I will analyse the interaction between Italian 
norms applicable to immigrant women and the multi-leve  system of fundamental rights law 
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in force in this country. The aim of this analysis is to enquire into whether and in what ways 
this interaction was actually fruitful for immigrant women in Italy, and to look at possible 
ways to enhance its impact in this area in positive ways. In order to do so, I will firstly 
provide an overview of Italian fundamental rights law, focusing not only on the Italian 
Constitution434 but also on the reception of supranational sources of human and fundamental 
rights law in the domestic order. Secondly, I will critically discuss specific provisions of 
Italian law that are, in my view, particularly problematic for this category, first in the field of 
family life and then in field of employment. For both realms, I will follow the two-step 
approach applied in the previous chapter. A first step, therefore, will consist in an assessment 
of the gendered shortcomings of the Italian immigrat on regime– or of other Italian laws 
applicable to immigrant women – in the light of this category’s fundamental right to family 
life and employment as recognised by the multi-level system of protection in force in the 
Italian order. In a second step, I will focus on the potential of these fundamental rights to 
unveil and correct the observed shortcomings. 
 
1. Fundamental Rights in the Italian Legal System 
 
The Italian Constitution establishes a broad and diverse range of fundamental rights in the 
fields of family and employment. On a general level, article 2 of the Constitution provides 
that “[the] Republic recognises and guarantees the inviolable rights of the person, as an 
individual and in the social groups within which human personality is developed”, requiring 
“that the fundamental duties of political, economic and social solidarity be fulfilled”435. In 
connection to this, article 3 establishes that “allcitizens have equal social dignity and are 
equal before the law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, 
personal and social conditions”, envisaging a duty of the Italian State “to remove the 
economic and social obstacles which by limiting the fre dom and equality of citizens, prevent 
the full development of the human person and the effective participation of all workers in the 
political, economic and social organisation of the country”.  
This first bundle of constitutional provisions grants a fundamental right to equal treatment 
and non-discrimination not only to Italian citizens, but to all individuals present on the 
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national territory. While article 2 is universal incharacter, embodying the fundamental 
principle whereby the human being is at the heart of the legal system436, the explicit reference 
to “citizens” by article 3 may support a restrictive interpretation whereby the principle of 
equality established by this provision may not apply to foreigners. However, an organic 
reading of this principle in the context of the entire Constitution – and especially in 
conjunction with the expression “inviolable rights of the person” adopted by art. 2 – has 
allowed the Constitutional Court to clarify that “while it is true that article 3 expressly refers 
exclusively to citizens, it is equally certain that the principle of equality also applies to 
foreigners” when the respect of their “inviolable rights of the person” is involved437. Thus, 
foreigners also enjoy the right to equality and non-discrimination in relation to all those rights 
that are recognised to them simply by virtue of their quality of human beings, rather than as 
citizens.  
The combination of the principles established by articles 2 and 3 of the Italian Constitution 
may also be specifically important for immigrant women victims of multiple discrimination. 
It has been rightly noted438 in this respect that, just like the European Convention on Human 
Rights – and I would add just like the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
– the Italian Constitution envisages an open list of p ssible discrimination grounds. This 
factor arguably increases the capability of the Italian Constitutional system to effectively 
tackle multiple discrimination, also on grounds not explicitly mentioned by anti-
discrimination law439. 
 
As to the fundamental rights in the field of family, article 29 of the Constitution provides that 
“[the] Republic recognises the rights of the family as a natural society founded on marriage”. 
Very importantly, this articles moves on to clarify that “marriage is based on the moral and 
legal equality of the spouses [emphasis added] within the limits laid down by law to guarantee 
the unity of the family”. The fundamental rights protected by the Italian Constitution in the 
field of family therefore also encompass a fundamental right to equality within the family and 
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in spousal relationships. In relation to parenting, article 30 of the Constitution defines the 
support, raising, and education of children as both a duty and a right of parents. In connection 
to this, article 31(1) and (2) respectively provide that “the Republic shall encourage family 
formation and the fulfilment of related duties, with special regard to large families, through 
economic measures and other benefits” as well as tht “ e Republic shall protect mothers, 
children and the young by adopting the necessary measur s”.  
The affirmation of the principle of equality between men and women within the family in 
the Italian constitutional order played a crucial role for Italian women themselves, because it 
supported the bypassing of patriarchal notions underlying the socio-cultural but also 
normative view of the family sanctioned by the Italian legal order440. This principle inspired 
landmark judgments by the Constitutional Court aimed at ensuring equality between men and 
women in family matters441. For instance, the Court declared that the punishment by Italian 
criminal law of adultery exclusively when committed by the wife clashed with the principle of 
equality within the family enshrined in art. 29 of the Constitution. Indeed, by enforcing a 
different treatment between husband and wife which was “not only useless but also harmful to 
family unity”, the law at issue put the wife “in an i ferior position, infringing her dignity and 
forcing her to endure infidelity and offence, without any protection under criminal law”, 
granting “a privilege to the husband [which], like all privileges, violates the principle of 
equality”442. Similarly, in the field of citizenship, the Constitu ional Court detected a contrast 
with the constitutional principle of equality (as etablished on a broad level by art. 3 and 
specifically in the field of family by art. 29 of the Constitution) in the law concerning 
acquisition and loss of citizenship443. The Court, in particular, censured the automatic loss of 
Italian citizenship for women who marry foreigners and acquire the latter’s nationality444. In 
this respect, the Court significantly observed that this norm “[established] an extremely 
serious inequality between spouses from a moral, legal and political point of view and puts 
women in a state of clear inferiority, automatically depriving them of the rights attached to 
Italian citizenship merely because of their marriage”445. The support provided by article 29 to 
a gender-sensitive judicial analysis aimed at unveiling and neutralising legal factors of 
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subordination which breach women’s dignity within the family suggests that, at least in 
principle, this constitutional provision may represent an important reference for immigrant 
women in Italy.  
 
Moving on to the field of employment, article 4 of the Italian Constitution establishes a 
fundamental right to work with exclusive reference to “citizens”. On the other hand, article 35 
envisages a general obligation of the State to “protect work in all its forms and practices”. The 
following paragraphs of this article specify this obligation in the sense of providing 
professional or vocational training and “advancement for workers” – art. 35(2) - and of 
promoting and encouraging international agreements a d organisations aiming to establish 
and regulate labour rights – art. 35(3). In addition t  these broader State obligations, specific 
fundamental rights are recognised by article 38(2) –which states that “[workers] have the right 
to be assured adequate means for their subsistence needs in the case of accident, illness, 
disability, old age and involuntary unemployment”446 , and article 40–grounding a 
fundamental right to “industrial action” to be exercised in compliance with the law. 
Articles 36 and 37, on their part, have been pointed out as adopting “a language full of 
gender stereotypes”447. Admittedly, while article 36 refers to lavoratori, i.e., male workers, 
article 37 is devoted to the donna lavoratrice, i.e., the female worker, in an apparent division 
of the rights of male and female workers. Article 36, in particular, grants a fundamental right 
to “a remuneration commensurate to the quantity and quality of their work and in all cases to 
an adequate remuneration ensuring [workers] and their families a free and dignified 
existence”. Art. 36(2) also states that maximum daily working hours must be established by 
law, while art. 36(3) provides workers with a fundamental right to weekly rest and paid 
annual holidays. Article 37(1), on the other hand, establishes that “working women have the 
same rights [of men workers, ed.] and are entitled to equal pay for equal work”, and that 
“working conditions must allow women to fulfil their essential role in the family and to 
ensure specific appropriate protection for the mother and child”. However, as suggested by a 
closer look to the rights established by articles 36 and 37, its provisions are actually “norms of 
anti-discriminatory guarantee and not norms prescribing family roles”448. This interpretation 
was also confirmed by the Constitutional Court in the context of a judgment extending access 
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to childcare-related leave to male workers449. Here, the Court observed an increasing tendency 
at the normative level to “modify the functions of men and women within the family, also 
with the aim of allowing a different balance between the latter’s role of mothers and their 
extra-domestic work”450 and that the norms at issue “[impeded] the fulfilling of childcare 
duties which are assigned to the equal responsibility of parents by art. 30, paragraph 
1” 451.Lastly, art. 41(2) of the Constitution appears of relevance in relation to immigrant 
women’s right to be free from labour exploitation. This provision, indeed, establishes that 
economic initiative in the private sector “cannot be conducted in conflict with social 
usefulness or in such a manner that could damage safety, liberty and human dignity”. 
 
In addition to the Constitution, another important source of fundamental rights is provided by 
customary and conventional international law instruments received in the Italian order. The 
Italian Constitution regulates the process of adaptation of domestic law to customary and 
conventional international law (including human and fundamental rights sources) respectively 
at article 10(1) and article 117.  
Article 10(1) states that “[the] Italian legal system conforms to the generally recognised 
rules of international law”, envisaging a process whereby international customary law 
automatically applies in the domestic order without f rther legislation of reception452. 
Because of the automatic character of this reception, article 10 has been defined as a 
“permanent transformer” (trasformatore permanente) of customary international law into 
domestic law453.The constitutional provision at issue also means that he entire Italian legal 
system, including the Constitution itself, is subordinated to customary international law. 
Consequently, not only will every domestic norm be constitutionally illegitimate if it contrasts 
with customary international law, but the latter will also prevail on constitutional provisions 
themselves. The only exception to this rule concerns the core values underlying the Italian 
Constitution, which will prevail on contrasting norms of customary international law454.  
As to conventional international law, normally its reception in the Italian order occurs 
through an “order of execution” (ordine di esecuzione), i.e., through a specific law in which 
the State expresses its willingness to have a certain treaty or convention applied in the 
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domestic order, reproducing its text without any changes455. Because this order is normally 
established as an ordinary law, the common understanding as to the binding force and rank of 
international conventional law in the Italian order was that this source had the same force as 
ordinary law and could not therefore prevail on constitutional law. However, important 
changes in this respect were brought by Constitutional Law n. 3 of 2001, which modified 
article 117 of the Constitution. Art. 117(1) now states that “legislative powers shall be vested 
in the State and the Regions in compliance with the Constitution and with the constraints 
deriving from EU legislation and international obligations [emphasis added]”. This provision 
has indeed established the prevalence of international bligations, including those deriving 
from treaties, on ordinary law456, with the consequence that any ordinary law clashing with 
international treaties ratified by Italy will be constitutionally illegitimate and may be annulled 
by the Constitutional Court. Interestingly, this interpretation had already been advanced by 
the Constitutional Court with specific reference to treaties on the treatment of foreigners457. 
Article 10(2) of the Constitution, indeed, establishe  that “[the] legal status of foreigners shall 
be regulated by law in conformity with international provisions and treaties”. In addition to 
providing conventional sources on the specific matter of foreigners with a constitutional rank, 
article 10(2) significantly establishes that the situation of foreigners may not be regulated 
through administrative acts but rather through law – and that this matter may not be left to the 
discretion of administrative powers458.  
Among the international human rights law conventions a d treaties ratified by Italy, those 
most relevant for immigrant women’s right to family ife and to employment are the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination459 (under 
which Italy has also recognised the competence of the related Committee on individual claims 
against its authorities), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – and its first 
Optional Protocol460 granting the Human Rights Committee with competence on individual 
complaints – as well as the International Covenant o  Economic, Social and Cultural 
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Rights461 (but not its Optional Protocol assigning competence on individual complaints to the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights462). Furthermore, Italy has also ratified 
the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women463 and its 
Optional Protocol464, consenting to be subjected to the CEDAW Committee’s scrutiny on 
grounds of individual communications and to its enquiries into serious and systematic 
violations of women’s rights eventually occurring on the national territory. Another key 
source for immigrant women, which has been recently ratified by Italy, is the 2011 ILO 
Domestic Workers Convention465. Italy is also a State Party to the European Social Ch rter, 
the European Convention on Human Rights and of course of all the EU Treaties – including 
the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. In relation to the specific matter of violence 
against women, Italy was the fifth country to ratify the Istanbul Convention on Violence 
Against Women466 (after Albania, Portugal, Turkey and Montenegro). As with the vast 
majority of states of immigration, this country is not on the other hand a signatory of the 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families467. 
 
In time, the Constitutional Court has established important principles in relation to both the 
status of international treaties in the Italian domestic order and most importantly the 
relationship between the European Convention on Human Rights and the Constitutions as 
sources of fundamental rights protection, starting from its “twin” judgments no. 348 and 349 
of 2007468. As to international treaties in general (and therefore also international human 
rights treaties ratified by Italy), the Court assessed that article 117(1) of the Constitution has 
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not granted these sources with a constitutional rank in the Italian domestic order. While the 
legislator is under an obligation to respect their provisions and that in case of contrast 
between an ordinary norm and said international treaties the former will be declared 
constitutionally illegitimate, the Court also qualified international treaties recalled by article 
117 as “interposed norms, (...) themselves subjected (...) to a compatibility control with the 
provisions of the Constitution”469. As to the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
Constitutional Court stressed its peculiar position in comparison to other international treaties, 
consisting in its being “more than a simple sum of rights and mutual obligations for States 
Parties” and in its establishment of “a uniform system of fundamental rights protection”470. 
Such a peculiarity, and the consequent existence of a judicial organ in charge of the 
interpretation and implementation of the Convention such as the European Court of Human 
Rights, has also prompted the Constitutional Court to clarify its own role in respect to the 
Convention’s norms. In particular, the Court has identified its task not only in the assessment 
of the compatibility of ordinary norms with the ECHR, and thus with article 117(1) of the 
Constitution, but also, in case of incompatibility, in “ascertaining whether the Convention’s 
norms themselves, as interpreted by the Strasbourg Court – guarantee a level of protection of 
fundamental rights at least equivalent to that of the Italian Constitution”471. The ultimate aim 
of this scrutiny is to verify the compatibility of specific provisions of the Convention with 
related constitutional norms, realising “a correct balance between the need to guarantee the 
respect of international obligations mandated by the Constitution and that of avoiding that this 
may entail a breach of the Constitution itself”472. 
The “twin” judgments, however, have not definitively clarified the relationship between 
supranational human rights norms established by the ECHR and those enshrined in the Italian 
Constitutional Court. A central problem, for example, concerns the possibility for the 
Constitutional Court to rely on the Strasbourg Court’s interpretation of certain provisions of 
the Convention even when this interpretation has been carried out in the context of judgments 
involving States other than Italy. While the Constitutional Court appears to have given a 
positive answer to this question,473 this solution has been criticised on the grounds of the 
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observation that it ultimately grants a general, erga omnes effect to supranational judgments 
intended to produce effects only between the involved parties474.  
 
As to the reception of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the Italian 
domestic order, article 11 and the abovementioned article 117(1) of the Constitution 
constitute key references. On the one hand, art. 11 establishes that “Italy agrees, on conditions 
of equality with other States, to the limitations of s vereignty that may be necessary to a 
world order ensuring peace and justice among the Nations, [and] promotes and encourages 
international organisations furthering such ends”. Art 11, indeed, functioned as a legitimising 
clause of Italy’s accession to the European Union, and of the consequent limitations of 
sovereignty implied in it475. 
On the other hand, art. 117 also refers to constraits deriving from EU legislation and 
therefore may also ground questions of constitutional legitimacy that use the Charter as an 
interposed norm. Although to this day that Constitutional Court has yet to examine a claim of 
this sort, it has been rightly argued476 that the Court will likely reinstate in this area the 
principle already established in respect to the European Convention on Human Rights, 
whereby the constitutionally mandated respect of Italy’s international obligations may not 
entail a weaker protection of fundamental rights in comparison to that afforded by the 
Constitution. Furthermore, it is also very significant that in cases where the application of EU 
law was not at issue, the Constitutional Court has referred to the Charter – together with other 
international human rights treaties ratified by Italy, including the ECHR – as an interpretative 
aid with the aim to determine the existence of fundamental rights not explicitly envisaged by 
the Constitution which may nonetheless be included within the scope of its article 2477. 
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2. Immigrant Women’s Fundamental Right to Family Life:  Problematic Provisions 
of Italian Law  
 
Having outlined the regulatory regime applicable to immigrant women in Italy and the Italian 
fundamental rights framework, I will now turn to examine the interaction between these two 
systems in relevant cases concerning immigrant women’s family life. In order to do so, in 
each section I will analyse more closely specific aspects of Italian law which 
disproportionately and negatively affect immigrant women’s enjoyment of family life, and I 
will then turn to discuss relevant judgments by Italian courts in order to understand whether 
and to what extent the fundamental rights framework enforced in the domestic order has been 
able to correct such shortcomings.  
This type of analysis will be conducted with respect to three main topics: possibility to 
sponsor of family reunification, access to residence rights on the grounds of pregnancy and 
early maternity as well as protection against domestic violence. The first and the third matter 
have been chosen because of the availability of significant examples of worthy judicial 
reasoning by Italian courts on the effects of national norms on immigrant women specifically 
in the light of their fundamental rights. Access to residence rights during pregnancy and 
maternity has been selected because at least two ineresting judgments by the Constitutional 
Court have discussed the scope and limitations of this right in the light of constitutional 
principles, with meaningful results. 
 
It must be noted at the outset that the vast majority f the normative problems that will be 
highlighted in this section can be connected to the wide discretional power left by European 
Union law to Member States in the field of immigration. The majority of the problematic 
provisions of domestic law that will be critically analysed in this section, indeed, have been 
adopted in order to receive EU immigration law. In chapter 2, I criticised the wide margin of 
appreciation left to Member States in particularly crucial fields for immigrant women. I 
observed how by failing to provide minimum standards in these sensitive areas, EU law 
allowed for the adoption of national immigration regimes producing a disparate impact on 
immigrant women’s rights in the field of family life and employment. In this section, I will 
also discuss some tangible examples from Italian law that have in fact realised such a risk. On 
the other hand, I will question whether the Italian system of fundamental rights has been able 




consistent way than what has so far been realised by the European Court of Justice’s 
jurisprudence. 
 
a. Access to Family Reunification Versus Income Requirements Imposed by Italian 
Law in the Light of Migrant Women’s Constitutional Rights  
 
Art. 29 of the T.U. regulates access to family reunification for third-country nationals. 
According to its paragraph 1, family members admitted o reunification include the “spouse 
not legally separated and above the age of eighteen”, as well as minor unmarried children 
even if only of the spouse and if born out of wedlock (provided that the other parent 
consents), adult dependent children who are completely unable of providing for themselves 
for health reasons and dependent parents who don’t have other children in the country of 
origin or are over the age of sixty-five whose other children are incapable of supporting them 
due to serious health reasons. As for the requisites imposed by this norm, art. 29(3) requires 
that the sponsor shows availability of housing in compliance with “health and sanitary 
requisites” as well as certified living suitability, of healthcare insurance in case of 
reunification with parents over sixty-five and most importantly of a “minimum yearly income 
deriving from legal sources and not inferior to theyearly amount of the welfare cheque plus 
half of this sum for each family member for which reunification is pursued”. Income 
requirements are raised to double of the welfare cheque when family reunification is pursued 
for two or more children below the age of fourteen or for two or more family members 
entitled to subsidiary protection.  
I have repeatedly stressed how for immigrant women pursuing to sponsor family 
reunification income requirements may be disproportionately difficult to satisfy due to several 
factors including lower pay, low labour market participation, their concentration in the worst 
sectors of the labour market, and so. In the Italian context, it is particularly interesting to 
focus on the specific problem of the possibility for immigrant women to access family 
reunification – and thus to their fundamental right to family life – on the grounds of care and 
reproductive work rather than productive work. In this respect, a first hint of the openness of 
the Italian system to this possibility is provided by art. 29(3)(b) of the T.U., which clarified 
that “for the purpose of determining income the total yearly income of the family members 
living together with the person applying for family reunification must also be taken into 
consideration”. This provision is particularly important for immigrant women, who are more 




family and who may therefore disproportionately benefit from norms allowing them to 
sponsor family reunification by relying on the total income of their families. While this 
provision suggests that the Italian rules on family reunification –at least in relation to income 
requirements – may live up to immigrant women’s fundamental right to family life as 
enshrined in the Italian Constitution, one may argue that it would be far-fetched to affirm on 
this sole basis that the Italian fundamental rights framework demands to take immigrant 
women’s reproductive or care work into consideration as a ground to sponsor family 
reunification. In particular, the norm at issue may also be interpreted as requiring sponsors to 
perform paid employment in any case, and as including the income of other family members 
in a merely cumulative sense. If that is the case, the capability of art.29(3)(b) to ensure access 
to family reunification for sponsors devoted entirely to reproductive and care work would be 
severely undermined. 
 
A crucial response to these doubts has been provided by Italian Courts, which have 
established extremely important principles in this field with specific respect to unemployed 
third-country national immigrant women pursuing to sponsor family reunification with their 
children. Two main cases are particularly significant for the purposes of this section. 
Firstly, in 1995 the Italian Constitutional Court478 was submitted with the case of a 
Brazilian woman whose application for family reunification with her son had been rejected on 
the grounds of the fact that, “being a homemaker, she did not carry out any employed 
activity”479. The applicable norms at the time indeed granted th  right to family reunification 
to “third-country national workers”. Interestingly, the Constitutional Court assessed that the 
correct interpretation of this norm necessarily hadto go beyond the literal text and consider 
the right to family reunification as also attributed to homemakers. Two main constitutional 
rights demanded so.  
On the one hand, the Court considered that despite the fact that the norms at issue were 
aimed at protecting third-country national workers, the specific provision on family 
reunification had “an autonomous relevance” because “it [protected] rights such as those of 
the family and particularly of minors – which are guaranteed by the Constitution and 
recognised by multiple international sources (first of all by the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights)”480. Therefore, this norm protected “a need – that of a family living together – 
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which has its roots in the constitutional norms which ensure protection to the family and in 
particular, in its context, to minor children”481. The fundamental right to family life as 
emerging from articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution had to be recognised to third-country 
nationals too, because “the right and the duty to raise and educate one’s children, and thus of 
living with them, and the right of parents and children to a common life based on family unity 
are (...) fundamental rights of the human being”482. While these rights could be balanced with 
other constitutional values, this balance was already realised by imposing the prerequisite of 
being able to support one’s family members when pursuing family reunification with them. 
Thus, the Court assessed that the fundamental right to family life as emerging from articles 29 
and 30 of the Constitution demanded an interpretation of the norm at issue as ensuring access 
to family reunification as sponsors not only to workers but also to “those who carry out 
domestic work”483.  
On the other hand, and even more significantly, the Court was not content with identifying 
the constitutional right to family life as a ground for the described interpretation of the norm 
at issue. Despite the fact that this aspect had not been raised by the referring court, the Court 
included article 35 of the Constitution in the fundamental rights demanding the inclusion of 
homemakers in the possibility to sponsor family reunification. In this respect, the Court noted 
that the state obligation to “protect work in all its forms and practices” established by article 
35 did not merely refer to productive work but also included unpaid reproductive and care 
work within the family. Indeed, “also the work performed within the family, due to its social 
and economic value, can be included, notwithstanding its peculiarities, under the protection of 
article 35 of the Constitution to all forms of work”, because “it is a kind of working activity 
which has already been recognised as of social and economic value, also because of the 
undeniable benefits which the entire community draws from it and at the same time of the 
burdens and responsibilities which derive from it and which even at present time almost 
exclusively weigh on women (also due to widespread phenomena of unemployment)”484. On 
the grounds of this evaluation of reproductive and care work as actual work, the Court 
concluded that “the importance of working activities within the family must generate the 
consequence that this activity is assimilated to forms of employment which the law at issue 
requires to access family reunification”485 and therefore the applicant woman had to be 














considered as a worker entitled to the right to family reunification with their children. The 
judgment at issue is extremely significant not only for its accurate characterisation of unpaid 
care and reproductive work as “proper work” but also and especially for its analysis of a 
biased norm of family migration law in the light ofthe fundamental rights to family life and 
to employment. By imposing an interpretation of this norm on the grounds of constitutional 
rights protecting not only family life and minors but also employment, the Court was able to 
address a perverse gendered effect of a provision of national immigration law and correct it.  
 
The importance of this judgment is not undermined by the fact that it concerned a legislation 
no longer in force. After the Testo Unico currently in force had already been adopted, a more 
recent decision by the Bologna Court486 indeed used this judgment as a reference to assess a 
similar case concerning a third-country national woman whose application for family 
reunification had been rejected on the grounds that s e had no income. As observed by the 
Court, the applicant in this case was herself residing in Italy together with her son and his 
family on the grounds of a residence permit for family reunification, which allowed her to 
work. However, she had chosen to “contribute within t e family, where young children are 
present, [which] had allowed her to integrate more in her new environment while maintaining 
her traditional role”487 . On the specific grounds of the principles established by the 
Constitutional Court almost ten years earlier, the Bologna Court observed that “it was 
unreasonable [for the authorities] to choose restrictive interpretations which contrast with 
constitutional principles”, that said principles “arguably include both the protection of family 
unity (arts. 29 and 30 of the Constitution) and the protection of women’s work within the 
family pursuant article 35 of the Constitution” and that “it would appear to be constitutionally 
illegitimate to allow family reunification with children to the foreign woman who works 
outside of the home and to deny it to the foreign woman who carries out her homemaker 
activity, with the logistic and material support of entire families”488. On these grounds, the 
Court annulled the rejection of the mother’s application for family reunification with her son 
declaring it illegitimate489. 
                                                           
486






 Incidentally, the same principles explored in this section have even more recently inspired judgments by the 
Consiglio di Stato upholding immigrant women’s oppositions against the rejection of their citizenship 
applications on grounds of lack of independent income
489
. In these judgments the Consiglio condemned the 





In the examined judicial examples, immigrant women’s fundamental rights as recognised by 
the Italian order played an extremely powerful and positive role in ensuring their access to 
family reunification in conditions of equality not only with men but also with working 
women. Indeed, the recalled fundamental rights supported a gender-sensitive interpretation of 
legal rules on family reunification less focused onpaid, reproductive work and on an 
underlying breadwinner model, as well as a recognition of the same dignity and value to 
productive and reproductive or care work when materi l support to the family member can be 
ensured in other ways which do not weigh on the natio l finances. Therefore, these 
fundamental-rights based judicial discourses prompted he establishment of extremely 
important guidelines for an interpretation of art. 29(3)(b) of the T.U. as also allowing 
immigrant women performing unpaid care work within the household to sponsor family 
reunification. 
 
b. Protection during Pregnancy and Maternity: Special Permits “for Medical 
Reasons” in the Light of Migrant Women’s Constitutional Right to Family Life 
 
The Italian legal framework applicable to third-country national women grants them with a 
special protection during pregnancy regardless of the regularity of their stay. Article 19(2)(d) 
of the T.U. prohibits the expulsion of “women during pregnancy or in the first six months 
after giving birth”. In connection to this, art. 28(1)(c) of Presidential Decree n. 394 of 1999 
establishes that in this case women will be granted with a special residence permit “for 
medical reasons” (per cure mediche) after they have presented a medical certificate 
confirming their condition. Regardless of whether they hold this permit or not, third-country 
national women are in any case recognised by art. 35(3)(a) of the T.U. with a right to obtain 
urgent or essential healthcare connected with “the social protection of pregnancy and 
maternity”, in conditions of equality of treatment with Italian women. 
The main limitation of this permit lies in its exceptional character. The cited sources do not 
speak of a more or less stable right to stay enshried n a residence permit on the grounds of 
pregnancy and maternity, but rather simply prohibit expulsion of third-country national 
women during pregnancy and the first six months after giving birth. The limited duration of 
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the permit, as well as its characterisation as a permit for “medical care”, casts several doubts 
as to the rights connected to this permit. Important questions concern the extent of the 
protection granted by this permit to third-country national women during pregnancy or after 
giving birth, as well as to which perspectives may open up for holders of this permit beyond 
its temporary validity. Arguably, immigrant women may have very few interests in actively 
pursuing said permits if the only result for them would be a postponement of their expulsion 
as a consequence of self-reporting their irregular st y to the authorities. If that were the case, 
the residence permit “for medical care” would generat  hardly any protective effects for this 
category. 
Against this background, two main issues were faced by Italian courts in the light of 
immigrant women’s fundamental rights. Both concern c ucial aspects of this category’s 
possibility to effectively enjoy residence rights through the special residence permit for 
pregnancy reasons. The first matter relates to the possibility for husbands and partners to also 
obtain these permits, in order to be authorised to reside in Italy together with their wife or 
partner for the duration of her pregnancy and during the early months of maternity. The 
second issue concerns immigrant women’s access to more stable residence permits after the 
expiration of their special permit for pregnancy or maternity, so as to consolidate the 
emergence from their irregular status obtained through the latter.  
 
As to the possibility to extend residence permits for medical care to the holders’ partners, in 
2000, the Constitutional Court first ruled on this matter490, establishing that immigrants’ 
fundamental right to family life demanded the extensio  of the residence permit for medical 
care held by a pregnant Albanian woman to her husband who lived with her in Italy but did 
not hold a residence permit. In order to reach this conclusion, the Court relied on migrants’ 
fundamental right to family unity as enshrined in articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution. In 
particular, it recalled its previous judgment no. 28/1995, whereby the parents’ right to raise 
and educate children and thus to live with them enjoyi g family unity, as fundamental rights 
of every human beings, must also be recognised to foreigners. In addition to the Constitution, 
the Court importantly identified several international human rights sources recognising 
migrants’ fundamental right to family unity. The Court indeed referred to “provisions of 
international treaties ratified by Italy, among which: those enshrined in articles 8 and 12 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (...), article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil 
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and Political Rights of 1966 (...), [and] articles 9 and 10 of the New York Convention of 20 
November 1989 on the Rights of the Child”491. On these grounds, the Court concluded that 
“from the entirety of these norms, despite the variety of their formulation, it emerges a 
principle which is fully recognisable in articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution whereby the 
widest protection and support must be guaranteed to the family”492 and that “this protection 
and support must be granted regardless of whether par nts are citizens or foreigners, because 
they involve fundamental human rights which can only be limited in presence of specific and 
justified needs of protecting the very rules of democratic coexistence”493.  
These state obligations to protect the family, in the Court’s view, clashed with the 
restriction of the granting of residence permits for medical care only to pregnant women or to 
women having just given birth also for specific gend red reasons. Indeed, the Court observed 
that “the norm tragically forces foreign women residing in Italy to choose between following 
expelled husbands abroad and facing childbirth and the first months of their child without 
their husbands’ support”494. Most importantly, the Court observed that the constitutional right 
of parents to raise and educate children does not distinguish between female and male roles 
within the family but is rather based on “a mutual integration between them”. In the light of 
these considerations, the Court declared art. 19(2)(d) of the T.U. in breach of the Constitution 
because it did not extend the prohibition of expulsion to husbands. 
Arguably, the examined judgment constitutes another significant example not only of the 
strength of fundamental rights vis-à-vis restrictive norms of immigration law and of their 
positive impact on immigrants’ enjoyment of family life in the host country, but also of the 
Court’s capability to adopt a gender-sensitive persctive while examining immigration law 
through these fundamental rights standards. It appears very clearly, indeed, that admitting 
husbands to the same residence rights recognised to immigrant women during pregnancy and 
early maternity constitutes an important development for the latter as well. As a result, 
immigrant women are much more likely to enjoy an effective and not illusory protection on 
the grounds of their special permits by not having to suffer enforced ruptures of their family 
unity in order to enjoy residence rights. Moreover, it has been shown that immigrant women 
during pregnancy suffer from significantly higher levels of anxiety than Italian women, 
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especially when they lack the support of social networks and feel that they cannot rely on 
their partners495. 
Furthermore, I would argue that a particularly interesting aspect of this case lies in the fact 
that the reason for the extension of the residence permit at issue to husbands was understood 
by the Constitutional Court itself as demanded by the fundamental principle of equality 
between sexes (recalled by the remitting judge, who also relied on article 3 of the 
Constitution) and of the essential character of the father’s presence during pregnancy and 
early maternity (also discussed in the light of the equal duty and right of both parents to care 
for and raise their children). In sum, it appears from this judgment that an entire system of 
fundamental and human rights pushed towards the change of a norm of national immigration 
law in order to realise a more effective protection of immigrant women during pregnancy and 
early maternity, as well as of their right to equality within the family as to the distribution of 
childcare burdens.  
All of these important developments, however, suffer rom a significant limitation. In 
2006, the Constitutional Court established that theItalian Constitution recognises a 
fundamental right to family unity only on the grounds of marriage. The referring Court in this 
case had requested the Constitutional Court to determin  whether the fundamental right to 
family life also demanded the extension of residence permits for care reasons to unmarried 
partners of third-country national women. In this re pect, the referring court rightly observed 
that the international human rights law sources cited by the Court in its 2000 judgment496 
recognise the fundamental right to family life regardless of whether a family is founded on 
marriage. According to the referring court, art. 19(2)(d) of the T.U., by not extending the 
permit for medical care to unmarried partners, violated article 2 and 30 of the Constitution 
because it prevented “the enjoyment of the fundamental right to raise and educate children, 
even if born out of wedlock”497, as well as articles 31 and 32 of the Constitution – the latter 
because it constrained “the absolute obligation of solidarity connected to the protection of the 
right to health”498. The Constitutional Court, however, rejected this view. It argued that that 
the extension of the suspension of expulsion to husbands “presumes a certainty of family 
relationships that cannot be found (...) in the case of a de facto relationship which, as such, 
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cannot but be affirmed by the involved persons”499 and that “art. 31 of the Constitution is 
aimed at safeguarding the family as a natural society founded on marriage and cannot, 
therefore, be invoked with respect to a situation such as that submitted by the referring 
court”500.  
The limitation provided by the Court in this judgment is in my view regretful. By creating 
a gap between international human rights law and the Italian fundamental rights system in 
relation to the degree of protection ensured to immigrant women’s enjoyment of family unity, 
it interrupted a synergy that had worked very well in its previous judgment of 2000 – both in 
terms of the effective protection ensured and in terms of encouraging a gender-sensitive 
enforcement of national provisions of immigration law. Furthermore, with this judgment the 
Court discouraged the further expansion of the principles established in its 2000 judgment –
which had for instance been carried out in a 2004 judgment by the Turin Court501. In the latter 
case, indeed, the Turin Court had assessed that “a constitutionally oriented reading of article 
19 demands the extension of the prohibition of expulsion is extended to the partner living 
with together with the pregnant woman as if married to her”502 also because the “status of 
parents is exclusively determined by filiation and not by marriage”503. 
 
Moving on to the second issue faced by Italian Courts, this concerned the possibility to 
convert residence permits for medical care into other, more stable, residence permits. In this 
respect, it must be noted that both in judgment 376/2000 and in decision 444/2006 the 
Constitutional Court referred to the suspension of the expulsion underlying the granting of 
this permit as “temporary”. Subsequently, a Circular by the Ministry of Interior clarified in 
2009504 that residence permits for medical care can be converted in more stable residence 
permits for family reasons – provided of course that t e holder of the permit satisfies the 
requirements for the latter. 
This clarification was much needed, especially because the fundamental rights system in 
force in the Italian order had proved unable to foster a similar interpretation in judicial 
contexts in a stable manner. In this respect, we may observe for instance that the Court of 
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Vicenza produced two contrasting interpretations on this matter, despite the fact that both 
were heavily influenced by fundamental rights. Interestingly, in a first decision505 the Court 
assessed the case of the husband who had already been involved in the Constitutional Court’s 
judgment 376/2000. After being granted with a temporary permit for medical care by the 
latter judgment, the husband argued before the Vicenza Court that he could convert this 
permit into a permit for family reasons. It is extremely significant that the Vicenza Court 
applied the reasoning of the Constitutional Court to the contemporary situation of the 
involved immigrant couple. In this context, it stated that the principles affirmed by the latter 
could also be applied to the granting of a residence permit for family reasons since they had 
involved their access to the fundamental right to family unity as protected by the Constitution 
and by international human rights law. Thus, the Vicenza Court observed that the upholding 
of the applicant’s claim was supported by the fact tha in case of expulsion of the husband, the 
wife would have to choose “whether to abandon Italy, where she regularly lives and resides, 
renouncing opportunities of social and economic advancement also linked to better life 
opportunities for the minor, to follow her husband i  the country of origin in order to maintain 
family unity”506.  
In a subsequent decision507, on the other hand, the Vicenza Court rejected the application 
of a Nigerian woman opposing the national authorities’ refusal to convert her permit for 
medical care into a permit for family reasons despit  the fact that she lived together with her 
children and her husband in Italy and the latter held a residence permit for work reasons. The 
applicant argued that this decision breached her fundamental right to family unity under 
constitutional law and international human rights law. The Court, however, held that the 
fundamental right to family unity of the applicant had to be balanced “with other values of 
equal constitutional rank” and observed that allowing to convert the permit for medical care in 
a more stable permit “would turn an exceptional andtemporary remedy (...) into a tool to 
circumvent the national rules on the entry and stayon the national territory, that is, to access 
family reunification without observing the procedural and substantial preconditions which (...) 
substantiate the legitimate exercise of the right to family unity” under the T.U. Therefore, the 
Court’s preoccupation with avoiding the encouragement of illegal entry “with the 
expectation/hope to regularise one’s stay in the future” through pregnancy and maternity 
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prevailed over the need to ensure the enjoyment of the applicant’s right to family unity which 
had been protected in its previous decision. 
The lack of incisiveness of fundamental rights in the examined judicial context made the 
subsequent clarification by the Ministry of Interior utterly necessary in the view of ensuring 
that immigrant women could effectively benefit from special permits on the grounds of 
pregnancy and early maternity. Arguably, the possibility to convert them into more stable 
residence and work permits actually makes their granting a positive result for immigrant 
women in these situations, who are allowed to effectiv ly emerge from their irregular status 
rather than merely obtain a postponement of their expulsion508. Consequently, immigrant 
women are much more incentivised to request permits “for medical reasons”.  
 
The case law analysed in this section suggests that in the field of permits for medical care the 
fundamental rights system in force in Italy created mixed results. It is however interesting to 
note that when the fundamental right to family unity did prevail in this balance, it fostered 
gender-sensitive observations by Italian courts on the involved immigrant women’s condition. 
In particular, both the Constitutional Court in itsjudgment no. 376/2000 and the Court of 
Vicenza in its 2002 decision, when discussing the husbands’ right to stay in Italy, were 
careful to consider the impact of the husbands’ eventual expulsion for the involved women. 
What is more, the Court of Vicenza did so with refence not only to the impact on the 
migrant woman’s family life but also on her “opportunities for economic and social upward 
mobility connected to the development of her economic activity” 509 – that is, with an 
appreciable consideration of both productive and reproductive work carried out by the mother 
in the case at issue. On a more general level, the ext nsion of permits for medical care to 
fathers also in the light of the constitutional principle of equal distribution of parental rights 
and duties between men and women enshrined in article 30, although limited by the Court to 
married couples, arguably produced important effects on immigrant women’s right to equality 
within the family. 
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c. Immigrant Women’s Freedom from Domestic Violence: Influence of 
Fundamental Rights on Italian Courts 
 
The Italian Criminal Code prohibits domestic violenc  and abuse by article 572, punishing 
“abuse against family members and cohabiting persons” (maltrattamenti contro familiari e 
conviventi) with detention from two to six years. More severe d tention measures are 
established in case the abuse causes a serious personal injury or an extremely serious injury. If 
the abuse causes the death of the victim, detention can be imposed for up to twenty-four 
years. In order to make this protection more effectiv , in 2001510 article 291 of the Criminal 
Code of Procedure511 was amended so that it would allow public prosecutors, in case of 
urgency and necessity, to request judges to order that accused persons immediately leave the 
household and to prevent them to access it again without the judge’s authorisation. 
 
Italian immigration law, on its part, offers different levels of protection. In the context of 
family migration, the intensity of such a protection depends on the nationality of the sponsor. 
Article 12(3) of d.lgs. 30/2007, applicable to third-country national family members of Union 
citizens, includes domestic violence among the cases where third-country national family 
members who have not yet acquired a permanent residence right512 are allowed to maintain 
their permit for family reasons in case of divorce or annulment of marriage. In particular, art. 
12(2)(c) grants this possibility to “injured parties in a criminal proceeding, still pending or 
concluded with a conviction, for offences against the individual committed in the family 
environment”. In addition to limiting the described protection to cases where victims of 
domestic violence have initiated proceedings against their abusive family member and have 
finalised a divorce (separation apparently being insufficient), this provision is affected by a 
further shortcoming. Pursuant article 12(4), in any case the third-country national family 
member will have to provide proof of being employed or self-employed, “so that they do not 
become a burden for the national social assistance system during their stay”, as well as of 
having health insurance, or of being part of the family of a person who already satisfies such 
conditions in Italy. On a broader level, d.lgs. 30/2007 does not mention cohabitation as a 
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specific condition that third-country national family members need to satisfy nor as a 
precondition for maintaining residence permits for family reasons. 
On the other hand, article 30 of the T.U. does not offer similar guarantees to family 
members of third-country national sponsors. In addition to failing to mention domestic 
violence as a specific ground of legal protection fr holders of residence permits for family 
reasons, article 30 also establishes a problematic link between cohabitation and the 
maintenance of said residence permits. Indeed, pursuant art. 30(1-bis), residence permits for 
family reasons granted to foreign spouses of Italian, Union, or third-country citizens “will be 
immediately revoked if it is ascertained that an actu l cohabitation did not follow the 
marriage, except when children were born from the marriage”. This provision applies in 
particular to third-country nationals already residing in Italy for at least one year who 
subsequently marry an Italian or Union citizen or a regularly staying third-country national. 
Arguably, this measure responds to the implicit aimof deterring sham marriages contracted 
with the sole aim of obtaining residence permits. It is however unclear why only third-country 
nationals already residing in Italy are included within the scope of this indirect “cohabitation 
requirement”, whereas art. 30(1-bis) directly establishes that permits for family reason  
granted at first entry in Italy will not be granted nor renewed and will be revoked “if it is 
ascertained that the marriage (...) [has] taken place only in order to allow the interested person 
to reside on the national territory”. 
 
In addition to the described provision concerning the protection of immigrant women holding 
residence permits for family reasons, it should be noted that the T.U. also envisages the 
possibility to access special residence permits on the grounds of being victims of violence. 
Until August 2013, the protections against domestic violence established by the T.U. were 
utterly inadequate and presented serious limitations. I  particular, until that date the only 
available tool for victims of violence consisted in the special permit “for humanitarian 
reasons”, pursuant art. 18 of the T.U. According to this provision, such a permit can be 
granted to foreign victims of “violence or of serious exploitation”. However, art. 18 also 
established that the violence or abuse must be accompanied by “tangible risks for one’s 
physical integrity, due to efforts to subtract oneself from the influence of a criminal 
organisation (...) or of declarations made in the context of preliminary investigations or of 
proceedings”. Therefore, according to a literal interpretation of art. 18, immigrant women 
subjected to domestic violence by individuals rather t an by criminal organisation could not 




This regrettable situation was changed by law n. 119/2013513, which introduced the 
possibility for victims of domestic violence to obtain a special residence permit “for 
humanitarian reasons”. Before moving on to discuss the regulation of such a permit, it should 
be stressed that law n. 119/2013 provides an important example of the influence of 
fundamental and human rights on the legal treatment of immigrant women in Italy at 
normative level. Such a law, indeed, was adopted in the aftermath of the ratification of the 
Istanbul Convention by Italy514 and was the result of a lively debate in Italian politics and 
society515. Although the law was ostensibly aimed at reforming Italian law so as to ensure its 
compliance with the Istanbul Convention, it mainly affected domestic criminal law, which 
was only one of the many sectors involved by the Convention. It is in any case very 
significant that the objective of receiving the human and fundamental rights recognised in the 
Convention was also pursued through the introduction of a special permit for immigrant 
women victims of domestic violence. In this respect, it appears that art. 59 of the Convention 
was the specific provision inspiring the reform. According to art. 59(1) and (2), State Parties 
have an obligation to ensure that victims of violence against women516 whose residence 
permit is dependent on that of their spouses or partners are allowed to access an autonomous 
residence permit in case of dissolution of the marriage or the relationship, and that eventual 
expulsion proceedings initiated against them shall be suspended in order to allow them to 
apply for such a permit. Furthermore, art. 59(3) envisages a broader state obligation to issue 
renewable residence permits to victims whenever it is established that their stay “is necessary 
owing to their personal situation” and/or for the pur ose of their cooperation in an 
investigation or criminal proceedings. 
Thus, a new article (18-bis) was added in the T.U. by law 119/2013. Art. 18-bis refers to 
situations of abuse and violence against foreigners ascertained in the context of investigations 
or proceedings concerning certain criminal offences ommitted in the context of domestic 
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violence517, or within the activities of anti-violence centres, local social services or specialised 
social services for victims of violence. Like art. 18, art. 18-bis also requires the presence of a 
concrete and present danger for the physical integrity of the involved foreigner, as a 
consequence of declarations made by the victims during preliminary investigations or trials, 
or as a consequence of their choice to subtract themselves from the suffered violence. When 
such preconditions are satisfied, after having obtained a judicial opinion, Italian police 
authorities shall grant victims of domestic violenc with a special residence permit for 
humanitarian reasons in order to “be allowed to subtract themselves from the violence” (art. 
18-bis, paragraph 1).  Importantly, art. 18-bis(4) establishes that this permit will be revoked 
“in case of conduct incompatible with its scope”, without offering further specifications as to 
what may constitute incompatible behaviour. It is safe to assume that resuming cohabitation 
with the perpetrator of domestic violence may be considered as an example of incompatible 
behaviour, but the generic character of this expression may also give leeway to more 
questionable interpretations. Some recent examples of questionable judicial assessments of 
cases of violence against women command a specific attention to this problem, in the view of 
avoiding that immigrant women holding the permits at issue would be deprived from them on 
the basis of stereotypical assumptions as to what constitutes “proper” or “normal” behaviour 
for victims of domestic violence518. Therefore, it will be crucial to observe how Italian courts 
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will interpret art. 18-bis – and whether or not fundamental rights may support a non-
stereotypical and balanced assessment of cases concerning special permits for domestic 
violence. Unfortunately, due to the recent characte of the reform at issue, this analysis is not 
yet possible. 
 
Against this background, I would argue the Italian system of protection of immigrant women 
against domestic violence has significantly improved thanks to the recent ratification of the 
Istanbul Convention – and of the great influence of the human and fundamental rights 
proclaimed by this source on recent legislative reforms of Italian immigration law.  
However, I shall stress that even after such reforms the Italian family migration regime 
presents some critical aspects in relation to immigrant women’s freedom from domestic 
violence. In particular, two main problematic areas c n be identified. Firstly, the provision 
whereby residence permits for family reasons will be immediately revoked in absence of 
cohabitation poses serious problems of coordination with the general legislation on residence 
permits for domestic violence. It is indeed reasonable to imagine that an interruption of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
from a sexual point of view than what may normally be expected from a girl of her age” (Corte di Cassazione 
Penale, sezione III, sentenza no. 6329 of 20 January 2006). Furthermore, and in my view even more 
questionably, the Court recently qualified as “less serious” a sexual violence committed against a child under 
fourteen (an age under which Italian law automatically assumes lack of consent) because “the sexual act had 
been committed within a love affair”. Therefore, “despite the fact that sexual abuse is always characterised by 
a serious physical invasion, in this specific case it cannot be qualified as equally invasive as when it occurs with 
force and violence and outside of a love affair” (Corte di Cassazione Penale, sezione III, sentenza no. 45179 of 8 
November 2013). In sum, by examining a case of sexual violence through a “romantic” lens, the Court shifted 
the focus of its analysis from the perpetrator to the victim, and explicitly discussed “consent” in quotation 
marks – as if to suggest that despite the existence of an absolute presumption in Italian criminal law whereby 
children under fourteen cannot consent to sexual relations, that particular child could be considered as 
consenting because she was “in love” with her abuser. 
The Court’s consideration of young female victims of sexual violence in the cases cited is in my view deeply 
gendered. In the first case, the fact that the victim had had previous sexual encounters was qualified by the 
Supreme Court as abnormal for her age, and was used in favour of the perpetrator – who as a direct 
consequence of this obtained a milder sentence because the fact was qualified as less serious. Similarly, in the 
second case the Court unfortunately deemed it acceptable to frame the abuse that occurred between a 
thirteen-year old girl and an adult man in the context of a “love affair”. I would argue that a similar assessment 
would have not been made had the child been male, but most importantly I would qualify it as deeply 
inappropriate that the fact that the supposedly romantic feelings attributed to the victim once again played to 
her disadvantage. 
Lastly, a significant gender bias in the Court’s judicial reasoning was also visible in its judgment no. 25138/2010. 
Here, the Court acquitted a man accused of abuse against family members ex art. 572 of the Criminal Code on 
the grounds of the observation that the assumed victim (his wife) had not suffered from a breach of her 
physical or psychological integrity. The Court reached this conclusion by applying a clearly stereotypical view of 
the “normal” behaviour expected from domestic violence victims. The applicant husband had indeed 
highlighted that his wife had “a strong character”, and the Court accepted this view by considering that the 
involved wife was “far from scared of her husband’s behaviour”, and was simply “shaken, exasperated and very 
emotionally charged” thus concluding that a breach of her physical and moral integrity had not been proven 




cohabitation in order to subtract oneself from domestic violence may remain undetected by 
the national authorities as well as by social servic s. More broadly, I would also argue that a 
legal requirement of cohabitation may exacerbate situations of oppression and unequal marital 
relationships which cannot be ascribed under the scope of art. 18-bis, but which may 
constitute significant triggers of domestic violenc.  
Secondly, the response of the Italian legislator to the ratification of the Istanbul Convention 
was strongly focused on criminal repression and was characterised by an underlying 
emergency discourse. The reform that followed the ratification indeed mainly concerned the 
Italian criminal law system, adopting “urgent provisions on security with the aim to contrast 
gender-based violence”519. The only two other areas touched upon by the reform consisted in 
the regulation of anti-violence centres and, precisely, immigration law. Furthermore, the 
newly introduced art. 18-bis also appears to reproduce in part the focus on criminal 
repression. This is reflected in the reference to criminal proceedings and investigations as one 
of the two realms where the prerequisites for obtaining special permits for domestic violence 
shall be ascertained, and on the request of criminal judges’ opinions before issuing said 
permits in any case. Furthermore, art. 18-bis(4-bis) establishes that residence permits may be 
revoked to foreigners who have been condemned (alsowith a non-final sentence) for one of 
the criminal offences envisaged by this provision and committed in the context of domestic 
violence, and they may be expelled.   
The almost exclusive focus on criminal law may be criticised per se from the specific point 
of view of immigrant women’s freedom from domestic violence. One may argue that 
concentrating on repression rather than also pursuing prevention, for instance by ensuring 
access to independent permits or to a more independnt status of family members in family 
reunification regimes beyond the case where domestic violence has already been committed, 
may constitute a rather myopic choice with limited impact on the causes of the issue it targets. 
In this perspective, I will now move on to examine judicial examples of the interaction 
between fundamental rights and the concept of cohabitation as a legally-imposed requirement, 
exploring the role eventually played by the former in steering relevant norms in a more 
gender-sensitive direction. 
 
From the outset, it must be noted that Italian administrative courts have repeatedly interpreted 
several norms of the T.U. as requiring cohabitation as a prerequisite for the validity of 
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residence permits on the grounds of marriage. This has occurred in relation to not only the 
residence permit for family reasons envisaged by art. 30 of the T.U.520 but also long-term 
residence permits granted under article 9 of the T.U. on grounds of marriage521. In these 
decisions, fundamental rights established by the Italian Constitution or by international 
conventional law ratified by Italy did not play any role. On the other hand, while it is not 
possible to identify a solid case law interpreting cohabitation requirements established by 
immigration rules in the light of fundamental rights, at least two judicial examples may be 
identified where this type of interpretation occurred.  
In the first case, the Turin Administrative Court522 held that a “constitutionally oriented” 
reading of article 30 of the T.U. demanded the renewal of a residence permit for family 
reasons to a Russian woman on the grounds of her marriage with an Italian citizen regardless 
of the fact that the two were not cohabiting at the time. In the Court’s view, the circumstance 
that the husband was being held in custody as a precautionary measure in view of a criminal 
proceeding against him “[could] not be considered as a fact grounding a lack of cohabitation 
as understood by the legislator523. Indeed, “a constitutionally oriented interpretation of the 
norm [demanded] to give exclusive importance to those hypotheses where lack of 
cohabitation is symptomatic of a lack of real conjugal relationship between husband and wife, 
so as to prove, in fact, that the marriage itself has been entered upon exclusively to allow the 
foreign spouse to access a more favourable permit for family reasons”524. On the other hand, 
the Court held that an interpretation of this norm in the light of the Constitution suggested that 
“those unwanted situations of temporary absence of a spouse from the conjugal home which 
can only apparently be imputable to a lack of cohabitation must not negatively weigh on [the 
foreign] spouse”525. 
The Turin Court’s decision to interpret a norm requiring continuous cohabitation as a 
prerequisite for maintaining residence rights acquired on grounds of marriage in the light of 
the Constitution is certainly significant. However, it is unclear which constitutional rights 
specifically the Court believed to be relevant in this case. What is more, this case did not 
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specifically raise the issue of the extent of the State’s obligation to protect immigrant women 
against domestic violence.  
 
For these reasons, the second case ascribable to this section is especially noteworthy. In 2010, 
the Court of Novara produced an extremely interesting judgment526 concerning the case of a 
Russian woman whose application for a long-term residence permit on the grounds of her 
marriage with an Italian citizen had been rejected for lack of cohabitation between the 
spouses. Differently than in the previous judicial example, the requirement of cohabitation in 
this case was not explicitly envisaged by applicable norms (in particular by d.lgs. 30/2007), 
but had been imposed by the police authorities on the grounds of the different norm 
established by article 19(2)(c), which prohibited the expulsion of foreigners cohabiting with 
Italian spouses. In the specific case at issue, the couple did not cohabit at that time because 
the husband had been imprisoned as a precautionary measure after the applicant had reported 
him to the authorities for committing physical abuse and sexual violence against her. The 
applicant in this case however declared that, despit  the domestic violence suffered, she did 
not intend to leave her husband, and that she had reported him to the authorities under the 
false belief that he would be checked into a rehabilit tion facility to cure his drug addiction.  
Significantly, the Court of Novara examined the entir  case in the light not only of the 
national fundamental rights framework but also of international human rights law and 
European fundamental rights law as enforced in the domestic order. Firstly, the Court 
highlighted the “mutual assimilation of the protections offered by constitutional provisions 
and, from the outside, by the ECHR provisions as interpreted by the Strasbourg Court on the 
grounds of the ‘interposition’ established by article 117(2) of the Constitution”527. Therefore, 
these two systems integrate and expand each other’s protection of fundamental and human 
rights in order to reach the widest degree of protection possible in the domestic order. The 
Court also recalled that this is also reflected in the “obligation of ordinary judges to interpret 
domestic rules in conformity with international conve tional law”528, and stressed that “the 
protection of fundamental rights must be systemic and not fragmented in a series of 
uncoordinated norms potentially in conflict with each other”529.  
Secondly, the Court observed that “the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and thus of the 
Charter of Nice – i.e., the Charter of Fundamental Rights – has completed a process of 
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‘comunitarization’ of human rights”530. In the Court’s view, while this case could be 
considered as a purely internal situation, “surely after the entry into force of [the treaty of] 
Lisbon and the declaration of the binding force of the Charter – it will not be possible to 
assess it without taking into consideration the supranational constitutional principles 
established in the Charter”531. 
Therefore, the Court turned to examine the case at issue “in the light of a ‘conventionally 
compatible’ interpretation aimed at ensuring the ‘highest possible level’ of protection on the 
grounds of the described ‘multilevel system’”532. In particular, it noted that the fundamental 
right to respect of private and family life is established by article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, article 7 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 16 of the European Social 
Charter, and article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Similarly, 
the Court highlighted that article 29(2) of the Constitution establishes a fundamental right of 
“moral and legal equality” within marriage. On a more specific note, it relied on the 
Strasbourg Court judgment of E.S. and Others v. Slovakia533 to establish that the fundamental 
right to family life also encompasses “an obligation f every Member State to put in place 
adequate measures of protection against abuse within the family”534.  
Against this rich normative background, the Court considered that while Italian citizens 
benefit from an effective protection against domestic abuse (because national law allows them 
to immediately obtain court orders imposing precautionary measures to protect them), the 
same is not true for migrant women. Indeed, on the on hand “the fact that precautionary 
measures involve putting an end to cohabitation – ranging from the removal from the conjugal 
home to precautionary detention – does not negatively mpact victims, who can still freely 
determine their marital situation”535, that is, whether to end the marriage or not. On the other 
hand, the national authorities’ interpretation in the case at issue meant that this right – 
extended by the Charter to all individuals – was precluded to migrant women. Indeed, 
maintaining that a lack of cohabitation between spou es could automatically cancel the right 
of residence of the applicant “creates a clear discrimination between third-country national 
women and Italian women, and puts the former in the inacceptable condition of having to 
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choose between suffering family abuse by the spouse without reacting and to risk, after 
reporting her situation, being expelled from the State where she has built, as in the case at 
issue, her entire network of emotional, employment and economic relationships”536. 
Therefore, the Court concluded that this lesser protection was not compatible with the 
multi-level system outlined. In the light of the recalled principles, the Court demanded an 
interpretation “whereby the possibility to react to family abuse with the means set forth by the 
State is guaranteed without any difference to any person present on the national territory, 
preventing that the status of Italian citizen or of third-country national woman married to an 
Italian citizen, or of legal resident on other grounds, could negatively affect her”537 as well as 
her freedom of self-determination in relation to her ethical and moral sphere538. 
 
The mentioned judgments cannot support the conclusion that fundamental rights consistently 
prompted the Italian Court’s awareness of the deeply gendered effects of imposing 
cohabitation as a condition for the validity of residence permits. Nonetheless, I would assess 
that they constitute interesting examples of how fundamental rights, when actually recalled in 
judicial realms, have produced a crucial influence on immigrant women’s effective enjoyment 
of freedom from domestic violence in conditions of equality with Italian women, by 
encouraging more extensive and gender-sensitive interpretations of relevant Italian norms in 
this field. 
 
d. Overall Influence of Italian Fundamental Rights Law on Immigrant Women’s 
Enjoyment of Family Life 
 
On a broad level, the multi-level system of fundamental rights in force in the Italian domestic 
order produced positive results in judicial contexts, curbing the gendered and perverse effects 
of problematic provisions of Italian immigration law. Admittedly, in some of the examined 
aspects, judicial interpretations of these rights did not produce such results. In particular, in 
the considered judicial examples concerning special permits for pregnancy and maternity, 
judicial claims for the extension of these permits to unmarried partners or for the possibility to 
convert these permits into more stable ones which were based on fundamental rights were not 
consistently upheld by the competent courts.  










Nonetheless, in the majority of the examined areas, It lian fundamental rights law played a 
seminal role from a specifically gendered point of view. Many of the judgments analysed in 
this section, indeed, offer examples of the extremely positive effects that fundamental rights-
based interpretations of biased norms can produce on immigrant women’s access to rights and 
entitlements in the field of family life in conditions of equality and non-discrimination. I have 
emphasised how the discussed norms, or their interpretation by the national authorities, 
produced the perverse effect of undermining immigrant women’s equal access to rights in 
theory recognised to them, both in relation to immigrant men – as shown by the case of 
income requirements imposed by the family reunification regime– and to citizen women – as 
for instance in the case of cohabitation requirements. In many of the examined judicial 
examples, fundamental rights-based interpretations of these biased norms allowed Italian 
courts to unveil these forms of indirect discriminat on against immigrant women. What is 
more, several forms of inequality were unveiled by these judicial analyses as the result of the 
contested norms and consequently corrected.  
A first dimension of the perverse effects of indirect discrimination produced by certain 
Italian norms concerned immigrant women’s right to equality with immigrant men. This 
aspect was particularly visible in Italian courts’ examinations of claims of extension of special 
residence permits during pregnancy and maternity to fathers. Here, the Constitutional Court 
importantly grounded this extension also on the grounds of art. 30 of the Constitution, 
whereby mothers and fathers share the same duties as to childcare539.Notwithstanding the 
limited application of this principle only to married couples, it is still notable that the 
collateral effect of the constitutional values recalled in this judicial example was that of 
promoting an interpretation of the discussed norms in the sense of ensuring a more equitable 
distribution of care burdens within the family. A similarly positive effect was observable in 
the examples of judicial correction of the indirect discrimination against immigrant women, in 
relation to their possibilities to access family reunification in conditions of equality with their 
male counterparts. In this context, the examined juicial interpretations of income 
requirements disestablished the breadwinner model that the national authorities had tried to 
enforce, thanks to a constitutionally inspired framing of care work as actual work. 
Incidentally, this resulted in the recognition of unpaid carers’ right to access family 
reunification in conditions of equality and non-discr mination not only with respect to 
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immigrant men but also to other immigrant women who were devoted to productive work, as 
made explicit by the Bologna Court540. 
A second important dimension of immigrant women’s right to non-discrimination in the 
field of family concerned their access to rights and e titlements in this field in conditions of 
equality with citizen women. This aspect was well illustrated by the example of the Novara 
Court541, where a judicial analysis firmly grounded on the multi-level system of fundamental 
rights protection in force in the Italian order prompted the recognition of the indirect 
discrimination resulting from the interaction between norms from different legal domains. 
Thus, this type of framing allowed the competent court not only to unveil how the discussed 
norms disproportionately undermined immigrant women’s possibility to obtain protection 
against domestic violence, but also to connect norms from traditionally separated legal 
domains – family reunification law and criminal law– in order to understand their disparate 
impact as a whole on this category. The meaningfulness of this example therefore also lies in 
its quality of further proof of the beneficial effects of a contextual legal analysis for 
immigrant women specifically, and of the possible contribution that fundamental rights may 
provide to encouraging this type of judicial discourse. 
 
3. Immigrant Women’s Fundamental Rights in the Field of Employment: 
Problematic Provisions of Italian Law 
 
In this section devoted to immigrant women’s fundamental rights in the field of employment 
in the Italian legal context, I am going to focus on two main issues. Firstly, in sub-paragraphs 
a) and b), I will discuss the most problematic effects of Italian labour migration rules on 
immigrant women workers, highlighting its main gendred shortcomings through the lens of 
immigrant women workers’ fundamental right to be fre from exploitation and abuse. In 
doing so, I will examine whether and to what extent such a right has, so far, been able to bear 
a positive influence on problematic norms in this field. Secondly, in sub-paragraph c), I will 
move on to consider immigrant women’s effective enjoyment of their fundamental right to 
non-discrimination in the field of employment, per se and with reference to limitations 
established by Italian law to their access to specific professions. 
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a. Immigrant Women’s Freedom from Exploitation and Abuse Versus Links With 
Employers Established by Italian Law 
 
Several norms of Italian law establish a somewhat problematic link between immigrant 
workers and their employers, in some cases granting the latter with a great amount of power 
and control over the acquisition of residence permits for work reasons. These features are 
particularly evident in the rules on the first entry of immigrant workers in Italy through labour 
migration schemes and in the legal framework establi hed to support their emergence from 
informal work.  
 
With reference to immigrant workers’ first entry in Italy, article 22 of the T.U. establishes that 
employers pursuing to hire a third-country national must present an application before the 
immigration authorities, showing that the worker will enjoy proper housing, declaring that 
any variation concerning the employment relationship will be reported and submitting a 
proposal of the so-called contratto di soggiorno. This “residence contract”, pursuant article 5-
bis of the T.U. and article 8-bis of D.P.R. 394/1999, consists in a declaration of the employer 
stating that he or she can provide suitable housing to the third-country national worker and 
that he or she will pay for the repatriation expenses of the worker. The employer’s application 
must also include, among other documentation, an employ ent contract proposal respecting 
minimum standards as to working time and – in the case of domestic work – pay542. No 
obligation for the employer to provide housing for free is established. If the employer plans to 
detract a sum from the employee’s pay as compensatio  for housing, art. 30-bis(4) of D.P.R. 
394/1999 establishes that the amount of the detraction must not affect more than one third of 
the pay and must be expressly indicated in the contratto di soggiorno. The described 
procedure must be activated when the third-country ational worker is still residing in his or 
her country. If the employer does not know any third-country nationals but he or she would 
like to employ one, art. 22(3) of the T.U. envisages the possibility to ask for an authorisation 
of entry for a worker enrolled in special lists whic  Italy may draft together with specific 
countries in order to regulate the entry and stay of workers from such countries. In any case, 
an authorisation of entry cannot be granted if the employer has been condemned for 
supporting the irregular entry of third-country nationals in Italy, for criminal offences related 
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to trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation and forced prostitution as well as to 
labour exploitation.  
Having obtained the so-called “authorisation to work”, the third-country national will be 
able to enter Italy through a work visa. Art. 22(6) of the T.U. establishes that the third-country 
national worker must sign the contratto di soggiorno proposed by the employer within eight 
days, without any possibility to modify it543. This step will be the first occasion for active 
participation of the third-country national worker in his or her labour immigration procedure. 
The employer will have already prepared an employment contract specifying working 
conditions and eventually pay, the employee’s housing conditions and eventually how much 
will be detracted from the worker’s pay to compensate for the provision of said housing. In 
addition to this, the employer must accompany the third-country national to the immigration 
authorities’ offices to subscribe the contratto di soggiorno and is also required to 
communicate the stipulation of a work contract with the third-country national within 48 
hours of the subscription of the contratto544. 
 
A similar power to the employer is granted by the rules governing the regularisation 
procedure for the third-country nationals performing formal work in the domestic sector. 
Art. 1-ter of law 102/2009 leaves the initiative of reporting an informal employment 
relationship to employers, who will have to submit – among other documentation – a 
contratto di soggiorno proposal as well as a declaration that they will respect minimum 
standards established by law as to pay and working hours. Employers will then also be 
obliged to accompany domestic workers to the immigrat on authorities in case of acceptance 
of their application in order to have them sign the contratto di soggiorno as well as submit a 
request for a residence permit for work reasons. It i  extremely important to note that pursuant 
art. 1-ter(8), if the employer or the employee do not show up after being summoned by the 
immigration authorities without a valid justification, the entire procedure will be dismissed. 
The employer is also required to report the hiring of the worker within 24 hours after the 
contratto di soggiorno is signed. As in the case of the first entry procedur , it is also possible 
to observe a strong control of employers over the entire regularisation process.  
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Both of the described legal regimes, i.e., that on labour migration and that on regularisation 
procedures, grant in my view a substantial amount of control to employers, which may 
disproportionately and negatively affect immigrant women workers’ possibilities to 
effectively react to labour exploitation and abuse from employers without jeopardising their 
residence status 
In this respect, two matters appear of importance. The first relates to the possibility for 
immigrant women to work for a different employer after arriving in Italy on the grounds of 
the authorisation to work granted in the context of his procedure (which may be pursued for 
instance because the working conditions actually imposed by the employer are exploitative, or 
in order to react to a refusal of the initial employer to hire them which may in turn give rise to 
severe exploitation and abuse grounded on the irregular status of the worker). A second key 
matter concerns the remedies available to domestic workers against their employer’s refusal 
to regularise them. The isolation typical of this profession and the high risk of abusive or 
exploitative working conditions – especially when performed informally – may indeed be 
aggravated by forms of blackmail by employers, who may threaten not to commence or 
follow through with the regularisation procedure in order to keep the domestic worker in a 
subservient position and even to discourage her from eporting violence, abuse, sexual 
harassment or labour exploitation. 
Therefore, I will now turn to examine these two normative areas in the light of immigrant 
women workers’ fundamental rights. In relation to initial entry, I will discuss two examples of 
judicial resistance to a more favourable interpretation recommended by the Ministry of 
Interior, and on the breaches of immigrant women’s fundamental rights that they may 
generate. With reference to regularisation procedurs, I will instead consider how 
fundamental rights may produce a positive influence on their highlighted shortcomings. 
 
With respect to the initial entry procedure, a 2007 circular by the Ministry of Interior clarified 
that when a third-country national enters Italy with an authorisation to work and a related visa 
in the context of this procedure, and the employer refuses to hire him or her, “the foreigner 
can apply for a residence permit on grounds of pending occupation, declaring that his or her 
employer is no longer intending to hire him or her”545. As a result, immigrant women workers 
have been able to counter before administrative courts the rejection of their applications for 
residence permits – or for their renewal – justified by the fact that they were not employed by 
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the person who had applied for their authorisation o work546. These administrative decisions 
did not seem to grant much importance to whether th migrant workers involved had 
explicitly reported their employers’ refusal to the immigration authorities or not. 
Nonetheless, in some cases Italian jurisprudence offered examples of judicial resistance to 
such an interpretation. In 2011, for instance, the Naples administrative Court547 upheld the 
rejection of an application for a residence permit for work reasons by a Chinese woman on the 
grounds that she had never been employed (as a domestic worker) for the person who had 
initiated her labour migration procedure548 . Subsequently, a 2012 judgment by the 
administrative Court of Trieste549 justified the link between the regularity of an immigrant 
woman’s stay and her working for the initial employer, what is more with the declared aim of 
protecting her human dignity. In particular, the Court supported “the need that the 
employment relationship, to which the request of authorisation to work and the following 
contratto di soggiorno are aimed, is actually established with the specific employer who has 
passed the controls of the immigration authorities, because that is the employer who has been 
authorised to hire by virtue of his or her suitability, reliability and morality, and not others”550. 
In the Court’s view, the lack of an effective establishment of the employment relationship 
“bears (...) the consequence (...) that it is absolutely uncertain that the foreigner can reside in 
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Italy in a dignified manner and support himself or he self with the legal proceeds of his or her 
work”551.Although the Court ultimately rejected the application because the applicant failed to 
satisfy requisites concerning minimum periods of work necessary to benefit from 
regularisation procedures, the fact that the majority of its reasoning focused on a restrictive 
interpretation of the discussed norms is significant in itself. 
These examples of judicial resistance to the Ministry’  guidelines appear particularly 
worrying because the eventual affirmation of the principles established by these courts on a 
broader scale may give rise to violations of immigrant women workers’ fundamental rights. In 
particular, the rights to receive adequate remuneration, to weekly rest and to paid annual 
holidays protected by art. 36 of the Constitutions are seriously jeopardised by a judicial 
interpretation that ultimately forces immigrant worke s to remain with a specific employer as 
a precondition for maintaining their residence rights. Such an interpretation, indeed, grants 
employers with great leverage and constitutes an objective obstacle to the possibility for the 
employee to negotiate adequate working conditions. In the most extreme cases, this may give 
rise to a violation of the prohibition to conduct private economic activities in breach of safety, 
liberty and human dignity ex art. 41 of the Constitution, provided of course that t e employer 
is a private enterprise. In this light, the calls to human dignity by the Court of Trieste in the 
abovementioned example as grounding its restrictive judicial interpretation appear quite 
paradoxical. One may indeed question whether exposing th rd-country national workers to the 
risk of finding themselves in an irregular status in their host country simply because the 
person who initiated their migration process subsequently refuses to hire them may support 
their possibilities “to live in Italy in a dignified manner”552, much less of supporting 
themselves through legal channels. 
 
In the context of regularisation procedures, on the other hand, an interesting example of the 
positive influence of fundamental rights on an immigrant woman’s possibility to react to her 
employer’s refusal to regularise their situation has been provided by a 2009 judgment by the 
Court of Brescia553. In this case, a domestic worker from Salvador submitted that her 
employer refused to regularise her status pursuant L w 102/2009 and that she had dismissed 
her for this reason. Significantly, the Court recalled the Italian Constitution to assess this 
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claim, holding that the dismissal had to be annulled b cause of its discriminatory character 
“on the ground of the applicant’s status of irregularly resident foreigner”554 and ordering the 
applicant’s reintegration in her employed position as well as her regularisation by the 
employer. In particular, the Court importantly established that “only by affirming the 
existence of a right of the employee to be regularised it is possible to realise an interpretation 
[of law 102/1999] in conformity with the Constitution, since it cannot be maintained that the 
submission of the regularisation application pursuant article 1-ter of law 102/999 is linked to 
the mere discretion of the employer”555 . Similar conclusions were also reached by 
administrative tribunals, but without any reliance on the fundamental rights of the involved 
workers556. 
Despite its isolated character, the case assessed by the Court of Brescia epitomises how 
fundamental rights may successfully promote extensiv  interpretations of norms concerning 
regularisation procedures in particularly important spects of immigrant women’s working 
lives. The Court did not specify which constitutional provision in particular inspired its 
reasoning, but rather referred to the Constitution as a whole. I would argue that the right to 
adequate remuneration, weekly rest, and annual holidays enshrined in art. 36 may once again 
constitute an important reference in this matter, considering that this right may be seriously 
endangered in informal work contexts, if read in cojunction with the fundamental right to 
substantial equality established by article 3. In this respect, it is also interesting to observe that 
being an irregularly resident migrant was identified by the Court as a prohibited ground of 
discrimination under the Constitution. 
 
b. Links With Employers in Residence Permits for Entertainers: Observations for a 
Future Analysis in a Fundamental Rights Perspective 
 
A legal framework which has yet to be addressed from a human and fundamental rights 
perspective in the Italian context but which is in my view deserving of a special attention is 
provided by the rules governing residence permits for entertainers. Art. 27 of the T.U. 
includes “dancers, artists and musicians to be employed in entertainment clubs”557 among the 
professions for which admission is possible beyond a nual quotas. A 2006 Circular by the 
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Ministry of Interior558 regulates the procedure by establishing that employers (managers or 
producers) will have to apply for an authorisation of first entry for the third-country nationals 
pursuing work as entertainers in Italy. As normally envisaged by the general procedure, 
prospective employers will have to apply for a work authorisation and declare in that context 
that they will cover the repatriation expenses of the hird-country national workers and will 
report any change in the employment relationship to the authorities. Moreover, prospective 
employers are required to declare that they will not dismiss the worker before the expiration 
of the contract for reasons beyond those allowed by law or by the contract itself. Pursuant art. 
27(2), third-country nationals granted with entertainers’ permits cannot be employed in a 
different sector, nor can they be hired with a different qualification. Art. 40(14) of D.P.R. 
394/1999 also prevents this category from changing employer, stating that renewals of 
authorisations to work and residence permits can only be granted “to continue the 
employment relationship with the same employer”. 
 
Several aspects of the described provisions appear to foster a high risk of labour exploitation 
and abuse from employers for third-country nationals holding entertainers’ permits. The tight 
links with employers and with the specific profession established by this framework appear 
particularly noteworthy, especially if considered in conjunction with the strong control 
granted by Italian law in general to employers over application procedures and their 
obligation to cover the workers’ repatriation expens s. 
In support of this view, it may be observed that several aspects of the Italian legal 
framework recall critical features of the Cypriot immigration regime for “artistes”, which 
were criticised by the European Court of Human Rights in the Rantsev case559 as fostering the 
trafficking and exploitation of immigrant women. For instance, the Court noted that “while an 
obligation on employers to notify the authorities when an artiste leaves her employment (...) is 
a legitimate measure to allow the authorities to monitor the compliance of immigrants with 
their immigration obligations”560 , such provisions must be carefully enforced because 
“measures which encourage owners and managers to track down missing artistes or in some 
other way to take personal responsibility for the conduct of artistes are unacceptable in the 
broader context of trafficking concerns regarding artistes in Cyprus”561. Similarly, the 
Strasbourg Court chastised the legal choice to requir  employers to undertake the 
                                                           
558
 Circolare del Ministero del Lavoro no. 34 of 13 December 2006. 
559
 Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, cit. 
560






responsibility to reimburse the State for repatriation expenses sustained in relation to their 
employees562. These aspects were among those considered by the Court as indicators of the 
State’s failure to effectively protect immigrant women against trafficking and exploitation 
under article 4 of the European Convention.  
In the Italian context, concerns over the risk of tra ficking implied by residence permits for 
entertainers have been voiced by the 2011 CEDAW Shadow Report on Italy. In particular, the 
Report stressed that “entry in Italy with a residence permit for entertainers (the limited 
duration of which is linked to the willingness of the employer to maintain the contract) creates 
a situation of dependence from club managers which is often conducive to exploitation”563. 
While the problem of the compatibility between immigrant women’s fundamental rights and 
the rules established by Italian law in this field has yet to be examined, I would argue that 
such an analysis is not only much needed but also potentially fruitful. In this respect, the 
Rantsev case may constitute a crucial legal reference for domestic courts in analysing the 
described regime in the light of immigrant women’s human right to be free from trafficking 
and labour exploitation under article 4 of the Convention (which enjoys a constitutional rank 
in the Italian order on the grounds of article 117 of the Constitution). Moreover, the latter 
source may combine with the prohibition of slavery, servitude, forced or compulsory labour 
and trafficking and the right “to engage in work and to pursue a freely chosen or accepted 
occupation” respectively established by articles 5 and 15 of the European Charter, as well as 
with the constitutional right to equality before the law without distinction of sex (art. 3), 
creating a multilevel human and fundamental rights framework in the light of which domestic 
courts may examine the norms at issue. In fact, I would argue that this framework is likely to 
support a reconsideration of the Italian regime on third-country national entertainers due to its 
numerous problematic triggers of labour and sexual exp oitation. 
 
c. Discrimination Against Immigrant Women in Access to Employment: Does the 
Italian Anti-Discrimination Regime Live up to Fundamental Rights Standards? 
 
Art. 2(3) of T.U. provides that “the Italian Republic, enforcing theILO Convention n. 143 of 
24 June 1975 received with law n. 158 of 10 April 198 , guarantees to all foreign workers 
regularly residing on its territory and to their family equality of treatment and full equality of 
rights with respect to Italian workers”. In turn, article 10 of the ILO Convention binds States 
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Parties to pursue national policies aimed at guaranteei g “equality of opportunity and 
treatment in respect of employment and occupation”. With specific reference to access to 
employment, article 43 of the T.U. prohibits discrimination on racial, ethnic, national or 
religious grounds– defined as “any behaviour which, directly or indirectly, entails a 
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference” on these grounds “with the aim or effect of 
destroying or undermining the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, in conditions of equality, 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms in (…) the economic field”. Art. 43(2)(c) provides 
that “any person illegally imposing more disadvantageous conditions or refusing to allow 
access to employment (…) to regularly staying foreign rs (…) only by virtue of their 
conditions of foreigners or of their belonging to a specific race, religion, ethnic group or 
national group” puts in place an act of discrimination. Art. 43(2)(e) also deems as 
discrimination any act of the employer or of his appointees which produces a negative effect 
on workers on the grounds of race, ethnic origin, la guage, religion or citizenship – even 
indirectly.  
As for the laws receiving the European anti-discrimination directives, legislative decree 
215/2003 (receiving Directive 2000/43) prohibits discr mination on grounds of race and 
ethnic origin in relation to “access to employment a d self-employment, including criteria of 
selection and preconditions for hiring” at art. 3(1)(a). Important limitations are established by 
art. 3(2), whereby “this legislative decree does not cover differential treatment on the grounds 
of nationality and does not undermine national law nd preconditions concerning entry, 
residence, access to employment, social assistance d security of third-country national 
citizens (…) on the national territory, nor any treatment, adopted according to the law, 
deriving from the legal situation of these individuals”. Furthermore, art. 3(4) also establishes 
that differential treatment which is indirectly discriminatory but which is “objectively 
justified by legitimate scopes pursued through appro riate and necessary means” does not 
amount to discrimination prohibited by the decree. A similar legislation is also established by 
d.lgs. 216/2003 (receiving Directive 2000/78) concer ing less relevant grounds of 
discrimination for immigrant women workers, i.e., religion, personal belief, disability, age 
and sexual orientation. 
The Equal Opportunities Code of 2006 (amended in 2010 to receive Directive 2006/54) 
prohibits at article 27 “any discrimination on the grounds of sex concerning access to 
dependent employment or self-employment or any other form of employment, regardless of 
the hiring conditions and in any sector or branch of activity, at any level of the professional 




the grounds of marital status, family status or pregnancy, or indirectly through job 
advertisements in the media that specify a particular sex as a precondition for applying. The 
only admitted derogations by this article concern particularly burdensome professions as 
identified through collective bargaining and cases where belonging to a specific sex is an 
essential requisite due to the nature of the specific profession. 
 
In respect to the question of whether the Italian anti-discrimination framework lives up to 
immigrant women workers’ fundamental right to non-discrimination recognised by the 
Constitution, it must be observed that Italian jurisp udence does not offer decisive hints in 
either direction. On a broad level, the Constitutional Court assessed that the principle of 
equality established by article 3 of the Convention not only prohibits discrimination in 
relation to foreigners’ inviolable human rights but also imposes that any differential treatment 
must be reasonably justified and cannot simply disfavour foreigners as such564.  
However, it is regrettable that no judgments concering sex discrimination claims submitted 
by immigrant women in the field of employment – in the context of the multi-level system of 
fundamental rights protection in force in Italy –are traceable in Italian jurisprudence. 
Discrimination on the grounds of nationality, on the other hand, has been discussed by Italian 
courts both in general terms565 and in relation to cases concerning immigrant women workers. 
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While none of these cases concerned sex discrimination, I will now turn to briefly analyse 
judicial examples of enforcement of the fundamental right to equality in relation to access to 
employment in a field characterised by a high concentration of immigrant women, i.e., the 
healthcare sector566. Therefore, although the importance of the judicial principles established 
in this context transcends the specific situation of immigrant women, the fact that these 
principles were established in relation to access to nursing professions may be considered as a 
particularly important result for this group.  
 
Two interesting judicial examples in this sense are identifiable. In the first case, the Court of 
Lodi567 was submitted with the case of a Nigerian nurse who had been excluded from the 
possibility to participate in a competition to switch from a fixed-term to an indefinite contract 
because she did not fulfil the requirement of Italian or Union citizenship. Before the Court of 
Lodi, the applicant – who held a long-term residence permit – submitted that she had been 
subjected to discriminatory treatment by the hospital. The hospital maintained that Italian 
laws on access to employment in public administrations included the requisite of Italian 
citizenship. It is extremely interesting to note that the Court interpreted the norms at issue as 
only admitting reservations to Italian citizens when implying the exercise of public powers 
(which was not the case of nurses) by specifically re ing on “the constitutional principles of 
equality”568 and by international human rights law sources. TheCourt indeed observed that 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
openly clashes with transnational general principles on which also the norms on European integration are 
based” (id.).  
Lastly, a 2010 judgment of the Court of Milan (Tribunale di Milano, sezione lavoro, ordinanza of 30 July 2010) 
concerning the rejection of an Ecuadorian woman’s application for a post of keeper by a regional building 
company on grounds of nationality reassessed the principle whereby in the Italian domestic order “a non-
absolute principle of equality between foreigners and Italian citizens exists in relation to access to employment 
(…) received through article 10(2) of the Constitution” (id.). The Court considered this principle “a useful 
parameter for the correct and appropriate interpretation of norms concerning the legal status of foreigners” 
(id.) and interpreted the case in this light, concluding that the principle of equality had been breached because 
the differential treatment of the applicant could not be justified – since the employer was not a public 
administration and because the exercise of public powers was not implied in the job (circumstances which 
would have justified a prerequisite of Italian or Union citizenship). 
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this interpretation “is necessary in order to avoid an unreasonable and arbitrary mortification 
of the unswerving right to work, according to the spirit of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (…), which recognised among fundamental rights the right to work (art. 23) to 
which every individual is entitled without any distinctions on grounds of nationality (art. 
2)”569, and also recalled the right to work ex article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. 
The second judgment, before the Court of Milan570, concerned a joint application by a 
group of third-country national women who held that their exclusion from a competition 
aimed at recruiting nurses on the grounds of nationl ty constituted a form of discrimination 
in access to employment. Once again, fundamental rights had an important influence on the 
judicial assessment of a claim of discrimination. Firstly, the Court of Milan referred to the 
principles established by the Constitutional Court in its judgment no. 432 of 2005 – 
concerning the boundaries of the fundamental right to non-discrimination affirmed by article 
3 of the Constitution – and applied them to the field of employment. In particular, the Court 
noted that the principle whereby differential treatment must always be justified by a rational 
and not arbitrary reason “cannot but apply to the right to work”571. Secondly, the Court 
observed that “in the matter of access to employment, be that public or private, the principle 
of equal treatment and equality between Italian citizens, Union citizens and third-country 
nationals applies, because the principle affirmed in article 2 of the T.U. must find immediate 
and direct application with reference both to employment and to the perspective of 
employment”572. Thirdly, the Court observed that the interpretation whereby reserving certain 
professions to Italian citizens is exclusively admissible when such professions entail the 
exercise of public powers (but not to nurses) “is the one most in compliance with 
constitutional principles”573. On these grounds, the Court found that the exclusion of the 
applicants from the competition at issue had a discriminatory character and ordered to cease 
it. 
 
The discussed cases constitute interesting examples of nforcement of the multi-level system 
of fundamental rights protection applicable in the Italian order in the matter of access to 
employment in conditions of equality and non-discrimination. Here, the interpretation of 














Italian norms establishing a differential treatment be ween third-country nationals and Union 
citizens in the light of the fundamental right to nn-discrimination recognised by this system 
prompted the recognition of the presence of discrimination on grounds of nationality with 
respect to access to employment – a ground on which t e anti-discrimination legislation (both 
European and Italian) appears to be weaker. This positive influence of fundamental rights did 
not produce a specifically gender-sensitive analysis of the Courts in the cases at issue. As I 
have stressed above, such gender-sensitivity was not called for by the applicants’ situation, 
which constituted textbook examples of discrimination on grounds of nationality and did not 
involve sex.   
Nonetheless, I would argue that from a gendered point of view this case law may still 
produce positive effects specifically for immigrant women’s access to employment in 
conditions of non-discrimination. After all, discrimination on the grounds of citizenship – 
especially when not sanctioned by law but rather enacted by employers – may hide other 
forms of discrimination, such as that on the intersecting grounds of sex and ethnic or racial 
origin. In this respect, I shall recall that nationality is a particularly important ground of 
discrimination against immigrant women – both alone and in combination with other 
intersecting grounds. In the previous chapters, I have repeatedly emphasised the extent to 
which nationality discrimination hinders immigrant women’s access to the labour market in 
the European legal space, and consequently how crucial it is to interpret the scope of 
admissibility of differential treatment on the grounds of Union or national citizenship in a 
restrictive manner. 
 
d. Overall Influence of Italian Fundamental Rights Law on Immigrant Women’s 
Enjoyment of Workers’ Rights 
 
In the field of employment, the influence of Italian fundamental rights law on biased norms 
applicable to immigrant women was much less consistent than that observed in the field of 
family life. In fact, while I have highlighted how several areas of domestic law raise issues of 
compatibility with fundamental rights because of their disparate impact on immigrant women 
workers, Italian courts so far have offered few indications as to the capability of the multi-
level fundamental rights framework in force in Italy to expose and correct the observed 
shortcomings. This feature alone, however, does not suggest an inherent incapacity of this 
system to serve as a ground to counter the discriminatory effects of certain national norms or 




of interaction, positive or negative, between norms applicable to immigrant women and 
Italian fundamental rights law, suggests that such a conclusion may be far-fetched. Rather, I 
would assess that a judicial attention to the highlighted problems has yet to develop in the 
Italian context, and that future developments in ths area may offer further insights as to the 
potential and shortcomings of the multi-level system of fundamental rights protection in force 
in the Italian order in relation to the indirect discrimination deriving from biased norms 
applicable to immigrant women, and as to its capability to serve as a solid legal ground to 
correct these perverse effects.  
 
With this aim, indications from supranational courts may also serve as useful references for 
national courts. For instance, in the case of entertainers’ permits and labour exploitation, 
argumentations similar to the ones submitted in the Rantsev574 judgment before the Strasbourg 
Court would have a great chance of being upheld by Italian courts as well – considering the 
utter similarity of the problems observable in the Italian legislation with those criticised in the 
ECHR judgment. Indirectly, the observations of the Court in Rantsev concerning state 
responsibility in relation to breaches of art. 4 ECHR, due to the enforcement of national 
norms which establish a high level of dependence on employers, may also be used as an 
effective argumentation to contrast judicial interpr tations of national rules on initial entry 
and regularisation procedures that grant excessive leverage to employers.  
As to the matter of discrimination in relation to access to employment, the recent 
recognition of intersectional discrimination in the case of B.S. v. Spain575 by the Strasbourg 
Court may encourage similar claims in the Italian co text by immigrant women. This, in turn, 
would push for a more heterogeneous case law at the national level on forms of 
discrimination other than nationality, in the field of employment and beyond. With specific 
reference to access to employment, moreover, the framing by the European Court of Justice in 
Firma Feryn576 of a case of possible discrimination on the grounds of nationality as race 
discrimination suggests that certain discrimination grounds may hide others – and that 
different legal grounds may be inextricably linked with each other. In this sense, the Firma 
Feryn case may also represent an important reference for Italian courts. 
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4. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter, I have provided several examples of pr blematic provisions of Italian 
immigration law from the point of view of immigrant women’s family life and employment. 
In particular, I have discussed specific norms which produce a disparate impact on immigrant 
women, highlighting in what respect these sources fall short of the multi-level system of 
fundamental rights protection in force in the Italian order. On the one hand, from my analysis 
it emerges that Italian immigration law is in some cases affected by issues already observed 
both at national level (with respect to other domestic immigration regimes examined by the 
Strasbourg Court, which I have discussed in chapter 1) and on a supranational scale (with 
reference to the problematic norms of EU immigration law analysed in chapter 2). In some 
instances, indeed, Italian immigration law appears to overlook factual difficulties 
disproportionately experienced by immigrant women residing on its territory. As a 
consequence, when these apparently gender-blind norms a e implemented, they reveal their 
gender-insensitive nature by producing a disparate impact on immigrant women. This is the 
case, for example, of Italian labour law and of its rules on first entry and regularisation 
procedures. In other instances, such as in the case of special residence permits for pregnancy 
and early maternity, the negative impact of Italian norms on immigrant women rests on the 
fact that specific rules established for this category’s protection are restrictive to the point of 
making such protection void. Moreover, while the majority of the identifiable gender 
shortcomings relate to Italian law in itself, in some instances – and notably in the case of 
income requirements and of legally-enforced cohabitation – the disparate impact stemmed not 
from the law itself but rather from its interpretation by the national authorities. 
On the other hand, Italian immigration law also presents specific shortcomings relating 
directly to the reception of EU law in the domestic order. As anticipated in the introduction to 
this chapter, the Italian case study provides examples of how the great discretional power left 
to Member States by EU immigration law can translate into severely biased immigration 
regimes at the domestic level. This is particularly visible in the field of family life. For 
instance, the Italian case illustrates how the vastdiscretion left to Member States as to the 
possibility to introduce purely economic thresholds to third-country nationals aiming to 
sponsor family reunification may translate into domestic rules which, while in compliance 
with secondary EU law, negatively affect immigrant women’s right to enjoy family life in 





Moving on to my main research question, the analysis undertaken in this chapter offers 
several insights with respect to the role so far plyed by the multi-level system of fundamental 
rights in force in the Italian order vis-à-vis the observed shortcomings of Italian rules 
applicable to immigrant women, and to its potential for further development in this area. 
Arguably, the domain of family life emerged as much more dynamic than that of 
employment. In the family realm, indeed, several judicial examples showed a productive 
impact of fundamental rights-based discourses, which prompted gender-sensitive 
interpretations of certain norms of Italian law so as to avoid that such norms would result in 
indirect discrimination against immigrant women. Despite some setbacks, particularly in 
relation to exceptional residence permits for medical reasons, Italian fundamental rights law 
produced important results – such as the disestablihment of the one breadwinner model 
enforced in the context of family reunification, the support to a contextual interpretation of 
immigrant women’s right to live free from domestic violence and the promotion of a more 
equal distribution of reproductive work within immigrant families in relation to residence 
permits for medical reasons. As I have stressed above, it is notable that these achievements 
concerned immigrant women’s access to their right to family life in conditions of equality 
with both immigrant men and citizen women.  
In the employment domain, on the other hand, fundamental rights were seldom recalled. 
Furthermore, when fundamental rights did produce positive results for the involved immigrant 
workers – as for the case of employment discriminatio  – it was always in a gender-neutral 
perspective. Nonetheless, two main areas were identified as potential playing fields for 
fundamental rights law in force in the Italian order: protection against labour exploitation and 
multiple or intersectional discrimination in relation to employment. These areas are indeed 
strictly connected to immigrant women’s right to enjoy employment-related rights in 
conditions of equality with both immigrant men and citizen women. Therefore, the lack of 
available judicial examples of application of fundamental rights in these fields from a 
specifically gendered point of view is cause for paticular concern. In this respect, I have 
discussed how interesting cues could and should be extracted from both the European Court 










































The Spanish Case: 
Immigrant Women in Spain and Their Fundamental Rights  





Similarly to Italy, Spain experienced a relatively recent transition into constituting a country 
of immigration. When the first immigration law was adopted in 1985577, the number of 
foreigners residing in Spain amounted to a mere 200,000 (mostly European citizens)578. From 
that date, immigration to Spain has been steadily increasing. According to Eurostat, in 2012 
Spain was the EU Member State with the third highest number of third-country national 
immigrants in the European Union (after Germany and Italy), amounting to 6.9 % of the total 
population.579 The main motivation for female migration to Spain is constituted by search of 
employment, with the sole exception of those emigrating from African countries, which 
mainly enter through family reunification schemes. As a consequence, the majority of 
immigrant women enter Spain alone580. Among female migrants, those from Latin America 
constitute the most numerous groups. In 2011, the three most represented countries among the 
total number of immigrant women in Spain were Bolivia, Brazil and Colombia581. 
 
Within the initial migratory fluxes towards Spain, during the 1990s, women constituted a 
significant percentage of the total number of migrants, and in some national groups they 
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significantly exceeded men582. Female migration to Spain at the time was fuelled by the 
stronger participation of Spanish women in the labour market and the consequent high 
demand for foreign domestic workers, and was further encouraged by quota systems 
recognising such a demand583. The subsequent decrease of the proportion of women in the 
total number of immigrant in Spain from 2000 until 2007 – due to the strong economic 
growth and specifically to the prosperity enjoyed by the construction sector, which was 
characterised by a high demand of male foreign workers – also meant that immigrant women 
have been less affected by the financial crisis which as stricken Spain since2008, in the sense 
that unemployment rates have indeed been much higher for immigrant men than for their 
female counterparts584.  
Nonetheless, immigrant women’s situation on the Spanish labour market has always been 
one of particular disadvantage. On a broad level, this category has been affected by the low 
pays, fewer legal protections, and high informality characterising traditionally female jobs in 
Spain. Among those professions, immigrant women also di proportionately concentrate in the 
lower rungs of the national labour market, i.e., domestic and care work, housecleaning 
services, or sex work585. With specific reference to the economic crisis, it must be stressed 
that while immigrant women’s employment rates have be n less impaired, this category has 
been negatively affected in multiple ways. For insta ce, it has been observed that female 
migrants have been pushed by the crisis to accept worse labour conditions, a descending 
labour mobility, and stronger deskilling586. Other specific consequences of the financial crisis 
have consisted in a significant lowering of pays – despite the stable demand for immigrant 
women workers, especially in the service sector, in narrower chances for this category to 
transition into self-employment, in cuts to social assistance benefits which force them to 
sustain more expenses for schooling and health services, and lastly in “family de-unification”, 
whereby the family breadwinner remains in Spain while previously reunified, inactive family 
members – especially children – are sent back to the country of origin587. The latter process 
has disproportionately involved immigrant women, especially in the Latin American 
community, where women providers have been pushed by the higher costs of living to 
renounce enjoying family life with their children iSpain and to send them back to live with 
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their grandparents in their countries of origin. These observations suggest a strict correlation 
between issues experienced by immigrant women in the employment domain and difficulties 
in the family realm. 
 
In relation to family life, immigrant women in Spain commonly experience issues similar to 
those highlighted for the Italian context. Firstly, many foreign women living in Spain 
encounter disproportionate difficulties in reconciling work and family life, and this conflict is 
more likely to result in a “retreat” into the family realm than it would for Spanish women. 
Obviously, this issue is also intrinsically related to the employment domain. The 
disproportionate concentration of immigrant women in sectors of the labour market which 
grant them with few benefits in terms of pay, security and labour protection (thus making paid 
employment a less attractive choice), together withthe absence of public care services and of 
family networks in the host country which may help them sustain care burdens, push 
immigrant women to renounce working altogether, whenev r of course this is a viable 
option588. This phenomenon, in turn, negatively affects gender relations in immigrant 
households. Reinforcing immigrant women’s labour instability indeed also means 
strengthening their economic dependence on husbands and partners. Moreover, very rarely do 
the described difficulties in reconciling work and family life spur strategies based on a re-
thinking of the gendered divisions between productive and reproductive work within the 
family589.  
Secondly, immigrant women are disproportionately at risk of domestic violence or gender-
based violence in comparison to Spanish women. In 2011, the percentage of foreign women 
reporting having suffered from gender-based violence at least once in their lifetime amounted 
to 20.9%, in contrast with 10.1% of Spanish women590. The double incidence of gender-based 
violence on non-Spanish women was consistently report d regardless of age, education, 
working situation, marital status, health conditions, and dependency situation. As to the most 
affected national groups, the most numerous reports came from women born in Romania, 
Morocco, Ecuador, Colombia, and Bolivia. Arguably, the significantly higher exposure of 
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immigrant women to domestic and gender-based violence is imputable to multiple factors, 
including the lack of family and social networks to rely on, language barriers, the economic 
and legal dependence on the violent partner or spouse, as well as the fear of jeopardising 
one’s residence by reporting a situation of abuse to the authorities591. 
 
Against this background, this chapter will discuss the Spanish case study starting – as chapter 
3 did for the Italian case study – from the observation that domestic law applicable to 
immigrant women can actually exacerbate the described factual difficulties. The analysis that 
will be carried out in this chapter thus mirrors that undertaken for the previous chapter on 
Italy. Therefore, in this chapter I will examine gend red shortcomings of relevant provisions 
of Spanish law applicable to immigrant women with the ultimate aim to assess the normative 
and judicial impact of human and fundamental rights as tools to correct such a bias. 
More specifically, in a first section of the chapter he system of human and fundamental 
rights applicable in the Spanish legal order will be critically assessed, with a view to 
providing a solid background concerning the fundamental rights recognised to immigrant 
women in Spain in the fields of family and employment. Subsequently, the gender bias of 
selected provisions of Spanish law will be discussed, highlighting gender-specific limitations 
indirectly or directly imposed to immigrant women’s rights in the family life and employment 
domains respectively as a consequence of the describ d bias. This analysis will be then 
completed with an assessment of whether human and fundamental rights at different levels 
(international, European and national) have been able to provide Spanish courts with an 
effective ground to correct the observed gender bias of such problematic legal provisions, as 
well as whether and in what respects they have, on the other hand, failed to do so, and with an 
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1. Foreigners’ Fundamental Rights in the Spanish Legal Order 
 
The Spanish Constitution of 1978592 constituted a landmark step in the democratisation 
process after the end of the 40-years long Franco di tatorship. The rule of law principle 
established by the Constitution marked the transition from a legitimacy of power based on 
tradition and the leader’s personality to one grounded on legal certainty and fundamental 
rights593.  For immigrants in Spain, however, this change was not as pivotal as it was for 
Spanish citizens. If indeed “it would make no sense to speak of foreigners’ rights during 
Franco regime, when Spanish people themselves did not enjoy any”, it is also true that many 
immigration law sources adopted during the dictatorship persisted well after the adoption of 
the Constitution594.  
The Spanish Constitution instead marked a break with the Francoist past from a gendered 
point of view. During the dictatorship, Spanish women had been deprived of human and 
fundamental rights in a very specific way. They had been forced into a patriarchal model of 
family whereby they were not recognised with legal c pacity and submitted to their fathers’ 
and husbands’ authority595. Their economic dependence within the family was also reinforced 
by legally-enforced limitations to their access to the labour market, especially in sectors 
considered unsuitable for women. After the death of Franco in 1975, the women’s movement 
flourished and the first legal reforms started to push women’s legal status towards equality596. 
Nonetheless, women themselves – both as individual “founding mothers” and as a group – 
were almost entirely absent from the constituent process. All seven members of the 
Committee in charge of drafting the Constitution – the so-called “fathers of the Constitution” 
– were in fact men, chosen by a Constitutional Commission nominated by the Congreso de 
los Diputados (Chamber of Deputies) from all the main political parties represented in the 
Parliament597 . This all-male presence is mirrored in the absence of a proper gender 
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perspective in the Constitution, as suggested by the low number of specific references to 
women and in the lack of an explicit inclusion of women among the groups needing a special 
protection in the enjoyment of their rights598. 
 
Turning to immigration law, the first attempt to adapt this source to constitutional norms and 
standards came only with the abovementioned L y Orgánica n. 7 of 1985. Arguably, this 
lateness was also imputable to the fact that, at the time of the democratisation process, 
immigration was far from constituting a large-scale phenomenon and it therefore was not a 
main concern at the time.  
In the mid-eighties, however, the fundamental and constitutional rights discourse penetrated 
immigration law. Public powers’ concern with establishing and spreading constitutional 
values and human rights in order to mark a definite closure with the past also involved 
immigration599. The Preamble of the 1985 Ley Orgánica – despite the very restrictive content 
of its provisions – apparently mirrored such efforts by emphasising its aim to establish rules 
in the field of immigration on the grounds of the constitutional mandate represented by article 
13 of the Constitution. The latter draws a key distinction between foreigners and Spanish 
citizens. While its paragraph 1 recognises foreigners with “public freedoms guaranteed by 
[Title I] in the terms established by treaties and the law”, paragraph 2 reserves to Spanish 
citizens “the rights recognised by art. 23” (that is, the right to participate in public affairs 
directly or through their freely elected representatives, as well as the right to access to public 
functions and positions in conditions of equality, with the requisites established by the 
law).The Preamble, on its part, highlighted the open character of the provisions of the L y 
Orgánica on the rights recognised by Title I of the Constitution, “done in such a way that, on 
the one hand, those rights whose enjoyment must be recognised, because they are inherent to 
personhood, are explicitly established” while dictating “clear guidelines in relation to the 
other rights”600. 
The reference to personhood in the Preamble of 1985Ley Orgánica reflected a distinction 
traced by the Spanish Constitutional Court in the landmark judgment no. 107 of 1984601. 
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Here, the Court drew three groups of constitutional rights with reference to immigrants: 
firstly, constitutional rights which “equally belong to Spanish citizens and foreigners, whose 
regulation must be equal for both”; secondly, “rights that do not belong to foreigners in any 
way (those recognised by article 23 of the Constitution)”; and thirdly, “other [rights] which 
will or will not belong to foreigners depending on what is established by treaties and 
legislations, with a differential treatment with Spanish citizens as to their exercise being 
therefore admissible”602. The first group, in particular, is made up by those rights “that belong 
to persons as such and not as citizens, or (...) those which are essential to the guarantee of 
human dignity which, pursuant to art. 10(1) of [the] Constitution, constitutes the foundation of 
the Spanish political order”603. Art. 10(1), indeed, includes human dignity, together with “the 
inviolable rights which are inherent to it”, among the foundations of the domestic order. 
In its subsequent case law, the Constitutional Court has further clarified the constitutional 
status of foreigners, in the sense of reinforcing the category of rights related to human dignity 
on the one hand, and of limiting the legislator’s di cretion in relation to the third group of 
rights on the other604. In relation to the latter, in particular, the Court has clarified that the 
legislator must respect the essential content of said rights as established by the Constitution, 
referring to international treaties recognising similar rights as an interpretative aid, thus 
making clear that the assignation of certain rights to the third group should not be equated 
with their de-fundamentalisation, because it simply means that such rights are recognised in 
conformity with their legislative configuration605.A further intervention by the Constitutional 
Court606also identified a fourth group of constitutional rights, constituted by those rights 
which are not inherent to human dignity but are recognised by constitutional provisions 
formulated in sufficiently broad terms as to include both citizens and non-citizens under their 
scope. In relation to these rights, the legislator may establish a differential treatment between 
citizens and foreigners, but cannot freely determine the content of said right, which has 
already been defined by the Constitution itself.  
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At the dawn of the new century, the restrictive 1985 Ley Orgánica was repealed by Ley 
Orgánica 4/2000 on the rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain and on their integration607, 
which to this day constitutes the main corpus of rules in the field of immigration in the 
Spanish legal order. The most important change introduced by Ley Orgánica 4/2000 was 
precisely the establishment of a coherent statute of foreigners’ rights inspired by the principle 
of equality and non-discrimination between regularly staying immigrants and Spanish 
citizens, together with the recognition of a minimu core of rights to irregularly staying 
migrants608. L.O. 4/2000 was modified on multiple occasions. A first reform occurred already 
in 2000 with Ley Orgánica 8/2000609. Subsequent changes were brought by Le Orgánica 
11/2003610, Ley Orgánica 14/2003611 and most recently by Ley Orgánica 2/2009612. 
As far as L.O. 4/2000 is concerned, its scope is defined by article 1 as including all 
foreigners, broadly defined as “those lacking Spanish citizenship”, and excluding European 
Union citizens (except for more favourable norms eventually established by the organic law). 
Title I of the law is entirely devoted to “foreigners’ rights and freedoms”, providing a sort of 
bill of rights for immigrants in Spain. Article 3(1) of the L.O. reinstates the constitutional 
principle of equality as interpreted by the Constitutional Court, providing that “foreigners in 
Spain enjoy the rights and freedoms recognised in Title I of the Constitution under the terms 
established by international treaties, by this law and by those which regulate the exercise of 
each one of them”, adding that “as a general interpretative criterion, it will be understood that 
foreigners exercise the rights recognised to them by this law in conditions of equality with 
Spanish citizens”. Foreigners’ right to equality and on-discrimination is then thoroughly 
developed in Chapter IV of the L.O. 
Moreover, article 3(2) of the L.O. confirms the particularly important role played by
international human rights law as an interpretative criterion of fundamental rights on the 
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grounds of article 10 of the Spanish Constitution, stating that “norms concerning fundamental 
rights of foreigners will be interpreted in accordance with international treaties and 
agreements on the same matters which are in force in Spain”. Title I then proceeds to 
recognise foreigners with a wide array of fundamental rights. Among them, the most 
interesting for our purposes are the right to work and to social security established by article 
10, whereby “resident foreigners that satisfy the conditions envisaged by this Ley Orgánica 
and in the provisions that specify it have the right to carry out a remunerated activity, 
autonomous or dependent, as well as to access the social ecurity system in compliance with 
the law in force”. Other key social rights recognised by L.O. 4/2000 are the right to healthcare 
(art. 12), the right to access public housing system  (art. 13) and the right to social security 
and social services (art. 14) – although with different intensity depending on residence status. 
In the field of family life, article 16 is a key provision because it grants regularly resident 
foreigners with the right to family life and to family intimacy as well as with the right to 
family reunification. Importantly, article 16(3) provides that “the spouse who has acquired 
residence in Spain for family reasons and his or her family members reunited with him or her 
will maintain residence even in case the marital link that grounded this acquisition is broken”, 
leaving to regulations to establish an eventual mini um period of cohabitation as a 
prerequisite for enjoying this right.  
The following Titles of the Ley Orgánica are devoted to providing a general regime of 
entry and stay of foreigners in Spain. Title II establishes rules concerning the entry and stay of 
foreigners, delineating the visa and residence permits regime, while Title III focuses on 
irregularly staying migrants and on the corresponding sanctions for irregular stay (from fines 
to expulsion). Finally, Title IV contains provisions aimed at favouring the coordination 
between public powers and bodies in matters concerning migration.  
 
Moving on to the Spanish Constitution, this source establishes a wide array of fundamental 
rights that are of great importance for third-country national migrants and have the potential 
of playing a positive role at judicial level for immigrant women in particular. Before 
discussing key provisions in the field of family life and employment, another crucial group of 
constitutional rules must be analysed, i.e., those norms regulating the reception of 
international human rights law as well as European fundamental rights law in the Spanish 
legal order. Three articles are particularly relevant in this respect.  
Firstly, article 96(1) establishes that “validly concluded international treaties, once 




provisions may only be repealed, amended or suspended in the manner provided in the 
treaties themselves or in accordance with the general rules of international law”613. This 
article regulates the reception of all sources of international treaty law into the domestic 
order614.  
A second, more specific norm, on the other hand, regulates the reception of international 
human rights treaties in the Spanish order: article 10(2), indeed, provides that “the principles 
relating to the fundamental rights and liberties recognised by the Constitution shall be 
interpreted in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
international treaties and agreements thereon ratified by Spain”. It has been importantly 
observed that article 10(2) grants international human rights treaties with a special status in 
comparison to international treaty law in general. In addition to the intangible character 
recognised by article 96(1) to the latter source once received in the domestic order, article 
10(2) grants a “new and different effectiveness to in ernational sources concerning [human] 
rights in comparison to other treaties which form part of the Spanish legal order”, consisting 
in their quality of “standard of interpretation of rights and freedoms established by the 
Spanish Constitution”615 . Thus, in addition to constituting a legal source with full 
effectiveness like all other international treaties ratified by Spain, international human rights 
treaty law has the character of “norm of constitutional interpretation”616. The most important 
consequence of this privileged status in the Spanish legal order concerns the character of 
constitutional standard assumed by international human rights law – although not in a 
completely autonomous manner. In other words, any legal provision contrasting with 
interpretations of constitutional rights demanded by international human rights treaties ratified 
by Spain will be constitutionally illegitimate. Accordingly, all national courts will be obliged 
to enforce constitutional rights in a way which is respectful of international human rights 
treaties, to proceed to the non-application of legal provisions contrasting with such 
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interpretations and – if possible – directly apply relevant international treaties on the matter, 
being obliged otherwise to raise an issue of constitutionality617.  
 
It is also important to stress that the Spanish Constitutional Court has interpreted article 10(2) 
in an extensive way, in two main senses. Firstly, i has established that not only international 
human rights treaties, but all international treatis which may help to clarify the meaning of 
constitutionally-established fundamental rights, should be understood as recalled by article 
10(2)618. Secondly, the Constitutional Court established that not only the constitutional 
provisions enshrined in Title I (entitled “fundamental rights and duties”) but all norms of the 
Spanish legal order concerning fundamental rights must be interpreted according to the 
international sources recalled by article 10(2)619. Interestingly, among international human 
rights treaties, the European Convention on Human Rights has been progressively but steadily 
recognised by the Constitutional Court as having a special relevance for the interpretation of 
the fundamental rights established by the Constitution620. A similar relevance has been 
granted to the Strasbourg Court’s case law, whose judgments have been recalled by the 
Constitutional Court – even shortly after they had been issued621– with increasing frequency, 
not only with the aim to reinforce its own judicial reasoning but also to incorporate new 
meanings or interpretative criteria622. Other international human rights treaties of particular 
importance for immigrant women that have been ratified by Spain and constitute therefore a 
standard of interpretation of constitutional provisions are the Convention for the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (ratified on 5 January 1984) as well as its 
Optional Protocol (ratified on 6 July 2001), the Convention for the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (ratified on 13 September 1968), theInternational Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(both ratified on 27 April 1977), and the European Social Charter (ratified on 6 April 1980). 
The Istanbul Convention, signed on 11 April 2011, is currently awaiting for ratification by the 
Spanish authorities, while Spain is neither a State Party of the International Labour 
Organization’s Domestic Workers Convention of 2011 nor of the UN International 
                                                           
617
 Ibid., pp. 13 – 14.  
618
 SAIZ ARNAIZ, A., La Apertura Constitucional al Derecho Internacional y Europeo de los Derechos Humanos: el 
Artículo10.2 de la Constitución Española, Consejo General del Poder Judicial, Madrid, Spain, 1999, pp. 91 – 93. 
619
 Tribunal Constitucional (Sala Primera), sentencia no. 78 of 20 December 1982.  
620
 TORRES PÉREZ, A., ‘The Judicial Impact of European Law in Spain: ECHR and EU Law Compared’, 30(1) Yearbook 
of European Law (2011) 159, p. 160 ff. 
621
 Saiz Arnaiz, A., La Apertura Constitucional, cit., p. 155 ff. 
622




Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families of 1990.  
The third key provision for the reception of supranational law in Spain is constituted by 
article 93 of the Constitution. Art. 93 establishes that “by means of an organic law, 
authorisation may be granted for concluding treaties by which powers derived from the 
Constitution shall be vested in an international organisation or institution” and that “it is 
incumbent on the Cortes Generales or the Government, as the case may be, to guarantee 
compliance with these treaties and with the resolutions emanating from the international and 
supranational organisations in which the powers have been vested”. While art. 93 was drafted 
with the implicit intention to regulate an eventual accession of Spain to the European Union – 
which eventually occurred in 1986 – the Constitutional Court rejected the idea of a resulting 
constitutional status of EU law on the grounds of this provision623. Instead, it distinguished 
between EU fundamental rights – which are ascribable under the scope of article 10(2) and 
must therefore constitute a standard of interpretation of constitutional rights – and EU law in 
general624 . Although article 93 has been interpreted by the Constitutional Court as 
establishing a primacy of EU law over domestic law, and as granting them with a direct 
effect625, in case of contrast between these two sources an i sue of constitutionality may not 
be raised. The conflict must be qualified as one betwe n infra-constitutional norms, which 
will be resolved before ordinary courts by granting prevalence to EU law626. European Union 
law has also been consistently used by the Constitutional Court as an interpretative parameter 
of constitutional provisions, including those directly concerning fundamental rights627. 
 
Moving on to the most relevant fundamental rights for immigrant women established by the 
Spanish Constitution, they can be divided in two main groups, i.e., those concerning family 
life and those more closely pertaining to employment – although the two categories inevitably 
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overlap. In addition to discussing the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution, which 
may only be found in Chapters 1 and 2 of Title I, I will also refer to Chapter 3 of this Title. 
While indeed the provisions established in the latter may not be considered as establishing 
fundamental rights, they can still provide inspiration to judicial analyses in crucial areas for 
immigrant women’s family life and employment. 
Against the background of the complex constitutional st tus of immigrants in the Spanish 
order, two key constitutional provisions of general relevance are article 14, establishing the 
principle of formal equality, and article 9, focusing on substantial equality. On the one hand, 
article 14 provides that “Spaniards [emphasis mine] are equal before the law and may not in 
any way be discriminated against on account of birth, race, sex, religion, opinion or any other 
personal or social condition or circumstance”. Despit  its literal reference to Spanish citizens, 
article 14 has been extensively recalled for non-citizens and immigrants, including immigrant 
women, confirming the general character of the principle of equality and non-discrimination 
as affirmed in the Spanish Constitution. The Spanish Constitutional Court indeed clarified 
that “the lack of a constitutional declaration proclaiming equality between foreigners and 
Spanish citizens is not, without a doubt, a sufficient argument in support (...) of the 
consideration that inequality of treatment between foreigners and Spanish citizens is 
constitutionally admissible, or even that the very claim of an issue of inequality between 
foreigners and Spanish citizens is constitutionally ruled out”628. The Court stressed in this 
respect the need to consider art. 14 in conjunction with “other provisions without which it not 
possible to determine foreigners’ legal position in Spain”629, primarily art. 13. By doing so, it 
clarified that foreigners are recognised with a right to equal treatment with Spanish citizens in 
respect to all those rights which are essential for the guarantee of human dignity. On the other 
hand, article 9(2) provides that “it is incumbent upon the public authorities to promote 
conditions which ensure that the freedom and equality of individuals and of the groups to 
which they belong may be real and effective, to remove the obstacles which prevent or hinder 
their full enjoyment, and to facilitate the participation of all citizens in political, economic, 
cultural and social life”. 
Within the first two Chapters of Title I, several constitutional rights appear of particular 
importance for immigrant women in the field of family life. Article 18(1), which recognises 
the right to personal and family privacy, is the provision more strictly related to the right to 
family life. Another relevant fundamental right recognised by the Spanish Constitution 
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concern the right to marry ex article 32. Such a right is recognised to men and women “with 
full legal equality”, and the regulation of the forms of marriage, the minimum age required, 
the grounds for separation and dissolution as well as their consequences is entrusted to law.  
Moving on to Chapter III of the Constitution, Article 39(1) provides that public authorities 
have an obligation to “ensure the social, economic and legal protection of the family”. In 
relation to the issue of domestic violence, the right to life and to physical and psychological 
integrity, as well as the right to be free of inhuman or degrading treatment – all enshrined in 
article 15 – also appear of importance. Article 39(2) also recognises children with the right to 
obtain full protection by public authorities and to equality before the law irrespective of their 
parentage, granting the same right to mothers irrespective of their marital status. Furthermore, 
article 39(3) establishes that “parents must provide their children (...) with assistance of every 
kind while they are still underage and in other circumstances in which the law is applicable”, 
while article 39(4) establishes that children “shall enjoy the protection provided for in the 
international agreements which safeguard their rights”. Interestingly, article 39 envisages a 
special protection for mothers. While indeed paragraph 3 of this article establishes both 
parents’ duty to provide assistance to their children, only mothers and children are included 
under the scope of the right to full protection by public authorities envisaged by paragraph 2. 
This differential treatment has been condemned by some as discriminatory because it would 
grant a direct constitutional protection only to female parents630. However, others have rightly 
noted that such a special protection responds to the need to ensure substantial equality 
pursuant article 9 of the Constitution itself. As long as this special protection is not 
understood as burdening mothers with tasks that they s ould be able to share with their 
partners, it is indeed positive in that it recognises the mothers’ peculiar position both within 
and outside of the family and their resulting situation of inequality631. 
Lastly, the fundamental right to health protection is granted to all individuals by article 43, 
which also establishes at paragraph 2 an obligation for public authorities “to organise and 
safeguard public health”. When interpreted as also encompassing the right to reproductive 
health and to maternal health, the right to health constitutes a particularly significant right for 
women’s family life. 
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In the field of employment, the Constitution envisages both collective and individual rights in 
the first two Chapters of Title I. Among the first group, it is possible to cite the right of 
association (art. 22), the right of unionisation as well as the right to strike (art. 28), and the 
right to collective bargaining (art. 37). In relation to individual rights, the key provision is 
constituted by article 35, which establishes that “all Spaniards have the duty to work and the 
right to employment, to free choice of profession or trade, to advancement through their work, 
and to sufficient remuneration for the satisfaction of their needs and those of their families”, 
adding that “under no circumstances may they be discriminated against on account of their 
gender”. Despite the explicit reference to Spanish citizens, immigrant workers are not 
excluded from the scope of article 35. They will indeed enjoy the constitutional right to work 
according to what is established by law, i.e., both by sources applicable to citizens and non-
citizens alike and by those norms establishing specific rules for foreigners such as Spanish 
immigration law632. The Spanish Constitutional Court has indeed qualified the right to work 
as one of the constitutional rights which “will belong or not to foreigners depending on 
whether treaties and law establish so, being thus admissible a differential treatment with 
Spanish citizens in relation to their exercise”633. On these grounds, the Constitutional Court 
has for instance admitted the possibility to establish regular residence as a prerequisite for 
foreigner to enjoy the right to work634. Incidentally, this discourse can also be extended to 
article 41 of the Constitution, which affirms the right to social security for “all citizens” – 
although in Chapter 3 of Title I635. In addition to this, the Constitutional Court has expressed 
the view that the right to work (together with other rights such as the right to health, to receive 
unemployment benefits, and with some limitations the right to reside in Spain) is included 
among those rights that may be restricted or limited by the legislator pursuant art. 13 of the 
Constitution, but whose content as determined by the Constitution or by international treaties 
signed by Spain may not be affected636. 
Moving on to Chapter 3 of Title I, article 40(1) envisages an obligation for public 
authorities to “promote more favourable conditions for social and economic progress and for 
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a more equitable distribution of personal (...) income within the framework of a policy of 
economic stability” and encourages the pursuance of a policy of full employment. Article 
40(2), on its part, establishes public authorities’ obligation to guarantee vocational training 
and retraining, workplace safety and hygiene, and adequate rest through the limitation of 
working days, periodic paid holidays and the promotion of suitable centres.  
 
2. Spanish Immigration Law: an Overview 
 
Due to my focus on regularly staying migrants, I will now move on to briefly analyse the 
baselines of the regime of entry and stay of foreign rs as drawn by L.O. 4/2000. In addition to 
organic laws, another key source of Spanish immigration law is provided by regulations 
adopted for their implementation. A first regulation was adopted through Real Decreto 
2393/2004637, which was repeatedly amended638 and ultimately repealed and replaced by Real 
Decreto 557/2011639.  
Title II of the L.O. is based on the distinction between estancia (stay for a maximum period of 
90 days) and residencia (residence), for which different permits are required. Focusing on 
residence permits, article 31 regulates “temporary esidence”. Despite the qualification as 
temporary, this type of residence can be authorised from a minimum of 90 days to a 
maximum of five years. Residence authorisations for less than five years can be renewed. On 
the other hand, long-term residence – understood as a situation whereby foreigners are 
authorised “to reside and work in Spain indefinitely, in conditions of equality with Spanish 
citizens” is regulated by article 32.  
Concerning temporary residence, art. 45 of R.D. 577/2011 envisages different types of 
residence permits depending on the reasons for staying in Spain, i.e., residence permits for 
non-economic reasons (residencia temporal no lucrativa), for family reunification, residence 
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and work permits for dependent work, for research, for highly qualified workers holding an 
EU Blue Card, for fixed-term dependent work, for self-employment, for transnational 
providers of services and finally residence and work permits without an authorisation to work. 
Residence permits for exceptional circumstances are also crucial: pursuant art. 123 of R.D. 
557/2011 several categories of immigrants are granted with the possibility to access legal 
residence in Spain on the grounds, among others, of their integration and rootedness in the 
host country (arraigo laboral, social or familiar) and of being a victim of gender-based 
violence, regardless of their residence status. 
 
While the ground rules for entry and stay in Spain on the grounds of a residence permit for 
family reunification are included in Title I on foreigners’ rights and freedoms (arts. 16 – 19 of 
L.O. 4/2000), access to residence permits for work reasons is regulated under the heading of 
Title II, entitled to the legal regime of foreigners ( égimen jurídico de los extranjeros, arts. 36 
- 43). As to family reunification, the rules applicable to immigrant women entering and 
residing in Spain in the context of family migration will depend on whether their family 
member is a European Union citizen or a third-country ational. In the latter case, articles 16 
– 19 of the L.O. will apply. In the former instance, on the other hand, the provisions of Real 
Decreto 240/2007 (implementing Directive 2004/38 in the Spanish legal order) will apply. 
Sponsorship of family reunification is open to both spouses and persons “maintaining a 
relationship akin to marriage” (art. 53 of R.D. 557/2011), and is subjected to requirements 
concerning minimum periods of residence in Spain as well as income and housing 
requirements – as is access to independent permits for reunited family members, as a general 
rule.  
Moving on to the field of employment, a key general requirement for the validity of 
residence and work permits (which are generally issued simultaneously) is enrolment in the 
national social security system. Initial residence permits for the purpose of dependent work 
are limited in time and space, since they are valid for one year and will be linked to a specific 
occupation in a determined geographical area (art. 63 of R.D. 557/2011). The first admission 
of migrants for the purpose of work is linked to the national labour market situation in several 
ways. Firstly, applications for residence and work permits will be assessed in the light of a list 
of professions for which the availability of Spanish workers is low (Catálogo de Ocupaciones 
de Difícil Cobertura, prepared by the Servicio Público de Empleo Estatal), pursuant art. 38(1) 
and (2) of the L.O. Secondly, art. 38(2) of the L.O. also provides for the possibility to issue 




insufficient availability of prospective Spanish workers in that area. Thirdly, the national 
labour market situation must be taken into account in another key procedure, i.e., the 
collective management of initial hiring (gestión colectiva de contrataciones en origen), 
regulated by art. 39 of the L.O. and by Title VIII of R.D. 557/2011. The collective 
management of hiring consists in the annual establihment of the number of positions which 
can be covered by workers who do not live or reside in Spain – requiring prospective 
employers to personally submit job offers pursuant art. 170(3) of R.D. 557/2011. 
 
In respect to the anti-discrimination regime currently in force in Spain, this country has 
transposed the EU legal framework on this matter through two legal sources. As far as race 
discrimination is concerned, Directive 2000/43 was received in the Spanish legal order 
through law n. 62/2003640. This source, in addition to providing legal definitions of equality, 
direct and indirect discrimination, and harassment on the grounds of race and ethnic origin, 
envisaged specific provisions applying the principle of race equality in the field of 
employment. Accordingly, it reformed individual articles of the Spanish Workers’ Statute641 
and of the Law of Labour Procedure642, among other sources.  
Moving on to sex discrimination, law n. 3/2007643 was considered by the Spanish 
Government as transposing Directive 2006/54 in the domestic order – although the law itself 
did not explicitly declare this644. Like law n. 62/2003, this source is also focused on 
implementing the principle of sex equality and non-discrimination in the field of employment, 
with a particular stress on the promotion of equal opportunities. 
 
Immigrant women are explicitly mentioned by Ley Orgánica 4/2000 in three instances: in 
relation to the principle of equality between men and women, as victims of gender-based 
violence and as mothers. More specifically, equality between sexes is recalled by art. 2 as one 
of the principles Public Administrations must respect when exercising their competences in 
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the field of immigration, as well as by art. 2-ter(2) as one of the values that they must convey 
to immigrants in the context of formative actions aimed at their integration. Immigrant 
women victims of gender-based violence, on their part, are a category to which the L.O. 
grants a specific protection by granting them with the possibility to obtain a residence permit 
for exceptional circumstances (regulated mainly by art. 31-bis of the L.O.). Lastly, immigrant 
mothers receive a special protection during pregnancy i  the sense that art. 57(6) and 58(4) 
prohibit the implementation of expulsion orders against pregnant women whenever this may 
imply a risk for the pregnancy or for the mother’s health. An identical attitude is apparent in 
the provisions of R.D. 557/2011. 
Immigrant women, however, experience a much wider range of issues and difficulties in 
Spain of which Spanish law is not always aware. As a consequence, apparently gender-neutral 
norms can produce a disparate impact on this category. While the specific protection of 
immigrant women during pregnancy and in case of gender-based violence is certainly 
appreciable, in other instances it is possible to observe serious gendered shortcomings in 
provisions of law applicable to this group645.  
In paragraphs 3 and 4, I will therefore analyse problematic norms in the fields of family 
life and employment respectively, while exploring the influence of fundamental rights 
recognised in the Spanish legal order on such norms. In particular, I will consider specific 
provisions of Spanish immigration law, along with Spanish norms beyond immigration law 
that are nonetheless applicable and relevant to immigrant women. At the same time, I will 
analyse relevant judgments by higher and ordinary Spanish Courts with the ultimate aim of 
assessing whether and to what extent fundamental and human rights in force in the Spanish 
legal order have been able to correct the observed shortcomings, allowing immigrant women 
to fully enjoy their rights in the field of family life and employment. 
 
3. Immigrant Women’s Fundamental Right to Family Life:  Problematic Provisions 
of Spanish Law 
 
In relation to the fundamental right to family life, three main aspects of Spanish immigration 
law appear to be particularly interesting from a gendered point of view. The first concerns the 
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possibility for immigrant mothers to access residence rights on the grounds of their unpaid 
care work, and more specifically on the grounds of the care provided to their children. A 
second key issue relates to immigrant women’s access to ponsorship for family reunification 
with family members versus the emphasis of the Spanish legal system on economic 
prerequisites. Lastly, an interesting matter is constituted by the evolution of Spanish law as to 
the intensity of the protection offered to immigrant women victims of domestic violence. 
While the first two aspects have been chosen becaus of the availability of compelling judicial 
examples of fundamental rights-based interpretation of particularly crucial norms for 
immigrant women’s family life, the influence of fundamental rights in relation to protection 
against domestic violence will be discussed from a ore legislative point of view.  
In all of these three cases, the applicable provisins of Spanish law have evolved from an 
initial gender-blindness to a stronger sensitivity to immigrant women’s specific difficulties 
and issues. The newly reformed rules still do not specifically mention women. However, the 
risk of perverse effects for this category – which was in my view significant in the past – has 
been considerably reduced. Interestingly, in all three instances these reforms incorporated 
principles that had been previously established at judicial level on the grounds of domestic 
and supranational fundamental rights law, suggesting a process whereby both judges and 
legislators are steering towards the same direction. In this section, I will therefore discuss the 
role played by fundamental rights law in significant judicial examples in the sense of 
prompting a more gender-sensitive interpretation of biased norms of Spanish law, anticipating 
normative reforms of these sources. On the other hand, I will also enquire into the persisting 
shortcomings of current norms of Spanish law as well as of domestic case law in sensitive 
areas of immigrant women’s family life.  
 
a. From the Exception to the Rule: Immigrant Mothers’ Access to Residence Rights 
on the Grounds of Childcare 
 
At present time, R.D. 557/2011 grants third-country national parents with the possibility to 
acquire a residence permit on the grounds of being a parent to a child with Spanish 
citizenship. In particular, art. 124(3)(a) establishe  that residence permits for arraigo familiar 
will be issued to “fathers or mothers of a minor with Spanish citizenship, if the latter is in the 
care of the applicant parent and lives with him or her, or if the parent fulfils his or her parental 
obligations towards the child”. Before 2011, however, neither the regulation of arraigo nor 




fact, for the purpose of obtaining a residence permit for arraigo, art. 45(2)(b) of R.D. 
2393/2004 only considered being a parent as a relevant feature insofar as it was combined 
with other prerequisites consisting in a minimum period of residence of three years, a clean 
criminal record – both in Spain and in the country of origin, and a signed employment 
contract for a minimum duration of one year. On the other hand, this provision did not restrict 
the possibility to obtain a residence permit for arraigo only to parents of Spanish citizens, but 
it extended it to parents of all children. 
In any case, the strict and numerous requirements in the old regulation of arraigo made it 
particularly difficult for third-country national mothers to obtain residence permits on the 
grounds of the care provided to their children. This regulation required them to work and care 
for children at the same time, which was arguably more difficult for them both as mothers and 
as migrants because of the described difficulties experienced by this category in accessing the 
Spanish labour market and in reaching a satisfying work/family balance. As a consequence, 
immigrant women in Spain pursuing residence permits on the grounds of their unpaid care 
work resorted to attempt a different legal strategy, applying for residence permits on the 
grounds of art. 31(3) of the L.O. This provision, indeed, not only grants the possibility to 
obtain “a temporary residence permit for arraigo, for humanitarian reasons, for reasons of 
collaboration with justice” but contains a final open clause adding “or in other exceptional 
circumstances which will be determined by regulations”.  
The “other exceptional circumstances” clause was repeatedly relied on by immigrant 
women pursuing residence permits on the grounds of motherhood, but many requests were 
rejected by the Spanish authorities. This gave rise to a consistent number of applications 
before domestic courts by third-country national immigrant women arguing that the refusal to 
grant them a residence permit breached their fundamental rights in the field of family. I am of 
the view that the case law that followed is extremely interesting not only because it 
constitutes a fitting example of how fundamental rights can positively influence gender-blind 
norms of immigration law and correct their gendered shortcomings. These fundamental 
rights-based judicial interpretations, indeed, brought Spanish courts to establish principles 
which anticipated a legal reform that ultimately recognised immigrant women’s right to 
access residence rights purely on the grounds of unpaid care work, without any further 
requirements646.  
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One of the earliest traceable judgments on this matter was pronounced by the Tribunal 
Superior de Justicia of the Basque Country in 2007647. The case concerned an Ecuadorian 
mother living in Spain with her Spanish citizen daughter. The mother had applied for a 
residence permit for exceptional circumstances ex art. 31(3) of the L.O. on the grounds of 
being the parent of a Spanish child. Both the Spanish authorities and the lower administrative 
court648 had assessed that she did not satisfy the minimum requirements for obtaining a 
residence permit as established by art. 45 of R.D. 2393/2004. First and foremost, the rejection 
had been based on the consideration that the applicnt mother had not been residing in Spain 
for a minimum of two or three years as required by art. 45, and that this prerequisite had to be 
preliminarily ascertained before examining the presence of all the other requirements 
established by this provision. Secondarily, the competent authorities argued that the applicant 
mother relied on social assistance benefits that did not even amount to the minimum wage. 
Before the Tribunal Superior, the applicant mother stressed that she had not applied for a 
residence permit for arraigo pursuant art. 45 of R.D. 2393/2004, but rather for a residence 
permit for exceptional circumstances ex art. 31(3) of the L.O. More specifically, she argued 
that the expression “other exceptional circumstances” used by art. 31(3) could not be 
understood as being exclusively regulated and specified by art. 45 of the R.D., and that being 
the mother of a Spanish child could well be interprted as constituting another exceptional 
circumstance, besides the arraigo, that could justify the granting of a permit for init al 
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residence. Importantly, the applicant mother also noted that the previous judgment had 
“disregarded all international agreements which refer to the right to family life”649. 
In order to resolve this issue, the Tribunal did not merely refer to previous jurisprudence 
establishing that the provisions of art. 45 of R.D. 2393/2004 neither constituted the only 
specification of art. 31(3) of the L.O., nor did it enjoy an exclusive role in this sense. What is 
more interesting for our purposes is that the Tribunal also relied on the European Court of 
Justice’s case law and on its interpretation of the fundamental rights and freedoms of Union 
citizens. In particular, the Zhu and Chen judgment650 was extensively cited by the Tribunal 
and played a key role in its judicial reasoning. Firstly, the Tribunal embraced the applicant 
mother’s statement whereby she had applied for a residence permit not on the grounds of 
arraigo, but rather on the grounds of being the parent of a Union citizen child. Secondly, the 
Tribunal observed that while this circumstance was not expressly envisaged by the R.D., art. 
31(3) could have a direct application to the case at issue. This argumentation was grounded, 
in the Tribunal’s view, on “the freedom of movement a d of residence of the minor Spanish 
citizen recognized by article 19 of the Spanish Constitution”651, as well as on “the protection 
of Spanish children’s right to family life established by article 18(1) of the Spanish 
Constitution”652. The fact that this constitutional right demanded a irect application of art. 
31(3) was further corroborated by the ECJ’s reasoning in Zhu and Chen, since “the refusal to 
allow a third-country national parent to reside with a Spanish minor would deprive of any 
useful effect both the minor’s right to reside in Spain and his or her right to family life”653. 
Another compelling aspect of the Tribunal’s reasoning concerned the State’s obligation to 
allow the applicant mother to work. Indeed, the judgment stated that “the consequences of the 
refusal to allow a third-country national parent residing with a Spanish minor would include a 
violation of article 14 of the Spanish Constitution”654, i.e., of the principle of equality and 
non-discrimination, since by denying a residence permit, the Spanish authorities would 
implicitly deny the mother the possibility to enter the national labour market. As a 
consequence, “a category of Spanish minors, illegitimately discriminated due to the 
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impossibility of the ascendants in charge of their ca e to access the labour market, would be 
created”655 and this would “deprive, ab initio, a minor child with the possibility of freely 
developing his or her personality in conditions of equality with Spanish minors whose 
ascendants enjoy access to the labour market”656. 
Against this background, the Tribunal concluded that the legal recognition of the 
applicant’s mother situation was coherent with the constitutional guarantee of equality and 
non-discrimination established by art. 14 with respect to Spanish minors. Therefore, it 
recognised the mother’s right to obtain a residence permit for exceptional circumstances on 
the grounds of being the parent of a Spanish child. In sum, this judgment rested on three 
pillars – all related to the Spanish child’s fundamental rights: the right to family life, the right 
to freedom of movement and residence and the right to equality (respectively ex arts. 18, 19 
and 14 of the Constitution). Interestingly, these fundamental rights of the child also prompted 
the indirect recognition of the mother’s fundamental right to family life and to work. 
 
The observed judicial reasoning was reproduced in aconsistent number of judgments by 
Tribunales Superiores de Justicia657. Interestingly, when similar applications were submitted 
by third-country national mothers before the Audiencia Nacional, this court chose to disregard 
their fundamental rights-based argumentations in favour of a judicial reasoning based on 
systematic interpretation in order to conclude for the indeterminate and open character of the 
concept of “exceptional circumstances”. That was the case, for example, of a 2011 
judgment658 where the Audiencia avoided embarking on an analysis of a Cuban mother’s 
claim whereby the refusal to grant her with a residnce permit for exceptional circumstances 
violated the constitutional obligation to social, economical and legal protection of the family 
as well as her and her Spanish son’s right to protecti n ex art. 39 of the Spanish Constitution. 
A similar attitude was already observable in two 2009 judgments where the applicant 
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mothers’ claims of violation of their and their children’s fundamental rights under articles 10, 
13, 14, 18 and 39 of the Spanish Constitution remained unaddressed659.  
In any case, judicial decisions by Tribunales Superiores de Justicia on the matter became 
particularly frequent around 2011, when R.D. 557 explicitly introduced residence permits for 
third-country national parents of minor Spanish children, recognising that parenthood is in 
itself sufficient to suggest the existence of arraigo familiar without any further requirements. 
Importantly, even after the adoption of R.D. 557/2011, fundamental rights continued to play a 
prominent role in Spanish courts’ reasoning. In fact the latter considered the R.D. as a mere 
confirmation of the interpretation of the norms at issue, which was demanded by fundamental 
rights both at the constitutional and European level660.  
In addition to the right to family life xart.18(1) and to the principle of equality and non-
discrimination ex art. 14, other fundamental rights protected by the Spanish Constitution were 
also relevant in this case law. Among them, parents’ duties and rights as established by art. 
39(3) were repeatedly recalled by Spanish Courts. For instance, in a case concerning the 
refusal to issue a residence permit for exceptional circumstances to a third-country national 
mother of a Spanish child due to her criminal record, the Tribunal Superior de Justicia of 
Castilla y León661 considered that “the fact that the applicant is the mother of a minor with 
Spanish citizenship produces extremely complex consequences, because in our legal order 
parents’ rights and duties (...) towards their children are established”662. The Tribunal then 
proceeded to recall parents’ constitutional obligation o provide their children with assistance 
of any kind ex art. 39(3), and stressed that such rights and duties relate to a wide variety of 
international treaties establishing similar rights (the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the European Co vention on Human Rights and of 
course the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child). In this light, the Court concluded that 
refusal to grant a residence permit to the mother “gives rise to a clear tension between the 
administration’s decision (...) and the relationship between the applicant and her minor 
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Spanish daughter, presenting mother and daughter wih a veritably diabolic alternative (...): 
the mother, and only her considering the young age of the daughter, will be forced to decide 
between depriving her Spanish child of the right to gr w up and receive an education on the 
territory of her own country, to which she has a right that cannot be derogated (...), or to fail 
to fulfil her motherly obligations to support and eucate her child, being prevented from 
working, and to part from her”663. 
 
The analysed case law constituted an important playing field where fundamental rights 
recognised by the Constitution were combined with the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
Union citizens as interpreted by the European Court f Justice, as well as with European and 
international human rights law. This combination provided a vital support for the applicant 
mothers’ claims, strengthening Spanish courts’ extensive interpretation of gender-blind norms 
on the grounds of a fundamental rights discourse. As a result, immigrant women were no 
longer requested to perform productive and reproductive care at the same time in order to 
enjoy family life with their children in Spain, and the indirect discrimination implied in this 
legal requisite was eliminated.  
However, the extensive reliance on European citizenship resulted in a case law and later in 
a legislative reform that only partially recognised immigrant women’s needs and difficulties 
by restricting the possibility to obtain residence permits to parents of Union citizen children. 
In this sense, I would argue that the influence of fundamental rights at constitutional, 
European and international level only prompted a half-victory for immigrant mothers residing 
in Spain. This result is not imputable to Spanish courts’ decision to focus on fundamental 
rights and freedoms of Union citizen children, but ra her on the structural features of the 
Spanish constitutional system. In particular, I have shown that the Spanish Constitutional 
Court has restricted the scope of the right to equality and non-discrimination between Spanish 
citizens and foreigners only to those fundamental rights which are essential to human dignity, 
admitting the possibility of a differential treatment and of restrictions to the enjoyment of 
other constitutional rights – including the right to family life as established by articles 18 and 
39 of the Spanish Constitution – for foreigners, who will be able to access said rights 
depending on what is established by treaties and by the law. Therefore, even if the Spanish 
Courts had relied less on Union citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms and more on 
constitutional provisions recognising a general right to family life, a differential treatment 
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between third-country national mothers depending on the citizenship of their children may 
have still been established. Thus it must be concluded that, regrettably, while fundamental 
rights had an extremely positive influence on the situation of third-country national mothers 
of Union citizens, it left that of the mothers of third-country national children unchanged. To 
this day, the latter group is still forced to comply with requirements that are 
disproportionately difficult to fulfil for immigrant mothers in general. In order to obtain a 
residence permit on the grounds of the care provided to their children, such mothers must 
indeed to satisfy the requisites established by art. 124(2) of R.D. 557/2011 for residence 
permits for arraigo social, i.e., they will also have to demonstrate that they old a clean 
criminal record and an employment contract for the duration of at least one year. 
 
The fundamental rights-based interpretation promoted by Spanish courts also presents specific 
gendered shortcomings. As I have already stressed in chapter II when analysing the ECJ’s 
case law on this very matter (Carpenter664, Baumbast and R.665, Zhu and Chen666, 
McCarthy667, Dereci668 and O. and S.669), establishing that immigrant mothers’ residence 
rights are strictly linked to the usefulness of their r productive and care work for Spanish 
children’s exercise of their own fundamental rights and freedoms arguably constitutes a 
double-edged sword for third-country national women. On the one hand, the judicial and 
normative recognition of unpaid care work within the ousehold as an activity with intrinsic 
importance for the exercise of their fundamental rights and freedoms, and as an autonomous 
and self-sufficient ground for the mother to obtain residence rights, certainly constitutes a 
positive result. On the other hand, however, creating such a route of access to residence rights 
also shifts the normative focus from mothers to children, and fails to offer any long-term 
guarantees to immigrant women who obtain these type of permits. In other words, even those 
immigrant women enjoying more favourable legal treatment do so merely on the grounds of 
being caretakers of Union citizens, and they risk losing that privileged status once their care is 
no longer needed. And, indeed, article 130 of R.D. 557/2011 establishes that residence 
permits for exceptional circumstances, precisely because of their exceptional character, are 
only valid for one year, and may be renewed only provided that “the competent authorities 
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ascertain that the reasons for its granting persist”. Conversely, immigrant mothers are 
confined to fulfilling the role of carers for as long as they are “needed”, as stated by art. 
130(2) whereby “only in case the authorities conclude that the reasons motivating the granting 
of the permit ceased to exist, [holders] may apply for a residence permit or a work and 
residence permit”. The latter norm is arguably central in making residence rights conditional 
on the continuous performance of unpaid care work, thus enforcing a rigid distinction 
between productive and reproductive work within thefamily. A preferable solution in this 
sense may be that of allowing holders of these exceptional permits to also apply for other 
permits, including work and residence permits, even if at the time of expiration the reasons 
justifying their initial granting remain. By doing so, immigrant women would at least be 
allowed to progressively build other grounds for their residence rights and to avoid the risk of 
losing their residence permits once their care is no longer necessary for their spouses or 
children.  
In conclusion, constitutional and European fundamental rights certainly played a vital role 
in prompting a more extensive interpretation of Spanish immigration law, which allowed 
immigrant women to access residence permits on the sole grounds of their unpaid care work 
within the household – a possibility that was previously precluded to them. The successful 
results that ensued were however limited to a specific group of immigrant women, i.e., 
mothers of Spanish children. In addition to this, the ambivalent character of framing residence 
rights as purely derivative from the enjoyment of others’ rights and freedoms, which was 
observed in the ECJ’s case law, was reproduced in Spanish judgments. I would therefore 
argue that the certainly remarkable influence of fundamental rights on the initially gender-
blind norms of Spanish immigration law in this specific matter produced quite mixed results. 
 
b. Immigrant Women Versus Income-Based Rules on Sponsorship of Family 
Reunification 
 
Immigrant women in Spain pursuing to sponsor family reunification with family members left 
behind encounter one common issue that has been observed both at supranational and at 
domestic level, in relation to European and Italian immigration law respectively. This issue 
involves the possible contrasts between immigration rules focused on financial prerequisites 
for sponsoring family reunification and the reality of their situation, characterised by a 
concentration in the worst sectors of the labour maket and by disproportionate care burdens 




shown in the introduction to this chapter, immigrant women in Spain are not immune to the 
risk of being unable to comply with the income requirements imposed by immigration law for 
family reunification, particularly so after the beginning of the economic crisis. 
In fact, minimum economic requirements appear to play quite an important role in Spanish 
rules on family reunification. Art. 18 of L.O. 4/2000 allows a regularly resident foreigner to 
sponsor family reunification provided that he or she has obtained the renewal of their initial 
residence permit and, pursuant its paragraph 2, that he or she “has adequate housing and 
sufficient economic means to provide for his or her n eds as well as those of his or her family, 
once reunited”. Art. 54(1) of R.D. 557/2011 clarifies that sufficient economic means for 
sponsoring family reunification amount to a monthly 150% of the IPREM670 in case of 
families with two members (including the sponsor and the reunited family member), together 
with a monthly 50% of the IPREM for each additional family members in families with more 
than two members. Furthermore, art. 54(2) establishes t at residence permits for the purpose 
of family reunification “will not be issued if it is ascertained beyond any doubt that there is no 
prospect of maintaining the economic means during the year following the submission of the 
application” and that this prospect “will be assessed by taking into consideration the evolution 
of the sponsor’s means for the six months preceding the date of submission of the 
application”. Such a focus on economic requirements a d financial stability of income can 
produce a disparate impact on immigrant women, whose employment situation is more 
precarious and rewarded less than that of their male counterparts.  
However, Ley Orgánica 2/2009 introduced an important change in the regulation of family 
reunification, reforming art. 18 of L.O. 4/2000 in the sense of allowing for the possibility to 
consider the entire family’s financial resources for the purpose of assessing the compliance 
with the economic requirements established by this very provision. In particular, after the 
reform art. 18(2) of the L.O. provides that “in the assessment of the income for the purpose of 
reunification, that coming from the social assistance system will not be considered, while 
other income brought by the spouse residing in Spain and cohabiting with the sponsor will be 
taken into account”. The restriction to the cohabiting spouse as the only family member 
allowed to contribute to the compliance with economic requirements for the purpose of family 
reunification was subsequently eliminated by art. 54(4) of R.D. 557/2011. This provision 
confirms the impossibility to count social assistance benefits among the financial resources 
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relevant for this purpose, but also states that economic means in this context can include 
“those brought by the sponsor’s spouse or partner, as well as by any other direct family 
member of first degree, provided that he or she resides in Spain and cohabits with the 
sponsor”.  
 
Art. 54(4) of R.D. 557/2011 recalls an analogous provision established by Italian immigration 
law. More specifically, art. 29(3)(b) of the Testo Unico Immigrazione similarly provides that 
“for the purpose of determining income, the total yearly income of the family members living 
together with the person applying for family reunification must also be taken into 
consideration”. The criterion of cohabitation is indeed adopted by both Spanish and Italian 
law in order to assess the individuals admitted to contributing to the satisfaction of economic 
thresholds for accessing family reunification.  
This type of provision is particularly positive for immigrant women, because it appears to 
reach a balance between the state’s need to ensure that the reunited family members will not 
become a burden for the national social assistance system and the sponsor’s right to enjoy 
family life in the host country with his or her family members – an aspiration that may be 
disproportionately curbed for women. Similar norms perform a symbolic disestablishment of 
the one breadwinner model, marking an important step towards ensuring immigrant women’s 
equal enjoyment of their fundamental right to family life. In my commentary on Italian case 
law on the matter, I observed that in some instances fundamental rights recognised by the 
Constitution were able to push immigrant women’s enjoyment of their right to family 
reunification even further by allowing those entirely devoted to reproductive and care work 
within the household to sponsor family reunification. In the examined judgments, Italian 
courts indeed relied on fundamental rights to argue that even in cases where immigrant 
mothers were not performing any kind of employed activity, they could still sponsor family 
reunification because their contribution to households where other family members were in 
charge of performing productive work could not be qualified as inactivity. Just like Italian 
rules on the matter, the described norms of Spanish immigration law appear to neither 
decisively deny nor explicitly admit this possibility. Regrettably, the specific case of 
immigrant women entirely devoted to unpaid reproductive work does not appear to have been 
brought to the Spanish courts’ attention.  
 
However, this does not mean that interesting cues for assessing fundamental and human 




not be extracted from domestic judgments on legal prerequisites based on income. In 
judgment 1258/2012671, the Tribunal Superior de Justicia of Castilla y León examined the 
case of a Colombian mother whose application for a residence permit for family reunification 
on behalf of her children had been rejected on the grounds that she had not shown that she had 
sufficient economic means to support the whole family pursuant the rules in force at the time, 
i.e., art. 42(2)(d) of R.D. 2393/2004672. Interestingly, the applicant mother argued that 
pursuant art. 54(4) of R.D. 557/2011 – entered intoforce pending the judicial controversy, 
both her and her partner’s income should have been taken into consideration. More 
specifically, she submitted that although her partner was not the biological father of the 
children with whom she sought reunification, he contributed to their support as well as to that 
of their common child through his unemployment benefits. Even more importantly, on these 
grounds the applicant mother lamented a breach of te constitutional principle of protection of 
the family enshrined in art. 39 of the Constitution. The Tribunal, however, considered that no 
violation of this constitutional right had occurred. Indeed, the applicant had only proved a 
monthly salary of 700 Euros for her employment as a domestic worker and her partner’s 
income could not be taken into account because it consisted of social assistance benefits. The 
fundamental right to protection of the family was thus not able to prompt a more favourable 
interpretation for the involved applicant mother. In fact, the Tribunal assessed that the 
discussed economic requirements precisely had the aim of protecting the family from 
economic difficulties in the host country, and to “avoid exposing the rest of the family to 
certain adverse circumstances in the host country that could first and foremost undermine the 
personal development of minors in an unknown country and to which they are not linked in 
any way besides by the will of the sponsor to bring them there”673.  
 
Assessed almost contemporarily to judgment no. 1258/2012, and by the same Tribunal, was a 
case where fundamental rights conversely prompted a positive and extensive interpretation of 
the rules at issue. Judgment no. 378/2012674, indeed, concerned the rejection of another 
Colombian mother’s application for a residence permit for the purpose of family 
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reunification, which she had submitted on behalf of her son. The reason for this rejection, in 
addition to the fact that the mother had not transferred money or supported the child in a way 
that suggested an economic dependence, was once again that the applicant had not shown that 
she had sufficient economic means pursuant art. 18(2) of the L.O. More importantly, the 
Spanish authorities and the administrative court assessing her case had rejected as irrelevant 
the applicant’s submission that her adult children co tributed to the family’s finances with 
their salaries. At the time of the rejection of theapplication, indeed, R.D. 557/2011 had not 
introduced the explicit possibility of taking into account other family members’ income for 
the purpose of satisfying economic requirements for accessing family reunification, and art. 
18 of the L.O. explicitly referred only to the husband’s income. The appealed decision of the 
administrative court had therefore adopted a restrictive interpretation of the involved norms of 
Spanish immigration law, considering that the adult children’s income could not be taken into 
account because the latter were not the ones sponsoring family reunification and had not 
undertaken any obligation to provide a certain sum to their minor brother. At most, their 
income could have played a positive role in so far as it would prove that they did not 
constitute an additional economic burden for the family.  
Before the Tribunal Superior de Justicia, the applicant mother contested this judicial view 
of the family as a fragmented sum of individually considered persons, rather than as a whole 
and organic entity to the sustenance and functioning of which all members collaborate. She 
considered that in her case “neither a joint and comprehensive analysis of the family unit of 
the sponsor, nor of dependent family members’ ability to work, nor of the actual economic 
capacity of said unit, had been carried out, due to the exclusion of [her] husband’s and two 
son’s income”675. Furthermore, she argued that “the cohabitation of multiple persons under 
the same roof creates a presumption that this entails a sharing of expenses and burdens, when 
also two adult children of the sponsor taken on the s aring of said expenses”676. Even more 
importantly, the applicant mother recalled the “constitutional principle of protection of the 
family and of the minor for which reunification is pursued”677, submitting that in the light of 
her family’s situation this principle was sufficient to ground the granting of the residence 
permit for family reunification. 
Against this background, the Tribunal observed that while at the time of the mother’s 
application art. 18(2) of the L.O. and art. 42 of R.D. 2393/2004 did not explicitly admit the 
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possibility to consider other family members’ income besides that of the husband, neither did 
they explicitly rule it out. In fact, this possibility was subsequently admitted by art. 54 of R.D. 
557/2011, which the court referred to merely as an interpretative aid. With respect to the issue 
of the mother’s satisfaction of the financial prerequisites, the Tribunal importantly stated that 
“the minimum doubts that in this case may exist should have been assessed in favour of the 
right of the minor and also in favour of the right to family life recognised to this minor, to the 
sponsor, to her husband and to their four children”678. In this light, the constitutional right to 
family life of the involved persons prompted a judicial interpretation of the family in a more 
organic sense than that carried out by the previous judicial and executive authorities. Indeed, 
the Tribunal considered the applicant mother’s family as “a fully organised and structured 
family unit with an actual rootedness in Spain that pursues, as it is logical, to be joined in 
Spain by the minor son of [the applicant’s husband] with the firm aim of realising the right to 
family life of this unit”679. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that the Spanish authorities’ 
rejection of the mother’s application was illegitimate due to the refusal to include the adult 
children’s income in the assessment of the compliance with the minimum economic threshold 
as referred to by art. 18 of the L.O. 
 
Against this background, it can be observed that the fundamental right to protection of the 
family and to family life as enshrined in art. 39 of the Constitution was not able to ground the 
possibility to consider social assistance benefits as relevant for the purpose of complying with 
income requirements established by rules on family reunification. After all, the explicit 
exclusion of this possibility by the reform introduced with L.O. 2/2009 did not leave any 
margin of appreciation in this sense. However, the constitutional principle of protection of the 
family was far from ineffective in promoting a less restrictive interpretation of the Spanish 
family reunification regime. What is more, I would argue that such an interpretation might 
offer further perspectives of development from a gendered point of view.  
It is extremely significant that the fundamental right to family protection grounded a 
different judicial view of the family – as a whole to which every family member contributes 
rather than as the mere sum of individually considere  persons. Embracing this legal view and 
establishing that the constitutional right to family protection requires immigration law to be 
interpreted accordingly is particularly important for immigrant women. In judgment no. 
378/2012, this meant that the applicant – a mother of four with three different jobs as 
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domestic worker with a total salary of 1,300 Euros per month – could rely on the economic 
contributions of her adult sons as well as that of her husband, instead of having to show that 
she could support her entire family by herself. In addition to this, I would argue that a similar 
positive effect could have been produced in a case wh re the immigrant mother would be 
entirely devoted to reproductive and care work while other family members contributed to the 
family’s well-being through productive, paid work. Because the Tribunal’s conclusions in this 
case were strictly linked to its consideration of the family as a whole, and on the 
constitutional obligation to protect it as such, a similar outcome could have been reached 
where the sponsor’s share consisted in performing upaid care work within the family. 
Undoubtedly, it would be difficult to maintain that  fundamental-rights based interpretation 
of Spanish rules on family reunification could or even should support the elimination of 
economic prerequisites altogether. As clarified by the Tribunal Superior de Justicia in its 
judgment no. 1258/2012, requiring a minimum economic capacity of the sponsor does not 
simply respond to the need to ensure that the reunited family members will not weigh on the 
host country’s social assistance system. It also aims to allow said family members to enjoy a 
minimum level of wellbeing in the host country – anim that is ascribable to the State’s 
constitutional obligation to protect all families.  
Nonetheless, I would argue that requiring sponsors t  how their capability to support 
reunited family members by themselves through strictly economic prerequisites is not the 
most effective way to achieve this goal. Not only do such requirements produce the perverse 
effects of indirectly discriminating against immigrant women in their enjoyment of the right 
to family reunification, but they are also based on the shortsighted assessment of wellbeing as 
being a purely financial matter.  
In this sense, the observed positive influence of the constitutional right to family life in 
judgment no. 378/2012 constitutes a meaningful example of the transformative power of 
fundamental rights law at domestic level. This decision suggests the potential of fundamental 
rights-based judicial analyses such as that carried out by the Tribunal not only to 
accommodate immigrant women workers’ needs and respond to their disproportionate 
difficulties, but also to acknowledge the value of reproductive and care work conducted 
within the household as a contribution to the socio-ec nomic wellbeing of family units where 
other family members take on paid employment. Because this burden at present time 
disproportionately falls on women, this may also constitute a particularly favourable 
development for female third-country nationals’ access to sponsorship of family reunification 




In sum, the influence of fundamental rights in the field of immigrant women’s access to 
family reunification is not evident on an extensive scale. However, I am of the view that the 
available judicial examples on this matter have elabor ted fundamental rights-based 
discourses characterised by a good potential of further development – particularly with 
respect to accommodating both the particular needs of immigrant mothers in paid 
employment and those of immigrant mothers entirely d voted to unpaid care work within the 
household. 
 
c. Immigrant Women and Freedom from Domestic Violence 
 
Broadly speaking, Spanish law appears to offer a comprehensive system of protection to 
immigrant women victims of domestic violence. The Spanish Criminal Code680 envisages 
several offences in relation to domestic violence. In addition to provisions punishing various 
conducts in which domestic violence may be manifested– i.e., homicide, battery, sexual 
aggression and abuse, deprivation of liberty and so forth – the Criminal Code also establishes 
specific norms on domestic violence. In the latter fi ld, numerous reforms have been 
approved in relation to both the Criminal Code and the Criminal Code of Procedure681. The 
most recent changes were introduced with Ley Orgánica 1/2004682 , which aimed at 
establishing a comprehensive system of prevention and suppression of domestic violence and 
violence against women in general, including but not limited to a criminal law response. In 
addition to reforming relevant provisions of the Criminal Code, L.O. 1/2004 indeed envisaged 
a heterogeneous set of measures which included the impl mentation of awareness-raising 
programmes in the educational system, in the media and in the healthcare system, the 
provision of information as well as social and legal assistance to victims, the granting of the 
possibility to modify work-related aspects in order to accommodate victims’ needs, as well as 
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the granting of economic aid to victims. Immigrant women are however specifically 
mentioned by the L.O. only in art. 32(4), whereby collaboration programmes elaborated by 
public authorities with the aim of preventing and persecuting gender-based violence must 
“grant special consideration to the situation of women who, due to their personal and social 
circumstances, may run a higher risk of suffering from gender-based violence or may 
experience stronger difficulties in accessing the services envisaged by this Law, like women 
members of minorities, immigrant women, women experiencing social exclusion or disabled 
women”.  
 
As to the specific provisions of the Criminal Code related to domestic violence, art. 153(1) 
and 173(2) constitute the two most important references. Under Title III of the Code (which 
regulates criminal offences causing injury), art. 153(1) punishes those who “by any means or 
process cause psychological or physical harm that are not defined as a criminal offence by 
this Code to others, or batter or abuse others without causing them injury, when the victim is 
the spouse, or a woman that is or has been in an anlogous relationship with them also 
without cohabitation, or a particularly vulnerable p rson that lives with the perpetrator” with 
detention from six months to one year or by socially useful work from thirty to eighty days, as 
well as with the prohibition to detain or carry weapons from one to three years and eventually 
with the deprivation of parental rights. 
On its part, art. 173(2)– under the heading “torture and other offences against moral integrity” 
– punishes “those habitually putting in place physical or psychological violence” against 
current or former spouses, or against persons who are or have been in “an analogous 
relationship also without cohabitation” – among other victims – with detention from six 
months to three years, as well as with the prohibition o detain or carry weapons from two to 
five years and eventually with the deprivation of parental rights, in addition to the 
punishments envisaged by specific provisions prohibiting the concrete acts constituting 
physical or psychological violence. Victims of domestic violence may obtain three main 
precautionary measures: the preventive detention of the alleged perpetrator pursuant art. 502 
ff. of the Criminal Code of Procedure, restraining orders ex art.48 of the Criminal Code and 
art.544-bis of the Criminal Code of Procedure, and the protection order pursuant art.544-ter of 
the Criminal Code of Procedure. 
 
The protections envisaged by Spanish immigration law, similarly to the case of Italy, relate 




general residence permit to be granted to victims of gender-based violence. As to the first 
aspect, art. 59(2)(b) of R.D. 557/2011 establishes that the reunited spouse or partner will be 
able to obtain an independent residence and work permit whenever he or she “is a victim of 
gender-based violence, once a judicial protection order has been issued in his or her favour or, 
alternatively, in presence of a report by the Public Prosecutor indicating the existence of signs 
of gender-based violence”. Moreover, this permit will also be accessible to “victims of a 
criminal offence for violent behaviour in the family environment”, always in presence of the 
mentioned protection order or Public Prosecutor’s repo t. Importantly, art. 59(3) also ensures 
that victims of gender-based violence will not be discouraged from reporting their situation 
for fear of jeopardising their children’s (or other family members’) residence status, or of 
having to renounce to enjoy family life with them. This provision indeed allows family 
members who have also benefited from family reunification to “maintain the residence permit 
issued to them” and provides that “they will depend, for the purpose of renewing residence 
permits on the grounds of family reunification, on the family member with whom they 
cohabit”. 
Another extremely positive provision for enforcing immigrant women’s freedom from 
domestic violence consists in art. 59(1) of the R.D. By regulating several possibilities of 
obtaining an independent residence permit for reunit d family members beyond “emergency” 
situations such as widowhood, separation or divorce, or domestic violence. This provision in 
my view strongly supports an equal relationship betwe n sponsors and reunited family 
members, which is also beneficial in terms of the prevention of domestic violence. Despite its 
narrow focus on purely economic requirements, this norm is worth mentioning. In particular, 
art. 59(1) allows family members to obtain independent permits whenever they are able to 
show sufficient economic means for the granting of a residence permit for non-lucrative 
purposes, or an employment contract with a minimum d ration of one year, or when they are 
able to comply with requirements established for the granting of residence and self-
employment permits.  
 
Immigrant women victims of domestic violence also enjoy a specific protection granted by 
art. 31-bis of L.O. 4/2000. This provision regulates the possibility for women experiencing 
gender-based violence to obtain a residence permit for exceptional circumstances regardless 
of their residence status. In case an immigrant woman irregularly residing on the Spanish 
territory reports a situation of violence, art. 31-bis(2) establishes that no procedure for her 




suspended and that eventual expulsion orders shall not be enforced. A provisional residence 
permit will be granted on the condition that a protection order has been issued in favour of the 
alleged victims, or in presence of a report by the Public Prosecutor indicating the existence of 
signs of gender-based violence. According to art. 130 of R.D. 557/2011, the residence permit 
for exceptional circumstances is valid for one year and can be renewed if the competent 
authorities assess that the reasons justifying its ranting are still present. Pursuant art. 133(2), 
this permit allows the holder to perform any kind of work (employed or self-employed) in any 
sector and without geographical restrictions within Spain.   
Similarly to its art.59(2), art. 132(2) of the R.D. also responds to the need to ensure that 
immigrant women’s family life with their children would not be undermined by their efforts 
to remove themselves from situations of violence and buse. Art. 59(2) indeed states that “at 
the moment of [her] application [for a provisional residence and work permit for exceptional 
circumstances] or at any subsequent moment during the criminal proceedings, the foreign 
woman, by herself or through a representative, may apply for a residence permit for 
exceptional circumstances in favour of her minor children, or for a residence and work permit 
for exceptional circumstances in case of adult children who are on the Spanish territory at the 
time of the report to the authorities”. 
It is important to note that residence permits for exceptional circumstances are granted to 
victims of gender-based violence pending criminal proceedings for the crimes that they have 
suffered and are issued with the aim of protecting he holders from abusive situations. Once 
these proceedings come to an end, their result will however influence the validity of said 
permits. Art. 134 indeed provides that if criminal proceedings end with a sentence against the 
perpetrator, or with a judicial decision from which it is possible to infer that the involved 
woman has been a victim of gender-based violence, a definitive residence and work permit 
will be issued in case the victim had applied for it (otherwise she will be informed of this 
possibility) and eventual proceedings against the victim will be archived. In the opposite case, 
whereas the criminal proceedings against the alleged perpetrator of gender-based violence 
would conclude with a non-condemnatory judgment or with a decision from which it is not 
possible to infer that the involved woman has been a victim of domestic violence, art. 134(2) 
provides that her eventual application for a residence and work permit will be rejected, 
provisional residence and work permits eventually issued to her will no longer be valid and all 
proceedings against her initially blocked or suspended will be initiated or continued.  
Ex art. 40(1)(j) of the R.D., the consideration of the national labour market’s situation for 




employment contract is pursued by women holding residence permits for being victims of 
gender-based violence. The possibility for victims of domestic or gender-based violence to 
convert their permits for exceptional circumstances into more stable work and residence 
permits – and thus the possibility to transition from a situation of victimisation and isolation 
to one of integration and empowerment – is also ensur d by art. 202 of R.D. 557/2011. This 
provision exempts holders of residence permits for gender-based violence who have been 
residing on the Spanish territory for at least one year to obtain a visa in order to access 
residence and work permits, or mere residence permits. Provided that the requisites 
established by art. 71 on the renewal of work and residence permits are satisfied, and that 
holders of said permits are authorised to work, they will be issued with residence and work 
permits. The same provisions will also apply, pursuant art. 202(4), to access to residence and 
autonomous work permits, to residence permits without authorisation to work, to residence 
and work permit for research reasons and to residence a d work permits for highly-qualified 
workers – provided that holders of permits for exceptional circumstances satisfy the 
respective legal requirements. 
 
I.  Spanish Rules on Immigrant Women’s Freedom from Domestic Violence: A 
Gendered Analysis in a Comparative Perspective 
 
Against the described normative background, it appers clearly that Spanish rules applicable 
to immigrant women victims of domestic violence form a comprehensive system of protection 
that presents several differences with respect to the Italian provisions on this matter. In 
relation to immigrant women holding residence permits for family reunification, Spanish law 
appears to constitute a more favourable legislation in comparison to the Italian context. The 
Italian legal system, indeed, does not offer equally clear opportunities to react to situations of 
domestic violence for women holding residence permits for the purpose of family 
reunification. If art. 12(3) of legislative decree n. 30/2007 at least envisages limited 
possibilities for family members of Italian or Unio citizens in this sense683, an utter lack of 
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clarity characterises the situation of victims of violence holding residence permits by virtue of 
being family members of third-country nationals. On a more general level, the broader 
possibilities to access independent permits for family embers holding permits for family 
reunification – with the observed positive effects especially on sex equality within migrant 
couples – beyond “emergency” situations as envisaged by Spanish law have no 
correspondence in the Italian order. The latter, indeed, exclusively grants third-country 
national spouses with an explicit possibility to convert residence permits for family 
reunification into other types of permit in case of widowhood, separation and divorce.  
 
Moving on to specific residence permits for victims of domestic violence, the permit for 
humanitarian reasons recently extended to this group by art. 18-bis of the T.U. appears to be 
different from the corresponding Spanish residence permit for exceptional circumstances in 
several ways. On the one hand, I would argue that Sp nish law offers a more effective 
protection whereby – in addition to the fact that under Spanish law criminal proceedings for 
gender-based violence may also be initiated by other individuals and not necessarily by the 
victim - it does not require an active role on the victim’s part beyond that of requesting a 
provisional residence and work permit during criminal proceedings against the alleged 
perpetrator. The Italian residence permit, instead, will be issued only where the present and 
actual danger for the physical integrity of the immigrant women involved constitutes “a 
consequence of the choice to subtract themselves from (...) violence or as an effect of their 
declarations in the context of preliminary investiga ons or criminal proceedings”. From this 
point of view, the Spanish solution appears as a more appropriate choice in that it does not 
require often traumatised and isolated individuals such as immigrant women experiencing 
domestic violence to comply with an abstract model of “deserving victim” – offering 
protection regardless of their active or passive attitude vis-à-vis situations of violence and 
abuse. Another positive feature of the Spanish legis ation that emerges in the comparison with 
the Italian regime concerns the possibility to grant provisional residence permits when the 
situation of violence is only suspected, and has yet to be ascertained in a judicial context. 
On the other hand, the Italian regime appears to be more comprehensive in the sense of 
allowing access to residence permits not only in the context of proceedings initiated to 
prosecute perpetrators, but in a variety of realms which – pursuant art. 18-bis(3) of the T.U. – 
also include interventions by anti-violence centres, local social services or social services 
specialised in assisting victims of domestic violenc . Even if in these cases the opinion of the 




that the granting of a residence permit for humanitarian reasons is not subordinated to the 
initiation of criminal proceedings (which may not be the preferred solution for immigrant 
victims due to psychological, economic or social and cultural reasons). The involvement of 
social services also constitutes an important featur , especially because their grassroots work 
among immigrant communities and society in general allows them to effectively detect and 
respond to situations of violence or abuse. 
 
The different contexts on which the two national regimes focus (the judicial context for 
Spanish law and the broader social realm for Italian aw) also bear consequences on the 
respective regulation of withdrawal of residence permits granted to victims. In the Spanish 
case, the provisional permit will be revoked only when criminal proceedings conclude with 
the acquittal of the alleged perpetrator or establish that the alleged violence has not taken 
place – whereas art. 18-bis of the Italian T.U. establishes that permits will be revoked in case 
of “conduct which is incompatible with the scopes of the permit itself” or when the conditions 
justifying its release no longer subsist. In this light, it appears that the Spanish rules expose 
immigrant women to the risk of losing the provisional residence permit if they fail to prove 
the violence and abuse suffered. In this respect, it must be noted that language and socio-
cultural barriers as well as, in some cases, the competent authorities’ stereotypical views 
towards them, may negatively influence immigrant women’s capability to obtain a judicial 
recognition of domestic violence684. The consequences of such a failure could be disastrous in 
that not only they would be deprived of provisional residence permits, but those irregularly 
residing in Spain would also risk expulsion from the national territory. Therefore, the 
described focus on the outcome of judicial proceedings may seriously discourage many 
immigrant women – especially irregular residents – from reporting their situation to the 
authorities and risking their residence rights. It has been argued that the risk implied in such a 
legislation is necessary to avoid false accusations of domestic violence being made by women 
looking to acquire residence permits and regularise their status685. However, I am of the view 
that the different solution advanced by the Italian system allows for an effective control of the 
genuine character of situations of abuse and violence without the drawbacks of the Spanish 
rules. The Italian regime’s openness to extrajudicial solutions indeed appears to be more 
                                                           
684
 PÉREZ, M., ‘Emergency Frames: Gender violence and Immigration Status in Spain’, 18(2) Feminist Economics 
265 (2012). 
685
 ALMENDROS GONZÁLEZ, M. A., ‘La mujer Extranjera Trabajadora Víctima de Violencia de Género’, in García 
Castaño, F. J., Kressova, N., (eds.), Actas del I Congreso Internacional Sobre Migraciones en Andalucía, Instituto 




gender-sensitive and more responsive to the specific d ficulties of immigrant women, 
although I have highlighted how the lack of clarity as to what would constitute “incompatible 
behaviour” or changed conditions incompatible with the scope of the permits may be very 
problematic in itself. 
Lastly, an important provision envisaged by Italian l w concerns the possibility to revoke 
residence permits and expel third-country national perpetrators of criminal offences connected 
to domestic violence ex art. 18-bis(4-bis)of the T.U. While Spanish law does not establish a 
similar possibility, in the next section I will discuss judicial examples of the interaction 
between fundamental-rights based argumentations and the enial of residence rights to third-
country national perpetrators of domestic violence.  
 
In sum, I would argue that – despite presenting some gendered shortcomings – the Spanish 
system for protecting third-country national immigrant women against domestic violence is 
well developed and quite comprehensive. Both in the case of being undocumented and in the 
case of holding residence permits for family reunification, immigrant women in Spain are 
offered many normative safeguards of their right to live free of violence.  
Fundamental rights in this field constitute an important reference for two main reasons. 
Firstly, as in the other aspects of family life discu sed in this chapter, the State’s obligation to 
protect fundamental rights underlies many relevant norms on gender-based violence. Ley 
Orgánica 1/2004 itself recognised in its Preamble that “gender-based violence (...) constitutes 
one of the most flagrant attacks on fundamental rights such as freedom, equality, life, security 
and non-discrimination established in our Constitution”. Its art. 17(1) also establishes a 
general equality and non-discrimination clause, whereby the rights recognised by the L.O. 
must be ensured to all women regardless of their origin, religion or any other personal or 
social circumstance – which may implicitly understood as including nationality686– while art. 
17(2) of the L.O. states that information as well as social and legal assistance to victims 
“contribute to the realisation and effectiveness of their constitutional rights to physical and 
moral integrity, to freedom and security and to equality and non-discrimination on the 
grounds of sex”. Fundamental rights have also influenced relevant reforms concerning 
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immigrant women’s freedom from violence. For instance, Ley Orgánica 10/2011687 modified 
art. 31-bis of L.O. 1/2004 in the sense of allowing irregularly staying immigrants to report the 
gender-based violence suffered without having an administrative proceeding initiated against 
them on the grounds of their irregular stay. This reform was explicitly motivated by the need 
to “prioritise the protection of women’s rights to physical and moral integrity, when they are 
subjected to gender-based violence, as well as their right to effective judicial protection, vis-à-
vis a sanction motivated by their irregular status”688.Secondly, fundamental rights were at the 
heart of the Spanish courts’ judicial reasoning in at least one aspect of domestic violence 
against immigrant women, which I will now move on to examine more closely: the denial of 
residence rights to perpetrators.  
 
II.  Influence of Fundamental Rights Law on the Denial of Residence Rights to 
Perpetrators of Domestic Violence  
 
Before Spanish courts, a compelling interaction betwe n competing fundamental rights is 
observable in relation to the pursuance of residence rights by perpetrators of domestic 
violence. In the examples that will be analysed in this section, perpetrators of domestic 
violence relied on fundamental rights established by the Spanish Constitution or by 
international human rights law to argue in favour of their right to reside on the Spanish 
territory.  
 
A first important case in this respect was assessed by the Audiencia Provincial of Madrid in 
2010689. Here, a foreign husband had been condemned by the Juzgado Penal of Madrid for 
repeatedly subjecting his wife to violence and attacking her physical integrity, and thus for 
breaching art. 153(1) of the Spanish Criminal Code. In addition to issuing a restraining order 
against him and depriving him of the faculty to own a d carry weapons, the Juzgado had 
sentenced the husband to one year of detention and h d established that this punishment 
would be substituted by his expulsion from Spain and the prohibition to return for ten years. 
At the time of this first judgment, art. 89(1) of the Spanish Criminal Code provided that all 
criminal penalties consisting in detention under six years against irregularly staying foreigners 
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would be substituted with expulsion from the Spanish territory, unless the competent judge or 
court exceptionally assessed that the “nature of the offence” justified the serving of a term of 
imprisonment in Spanish detention facilities. The refe ence to the nature of the offence had in 
the meantime been eliminated by L.O. 11/2003 on measures concerning domestic violence690. 
With the aim to provide criminal court judges with an adequate basis to substitute detention 
with expulsion and to “avoid that the sentence and its serving become a way to remain in 
Spain, thus radically undermining the sense of the entire legal order”691, the reform modified 
art. 89 in the sense that expulsion as a general rule could be changed into detention in Spain 
only when courts and judges “detect reasons” justifying this exception.  
Before the Audiencia Provincial, the convicted husband appealed against the judgment of 
the lower criminal court maintaining that the legal conditions for condemning him to 
expulsion rather than detention were lacking, and that he had not breached art. 153(1) of the 
Criminal Code because his actions were not “a manifestation of discrimination and 
dominance of a husband towards his wife”692 . The Audiencia responded to both 
argumentations on the grounds of fundamental rights. In fact, it was precisely on the grounds 
of fundamental and human rights that this court upheld in part the husband’s appeal. 
In this judgment, indeed, the Audiencia assessed that the reference to the nature of the 
crime by the old version of art. 89 of the Criminal Code had to be interpreted in the sense of 
requiring judicial authorities to consider “some other element that allows to evaluate whether 
to grant expulsion or, exceptionally, to proceed to serving the sentence in Spain”. Moreover, 
the court clarified that “these elements must necessarily be the circumstances of the fact and 
of the perpetrator”. In order to ground these considerations, the Audiencia recalled a previous 
judgment by the Tribunal Supremo where the expulsion of a third-country national man 
convicted for selling heroine, instead of his detention, had been assessed as contrary to the 
law also because it infringed his right to family life693. In particular, the Tribunal Supremo 
had observed that “the norms currently in force must be interpreted on the grounds of a 
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constitutional reading vis-à-vis the reality of the effects which said norms can produce on the 
fundamental rights of all persons – whether they are immigrants or not, illegal or not – 
recognised not only by the (...) Constitution but also by international treaties signed by Spain” 
and that pursuant art. 10 of the Constitution, fundamental rights “not only constitute 
applicable domestic law, but must also be interpreted in conformity with said Treaties and the 
ECHR’s case law”694.  
Against this background, the Audiencia established that the fundamental right to family life 
of the convicted husband should have supported an exceptional sentence to detention rather 
than expulsion, because several of his family members r sided in Spain – including his 
Spanish citizen mother as well as their regularly resident father and brother – and because he 
had been registered as a resident in the same city for more than nine years695. 
As to the husband’s objection that he had no discriminatory intent when committing 
violence against his wife, the Audiencia clarified that “according to wide legal experience and 
to international treaties signed by our country, gender-based violence constitutes the most 
cruel manifestation of a conception of women as subordinated to men, and as bound to 
obedience and submission within relationships”696. The refusal to include a supposed 
intention to discriminate within the constitutive elements of the crime of gender-based 
violence is perfectly in line with international human rights law and jurisprudence. From the 
CEDAW to the Istanbul Convention, and including theInter-American Convention of Belém 
do Pará, the construction of gender-based violence as sex discrimination has been 
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consolidated regardless of the discriminatory intent of the entity breaching said right (private 
individuals or the state)697. 
 
Despite the latter clarification, it appears clearly that in the discussed case the fundamental 
and human right to family life of the perpetrator allowed him to obtain a more favourable 
result, consisting in being allowed to pursue residnce rights once completing his sentence 
instead of being prevented from entering the country in which he had committed domestic 
violence for ten years. One may argue that grounding a more favourable interpretation of 
criminal law provisions on the basis of the fundamental right to family life of individuals 
convicted for intra-marital violence is a questionable endeavour, raising the question of 
whether expulsion orders may actually be considered as a disproportionate measure when the 
crime committed has precisely caused a disruption of the family realm. Assurances that 
fundamental-rights based argumentations by perpetrators would not be carried too far, 
however, have come from a subsequent judgment on domestic violence where the 
fundamental rights of victims were taken into stronger consideration.  
In 2012, the Tribunal Superior de Justicia of Castilla y León was submitted with the case 
of a husband convicted for domestic violence who pursued residence rights in Spain on the 
grounds of his fundamental right to enjoy family life with the victim herself698. More 
specifically, the applicant was a man from Morocco whose application for a residence permit 
for family members of Union citizens had been rejected due to his criminal record – which, 
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among other offences, included domestic and gender-based violence against his wife. The 
applicant opposed this decision, invoking “the principle of protection of the family pursuant 
art. 39 of the Constitution and the European Court f Human Rights”. 
In this case, the Tribunal decisively rejected the husband’s argumentation. It observed that 
the rejection of his application for a residence permit had to be upheld not only because it 
responded to public order and security reasons, but also due to the specific circumstances of 
the case. Indeed, “the applicant’s conduct [constituted] a real, present and sufficiently serious 
menace that affects a fundamental interest of society” 699. With specific reference to the 
perpetrator’s constitutional right to family life, the Tribunal held that the rejection did not 
constitute a breach of the principle enshrined in th s provision. The reason for this conclusion 
highlighted the sheer contradiction implied in the invocation of the constitutional principle of 
protection of the family by an individual who had himself harmed his family. In particular, 
the Tribunal rightly observed that “the nature of the committed offence of gender-based 
violence, which especially disgusts society, prevents the applicant’s claim from finding any 
legal ground in the recalled protection of the family, whose minimum rights, freedom, 
physical integrity, security, the dignity of his spouse, mother of the two minor children whose 
protection he invokes, he has failed to acknowledge in such a relevant way that it has brought 
to a criminal conviction for the offence of domestic violence”700. In further support of this 
point, the Tribunal recalled the Preamble of L.O. 1/2004 and its definition of gender-based 
violence as a breach of the fundamental rights to freedom, equality, life, security and non-
discrimination established by the Constitution. 
 
The judgments examined in this paragraph constitute a good example of how fundamental 
and human rights-based argumentations may be advanced not only by victims but also by 
perpetrators of domestic violence. When the latter incorporate fundamental rights in their 
legal strategies to pursue residence rights and oppose expulsion orders issued against them, 
the complexity and often the contradictions underlying situations of domestic abuse emerge. 
The fact that the fundamental right invoked by perpetrators concerns the constitutional 
principle of protection of the family highlights this contradiction even further, because these 
individuals pursue the enjoyment of a family life which they themselves disturbed with their 
violent behaviour. In the case of judgment no. 1273/ 012 by the Tribunal Superior de Justicia 
of Castilla y León, this contradiction was particularly evident, leading to a significant 
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reasoning on the conflict between the need to protect the victim’s fundamental right to 
physical and moral integrity and the perpetrators’ claims of violation of his fundamental right 
to family protection. Interestingly, this conflict was solved not merely by stating the 
prevalence of the former over the latter, but by highlighting that committing domestic 
violence against one’s wife and the mother of one’s children harms the whole family rather 
than “just” her physical and moral integrity and dignity, thus making the invocation of the 
constitutional principle of family protection in one’s favour a hollow argument. 
 
d. Overall Influence of Spanish Fundamental Rights Law on Immigrant Women’s 
Enjoyment of Family Life 
 
In the field of family life, the discussed provisions of Spanish law and the related case law 
suggest the presence of a manifold influence of fundamental rights on immigrant women’s 
family life in Spain. Interestingly, in the analysed judicial examples, fundamental rights-based 
analyses of Spanish norms produced both positive and negative outcomes in relation to the 
same aspect, i.e., the one breadwinner model. On the one hand, some of the discussed judicial 
examples suggest that the constitutional principle of protection of the family and of the 
fundamental right to family life can de facto translate into the imposition of a rigid distinction 
between productive and reproductive work within the family – with immigrant women 
disproportionately assigned to the latter – and of a ne breadwinner model. This was the case, 
for instance, of the examined case law concerning access to residence rights for parents of 
Spanish children, but was also confirmed by a judicial example regarding income 
requirements imposed by family reunification rules (judgment no. 1258/2012 by the TSJ of 
Castilla y León701). On the other hand, always in relation to income requirements, I discussed 
a meaningful example of disestablishment of the one breadwinner model on the very same 
constitutional grounds. This result was achieved by virtue of an alternative judicial 
construction of the family (as a whole rather than as the sum of individually-considered 
persons) which was much more sensitive to the different types of contributions to its 
wellbeing, including unpaid care work in addition to purely financial shares. 
This discrepancy offers further confirmation of the absolute importance of a gender-
sensitive interpretation of fundamental rights in order for the latter source to correct biased 
legal norms and their disparate impact on immigrant women. The judgments examined in the 
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context of domestic violence, on their part, suggest that such an interpretation is also crucial 
to realise a balance between competing fundamental rights that does not disproportionately 
and negatively affect immigrant women’s right to physical and psychological integrity.  
 
4. Immigrant Women’s Fundamental Rights in the Field of Employment: 
Problematic Provisions of Spanish Law 
 
In relation to immigrant women’s fundamental rights in the field of employment, two main 
aspects of Spanish law appear particularly interesting. The first concerns problematic 
immigration law provisions imposing either continuous employment or an active search for 
employment for the renewal of residence and work permits. The second aspect deserving 
attention concerns the legal protections available to immigrant women against discriminatory 
dismissal on the grounds of sex and migrant status. In this section, I will examine both by 
highlighting the main issues disproportionately experienced by immigrant women in these 
realms – as a consequence of legal norms themselves or of their judicial application –and 
discussing relevant judicial decisions where fundamental rights have indeed proved to 
constitute a positive reference. 
 
a. Immigrant Women’s Residential Stability and Legal Requirements Based on 
Continuous Work or Active Search for Employment 
 
Reconciling work and family life is disproportionately difficult for immigrant women in 
Spain in comparison to both their male counterparts nd Spanish women. On the one hand, 
indeed, immigrant women are often not immune to thebroader problem of unequal 
distribution of care and housework burdens between sexes. On the other hand, in comparison 
to citizen women, third-country national immigrants have fewer resources to rely on in order 
to alleviate such a burden. For instance, as foreigners they have restricted or no access to 
social assistance services. Moreover, living in a foreign country often prevents migrants from 
enjoying the support of family networks that would be available in the country of origin702.  
As a result of these issues, immigrant women experience disproportionate difficulties in 
maintaining continuous employment. Moreover, it hasbeen noted that the unequal bearing of 
care burdens pushes immigrant women to pursue more flexible employed activities, including 
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those in the informal sectors of the labour market, as a reconciliation strategy703. This, in turn, 
aggravates the higher precariousness already experinc d by immigrant women on the 
national labour market due to their concentration in sectors characterised by lower labour 
protections and low pays. In a vicious circle, such higher precariousness combines with 
disproportionate care burdens in pushing immigrant women to question whether 
reconciliation efforts may be worth it altogether, and thus to renounce employment more or 
less permanently and devote themselves entirely to reproductive and care work within the 
family704. 
 
In the light of these considerations, certain provisions of Spanish immigration law concerning 
the renewal of residence and work permits appear to be disproportionately difficult for third-
country national immigrant women to comply with. In particular, art. 38(6) of Ley Orgánica 
4/2000 and art. 71 of Real Decreto 557/2011 may constitute a problematic provision in this 
sense. 
Art. 38(6) of the L.O. lists the cases where the renewal of residence and work permits is 
admitted. In particular, renewal will be possible when the employment contract on the 
grounds of which the permit was initially granted persists or has been renewed, or when a 
new employment contract has been concluded, when the competent authorities have granted 
the holder of the permit with unemployment benefits, when the foreigner receives an 
economic social assistance benefit aimed at advancing his or her integration in society or in 
the labour market, or when “other circumstances envisaged by regulations subsist, and in 
particular, the prerequisites for the termination of employment contracts or suspension of the 
employment relationship as a consequence of being a victim of gender-based violence”.  
Art. 71 of R.D. 557/2011 specifies the rules established by art. 38(6) of the L.O. In 
particular, its paragraph 2 clarifies all the hypotheses in which residence and work permits 
may be renewed. Obviously, renewal is possible when t  holder shows that the employment 
relationship that justified the initial concession f the permit is still in existence. If this 
condition is not satisfied, art. 71(2)(b) and (c) envisage two main possibilities. Firstly, in case 
the holder is able to prove that he or she has “habitu lly carried out the employed activity on 
the grounds of which the initial permit was granted for a minimum of six months per year”, 
renewal will be possible if a new employment contract “which complies with the characters of 
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the work permit” has been concluded with a different mployer, or if the holder has concluded 
a new contract that complies with the requisites establi hed by art. 64 of the R.D. for the 
initial granting of a residence and work permit. Secondly, in case the worker has carried out 
an employed activity for less than three months per year, the renewal will be granted if he or 
she can prove three cumulative conditions: that the employment relationship on which the 
initial residence and work permit was grounded has come to an end “for reasons beyond his or 
her will”, that he or she “has actively searched for employment, by enrolling as a jobseeker in 
the Servicio Público de Empleo” 705 and that at the time of application he or she has signed “a 
valid employment contract”. 
In addition to these hypotheses, art. 71(2) of the R.D. establishes that renewal will be 
accessible to those receiving unemployment benefits or social assistance benefits pursuant art. 
38(6)(b) and (c) of the L.O. and to victims of gender-based violence ex art. 38(6)(d) of the 
L.O. Lastly, art. 71 also allows the renewal of permits in two exceptional circumstances, i.e., 
when the applicant has worked for at least nine months out of twelve or for eighteen months 
out of twenty-four, the last employed relationship came to an end for causes beyond his or her 
control and he or she has actively sought employment, as well as when the applicant’s spouse 
or partner satisfies the economic threshold necessary for the purpose of family reunification 
with him or her.  
 
A reading of the described legislation in the light of immigrant women’s difficulties in 
reconciling work and family life, and of the employment precariousness disproportionately 
experienced by this group, suggests that the insistence of Spanish immigration law on 
continuous work (or at least on an active search for employment) as a precondition for 
renewing residence and work permits undermines this category’s access to residence rights in 
conditions of equality and non-discrimination with men. This is in my view also suggested by 
judicial examples concerning immigrant women applicants who submitted their specific 
difficulties precisely in complying with similar requirements. 
From the outset, it must be observed that in several instances fundamental rights law was 
completely absent from applicants’ claims and the competent courts’ analysis equally. 
Interestingly, such cases were also those where the applicants’ argumentations were most 
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often rejected by said courts. The Tribunal Superior de Justicia of the Comunidad Valenciana 
was one of the earliest judicial authorities to face the discussed issue. In judgment no. 
823/2011706, the Tribunal was submitted with the case of a third-country national woman who 
opposed the authorities’ decision not to grant her a renewal of her residence and work permit 
because she had failed to work for a sufficient number of days pursuant art. 54(3) of R.D. 
2393/2004, neither had she actively sought employment as required by art. 54(4) of the 
R.D.707. In support of her claim that the authorities’ refusal was contrary to the law, the 
applicant submitted that during the two years of validity of her permit she had given birth to 
two children, which explained the rescission in advance of her employment contracts or the 
denial of their extension. She also highlighted that she had in fact sought new employment 
and that she would have been employed as a seasonal d mestic workers had she not been 
denied with the renewal of her permit. Regrettably, the Tribunal deemed these allegations to 
be irrelevant in consideration of the fact that the applicant had not substantiated her 
statements with proof.  
Nonetheless, not one month passed before the same Tribunal was submitted with an 
essentially identical case. In judgment no. 874/2011708, this court assessed the case of a third-
country national woman whose application for the renewal of her residence and work permits 
had been denied by administrative and judicial authorities because she had failed to satisfy the 
requirements of art. 54(3) and (4) of R.D. 2393/2004. Among other argumentations, the 
applicant stressed that the denial was disproportiona e in the light of the fact that she had 
interrupted her employment relationship and had not actively sought employment because her 
child suffered from a chronic illness and she had to take care of him for six months. In 
response, the Tribunal simply stated that notwithstanding the applicant’s allegations 
concerning her child’s sickness, her case had been rightly assessed in first degree – where the 
competent judge had concluded that “her leave due to (...) her son’s sickness [was] not 
decisive for the purpose of obtaining the requested permit”709, dismissing her claim. 
A similarly dismissive attitude of immigrant women’s specific difficulties in satisfying 
continuous work requirements can be found in judgment no. 166/2013 by the Tribunal 
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Superior de Justicia of Las Palmas710. Here, a Nigerian woman appealed against the Spanish 
authorities’ rejection of her application for the renewal of her residence and work permit with 
the motivation that she had failed to comply with art. 71(2) of R.D. 557/2011. In particular, 
the applicant submitted that she had only worked for one day during the validity of her initial 
permit because she was pregnant and because her generally bad health conditions persisted 
even after giving birth. Therefore, she had been prevented from working for medical reasons 
completely beyond her will. In the applicant’s view, the disregard by the competent 
authorities of the reasons behind her failure to work constituted a wrongful evaluation of 
proof. Once again, this argumentation was not upheld by the competent court. The Tribunal 
indeed observed that “beyond the clinical profile in relation to her pregnancy, what is certain 
is that in the two years of validity of the work and residence permit [the applicant] carried out 
any kind of employed activity, whether continuous or not, related or unrelated with the 
granted work permit”711 and rejected her claim. 
 
In sum, in the examined judgments the applicants’ claims were mostly based on a supposedly 
wrongful evaluation of proof because of the authorities’ failure to incorporate their specific 
difficulties in such an assessment. These difficulties were deemed irrelevant by courts 
presented with a similar argumentation. However, I am of the view that the applicants’ 
argumentations in these judicial examples – which were strictly connected to maternity and 
childcare issues – epitomise very well the disparate impact of continuous work or “active 
search” requirements. By rejecting these argumentatio s, the competent courts performed a 
gender-blind assessment that failed to take into account the disproportionate difficulties 
experienced by immigrant women in this field. As a result of the application of identical 
standards to immigrant men and women, in these judicial examples the effects of indirect 
discrimination of the norms at issue in relation to immigrant women’s access to residence 
rights were further reinforced.  
 
In the mentioned cases, however, fundamental rights were not mentioned at all, leaving the 
question of their transformative potential in this area open. In this respect, helpful hints as to 
the possible role of fundamental rights in supporting a more gender-sensitive implementation 
of the biased norms at issue may be paradoxically provided by two judicial examples on the 
                                                           
710
 Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Islas Canarias, Las Palmas (Sala de lo Contencioso-Administrativo, Sección 
2ª), sentencia no. 166 of 5 June 2013. 
711




same matter originated by claims raised by immigrant f thers. In these cases, indeed, the 
applicants did ground their claims on the multi-level system of fundamental rights protection 
in force in the Spanish legal order. Furthermore, th  response of the competent courts to this 
judicial strategy offers important cues as to the potential of fundamental-rights based 
discourses to unveil the disparate impact of certain norms on immigrant women specifically.  
A crucial effect of the applicants’ reliance on fundamental rights law, indeed, was that the 
focus of the competent courts visibly shifted from the strictly objective approach adopted in 
the previously examined cases to a more subjective perspective. As I have stressed above, all 
the available judicial examples of this phenomenon originated from applications brought by 
migrant fathers712. A first interesting example in this area is constituted by judgment no. 
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 The available judgments in applications brought by immigrant mothers are not equally pertinent for the 
purpose of this section because they concerned mothers of Spanish children and were therefore focused on 
the latter’s right to reside in Spain.  
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freedoms. Second, the fundamental rights to family life enshrined in art. 18 and 19 of the Spanish Constitution 
also prevented “the denial of the renewal of the applicant’s permit, because the protection of the child’s rights 
to residence and to family life established in articles 18 and 19 of the Constitution (...) would be frustrated in 
this case if the mother from which the child depends would be deprived of her work and residence permit” 
(Ibid., § 4 of Legal Grounds).  
In another example, the Tribunal Superior de Justicia of Madrid exemplified the gendered shortcomings of 
fundamental-rights approaches recognising immigrant women’s residence rights strictly on the basis of their 
role as carers of Union citizen children, which I have discussed elsewhere in this thesis (for instance in the 
section of this chapter devoted to family life, or in my analysis of the gendered shortcomings of European 
family migration law carried out in Chapter 2). In its judgment no. 826/2010 (Tribunal Superior de Justicia de 
Madrid, Sala de lo Contencioso-Administrativo, Sección 9ª, sentencia no. 826 of 13 July 2010), indeed, it is 
possible to observe a compelling effort by a Senegalese worker and mother of a Spanish child to advance an 
argumentation against the authorities’ refusal to renew her work and residence permit which was based on her 




388/2012 by the Tribunal Superior de Justicia of Burgos713. The applicant in this case was a 
father of three who claimed that he had been “forced to renounce to his job (...) in order to 
take care of the children, since the employment circumstances of his spouse made it more 
difficult for her to renounce to her job”714. He opposed the authorities’ rejection of his 
application for a renewal of his residence and work permit under art. 54(4) of R.D. 
2393/2004, arguing that he had in fact stopped working for reasons beyond his will as 
required by this provision. The Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, argued that the applicant 
had stopped working “without any reason”715. 
The applicant’s argumentation in this case constitutes one of the first traceable attempts to 
recall fundamental and human rights law by an unemployed migrant parent pursuing the 
renewal of a residence and work permit. Differently from the previously examined judgments 
on the same matter, in this case the applicant referred to the “need to take into consideration 
what can be extracted from various provisions with reference to the right to family life, a right 
that is overlooked when denying the permit”. More sp cifically, he recalled “articles 18 and 
39 of the Constitution (...), articles 5 and 18 on the Convention on the Rights of the Child (...), 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Unfortunately, the argument chosen by the applicant in this case was destined to fail, since it contrasted with 
principles that had been well established by the Spanish Constitutional Court. In the case at issue, in particular, 
the applicant extensively relied on her fundamental right to equality ex art. 14 of the Spanish Constitution to 
argue in favour of the renewal of her permit. Instead of focusing her argumentation on her child’s right to 
reside in Spain as a citizen of this country, she submitted that the denial of the permit because she had failed to 
work for the minimum period established by the law implied “a discrimination on the sole grounds of being a 
foreigner, and put her in an unjustifiable position of inequality with respect to Spanish women with Spanish 
minor children, because the denial of the possibility to work meant that she was prevented from attending her 
Spanish child’s care and upbringing needs in conditions of equality with Spanish mothers of Spanish children” 
(Ibid., § 2 of Legal Grounds). 
What is more, the applicant also submitted that as the mother of a Spanish minor, she was obliged under art. 
39 of the Constitution to provide him with care and support and that “by denying her with a work permit, she 
[was] being discriminated with respect to Spanish mothers of Spanish citizens because the latter can exercise 
their rights to care for and raise their children [and] because they are allowed to work, while [the applicant 
was] prevented from providing to her Spanish child’s needs by being denied with a work permit and being kept 
in an irregular status”(Ibid., § 3 of Legal Grounds).  
In the light of the clarifications offered by the Constitutional Court with judgment no. 107/1984 (Tribunal 
Constitucional Sala Segunda, sentencia no. 107/1984, cit.), the Tribunal conceded that the applicant could not 
be excluded from the constitutional principle of equality only because she was a foreigner. However, the 
Tribunal also considered that the applicant invoked a constitutional right for which a differential treatment was 
admissible if and when established by the law, i.e., the fundamental right to work enshrined in art. 35 of the 
Constitution. Thus, the Court assessed that because L.O. 4/2000 establishes several preconditions for the 
exercise of the right to work by foreigners, the applicant could not invoke a discrimination when she had been 
treated differently due to her failure to comply with said requirements. The same logic applied to the right to 
family life granted by art. 39 of the Constitution. Therefore, the Tribunal dismissed the applicant’s claim.  
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[as well as] articles 8 and 14 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of 1950”. 
While such an attempt did not prompt the Court to uphold the applicant’s claims716, it is 
possible to observe that the fundamental and human rights recalled at least encouraged it to 
look more closely into the personal circumstances of the involved persons. Regrettably, the 
resulting assessment after this closer look echoed that of the Strasbourg Court in the Haydarie 
case. In particular, unpaid care work was considered by the Tribunal as a decision to stay 
inactive, as a lesser alternative to productive work. In its judgment, the Tribunal held that 
“there is no doubt that other ways of caring for the c ildren can be found, without the need to 
leave one’s job, considering that both parents are employed” and even interpreted the 
expression “for reasons beyond the worker’s will” as strictly confined to the employment 
realm717. As a consequence, the failure of the applicant to fulfil the legal requirements for the 
purpose of obtaining the renewal of his residence and work permit was framed by the Court as 
a consequence of his own choices. 
At this point, two main observations can be made. On the one hand, judgment no. 
388/2012 suggests that resting one’s application on fundamental and human rights law has the 
potential to attract courts’ attention to one’s personal circumstances. Arguably, this is an 
extremely positive effect from our point of view, considering that one of the main sources of 
gender bias within national immigration law is precis ly the lack of consideration of the 
specific circumstances and difficulties experienced by immigrant women in the host country. 
On the other hand, it must be noted that bringing courts to consider the personal situation of 
the applicant does not guarantee at all that such a onsideration will occur in a gender-
sensitive way. Although judgment no. 388/2012 concer ed an applicant father, it appears 
clearly that the Tribunal’s assessment set a judicial precedent that disproportionately and 
negatively affects immigrant women. I have indeed rpeatedly stressed that care burdens 
disproportionately weigh on this category. 
 
Another telling judicial example of fundamental rights-based argumentations is provided by 
the subsequent judgment no. 2567/2012 by the Tribunal Superior de Justicia of Granada718. 
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In this case, the human rights recalled by the applicant encouraged a judicial assessment that 
not only took into account his personal difficulties, but also resulted in a positive outcome for 
him. Nonetheless, the logic of the Court was still very much grounded on the primacy of paid 
employment over unpaid care work. A closer analysis of the case will clarify this point. 
Before the Tribunal, the applicant argued that the applicable law had been wrongfully 
interpreted by the competent authorities. In support of this view, he submitted that art. 54(4) 
had to be interpreted in a flexible way, i.e., “beyond the literal interpretation of the law, and in 
consideration of subjective circumstances such as the applicant’s sustenance possibilities and 
the fact that four minors are in his care, and thate latter have a right to his guardianship and 
to family protection pursuant articles 9, 10-1, 18 and 27 of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, ratified by Spain through the ratification order [instrumento de ratificación] of 30 
November 1990 (BOE of 31 December 1990)”719.  
This time, the reaction of the competent court to the applicant’s invocation of human rights 
law was utterly positive. The Tribunal assessed on the one hand that the administrative and 
judicial authorities had denied the renewal by simply stating that the applicant had not showed 
that he had worked for at least three months, basing this evaluation on uncertain facts. On the 
other hand, and most importantly, the Tribunal held that “the applicant could not have 
possibly stayed inactive because he was in charge of caring for his four children, and in case 
he lacked employment, he must have actively sought it” 720. In the Tribunal’s view, a similar 
evaluation should have necessarily been carried out by the competent authorities in the light 
of the “international treaties on the protection of minors and family unity, as invoked in the 
appeal”721. Ultimately, the Tribunal took up what had been alre dy affirmed by the Tribunal 
Superior de Justicia of Castilla y León i  relation to the need to consider personal 
circumstances when assessing applications for the ren wal of residence and work permits, and 
made a step further in consolidating this principle. It thus concluded that “the residence and 
dependent work permit, especially when renewal is at sue, must be granted in consideration 
not merely of objective circumstances such as the employed activity and its duration, but also 
of the subjective conditions of the worker, such as in this case his family or social rootedness, 
avoiding that this concession can be converted in a request of full occupation ahead of the 
current labour market situation of our country”722. 
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Against this background, it appears clearly that what was valued by the Court in this case 
was not the applicant’s eventual care responsibilities, or his difficulties in balancing work and 
family life. Rather, the Court focused on the presence of four dependent children to infer that 
the applicant could not possibly have remained “inactive”, in the sense of not performing or 
pursuing paid employment. Once again, the consideration of paid employment as the epitome 
of activity (and the implicit consideration of care work as a choice to stay inactive) was 
reinforced by judicial authorities. In connection to this, the applicant father’s obligations 
towards his children were framed as purely financial: h ving dependent children (“menores a 
su cargo”) only meant that he had to provide for them economically. In the judgment at issue, 
no mention was made of a mother, or of any other relativ , despite the fact that the Court 
referred to “other people” cohabiting with the father and the children.  
 
In the last two judicial examples, the applicants opposing the authorities’ denial of a renewal 
of their residence and work permit were migrant fathers. In judgment no. 388/2012, the 
traditional gender roles in relation to the distribut on of productive and reproductive work 
between men and women were actually reversed. Nonetheless, these judgments are still 
relevant from the specific point of view of immigrant women. One of the aspects at stake, 
indeed, was the judicial recognition of specific difficulties experienced by any person bearing 
the majority of care burdens within his or her family. The competent courts failed to grant 
such a recognition. Instead, they reproduced the well-known trope qualifying paid 
employment as an activity, and unpaid care work as, consciously chosen, inactivity. The fact 
that such an assessment was carried out on the grounds of human and fundamental rights, and 
despite the closer attention to the applicants’ personal circumstances prompted by their 
invocation, is significant. It suggests that human and fundamental rights law do not offer 
guarantees of a gender-sensitive interpretation of immigration law, and that these sources 
themselves may be understood in a gender-insensitive manner. In fact, in the mentioned 
judgments the rights and duties of parents to provide for their children’s care and upbringing 
as recognised both by the Spanish Constitution and by international human rights law were in 
my view interpreted in a strongly gendered way. In both cases, indeed, I would argue that the 
competent courts framed such rights and duties of the applicant fathers in a purely economic 
and financial manner. It is not possible to conclude with certainty that a similar interpretation 
would not have been carried out had the applicants been immigrant mothers. What is however 
certain in my view is that constructing these care obligations as encompassing both paid and 




less strict (and arguably more gender-sensitive) interpretation of the Spanish rules on 
residence and work permits, whereby unpaid care work ould have been considered as an 
objective burden for immigrant workers and thus as a “reason beyond their will” for the end 
of an employment relationship723. Secondly, because applicant fathers were involved in these 
cases, this judicial interpretation would have also encouraged a more equitable distribution of 
productive and reproductive work within migrant households by recognising unpaid care 
work performed by fathers as a legitimate reason for their temporary lack of employment. 
 
In sum, the applicants’ calls for fundamental and human rights law were not a sure gateway to 
access residence and work permits, nor did they prom t a correction of the gendered 
shortcomings observed in Spanish rules on the renewal of residence permits. Nonetheless, a 
comparison between the group of judgments where fundamental rights were not recalled by 
the applicants and those where they were unveils some interesting features. Argumentations 
based on fundamental rights consistently prompted judicial analyses that were more careful to 
examine the specific situation of the individual applicants involved. This did not always result 
in the upholding of their claims, and much less in a gender-sensitive judicial interpretation of 
the norms at issue. However, this effect of fundamental rights is still remarkable because all 
gendered shortcomings observable in rules applicable to migrants ultimately stem from a lack 
of consideration of their specific needs and difficulties both as women and as migrants.  
The analysed judicial examples, therefore, suggests that fundamental-rights based claims 
may be employed as an effective judicial strategy to prompt a contextual interpretation of 
certain biased norms, with the objective of unveiling their disparate impact on immigrant 
women. The importance of a contextual interpretation f r women affected by multiple 
burdens (and in particular for women of colour) was already stressed by feminist scholars 
such as Mari Matsuda724, Martha Minow and Elizabeth Spelman725. Their arguments in 
support of the adoption of a legal and jurisprudential approach careful to consider not only the 
specificities of individual cases, but also the broader patterns of differentiation that connected 
individual applicants to a broader context of exclusion, appear particularly pertinent for our 
purposes. They suggest that a contextual interpretation in judicial contexts may effectively 
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prompt a recognition of the indirect discrimination produced by the discussed norms on 
immigrant women. The examined judicial examples suggest that fundamental rights-based 
claims have the power to encourage similar interpretations, and that this strategy should be 
further pursued.  
 
b. Discrimination Against Immigrant Women Workers and Access to Justice 
 
Third-country national immigrant women living and working in Spain experience a variety of 
specific difficulties in the workplace, many of whic  are ascribable to inherent features of the 
labour market sectors in which they concentrate. In this section I will focus on the labour 
protections which immigrant women may be able to access directly on the grounds of 
fundamental rights recognized by the Spanish Constitution.  
In particular, I will analyse two issues: workplace discrimination and access to justice for 
migrant domestic workers. The first aspect concerns the single-based or intersectional 
discrimination disproportionately experienced by third-country national immigrant women – 
on the grounds of sex, nationality, ethnic origin, migrant status and so forth – in their host 
country, including in the work realm. The issue of access to justice, on its part, stems from the 
rigid public/private distinction underlying certain norms regulating domestic work. Although 
the Spanish context is no exception to the generally low availability of judicial examples of 
enforcement of fundamental rights in crucial areas for immigrant women workers, I have 
chosen to focus on these matters because they have been involved in interesting judicial 
examples offered by Spanish courts.  
 
I.  Protection Against Workplace Discrimination 
 
Pursuant arts. 53(4) and 55(5) respectively of the Spanish Workers’ Statute, dismissals for 
objective and disciplinary reasons are invalid if carried out during pregnancy, or during the 
suspension of employment contracts for maternity or maternity–related issues726, or after the 
worker has resumed its employed position after the end of this period. Furthermore, 
dismissals will also be invalid if they are motivated by any ground of discrimination 
prohibited by the Spanish Constitution or the Spanish law, or when they breach workers’ 
fundamental rights and freedoms.  
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Besides unlawful dismissal, the Spanish Workers’ Statute envisages several protections 
against discrimination on the workplace. First and foremost, art. 4(2)(c) of the Statute 
includes the right to non-discrimination – on the grounds of sex, marital status, age, racial or 
ethnic origin, social status, religion, political orientation, sexual orientation, union 
membership or language – among the basic rights recognised to all workers. The prohibition 
to discriminate is also specifically established in relation to access to work (art. 16), 
employment relationships (mostly between employer and employees, ex art. 17), access to 
professional training (art. 23), upward employment mobility (art. 24), pay (art. 28) and 
dismissal (arts. 53 and 55). With respect to relationships between employees, art. 54(2)(g) 
provides that any worker committing sexual harassment or harassment on the grounds of 
racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, sexual orientation or sex, towards the 
employer or co-workers, will carry out a contractual breach. Therefore, his or her employment 
contract may be terminated by the employer provided that this breach is considered “serious 
and intentional”. 
 
The described normative framework appears especially relevant given that the economic crisis 
not only exacerbated the labour precariousness already disproportionally experienced by 
immigrant women, but also increased instances of discriminatory behaviour towards 
immigrants in general in the workplace. In particular, cases of what has been defined as 
“employment xenophobia” have been observed with more frequency, together with the 
multiplication of hostile behaviour towards migrants, perceived by national workers as rivals 
in the effort to secure and maintain a job727. Arguably, women migrant workers are the most 
exposed to discrimination in the workplace in comparison to both citizen women workers and 
to immigrant men, due to the fact that many of their f atures may constitute grounds for 
unlawful differential treatment: sex, race and ethnic origin, language, nationality, migrant 
status, residence status, and so forth. As they are often placed at the intersection of two or 
more of these grounds, their risk of suffering from single-ground, multiple or intersectional 
discrimination is further heightened. In addition to this, such grounds can generate structural 
barriers that prevent them from fully accessing lega  protections theoretically recognised to 
them by the law. This, in turn, will give rise to unequal employment relationships and may 
seriously undermine immigrant women’s possibility to oppose unlawful dismissal – thus 
breaching their fundamental right to equality and non-discrimination on the grounds of sex in 
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the field of employment. One of such hurdles, which will be examined here, relates to 
language barriers hindering immigrant women’s understanding of the rights recognised to 
them by the law. 
In the light of these observations, it appears clearly that immigrant women’s possibility to 
enjoy the legal protections envisaged by this framework are strongly dependent on courts’ 
readiness to recognise the complex forms of direct or indirect discrimination which they may 
suffer on multiple or intersecting grounds. It its therefore crucial to understand whether 
Spanish Court have so far interpreted constitutional principles of formal and substantial 
equality (as well as provisions of Spanish law specifying these principles) in ways that 
allowed them to offer an effective protection of immigrant women workers against 
discrimination. Useful hints in this sense have been provided by two examples of judicial 
responsiveness to phenomena of multiple or intersectional discrimination within the 
framework of art. 14 of the Constitution. 
 
As to my first example, a recent judicial decision where the actual capability of the described 
system to effectively respond to the complex issue of discrimination against immigrant 
women workers was put to test is judgment no. 8384/2012 by the Tribunal Superior de 
Justicia of Catalonia728. The case concerned the disciplinary dismissal of a worker after he 
had verbally attacked another worker with offences related to the latter’s sex as well as her 
migrant status and national origin (Cuban). Among other complaints, the dismissed worker 
had argued before the Tribunal that his behaviour cld not be considered as a serious and 
intentional act of discrimination. More specifically, he maintained that the lower court had 
overlooked the context in which his behaviour had taken place and the fact that he alleged to 
have been provoked by the victim.  
In response, the Tribunal preliminarily recalled the fundamental right to equality and non-
discrimination on the grounds of sex to affirm that “the expressions used by the applicant (...) 
[were] literally offensive and [revealed] an intentio  not only to offend, but also to denigrate 
the female condition of the offended person, which affects not only the right to honour, but 
also the right to non-discrimination on grounds of sex, with derogatory references to the 
origin of the offended person”729. Then, the Tribunal moved on to consider that the 
applicant’s offensive behaviour was sufficiently serious and intentional to justify a 
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disciplinary dismissal pursuant art. 54(2)(g). Even setting aside the lack of acceptable 
justifications from the subjective point of view, indeed, “the expressions which the applicant 
addressed to his co-worker were, from an objective point of view, (...) sufficiently offensive 
to her honour and personal dignity”730. Therefore, the Tribunal upheld the disciplinary 
dismissal of the applicant. 
Despite its isolated character and the lack of avail bility of similar judgments in this field, I 
would argue that the judicial reasoning carried outby the Tribunal in this case is quite 
significant for our purposes. In this judgment, thefundamental right to equality was used as a 
fruitful basis to argue that offences directed at female co-workers and based on their sex 
constitute an attack on their dignity and can justify disciplinary dismissal. Even more 
importantly, the multiple grounds on which the victim was targeted (being an immigrant, 
being Cuban, being a woman) did not obscure each other in the Tribunal’s analysis, but were 
considered as a whole motive for the offences at issue and for the purpose of assessing the 
gravity of the applicant’s discriminatory behaviour. This open attitude on the Tribunal’s part 
is also appreciable, in that it shows how broad constitutional principles may effectively adapt 
to immigrant women’s peculiar experiences of discrimination (single-ground, multiple and 
intersectional) and ensure a sensitive implementation of the protections envisaged by the 
Workers’ Statute with respect to immigrant women workers. 
The importance of a judicial awareness of multiple discrimination in the workplace is also 
suggested by judgment no. 8133/2009 of the Tribunal Superior de Justicia of Catalonia731, 
concerning the case of an immigrant woman working for a cleaning company who had been 
dismissed during pregnancy, due to alleged complaints from a client concerning the 
unsatisfactory quality of her work. Despite the fact that art. 55(5)(b) of the Workers’ Statute 
clearly establishes the invalidity of all dismissals carried out during pregnancy, the company 
had the worker sign an agreement where it merely admitted to unfair dismissal and made a 
sum available to her as compensation and as severance pay. The lower court had therefore 
declared the dismissal invalid, importantly assessing that the agreement could not have any 
value also because “the foreign worker did not prope ly understand its terms”732.  
The company turned to the Tribunal, challenging thelower court’s judgment and 
maintaining that the agreement should have been considered as having releasing effects. The 
Tribunal’s response is extremely interesting for oup rposes. The judgment at issue, indeed, 
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constitutes a good example of an interpretation of norms applicable to immigrant women 
workers not simply in a gender-sensitive perspectiv, but also in a way that takes into account 
the specific difficulties experienced by them both as women and as migrants in their 
employment relationships. What is more, such an interpretation was spurred by the 
consideration of fundamental rights enshrined in the Spanish Constitution. 
Firstly, the Tribunal considered that the termination of the employment contract had not 
occurred on the grounds of an agreement between the company and the worker but as a 
consequence of the unilateral decision of the company to dismiss her. The existence of an 
agreement merely indicated that the company aimed at settling on the consequences of the 
dismissal in order to avoid a lawsuit. Secondly, the court established that “the dismissal [was] 
radically invalid due to its violation of art. 14 of the Constitution concerning the non-
discrimination of women, in its projection on pregnancy”, and it had therefore breached art. 
55 of the Workers’ Statute733. In fact, the Tribunal recalled that “women workers’ isk of 
losing their employment as a consequence of maternity probably constitutes the most 
important problem – together with the pay gap – for the effectiveness of the principle of non-
discrimination between sexes within employment relationships”734. Spanish law consequently 
envisages reinforced guarantees for the protection of pregnant workers, which enjoys “a clear 
constitutional relevance”735. For instance, dismissed pregnant workers are not required to 
prove that the employer knew about the pregnancy. In this context, the Tribunal recalled not 
only the fundamental right to equality and non-discrimination, but also the fundamental right 
to personal and family life enshrined in art. 18(1) of the Constitution as well as women 
workers’ right for the protection of their health. 
Importantly, the Tribunal applied these general principles to the individual situation of the 
immigrant worker involved by taking into account her specific difficulties as a foreigner 
working in Spain. From the outset, it conceded that an agreement which substituted the 
general rule of readmission of the worker with the payment of compensation is admissible in 
theory. The consequences of the invalidity cannot indeed be extended to imposing 
readmission to a worker who assesses that this solution is not adequate for his or her own 
interest. In the specific case at issue, however, th  Tribunal considered that these conditions 
were not observable, because the agreement was concluded “without a full understanding on 
the workers’ part – who what is more was also a foreign immigrant – on an illegal ground set 
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by the employer”736. Therefore, the Tribunal rejected the employer’s claims and upheld the 
lower court’s decision to declare the agreement as void of any effect.  
 
This judgment constitutes in my view an extremely positive example of how fundamental 
rights may be used to reinforce the legal protections available to immigrant women workers 
by shining a light on eventual specific barriers they may find, as women and as foreigners, to 
the enjoyment of workers’ rights. Here, indeed, theTribunal rightly detected language 
barriers that in this specific case prevented it from concluding that the worker had signed the 
agreement because she had assessed that receiving compensation corresponded to her best 
interest. I would argue that a similar sensitivity directly stemmed from the fact that the 
ultimate aim of the legislation at issue was that of pr tecting women workers’ fundamental 
right to equality and non-discrimination. In relation to non-discrimination on the grounds of 
sex, it is quite clear that all of the principles rcalled by the Tribunal responded to the need to 
ensure an effective enjoyment of this constitutional right. Thus, the general possibility for 
women workers to opt for compensation instead of reintegration in their previous position 
after an invalid dismissal during pregnancy responds to the need to avoid that a principle 
established for their protection may produce negative consequences for them. If, in other 
words, women workers assess that the continuation of the employment relationship does not 
respond to their best interest because it would prolong the conflict “due to the definitive 
interruption of personal relationships”737 with the employer – and possibly give rise to furthe  
discriminatory treatment – they should be able to conclude a similar agreement. In the 
specific situation of the immigrant woman involved in judgment no. 8133/2009, however, the 
Tribunal recognized that an effective realization of her fundamental right to sex equality had 
not occurred because she had failed to understand all of her legal possibilities and thus she 
had not been able to make an informed choice. This observation also recalls other grounds of 
disadvantage beyond sex, i.e., language and migrant st tus. The Tribunal’s view whereby as a 
migrant worker she had specific difficulties in understanding the terms and the consequences 
of the agreement suggests an important judicial awareness of the unequal enjoyment by 
immigrant women workers of the protections established by the Workers’ Statute. This 
unequal enjoyment demanded a specification to the gen ral rule allowing the choice between 
reinstatement and compensation, and prompted the courts’ conclusion that the agreement had 
to be considered void of any effect. 









II.  Access to Justice for Migrant Domestic Workers in Private Households  
 
Mirroring the Italian context, domestic work in Spain is a highly feminised sector in which 
immigrants predominate738. Domestic work constitutes an important route of first entry and 
lies at the heart of the regularisation strategies of immigrant women in Spain739. In this sector 
of the Spanish labour market, however, immigrant women workers experience many of the 
specific disadvantages characterising this type of employment and linked to the private 
character of their relationship with employers.  
In fact it is precisely the peculiarities of domestic work that were recalled in the Spanish 
legal order as the main justification for a separate regulation of this profession. Indeed, 
domestic work in Spain is not regulated by the Workers’ Statute but rather by the Real 
Decreto 1620/2011740. Its Preamble observes how the specific features of domestic work 
“justify the need for a different regulation than tha  of the common labour relationship”. The 
Preamble, in particular, identifies two peculiarities. The first relates to “the realm where the 
activity is carried out, which is the family household, strictly linked to personal and family 
intimacy and entirely alien to the common denominator of employment relationships, which 
are carried out in the context of productive activities led by the principles of market 
economy”. The second peculiar feature identified by the Preamble lies in the related “personal 
ties based on a special trust relationship presiding over the employment relationship between 
the head of the household and the household workers from its very beginning, a relationship 
which must not necessarily be present in other types of employment relationships”. 
 
The normative characterisation of domestic work as a special type of employed activity in the 
Spanish legal order is thus motivated by continuous references to the personalised and 
intimate quality of the employment relationship as well as of the workplace. However, as I 
have shown in chapter 1 while discussing the Strasbourg Court’s case law on freedom from 
labour exploitation, carrying out an employed activity in the private and intimate realm of the 
household may severely isolate the workers – especially live-in ones. In the case of migrant 
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workers, this isolation may be further aggravated by their migrant or foreigner status. With 
specific reference to immigrant women in the domestic work sector, it has been noted that the 
inherent invisibility of this type of work also makes women workers in this sector, especially 
immigrant ones, equally invisible from a social, economic and legal point of view741. 
Among the perverse effects generated by the features of domestic work identified by 
Spanish law, in this section I will focus on the particularly crucial matter of access to judicial 
protection. A commonly observed problem, in particular, concerns the difficulty to carry out 
labour inspections in private households employing domestic workers due to the obligation to 
respect employers’ fundamental rights such as the right to private life or the principle of 
inviolability of the domicile742. In relation to this matter, law 36/2011743 provides at art. 76 
that labour inspections may be carried out in workplaces coinciding with private domiciles 
against the employer’s will (or when there is a risk of opposition on his part) only in presence 
of a judicial authorisation, also “in order to allow for any other means of inspection or control 
which may affect fundamental rights or public freedoms”.  
 
Thus, the described issue does not simply constitute ye  another example of the specific 
barriers disproportionally experienced by immigrant women to their enjoyment of work-
related rights – in this case, because of the perverse ffects of the private character of their 
employment relationships. This instance also provides a good example of the perverse effects 
that fundamental rights law itself may produce on immigrant women employed as domestic 
workers. This may occur whenever employers’ fundamental right to privacy prevails over 
immigrant women workers’ fundamental right to access justice, including for the protection 
of their right to be free from exploitation – since barriers to labour inspections may also 
negatively affect domestic workers’ possibility to prove situations of exploitation to which 
they have been subjected in private household, especially when such a relationship has been 
carried out informally 
A compelling example of how this contrast between competing fundamental rights may 
play out in a judicial context has been recently offered by the Tribunal Superior de Justicia of 
Andalucía with judgment no. 126/2013744. In this case, an undocumented immigrant woman 
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from Cuba experienced the problem of proving her informal employment as a domestic 
worker in the context of a judicial opposition against her dismissal. Before the court of first 
instance, she had in fact succeeded in her efforts t  prove the existence of her employment 
relationship notwithstanding the lack of a written contract with her employer, and she had 
obtained a judicial recognition of the inadmissibility of her dismissal.  
Her employer, however, had turned to the Tribunal pursuing a revision of the factual 
assessment carried out by the lower court in its judgment. In particular, she contested the very 
existence of an employed relationship between her and the immigrant woman involved. She 
maintained that she had simply hosted the alleged worker in her home, under the 
understanding that she would provide the latter with board and keep in exchange for her 
company. Most importantly, the applicant held that the worker had not submitted irrefutable 
proof that she had been employed as a domestic worker. In fact, the alleged employee had 
brought to the lower court’s attention several facts that suggested the existence of an 
employment relationship, but none of them actually constituted conclusive proof in this sense. 
For instance, she had submitted letters written by her parents in which they thanked the 
employer for taking their daughter into her home and expressed the hope that she would be 
treated well. Moreover, she had presented bank documents attesting a regular income until the 
date of the dismissal, as well as a card from a social centre attesting that she was searching for 
a job.  
In this respect, the Tribunal carried out an extremely sensitive reasoning, considering the 
proof presented by the alleged employee in the light of her specific difficulties as an 
undocumented domestic worker employed in a private environment. More specifically, the 
Tribunal observed that “the special employment relationship of domestic workers owes its 
special character, among other things, to the subjects of the employment contract – 
individuals and families rather than companies – as well as to the place where the work is 
carried out, i.e., the family household, in cohabittion with persons that are not (...) considered 
a company in the colloquial sense of the word”745. On these grounds, the Tribunal rightly 
assessed that “the submission of irrefutable proof is difficult to accomplish, because this 
relationship lends itself to situations of familiarity, and because the workplace is located in 
the domicile of another person, in the light of the principle of inviolability of the latter 
established by the Constitution, which hampers inspections and even union activity”746.  
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Thus it was the constitutional principle of inviolability of the domicile that lay at the heart 
of the Tribunal’s conclusions. On the one hand, its judgment did not undermine this principle 
at all. The Tribunal strictly confined itself to analysing the problem of the value of the 
submitted proof rather than the domestic workers’ right to receive labour inspections in the 
household where she worked in order to obtain irrefutable proof of the existence of her 
employed activity. Thus, no principle was established with respect to the correct balance 
between the employer’s constitutional right to domicile inviolability and the worker’s 
fundamental right to be free from labour exploitation. On the other hand, the Tribunal 
mitigated the perverse effects of the principle of domicile inviolability by reaching a 
conclusion whereby the specificities of domestic work cannot simply justify a separate 
regulation – and the often implied lesser labour protections – but must also prompt a 
mitigation of general rules applicable to workers. In this case, therefore, the Tribunal 
concluded that “in the light of this situation, the irrefutable proof demanded by the [employer] 
as the only one capable of supporting the [worker’s] claim, emerges as practically impossible 
to present, and therefore those elements which will make up the judge’s conviction (...) will 
rather be indications, presumptions and an assessment of the whole proof in its entirety”747. 
Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that the lower court had rightly assessed the existence of an 
employment relationship on the grounds of the facts submitted by the applicant domestic 
worker and ruled in favour of the latter. 
 
Judgment no. 126/2013 constitutes an isolated yet significant example of the fact that 
fundamental rights-based claims for the recognition of interests competing with those of 
immigrant domestic workers may not necessarily reinforce the perverse effects of the 
extremely private character of the latter’s employment relationships. In fact, when interpreted 
on the grounds of an organic view of the situation of disadvantage often experienced by 
domestic workers, fundamental rights may support a judicial correction of these perverse 
effects. In this case, for instance, the judicial refe ences to the constitutional principle of 
domicile inviolability actually shed light on the normally invisible situation of isolation 
experienced by domestic workers, and worked in favour of the initial applicant – pushing for 
the recognition of her specific difficulties in gathering proof of the existence of her 
employment relationship. 
 







c. Overall Influence of Fundamental Rights Law on Immigrant Women’s 
Enjoyment of Workers’ Rights 
 
The judgments examined in this section have provided examples of the positive role that 
fundamental rights may play vis-à-vis gendered shortcomings observable in the structure or 
the application of certain norms of Spanish law. At the same time, the discussed decisions 
also confirm that a gender-sensitive interpretation of fundamental rights is crucial in order to 
prevent this source itself from further reinforcing these shortcomings.  
Positive examples in this sense were constituted by the cases concerning employment 
discrimination. Here, it emerged clearly that immigrant women’s possibility to fully enjoy 
legal protections against discrimination in the workplace on an equal footing with citizen 
women (and to effectively enjoy their fundamental right to non-discrimination on the grounds 
of sex) is also strictly related to a judicial awareness of other forms of discrimination on 
intersecting or combining grounds, such as language and migrant status. Another interesting 
aspect emerging from the analysed case law concerns the capability of fundamental rights to 
fruitfully interact with each other in order to produce positive results for the immigrant 
women workers involved. In the case concerning sexist and racist attacks towards a Cuban 
employee, I observed how the court’s connection betwe n the right to honour and dignity of 
the discriminated worker and her right to sex equality prompted a judicial recognition of the 
legitimacy of a disciplinary dismissal against the discriminating worker. The risk that 
fundamental rights themselves may disproportionally nd negatively hamper immigrant 
women’s enjoyment of workers’ rights was also confirmed in relation to access to justice for 
domestic workers. Here, the analysed judgment offered an interesting example of 
interpretation of the constitutional principle of inv olability of the domicile sensitive to the 
specific difficulties experienced by domestic workers in proving the existence of their 
employment relationship.  
Useful cues concerning a possible legal strategy to pursue judicial interpretations of both 
fundamental rights and national norms in the light of immigrant women’s specific difficulties 
were provided by the examined cases on continuous employment or “active search” 
requirements. On the one hand, this area was not immune from judicial discourses 
perpetuating the breadwinner assumption of the discussed norms – and reinforcing their 
disparate impact on immigrant women’s access to residential stability in conditions of 




discourses encouraged a contextual interpretation of biased norms by the competent courts. 
Arguably, this constitutes a positive result in itself, due to the great potential of a similar 
approach to shine a light on immigrant women workers’ multiple barriers to an effective 
enjoyment of rights and entitlements theoretically recognised to them by Spanish law. 
 
In the examined judgments, it is possible to observe that even when fundamental rights-based 
argumentations were not powerful enough to justify a ruling in favour of the immigrant 
women workers involved, at the very least they prompted a judicial analysis that was 
significantly more attuned to the peculiarities of the individual case. This, in turn, allowed 
competent courts to recognise the specific difficult es experienced by immigrant women in 
enjoying workers’ rights – marking a first step towards the enjoyment of said rights in 
conditions of equality and non-discrimination. What is more, this equalising effect was 
produced with respect to both citizen women (for example in relation to access to legal 
protections against unlawful dismissal during pregnancy despite language barriers) and 
immigrant men (as for instance in the examined judgments concerning care burdens versus 
continuous work requirements).  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter, I discussed several provisions of Spanish law that are in my view particularly 
relevant from the perspective of immigrant women working and residing in Spain. In the 
realm of family life, the majority of these norms were subsequently reformed, while in the 
field of employment these norms are still in force. In this respect, the gender bias of the norms 
highlighted in this chapter can be ascribed to two main problems. Interestingly, these 
problems correspond to what I observed with reference to the Italian case study. A first source 
of perverse, gendered effects of specific Spanish rules applicable to immigrant women is the 
lack of normative consideration of the specific difficulties and burdens that this category 
experiences. For instance, I have discussed how the previously in force legal requirement 
whereby immigrants had to submit an employment contract in order to sponsor family 
reunification disproportionally hindered immigrant women’s possibilities to enjoy family life 
in Spain. Another fitting example in this regard are the current strict legal prerequisites of 
continuous employment or active search for employment for the purpose of obtaining the 





Against this background, the aim of this chapter was to enquire into the effects of the multi-
level system of protection of fundamental rights in force in the Spanish order on the observed 
shortcomings. While the lack of a substantial case l w on significant issues for immigrant 
women suggests that a sweeping assessment of such an imp ct would be farfetched, the 
examined judicial examples prompt several insights. Fir tly, much of the observable impact of 
fundamental rights on legal norms in crucial areas of immigrant women’s family life and 
employment concerned their reinforcement or conversely their disestablishment of the one 
breadwinner model implied or allowed by these norms. Thus, the Spanish case study 
reproduces a feature that was already revealed in the previous chapters, both at supranational 
and national level. The fact that fundamental rights law, and in some cases the very same 
constitutional provisions, may alternatively enforce or overturn a deeply gendered 
breadwinner model suggests that the judicial interpretation of this source is key for immigrant 
women’s enjoyment of their rights in the field of family life and employment. This was 
further confirmed by the observation of examples of judicial balance between competing 
fundamental rights, which presented a high risk of producing an indirect discrimination 
against immigrant women in relation to protection against domestic violence and access to 
justice for the recognition of their rights as workers. Therefore, a gender-sensitive judicial 
interpretation of fundamental rights emerges as an indispensable prerequisite for the 
capability of this source to effectively expose and correct gendered shortcomings of rules 
applicable to immigrant women. 
In relation to perspectives for future development, a crucial effect of fundamental-rights 
based claims in some of the examined examples was that of prompting a contextual judicial 
interpretation of the norms at issue. This, in my view, suggests a strong future potential of 
fundamental rights to prompt gender-sensitive interpretations of domestic rules. In particular, 
the very fact that fundamental rights-based discourses encouraged a judicial consideration of 
the situation of the specific applicants not as isolated individuals, but as individuals in context, 
suggests that this can constitute a fruitful judicial strategy to shine a light on the factual and 
legal barriers to immigrant women’s enjoyment of their rights in the field of family and 
employment in conditions of equality and non-discrimination – and thus to unveil the indirect 











This thesis originated from the observation that law, nd primarily – but not exclusively – 
immigration law, can disproportionally and negatively affect immigrant women’s access to 
their rights and entitlements in conditions of equality and non-discrimination in the fields of 
family life and employment. My aim was to verify whet er European human rights law has 
thus far constituted an effective ground to contrast thi  disparate impact, as well as to test its 
potential and shortcomings in this regard. Therefore, in this thesis I carried out a twofold 
research. A first layer of my inquiry consisted in delving into the specific gendered 
shortcomings of European and national immigration law and of other legal sources applicable 
to immigrant women. Then, a second and most important layer of research concerned the rich, 
continually evolving, and multilevel human and fundamental rights framework in force in 
Europe. In this context, I explored the judicial impact of this framework vis-à-vis ostensibly 
neutral but essentially biased norms applicable to immigrant women living and working in the 
European legal space. 
On a general note, my research reveals that there is no definite answer to the question of 
whether human and fundamental rights law enjoys a supposedly inherent capability to 
effectively unveil and contrast the gender bias of legal norms applicable to immigrant women. 
Human and fundamental rights per se are neither infallible tools of analysis, capable of 
automatically prompting a gender-sensitive interpretation or implementation of legal norms, 
nor are they inevitably useless or even harmful sources. By analysing meaningful examples of 
their judicial application to crucial aspects of immigrant women’s rights in the fields of family 
life and employment at supranational and national level, the most consistent lesson that I have 
learned concerns the fact that human and fundamental rights law can alternatively serve to 
contrast or to reinforce gendered shortcomings of legal norms applicable to this group. In this 
respect, their judicial interpretation emerged as an essential aspect for either result.  
Among the shortcomings of European human and fundamental rights law observed 
throughout this thesis, the one that best illustrates the importance of interpretation concerns 
the fact that this source was used by national and supranational courts to alternatively reject 
and reinforce deeply gendered and indirectly discriminatory models enforced by legal norms 
applicable to immigrant women. In fact, and at all levels of my analysis, the reinforcement of 




rights were used to legitimise the legal and judicial imposition of abstract models of “good 
mothers”, or of a one-breadwinner family, or of a family based on a rigid and gendered 
distinction between productive and reproductive work. Interestingly, the indirect 
discrimination that resulted affected immigrant women both in comparison to immigrant men 
and with citizen women, because these models were not only deeply gendered but also dated– 
and thus no longer imposed on national women (or no lo ger imposed with the same 
intensity). 
 
In this light, a key question concerns what strategies should be pursued in order to steer 
judicial interpretations of human and fundamental rights away from reproducing the gendered 
shortcomings of legal norms applicable to immigrant women. I believe that an important 
answer to this question concerns one specific featur  hat was observable in the most 
successful judicial examples examined in this thesis, i.e., the capability of human and 
fundamental rights to prompt a contextual interpretation of legal norms applicable to 
immigrant women. At both supranational and domestic level, indeed, a judicial awareness of 
the disparate impact of specific norms on immigrant women was prompted by the 
consideration of the applicants not as isolated indiv duals, but rather as individuals in context. 
Interestingly, this context may be constituted by the society as a whole as was the case of the 
Abdulaziz et al. judgment before the ECHR, or of the judicial examples concerning 
continuous work requirements in the Spanish case study, or with the family, as was the case 
of the ECJ case law on carers’ access to residence rights, or of the judicial examples 
concerning carers’ access to family reunification examined in the context of the Italian and 
Spanish case studies. Even more importantly, some of the discussed examples revealed a 
judicial analysis of immigrant women in the context of domestic law as a whole, which 
allowed competent courts to unveil how certain violati ns of immigrant women’s rights 
stemmed from the interaction of norms traditionally assigned to different legal realms. This 
type of assessment, for instance, was carried out by the ECHR in the Rantsev judgment, or by 
the Italian Court of Novara in the judicial example concerning immigrant women’s access to 
legal protections against domestic violence. Despit the rarity of similar cases, I argue that 
this perspective is extremely valuable because it allows competent courts to capture 
immigrant women’s complex experiences of discrimination and exclusion as a consequence 
not of factual difficulties but of legal factors. In the mentioned examples, for instance, only a 
consideration of the involved immigrant women in the context of the broader legal system 




domestic criminal laws against violence and exploitation were rendered moot by apparently 
neutral norms of immigration law, or by apparently neutral interpretations of said norms by 
the national authorities.  
 
Arguably, the analysis carried out in this thesis suggests that the described contextual 
interpretation is neither a necessary consequence of fundamental rights-based judicial claims, 
nor an automatic trigger of judicial recognition of the disparate impact of certain norms on 
immigrant women specifically. In connection to this I want to stress that while in the Rantsev 
judgment and in the Spanish judicial example the recognition of human and fundamental 
rights violations resulted from a contextual interpr tation of problematic norms of 
immigration law, the disparate impact on immigrant women produced by the latter remained 
in the background. In other cases, such as the ECJ case law on carers and the judicial 
examples from the Spanish case study concerning continu us work requirements, the 
contextual interpretation carried out by competent courts on the grounds of human and 
fundamental rights did not even prevent the perpetuation of discriminatory legal tropes such 
as the rigid distinction between productive and reproductive work and the one-breadwinner 
model.  
The cases in which, conversely, the contextual interpretations triggered by human and 
fundamental rights realised their full potential to unveil the disproportionate and negative 
effects of certain legal norms on immigrant women were those involving the judicial 
assessment of possible violations of the right to equality and non-discrimination, in 
conjunction with other rights. This was the case, for instance, of the Abdulaziz et al. 
judgment, and of the judicial examples from the Italian case study concerning immigrant 
women’s access to sponsorship of family reunification on the grounds of unpaid care work 
and to protection against domestic violence. Here, indeed, the contextual interpretation carried 
out by competent courts on the grounds of immigrant women’s right to enjoy their human and 
fundamental rights in conditions of equality with both immigrant men and citizen women 
prompted a judicial recognition of the disparate impact on this group stemming from the legal 
enforcement of gendered models or from a harmful interaction of norms from different legal 
realms. Thanks to the adoption of this point of view, human and fundamental rights law 
constituted an effective ground to recognise the indirect discrimination suffered by the 
involved immigrant women as a consequence of gender-i s nsitive norms or of a gender-




In sum, contextual judicial interpretations of biased norms applicable to immigrant women 
in the light of their fundamental right to equality and non-discrimination should be further 
encouraged, not only for the beneficial effects produced thus far in individual judicial 
examples, but also because of its potential for development in other fields. Its capability to 
highlight the many forms of subordination and disempowerment experienced by immigrant 
women within the family, the host society, and the host country’s legal system, indeed, makes 
this approach fruitfully applicable to all of the observed shortcomings in the fields of family 
life and employment equally.  
 
In conclusion, human and fundamental rights law emerges from this thesis as a powerful tool 
of protection for immigrant women in the European legal space, but also as a possible ground 
of reinforcement of heavily gendered legal discourses. In order to fully realise the positive 
potential of the multi-level and synergic system of human and fundamental rights protection 
in force in the European legal space, it is crucial to develop effective strategies capable of 
encouraging a gender-sensitive interpretation of this source by supranational and national 
courts. The perspectives opened by my analysis encourage further investigation into the 
ongoing and future developments in human and fundamental rights law in the field of gender 
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